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B r o w n 1 
Demon ic F ic t ions: Cybernetics and Postmodern ism 
A l is ta i r B r o w n 
Wh i l s t demons are no longer v iewed as l i teral beings, as a metaphor the demon 
continues to t ra i l ideas about doubt and t ruth, s imulat ion and real i ty , in to post-
Enl ightenment culture. Th is metaphor has been revi ta l ised i n a contemporary per iod that 
has seen the dominance o f the cybernet ic parad igm. Cybernetics has produced technologies 
o f s imulat ion, wh i ls t the posthuman (a hyb r i d construct ion o f the self emerging f r o m 
cul tural theory and technology) perceives the w o r l d as part o f a c i rcu i t o f other 
in format iona l systems. I n this thesis, i l lustrat ive f i lms and l i terary f ic t ions posi t a 
connect ion between cybernet ic epistemologies and metaphors o f demonic possession, and 
contextual ise these against postmodern thought and its narrat ive modes. 
Demons mark a return to pre-Enl ightenment models o f knowledge, so that demonic 
(d is)s imulat ion can be seen to describe our encounters w i t h ar t i f ic ia l others and v i r tua l 
wor lds that ref lect an uncerta in ly const i tuted and unstable self. B y jux tapos ing Renaissance 
not ions o f the demon w i t h Donna Haraway 'ร posthuman " c y b o r g , " psychoanalyt ic demons 
w i t h the robots o f the science f i c t i on f i l m Forbidden Planet (1956)， and Descartes' 
"dece iv ing d e m o n " w i t h A l a n Tu r i ng ' ร ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence test, I propose that the demon 
proves a fluid, mul t iva lent trope that crosses h is tor ica l and d isc ip l inary boundaries. The 
demon raises epistemological questions about the relat ionship between real i ty, human 
psychology, and the representation o f both in other modes, par t icu lar ly narrat ive f ic t ions. 
W h e n this f ramework is appl ied to seminal science f i c t i on (2001: A Space Odyssey 
and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? [both 1968])， convent ional readings o f cyborgs 
as monstrous Others have to be revised. These f ic t ions are engaged w i t h cybernetic 
technologies w i t h an epistemological rather than onto log ica l concern, and consequently 
lend themselves to the k i n d o f sceptical doubt about real i ty that characterises postmodern 
thought. Contrary to Descartes, w h o sees foundat ional t ru th tiirough the deceptions o f his 
"dece iv ing demon, " later f i lms l i ke Blade Runner (1982) and The Matrix (1999) use the 
m o t i f o f cybernetic technologies to h igh l igh t the inescapabi l i ty o f the postmodern 
cond i t ion o f the hyperreal . F ina l l y , however , l i terary f ic t ions l i ke Umber to Eco 's 
Foucault's Pendulum (1988) and A . S . B y a t t ' s A Whistling Woman (2002) and Possession 
(1990) draw attention to their narrat ive mechanisms through meta f ic t ion , and set the 
creat ion o f l i terary meaning against computer-generated texts. Consequent ly 1 they defy 
both the determin ism o f cybernet ic sciences, and the postmodern pretence that the " r e a l " is 
i r recoverably evasive. 
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A c k n o w l e d gements 
I n the course o f researching this thesis, I encountered a story i n 1001 Nights i n 
w h i c h a character goes about w i t h his dest iny wr i t ten on his forehead. A s I wr i te this page 
- at the forehead o f this thesis, at the end o f its fate - 1 cannot help but feel an uncanny 
a f f in i t y w i t h that character. For i t seems to me that when some one has had parents 
prepared to read h i m The Hobbit f i ve t imes over w i thou t compla int , to r un the cheapest o f 
tax i services, and to keep the f inest o f hotels; when some one has g rown up w i t h 
grandparents w h o have dedicated their t ime and money to his educat ion; when that 
foundat ional school ing leads to a univers i ty l i ke D u r h a m , w h i c h later invests conf idence 
and money i n h i m through a Doctora l Fe l lowsh ip ; and when the Ar ts and Humani t ies 
Research Counc i l funds the two subsequent years o f research; when a l l these tracks have 
been la id out , then happy endings seem somehow inevi table, and it is as much b y fortune 
as j udgmen t that such a some one - m y o w n self - is s i t t ing now w r i t i n g these words. Bo th 
l i tera l ly and f igurat ive ly , this page contains the on l y personal note o f this thesis. 
Every th ing that fo l l ows has been dependent on the guidance, support and educat ion o f 
others. 
Hav ing said that, i t is on ly w i t h h indsight that m y p lo t seems so neatly concluded. 
T i m e and again as I p lodded m y w a y through this research, jus t when I seemed to have the 
reading done and a chapter sealed, I f ound myse l f lead astray by a demonic voice o f great 
humour and wa rmth , but o f unerr ing cunning. Over the past tíiree years, Professor Patricia 
Waugh has o f fered me numerous prompts and insights that I m igh t not otherwise have 
reached. W i t h o u t her input , this w o u l d have been f in ished long ago. W i t h i t , i t is in f in i te ly 
better than i t m igh t otherwise have been. I am immensely grateful for her guidance and 
support. I am also grateful to al l staff, academic and administrat ive, o f the Department o f 
Engl ish Studies, in part icular for he lp ing w i t h m y research proposals and pro l i fera t ing 
appl icat ion forms. Professor Cor inne Saunders o f fered carefu l ly pointed comments on the 
Renaissance contexts o f chapter 2 . 1 was also saved by m y exorcist, Beth Harmon, who 
carefu l ly proof-read and teased out the devi ls in the detai l . Natura l ly , any that remain are 
sins o f m y o w n . 
F ina l l y , i f this thesis has possessed me for the past three years, for ensuring that m y 
reason has been a l lowed to sleep i n the evenings w i thou t produc ing monsters, I owe most 
to m y fr iends and fami l y . I n part icular, Cfe is has l istened to me grumble over numerous 
mugs o f tea. Stephen and Lesley have prov ided the comfiest o f cottages, on the edge o f the 
cobweb-b low ing moors. A n d , more than anyone, He len cont inual ly reminds me that the 
most v i ta l destinies are, at the end o f the day, not wr i t ten on paper. 
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Chapter 1. Possessing Narrat ives: F ic t ional Games ana Cybernetics 
In а narrow corr idor cast in an electr ic blue hue, a survei l lance camera pivots and 
zooms to observe the p i le o f charred robots l y i ng at your feet. As you glance up, 
v ic tor ious, you recognise that the puls ing red ir is o f the camera w h i c h is po in t ing d o w n at 
you signif ies that its con t ro l l ing consciousness is s t i l l , f rustrat ingly, al ive. The camera is 
the eye to the soul o f Shodan, the spaceship's computer system w h i c h has somehow 
evolved f r o m its programmed routines to become conscious, operat ing now w i t h al l the 
unpredictabi l i ty that comes o f emot ion. Its voice issues f r o m speakers as you stare into the 
camera, taunt ing you that one wave o f attacks is over for n o w , but the next move in an 
inscrutably complex strategy is about to take place. A t root the female vo ice o f a mere 
housekeeping automata, Processing U n i t 43893， it is now spit ted w i t h static and p i tch-
adjusted to m i m i c a mascul ine tone. Its sexual hyb r id i t y eroticises an ent i ty that crosses 
comparable boundaries separating the mechanical too l and the sentient l i fe f o rm . A n d 
behind Shodan'ร taunts lies a strange af fect ion: even as Shodan wants to destroy you to 
prove her (his? its?) super ior i ty to humans, she needs you to bear witness to her rise to 
consciousness. 
But i f you were able to pause the waves o f enemies Shodan despatches, silence the 
trance- l ike soundtrack, and escape f r o m her incessant survei l lance, i f you were able to take 
a step out o f the game and watch yoursel f p lay ing , you m igh t note that you have a s imi la r ly 
paradoxical relat ionship w i t h the computer. Shodan'ร one weakness is that she cannot 
assault you d i rect ly but must possess robots and human cyborgs, wh i ch sometimes 
mal func t ion ; destroying Shodan should prove the power o f your self-contained, embodied 
consciousness. O n the other hand, master ing the game requires that you become even more 
l i ke the ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, a mental process concentrated pure ly on the second l i fe 
behind the screen. Y o u are a cyborg w o r k i n g through the med ium o f the personal 
computer. Y o u are possessed b y the ghost ly presence o f the machine. 
The Ghost in the Mach ine: The Cybernet ic M e d i u m 
W h o , then, is cont ro l l ing w h o in this narrat ive, a pastiche o f the суЬефипк role-
p lay ing game, System Shock 2? 1 C lear ly i t is not a one-way correspondence between the 
embodied player and his or her avatar; m y sl ippery second-person " y o u " wh i ch refers 
indeterminately to the d ig i ta l character and the physical p layer reflects the uncertainty o f 
1 System Shock 2, vers. 1 (Cambr idge, M A : L o o k i n g Glass Studios, 1999). 
B r o w n 6 
subject iv i ty here ᅳ indeed, i t m igh t apply also to you , dear reader, momentar i l y assuming 
that you too are p lay ing the game, m y game, o f pro ject ing your m i n d into an imaginary 
w o r l d through the m e d i u m or interface o f pr int . A l t h o u g h such sel f - ref lex ive relat ionships 
between the textual and the cybernet ic appear presently i n this argument, let us fo r now 
keep it s imple, and attend on ly to the relat ionship between the physical player and his 
d ig i ta l avatar. 2 A l t hough according to the p lot the gamer is reasserting his antJiropocentric 
contro l over errant technology, in actual i ty his encul turat ion into the v i r tua l env i ronment 
requires h i m to con fo rm to the standards o f a comparable system to that w h i c h he aims to 
destroy. 
In the very early stages o f the game, when l i fe on the space station seems norma l , 
Shodan maternal ly guides the player, exp la in ing the dynamics o f mo t i on and act ion in the 
v i r tua l w o r l d in her soothing, femin ine voice. The player learns the keyboard mappings 
that a l low h i m to wa l k , leap, crouch, s w i m , f ight ; Shodan also explains how to cyborg the 
avatar through using mechanical augmentations and neural st imulants, and how to interface 
w i t h the cyberspace computer terminals w i t h i n the computer game in a recursive p lunge 
deeper into the system. Thus the f u l l dynamics o f act iv i ty are unrestr icted by the b io log ica l 
l imi tat ions o f the p layer 'ร o w n body, and the game p lay ing experience is l iberat ing. 
However , the key to success involves the player acknowledg ing that he cannot defeat the 
errant Shodan in any way other than by accommodat ing h imse l f to the contro l system she 
has prev iously la id out. Th is is evidenced tíirough the keyboard ing o f thought. The cardinal 
points o f the v i r tua l geography are mapped onto the four cursor keys, but there is a f i f t h 
element required i n p lay ing that is not needed in real i ty. I n embodied l i fe , the process o f 
mov ing in three dimensions essential ly is the process o f interact ion; exercised p r imar i l y 
through the hands, to w o r k w i t h the physical w o r l d is s imp ly to intercept arms and f ingers 
w i t h the structure one consciously wants to manipu la te . 3 F r o m the behavioural perspective, 
thought can be inferred f r o m the " in tent ional stance" extrapolated f r o m an agent'ร bod i l y 
For s imp l ic i t y , and because games p lay ing remains a male-dominated 
entertainment, I use the mascul ine here, wh i ls t recognis ing that i t m igh t apply to either 
gender. 
3 Raymond Ta l l i s celebrates the hand as " the master too l o f human l i fe . The bra in 'ร 
most versati le and inte l l igent l ieutenant, the master grasper, i t is s imp ly ungraspable." 
Raymond Ta l l i s , The Hand: A Philosophical Enquiry into Human Being (Ed inburgh: 
Edinburgh U P , 2003) 22. 
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mot ions and vocal expressions. I n the game w o r l d , however , the dimensions o f movement 
are not enough log ica l ly to coordinate m i n d and body. Instead, usual ly mapped through the 
mouse but ton, the " in terac t " command in fonns the computer that thought has been 
happening i n the m i n d o f the player and must be recognised and translated into the game 
envi ronment through a programmed heur ist ic . 5 The player, for example, looks at a camera 
and pressing the but ton causes h i m to shoot i t ; or he looks at an access pad on a locked 
door, and pressing the but ton activates a key he ld i n the inventory. Thought is extracted 
f r o m the p layer 'ร m i n d and interpreted by the computer. Press the mouse to s ign i fy that i n 
real l i fe you are th ink ing o f us ing explosives to b l o w up the locked door i n the v i r tua l 
envi ronment , and no response w i l l be fo r thcoming . I n part, successful p lay ing l ies i n the 
abi l i ty to predict wh i ch part icular heurist ic w i l l be invoked in any part icular circumstance, 
and though the player appears to possess f reedom o f movement and cogn i t ion , there is 
essentially on l y one programmed path to comple t ion , w i t h autonomy an i l lus ion sustained 
by narrat ive craf t . 
Cogn i t i on in this case cannot be v iewed as tak ing place i n the p layer 'ร b ra in alone, 
since thought is ւ ո է շ տ օ Խ է շ ժ by and through the program. Examin ing cybernetic systems 
and cybertext narrat ives, N . Kather ine Hayleร suggests that the propr iorecept ive sense has 
been altered b y the in fo rmat ion revo lu t ion. The Cartesian subject begins by v isual is ing his 
th ink ing presence i n isolat ion f r o m the w o r l d as the one th ing he cannot doubt. However , 
the modern human w h o inhabits in fo rmat ion- r i ch environments " k n o พ ร that the dynamic 
and fluctuating boundaries o f her embodied cogni t ions develop in re lat ion to other 
cogniz ing agents embedded throughout the envi ronment , among w h i c h the most power fu l 
are inte l l igent mach ines . " 6 I n her anthropological studies o f computer users, Sherry Tu rk le 
4 The " in tent iona l stance" derives f r o m behavioural psychology, but is popular ly 
expl icated in Dan ie l c. Dennett , Consciousness Explained ( 1 9 9 1 ; London : Penguin, 1993) 
76. 
5 The future o f gaming systems seems set to e l iminate the need fo r a bod i l y 
interface at a l l . I n 2008 the E m o t i v company retai led the f i rs t neurological headset 
a l l ow ing gamers in tu i t i ve ly to manipulate the game envi ronment us ing bra in ac t iv i ty alone. 
Darren Waters, " B r a i n Cont ro l Headset fo r Games, " BBC News Online, 20 Feb. 2008, 2 
June 2008 <ht tp : / /news.bbc.co.uk/ l /h i / technology/7254078.s tm> 
6 N . Kather ine Hayleร, "F lesh and Me ta l : Reconf igur ing the M i n d b o d y in V i r t ua l 
Env i ronments , " Configurations 10 (2002): 303. A n d y Clark and D a v i d Chalmers have 
expounded a s imi lar hypothesis that mental processes are not conf ined w i t h i n the body 'ร 
boundaries but should be seen at w o r k w i t h i n the envi ronment w i t h w h i c h the self 
interacts. They argue that a player o f the shape-f i t t ing computer game, Tetr is , is possessed 
o f an "extended m i n d " regardless o f whether they must press a key to rotate the shape or 
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has compi led extensive evidence o f h o w people react to the d i f ferent wor lds ana identit ies 
the computer a l lows, through mul t i -user dungeons ( M U D s ) , chat rooms, ar t i f ic ia l l i fe 
s imulat ions, and mul t i - tasked operat ing systems. 7 A r e d ig i ta l wor lds real ly dist inct f r o m 
real i ty , or do they b lur together, s i tuat ing the self indeterminately between the two? Tu rk le 
maintains that computers are "marg ina l objects on the boundary between the physical and 
the psycho log ica l " and as such they force people to " b u i l d theories around the animate and 
the inanimate and to develop their ideas about thought i tse l f . " 8 Computers can prov ide 
power fu l ph i losophica l foc i for understanding the nature o f subject iv i ty . However , when 
such sel f - ref lect ion does not take place, the ind iv idua l can be characterised as possessed by 
the machine. For example, Tu rk le describes the case o f Stuart, a physics graduate who 
j o i ned the M U D , Gargoyle, under the pseudonym Ach i l les . In an elaborate but textual ly-
mediated exchange o f r ings, his avatar was marr ied to another i n the chat interface. Bu t 
when i n real l i f e , Stuart /Achi l les was asked whether he was single, h is rep ly was that he 
was mar r ied . 9 Th is b lu r r ing o f boundaries between the human body and technology is 
common l y def ined as the posthuman or the cyborg state. I n this sort o f scenario, the human 
becomes, as Hayleร puts i t , caught up in " a coup l ing so intense and mul t i faceted that i t is 
no longer possible to d ist inguish mean ing fu l l y between the b io log ica l organism and the 
in format iona l circuits i n wh i ch i t is enmeshed . " 1 0 
Though the resul t ing posthuman impl ies an onto logicai and histor ical break f r o m 
the human, is there no way we can conceptualise this sp l ic ing o f minds into cybernetic 
c i rcui ts us ing exist ing frames o f reference? E r i k Dav is has taught us that technology has 
not ent i rely disenchanted the w o r l d . Rather the o l d , metaphysical phantasms "wen t 
whether they have a neural implant w h i c h al lows thoughts to cause the act ion direct ly. I n 
both cases, the sk in /sku l l boundary o f thought comes into question. A n d y C lark and D a v i d 
J. Chalmers, "The Extended Mind;'Analysis 58 (1998) : 7-19. 
7 Sherry Tu rk le , The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (London : 
Granada, 1984); Sherry Turk le , Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet 
(London : We iden fe ld , 1996). 
s Turkic9 Second Self 21. 
9 Tu rk le , Life on the Screen 192-205. 
1 0 N . Kather ine Hay les, " V i r t u a l Bodies and F l i cker ing S ign i f ie rs , " October 66 
(1993) : 80. 
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underground, w o r m i n g their way into the cu l tura l , psycholog ica l , and myth ica l mot ivat ions 
that f o r m the foundat ions o f the modern w o r l d . " 1 1 Excavat ing one o f these myth ica l 
qual i t ies, this thesis tunnels down toough the strata o f postmodern thought and posthuman 
cybernetics to reveal an under ly ing archetype o f demonic possession. The demon is an 
agent or ig inat ing f r o m some metaphysical zone and cont ro l l ing a m i n d so that i t no longer 
perceives an absolute, concrete real i ty . Cybernetics is s imi la r ly concerned w i t h a rea lm 
other than the physical and софогеа і , i n w h i c h the immater ia l s igni f iers o f computer code 
cause a change i n the cogn i t ion and the mind-body relat ionship o f the player who is 
suddenly able to per fo rm heroic feats o f combat more appropriate to the gods than the 
normat ive ly human. L i kew ise the demon was said to inhabit an immater ia l realm between 
gods (or the dev i l ) and men. Because they operate l im ina l l y between the conceptual and 
the софогеа і , the prob lem o f understanding demons is a perspectivai one ak in to 
perceiv ing a cybernet ic w o r l d f r o m w i t h i n the game (a perspective I took i n the f i rs t 
paragraph o f m y pastiche at the start o f this chapter) or seeing its user outside i t engaged 
intent ly w i t h the physical computer (a stance I assumed i n m y second). I n both demonic 
and cybernet ic experiences, for the person be ing possessed, the experience migh t seem 
highly риф08ІУе, g i v ing them an element o f per format ive contro l that they lack i n real i ty. 
Witnessed f r o m the outside, however , demonic possession seems a h igh l y d is turb ing and 
v io lent experience ( i t is not տ ս փ ո տ տ § that there is a long association between demon ism 
and epi lept ic f i ts ) , wh i ls t the contemporary media have reported perverse stories o f people 
so caught up i n l i fe behind the screen, that they have forgot ten to eat or sleep տ real i ty and 
so have wasted a w a y . 1 2 O f t en rendered amusing ly i n the stereotype o f the shabby "geek , " 
neglect o f the body is the st igmata o f cybernet ic obsession. However , fo r the geeks 
themselves, the computer provides an interface to a social w o r l d that is more 
accommodat ing than that f r o m w h i c h they choose to cut themselves o f f . 1 3 Th is double 
perspective i n w h i c h we can on ly witness a cybernet ic possession f r o m an external point o f 
v i ew and never f u l l y enter another person'ร phenomenologica l perspective reminds that, 
E r i k Dav is , TechGnosis: Mythy Magic and Mysticism in the Age of Information, 
updated edi t ion (London : 5 s t a r - ร е ф е т ' s T a i l , 2004) 5. 
1 2 "South Korean Dies A f t e r Games Session," BBC News Online, 10 A u g . 2005, 3 
June 2008 < ht tp: / /news.bbc.co.Uk/ l /h i / technology/4137782.stm> 
1 3 For Tu rk le ' ร analysis o f hacker communi t ies , and the discrepancy between the 
w a y there are popular ly perceived and the w a y they perceive themselves, see Turk le , 
Second Self201-46. 
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equal ly, ve r i f y i ng the t ru th o f a demonic possession was always problemat ic in j ud i c ia l and 
theological tradit ions (as examples g iven later i n this chapter indicate) because the 
symptoms exhib i ted by the demoniac were so readi ly fraudable: i t was hard to dist inguish 
between a " r e a l " demon produc ing i l lusions and a f raud produc ing the i l lus ion o f demons. 
Reformat ion) , so cybernetics tests h o w far we are w i l l i n g to push the boundaries o f cul tural 
re la t iv ism. In the modern era, to def ine Stuart /Achi l les as unmarr ied s imp ly because his 
ceremony d id not take place i n physical real i ty is to fa i l to recognise that, for this 
ind iv idua l , " rea l i t y " as a personal construct may be mvested p r imar i l y in the mental w o r l d 
behind the screen. O n the other hand, i f Stuart /Achi l les is a l lowed to be marr ied i n a M U D , 
can we st i l l incarcerate the schizophrenic who murders i n the genuine conv ic t ion that he is 
f o l l o w i n g the w o r d o f G o d wh i ch possesses h i m (the ethical d i l emma i n A . ร . B y a t ť s novel 
A Whistling Woman, w h i c h I examine i n chapter 9)? A s Chr is Hables Grey reports in 
Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age, current laws w i l l not translate easily to a 
future o f v i r tua l environments, transgendered sexes, robot ic bodies, and genetic c lones . 1 4 
The v i r tua l or cyborg l ives that are faci l i tated b y cybernetics are fo rc ing us to broaden the 
boundaries o f what constitutes the normat ive ly human, leading to a more open society as 
the geographical boundaries separating races, or embodiments that indicate sex, are 
breached. The h is tory o f demonism seems to embody a comparable double trajectory, 
par t icu lar ly i n re lat ion to gender. O n the one hand, i t is no coincidence that over the 
centuries w o m e n seem to have presented w i t h cases o f possession by a d iv ine spir i t more 
of ten than men, using their minds to assume the v is ionary theological author i ty o f w h i c h 
their embodied selves were dep r i ved . 1 5 Conversely, there is a close association between 
demon ism and wi tchcraf t , the tr ials o f w h i c h between the f i f teenth and seventeenth 
centuries were used legal ly to proscr ibe the social status o f w o m e n . 1 6 Indeed, this 
association between demon ism and women ' ร r ights can be read w i t h i n the most in f luent ia l 
document o f changing po l i t i ca l subjects i n cybernet ic modern i ty , Donna Haraway 'ร 
Շ Խ ւ տ Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age ( N e w Yo rk : 
Rout ledge, 2002) . 
1 5 E l izabeth A l v i l d a Petroff , Medieval Women 's Visionary Literature (New Y o r k : 
O x f o r d U P , 1986). 
1 6 Stuart C lark , Thinking With Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modem 
Europe (New Y o r k : O x f o r d U P , 1997). See especial ly 106-33 fo r the l inks between 
womanhood and wi tchcraf t . 
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femin is t " C y b o r g Man i fes to . " I n chapter 2 , by compar ing Haraway 'ร cyborg to the w o r k o f 
a sixteenth-century natural ist and demonologist , I show that contests over the ver i f iab i l i t y 
o f real i ty ― can w e be possessed b y demons? can w e inhabit cyberspace? - are also ones 
about the ethical codes according to w h i c h human subjects should or should not operate. 
The prob lem i n both postmodern and pre-modern epistemologies is h o w far we can make 
ethical assertions, g iven that we cannot t ru ly k n o w h o w the w o r l d is perceived f r o m the 
perspective o f another, especial ly someone possessed by demons or cybernetic systems. 
These are jus t some o f the threads that in ter twine cybernet ic s imulat ions w i t h demonic 
h istory, and I w i l l trace some o f these later i n this chapter, and over the course o f this 
thesis. 
However , at r isk o f creat ing a tangle, I want to add another thread o f connect ion. 
W h e n he turns o f f System Shock, the game'ร player experiences a legacy effect: ending the 
game makes the player aware once again o f their embodied consciousness, so that even 
w i thou t the exp l ic i t po lemic against ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, he should s t i l l th ink about 
th ink ing , and what i t is to be human as opposed to ar t i f i c ia l ly intel l igent. A l t hough the 
m e d i u m by w h i c h this effect is produced may be re lat ive ly nove l , the message is a 
c o m m o n one to do w i t h locat ing the conscious self i n re lat ion to the inanimate wo r l d . I n 
this sense, cybernet ic s imulat ions can f i n d ancestors i n other modes o f product ion o f 
alternative perceptual f ie lds, i n w h i c h the s imula t ion requires us to test its correspondences 
and dif ferences to real i ty , i n the generic relat ionship k n o w n as al legory. Narrat ive has also 
long prov ided a mechanism b y w h i c h a w o r l d is m imet i ca l l y rendered in a way that is at 
once the same but also dislocated by its be ing represented through the med ium o f 
language. Predommant ly novels - but also poems, f i lms , metaphors i n general, and even 
scient i f ic hypotheses - are forms o f s imula t ion that set up feedbacks between themselves 
and their іпЇефгеЇегБ i n w h i c h percept ion is altered i n a potent ia l ly deceiv ing way w h i c h 
may nevertheless thereby prov ide access to some deeper t ru th about human real i ty. A n d , 
start ing w i t h the De lph ic oracle and art ist ic muses, m o v i n g f r o m the Apos to l i c revelat ion 
to the inspirat ion o f Caedmon, father o f Eng l ish poetry, there is a long heritage o f 
hal luc inatory demons or spirits as the source o f l i terary creat iv i ty , w i t h inspired or 
prophet ic w r i t i n g expla in ing the relat ionship o f the human to the w o r l d or to the heavens. 1 7 
1 7 I t is also no coincidence that three o f the most in f luent ia l horror stories, 
Frankenstein, Dracula and Strange Case of Dr. մ€կ11 and M K Hyde9 have their or igms i n 
v i v i d nightmares experienced b y Shel ley, Stoker and Stevenson, i n w h i c h their experiences 
in real i ty b lended w i t h dreams i n te r r i f y ing fashion. Christopher Fray l ing , Nightmare: The 
Birth of Horror (London : B B C Books֊BBC W o r l d w i d e , 1996). 
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I n re lat ion to l i terature, the a f f i n i t y between a demonic spir i t , creat iv i ty and 
technology has been simul taneously uneasy and product ive. Plato was suspicious o f 
w r i t i ng - a techne ᅳ fo r the way i n w h i c h i t m igh t lead to the redundancy o f personal 
memory and on l y the m i m i c r y o f an essential t ru th rather than the t ru th itself. Wh i l s t 
f reeing space i n the m i n d so i t cou ld venture to uncover new knowledge, the spoken w o r d 
expressed a personal veraci ty w h i c h could also be d i rect ly chal lenged t r o u g h the Socratic 
method; i n w r i t i n g d o w n his experience and knowledge, however, the author lost contro l o f 
his or ig ina l speech and cou ld always be misrepresented in unintended w a y s . 1 8 Odd l y , 
though, i t is precisely the unintent ional and i r rat ional qual i ty that appeals i n the m y t h o f 
creat iv i ty . A s T i m o t h y C la rk explores in his study o f l i terary inspirat ion, creat iv i ty has 
inherent ly demonic tendencies: " A crucial part o f the process o f compos i t ion is understood 
as a desired or even calculated suspension o f reasoning or del iberat ion, a temporary mania 
or i nsan i t y . " 1 9 E tymo log ica l l y , inspi rat ion derives f r o m the Lat inate fo r " t o breath i n t o . " 2 0 
Glossed as an empower ing spir i t , to be inspired is to lose one's agency, to be spoken 
toough rather than to speak; yet, o f course, i t is a matter o f personal credit that the wr i te r 
opens h imse l f to such a possessive experience. I n medieval Chr is t ian t rad i t ion, the scribe 
has author i ty on l y insofar as he is the med ium through w h o m d iv ine t ru th speaks; 
inspi rat ion, then, is the r ight to speak publ ic t ru th precisely because the scribe has been 
able to remove his agency, be ing s imp ly the mechanism by w h i c h a d iv ine w i l l or 
subject iv i ty is exercised. Compos i t i on i n w r i t i ng and speech appear to have been treated as 
comparable ways o f mediat ing a metaphysical rea lm to the pub l ic up un t i l the eighteenth 
century. W h e n technologies such as the pr in t ing press and the existence o f a mass l i terate 
audience appear, however , the author is g iven space to create or ig ina l ly , rather than mere ly 
Plato 's Socrates argues that, l i ke f igures in paint ings, words are mute when 
interrogated. Consequent ly "once it is wr i t ten , every compos i t ion trandies about 
everywhere in the same way , i n the presence bo th o f those who k n o w about the subject and 
o f those w h o have noth ing at al l to do w i t h i t , and i t does not k n o w how to address those it 
should address and not those i t should not. W h e n it is i l l treated and unjust ly abused, i t 
a lways needs its father to help i t ; fo r i t is incapable o f either defending or he lp ing i tsel f . " 
Plato, Phaedrus, trans, and in t rod. Christopher Rowe (London : Penguin, 2005) 63. 
f i m o t h y Clark , The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of 
Subjectivity in Romantic and Post-Romantic Writing (Manchester: Manchester U P , 1997) 
2. 
2 0 " Insp i re , " The Οφτά English Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1989. 
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to ventr i loquise the d iv ine or my th ica l t ru th. A s Clark shows, this space o f compos i t ion 
w h i c h was carved out by the advent o f En l ightenment science is nevertheless paradoxical ly 
situated i n an ongoing cul ture o f inspirat ion w h i c h derives f r o m a supra-rat ional cause 
outside the artist: " T h e space o f compos i t ion may be an encounter w i t h what m igh t be 
cal led a phantasmatic author, i.e. that t ransformed sense o f ident i ty that arises f r o m 
interact ion w i t h the various phantasmatic agencies at w o r k in the space o f compos i t i on . " 2 1 
One migh t suggest that the mat r i x o f an embodied subject, a demonica l ly insp i r ing source 
outside o f h i m , and w r i t i ng that is n o w considered a technology i n its o w n r ight (rather 
than, as against the Greek ora l t rad i t ion, a way o f t ranscr ib ing something that had its o r ig in 
i n speech), is i tself a propr iorecept ive revo lu t ion ak in to that o f the posthuman. The anxiety 
and power bound together i n w r i t i n g stem f r o m the fact that l i terature is a media t ing, even 
dominat ing , experience, as w e l l as a pure ly m ime t i c one. Focal ised through the concept o f 
the demonic ha l luc inat ion, the l i terary and the d ig i ta l s imulat ion f i n d themselves in odd 
p rox im i t y . No t on ly can the l i terary m e d i u m engage w i t h cybernetics - interrogat ing, for 
example, the ethics o f the technologies that emerge f r o m the science - but cybernetics also 
confronts l i terature w i t h its o w n doubts about the directness o f the correspondence between 
authors and readers, or the w o r l d and words. 
Though the aesthetic o f the Romant ic genius able to mediate between the zone o f 
inspi rat ion and the page m igh t seem d iametr ica l ly opposed to the Newton ian w o r l d o f 
mechanism, odd ly the idealised l i terature, l i ke science, is a med ium permi t ted to speak for 
i tself. A n uncontaminated l i n k between the unconscious and the pen involves the erasure o f 
the author as their sub ject iv i ty is focused through the technology o f w r i t i ng . B y 
representing the author as a func t ion o f discourse rather than as one w i t h pr iv i leged access 
to the t ruth through contact w i t h the d iv ine , a l i terary text can cross histor ical and cul tura l 
contexts i n ways closed to the physical author, jus t as a scient i f ic law remains true for al l 
relevant circumstances. S im i la r l y , the posthuman entails a d issolut ion o f an embodied ego 
i n favour o f a mu l t ip le self capable o f t raversing geography and identi t ies i f not at w h i m , 
then at least w i t h the c l i ck o f a but ton. I t is not տ ս փ ո տ ^ that the technological media o f 
the cybernet ic era have in fo rmed postmodern construct ions o f the subject. Speci f ica l ly in 
2 1 T . Clark 26. A l o n g the same l ines, Fr iedr ich K i t t l e r notes that the pen, w i t h its 
ab i l i t y to record thought a lmost d i rect ly i n a near seamless flow between m i n d and page, 
means that creat iv i ty is displaced un t i l after the mscr ibed record is produced. O n l y m 
rereading and edi t ing is a conscious, egocentr ic act o f authorship to be found . Fr iedr ich 
K i t t le r , Discourse Networb 1800/1900, trans. M ichae l Metteer (Stanford: Stanford U P , 
1990) 109. 
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relat ion to language, the v i ew o f l i terature as an autotel ic system i n w h i c h the embodied 
author is merely a m e d i u m for the abstract in format iona l content o f the message is 
val idated b y cybernetics, wh i ch understands and studies in fo rmat ion (whether 
consciousness, genes or texts) as floating detached f r o m any one specif ic substrate (the 
organic bra in , the embodied organism, physical books) . A s Jean-Pierre D u p u y has pointed 
out, a post-structural l i terary theory that denies mimesis shares much w i t h cybernet ics: 
post-structural ism claims that a text is closed to the w o r l d outside o f i tself, w i t h the 
signif iers i t contains representing the autonomy o f the text f r o m its or ig ina l p roduct ion i n 
the m i n d o f an author in the w o r l d ; cybernetics s imi la r ly represents the detachment o f 
in fonna t ion f r o m con tex t . 2 2 
Odd ly , though, there appears to have been comparat ive ly l i t t le research in to the 
relat ionships between cybernetics and postmodern l i terary theory. Probably this is because 
cybernetics and postmodern ism are such heterogeneous and in f luent ia l paradigms that we 
w o u l d hard ly expect there not to be connect ion. Therefore, wo rk i ng out w h i c h 
relat ionships are direct such that postmodern thought depends on cybernetics for its 
epistemologica! base is d i f f i cu l t . Some interd isc ip l inary flows certainly do f i n d a source i n 
cybernetics. Jacques Lacan 'ร 1954-1955 seminar was dedicated to cybernet ics, and 
emphasised the subject as the product o f symbols or meetings jus t as " the symbol ic w o r l d 
is the w o r l d o f the mach ine" ; Lévi-Strauss's Structural Anthropology acknowledges the 
importance o f cybernetics fo r the fu ture o f the social sciences, since Strauss'ร project 
involves interpret ing society as a who le according to theories o f unconscious 
communica t ion rather than as ind iv idua l subjects embodied i n their o w n w o r l d space; 
Roman Jakobsen employed Claude Shannon'ร The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication i n his treatment o f language as a cod ing system that structured the 
exchange o f i n f o rma t i on . 2 3 A l t hough connections exist, though, there is a r isk o f over-
Jean-Pierre Dupuy , "Sel f -Reference i n L i terature, " Poetics 18 (1989) : 491-515, 
ScienceDirect, 10 A u g . 2008 <ht tp : / /www.sc iencedi rect .com>. 
2 3 A l l these examples are taken f r o m one o f the f ew , recent articles to correct the 
def ic i t o f attent ion in this area: Cel ine Lafonta ine, " T h e Cybernet ic M a t r i x o f 'French 
T h e o r y ' , " Theory, Culture and Society 24.5 (2007) : 27-47, Swetswise, 3 Sept. 2008 
<http: / /www.swetswise.com.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/eAccess/searchArt ic les.do>. Lafonta ine 
notes that wh i ls t the relat ions between structural ism and cybernetics have been examined 
to a degree, there is a def in i te lack o f knowledge o f the inf luence o f cybernetics on post-
structuralists. There is a b r ie f descr ipt ion o f Lacan 'ร cybernetic seminars i n Jean-Pierre 
Dupuy , The Mechanization of the Mind: On the Origins of Cognitive Science, trans. M . B. 
DeBevoise (Prmceton: Prmceton U P , 2000) 108-9. 
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extrapolat ion in order to construct a direct epistemic relat ionship. I n pract ice, the 
cybernetic may s imp ly be used as a handy analogy fo r more sweeping revaluations o f 
l i terary and social structures that characterised post-war thought, and the rework ing o f 
Plato's p rob lem w i t h w r i t i ng for a hegemonic age o f in fo rmat ion . 
For example, i n her w o r k o n ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, Margaret Boden elaborates 
numerous examples o f computers produc ing l i terary artefacts that, to a naïve observer, 
m igh t be taken as c reat ive . 2 4 James Meehan 'ร T A L E - S P I N program can produce Aesop-
style fables w h i c h are at least structural ly sound, though w h o l l y unadventurous. 2 5 The 
i rony is that a l though T A L E - S P I N is art ist ical ly l im i ted , l i terary theory had already 
deconstructed the m y t h o f human creat iv i ty . Ext rapola t ing the Romant ic is t ve in to its 
extreme, Ro land Barthes proc la imed the death o f the author and argued that " W r i t i n g is the 
neutral , composi te, ob l ique space where our subject slips away, " i n w h i c h the wr i te r is a 
mere copyist o f anterior texts and gestures, produc ing a w o r k w h i c h is anyway on ly a 
"t issue o f quo ta t ions . " 2 6 A s Hayleร observes, c i t ing the Derr idean gap that separates 
speaking f r o m wr i t i ng , when w r i t i ng becomes mediated t feough " f l i c ke r i ng s ign i f ie rs" on 
computers underpinned b y b inary log ic , the narrator becomes "no t so much a scribe as a 
cyborg authorized to access the relevant codes . " 2 7 Meanwh i le , i n T A L E - S P I N , the wr i te r l y 
agent is displaced altogether, be ing a mere func t ion o f a lgor i thms and rout ines. Bu t though 
there is a neat l ine to Barthes f r o m T A L E - S P I N v ia Hay leร ' cyborg author, there is no 
evidence that Barthes had been inspired by any program. Rather, the phi losophies w o r k i n 
Margaret A . Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms, 2nd ed. 
(London : Rout ledge, 2004) . Boden tries not to be d rawn into the debate about whether 
such artefacts embody " t r a e " creat iv i ty , instead p rov id ing a survey o f examples f r o m 
wh i ch the reader is inv i ted to draw their o w n conclusions. 
2 5 For the details and sample outputs o f T A L E - S P I N , see James Meehan, " T A L E -
S P I N , " Inside Computer Understanding: Five Programs Plus Miniatures, ed. R.C. Shank 
and C.K. Riesbeck (Hi l lsda le , N J : Lawrence Er lbaum, 1981) 197-258. One example output 
is: "Once upon a t ime George A n t l i ved near a patch o f ground. There was a nest in an ash 
tree. W i l m a B i r d l i ved i n the nest. There was some water in a r iver. W i l a m knew that the 
water was i n the r iver. George k n e w that the water was i n the r iver . One day W i l m a was 
very thirsty. W i l m a wanted to get near some water. W i l m a flew f r o m her nest across a 
meadow through a va l ley to the r iver . W i l m a drank the water. W i l m a was not th i rs ty any 
more . " Meehan 199. 
2 6 Ro land Barthes, "The Death o f the Au tho r , " Image-Music-Text, trans. Steven 
Heath (London : Fontana-Нафег, 1977) 142, 146. 
2 7 N . Kather ine Hayleร, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: บ o f Chicago p， 1999) 43. 
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paral le l , cybernetics contending that creat iv i ty resides in def in i t i ve a lgor i thmic processes 
i n the bra in rather than in the effervescent spir i t o f genius, and Barthes deconstruct ing 
logocentr ic mytholog ies. Indeed, one m igh t also note some epistemic divergence. Whereas 
semiotics argues that s igni f iers do not po in t to specif ic signif ieds except in accordance 
w i t h the textual or social contexts in w h i c h they are used, the a im o f a cybernetic p rogram 
l i ke T A L E - S P I N is to show that the same codes can operate independent ly o f context, w i t h 
a story te l l ing rout ine being at w o r k bo th on the b inary code o f a computer and, by 
imp l i ca t ion o f this mode l , i n the neurological structure o f the bra in . The poss ib i l i ty that 
TALE-SPĽ^ Í is creative is i n tension w i t h our be l ie f - wh i ch is not on ly a poststructural one 
though i t may be endorsed b y i t - that context regulates meaning, so that the fact that 
Aesop 'ร tales were (contra Barthes) produced b y a conscious author contributes to their 
canonical value, whereas k n o w i n g that a tale was produced b y a computer may 
s ign i f icant ly bias our aesthetic admira t ion for i t . Thus , even though postmodern theory and 
practice may be related to cybernetics i n some dimensions, both the contemporary sciences 
and the arts may be ch i ldren o f a larger cul tural m i l i eu that is the post-war age o f 
in fo rmat ion in w h i c h broader questions are be ing asked than the detai l o f semiot ics. I n this 
case, one way o f f ram ing such questions across cybernetics and postmodern l i terary theory 
is to trace their demonic construct ion. For example, is i t not possible to apply the f o l l o w i n g 
comment b y T i m o t h y Clark about l i terary inspi rat ion to T A L E S P I N also? Inspirat ion, 
C la rk wr i tes: 
a f f i rms a logocentr ic concept ion o f a language o f self-evident author i ty. Ye t 
i t also represents an automat izat ion o f the s igni f ier , a speaking w i thou t 
thought or in tent ion. Ideas that sound a l i t t le l i ke accounts o f aporias i n 
deconstructive th ink ing merge i n bizarre ways w i t h not ions that rest on a 
rel ig ious or magica l w o r l d v i e w . 2 8 
I t is not that T A L E S P I N introduces any automatisat ion o f the w o r d that makes i t 
provocat ive - for , as Clarke wr i tes, such automatisat ion long lay at the heart o f the process 
o f being inspired ᅳ but that i t makes this process exp l ic i t , b r ing ing i t to a surface where i t 
can be reduct ive ly analysed, rather than keeping i t suppressed as a m y t h o f creat iv i ty. I t 
h ighl ights that what poets had taken to be the myster ious but paradoxical ly commendable 
absence o f thought or in tent ion i n the poet is actual ly the mater ia l (and therefore non-
2 8 T . C lark 4. 
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myst ica l ) residence o f such acts deep i n the pre-conscious o f the organic b ra in , or i n the 
log ic gates o f the cybernet ic machine. 
G i ven this nexus o f postmodern ism, mys t i c i sm and cybernetics, i t becomes hard to 
decipher whether i t is l i terary theory or cybernetic science (or something that connects the 
t w o , l i ke demonology) w h i c h stands behind a piece o f postmodern c r i t i c i sm l ike I ta lo 
Ca lv ino 'ร essay on "Cybernet ics and Ghos t s . " 2 9 Here, Ca lv ino argues that i f , as cybernetics 
c la ims, symbol -man ipu la t ing systems such as the bra in are comprised o f atomist ic 
calculat ions rather than spir i tual flows, we must change our theoret ical concept ion o f 
l i terary creat iv i ty . I n part icular, i f l i terature is the encoding o f some effervescent spir i t , " b y 
what route is the soul or h is tory or subconscious t ransformed into a series o f black lines on 
a whi te p a g e ? " 3 0 Cou ld i t be that authors and texts are essential ly machines? Even i f their 
approaches seem quite d i f ferent , cybernetics and l i terary theory ask comparable questions 
about m i n d , and h o w its outer product ions - such as text, speech, behaviour - correlate 
w i t h the inner act ivi t ies o f the embodied m i n d . De te rmin ing whether cybernetics flavours 
the ingredient o f theory speci f ical ly is possibly in 'devant , g iven than both are immersed in 
a soupy Zeitgeist o f contemporary science, society and culture w h i c h has its o w n overal l 
texture and taste. I n this, some o f the dominant flavours are the onmipresence o f s imulacra; 
doubt about the ver i f iab i l i t y o f real i ty ; the decentred or f ragmented nature o f the human 
subject i n a w o r l d o f in fo rmat ion ; the deconsüxict ion o f the metaphysics o f human 
creat iv i ty and spir i t . A l l these themes cross cybernetics and l i terary theory w i thou t 
necessarily re ly ing on either one o f t hem for their epistemology; and they f i n d themselves 
common l y expressed i n the idea o f the deceiv ing but potent ia l ly inspi r ing demon, and the 
no t ion o f possession by a metaphysical s imula t ion, w h i c h pre-exists cybernetics. Rather 
than attending to the direct connections between l i terary theory and cybernetics, then, m y 
method is to act as a reader o f l i terary f ic t ions w h i c h m igh t accommodate the diverse range 
o f cul tural experiences at a h istor ical moment , and to capture these sensations through 
focusing on this demonic mot i f . Wh i l s t his essay seems resigned to a reduct ionist account 
o f the l i terary genius, Ca lv ino closes by arguing that the sense o f " sp i r i t " ( the ghost o f his 
t i t le) w i l l be preserved in the m i n d o f the reader, w h o can interpret an ident ical text i n 
mu l t ip le ways depending on context. Thus I come to this analysis as a unique reader 
in fo rmed b y theory, rather than a theorist using l i terary texts to support a strong hypothesis 
2 9 I talo Ca lv ino , "Cybernet ics and Ghosts," The Literature Machine: Essays4 trans. 
Patr ick Creagh (London : Seeker, 1987) 3-27. 
I ta lo Ca lv ino , "Cybernet ics and Ghosts" 14. 
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about cybernet ic communica t ion and l i terary structural ism. Indeed, one po in t I shall make 
repeatedly is that wh i ls t cybernetics may d im in i sh the inspi rat ion o f the author by locat ing 
"c rea t i v i t y " i n computat ional menta l act ivi t ies rather than i n re lat ion to some external 
muse, cybernet ic f ic t ions cont inual ly make intense demands on their readers or v iewers. 
They expect us to engage w i t h the works and to tease out the ways in w h i c h the 
mechanism o f text or f i l m somehow produces var ious d i f ferent possible meanings for each 
ІПІЄфГЄЇЄГ. 
What is Cybernetics? 
Hav ing n o w tr iangulated this thesis, w i t h its three points compr is ing cybernetics, 
demons and postmodern f i c t i on , each can be resolved i n more detai l , start ing w i t h the tera i 
cybernetics. Cybernet ics has a speci f ic o r ig in i n Norber t W iener ' ร w o r k on feedback 1 w i t h 
his 1948 neo log ism der iv ing f r o m the Greek κυβερυή της , or steersman; j us t as the p i lo t 
cont inual ly adjusts his course, so the new disc ip l ine was concerned not w i t h cause and 
effect, as w i t h the t radi t ional physical sciences, but w i t h c i rcular causali ty, i n w h i c h 
feedback systems contr ibute towards goal-directed behaviour. For example, a person 
reaching for a glass is cont inua l ly i n fo rmed b y perceptions about h o w close they are, and 
feedback f r o m these perceptions determines how much addi t ional movement is imparted to 
the arm. The parad igm shi f t here is that whereas the physical sciences ignore te leology, 
seeing effects as f o l l o w i n g f r o m causes, cybernetics examines organisms f r o m the 
perspective o f their goals, and sees h o w their feedback regulat ion a l lows them to meet or 
deviate f r o m them. The term of fered a banner fo r the p ioneer ing and diverse group that 
came together at the ten М а с у conferences between 1946 and 1953, w i t h the f i rst 
conference characterist ical ly ent i t led "The Feedback Mechanisms and Ci rcu lar Causal 
Systems i n B i o l o g y and the Social Sciences M e e t i n g . " 3 1 Inc lud ing part icipants f r o m 
psychology (such as Lawrence Kub ie ) , a n t o o p o l o g y (Gregory Bateson and Margaret 
Mead) , language (Roman Jakobsen), mathematics, ph i losophy and physics, "cybernet ics" 
became a broad interd isc ip l inary rubr ic , accommodat ing a range o f methodologies and 
3 i The essential h is tory o f these meetings, their part icipants and research networks 
is Steve Joshua He ims , The Cybernetics Group (Cambr idge, M A : M I T Press, 1991). F ive 
o f the transactions o f the later М а с у Conferences were publ ished i n He inz von Foerster, 
ed., Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social 
Systems, 5 vo ls . (New Y o r k : Josiah М а с у Jr. Foundat ion, 1949-1955). The most detailed 
phi losophical study o f the group is Jean-Pierre D u p u y ' ร book The Mechanization of the 
Mind (see note 23 above). 
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technologies: the sciences o f m i n d , computer p rogramming , b io log ica l study o f physical 
organisms, sociological study o f behaviour, economics. T h i n k i n g o f System Shock, fo r 
example, Shodan can be said to express one cybernetic trajectory, ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, 
that has to date proved largely conceptual i n nature. However , cybernetics also describes 
the internal physical c i rcu i t ry and p rogramming language o f the system that virtual ises her, 
that is, the personal computer. The t w o strands f o l l o w f r o m the dif ferences i n the early 
cybernetics groups. O n the one hand were those such as John v o n Neumann, who 
emphasised the importance o f attending to the phys io log ica l and mechanical characteristics 
o f brains and machines, and w h o played a key role in developing the serial d ig i ta l 
computer. O n the other were those pure mathematicians w h o were more concerned w i t h 
theory than prac t ice . 3 2 For example, rather than develop ing useful devices, Wal ter Pitts and 
War ren M c C u l l o c h focused on neuronal log ic networks, wh i ch der ived f r o m A l a n Tur ing 's 
mathemat ica l ly abstract universal comput ing mach ine . 3 3 Add i t i ona l l y , the debate about 
whether communica t ion had to require the presence o f a conscious іпІефгеЇег (as i n 
Shodan or the human p layer) , or whether any homeostat ic machine (such as a r o o m 
thermostat or personal computer) cou ld be def ined as inte l l igent , was a key one throughout 
For the di f ference between the t w o groups, see Dupuy , The Mechanization of the 
Mind 58-69. The di f ference is expressed i n remarks M c C u l l o c h made after hear ing an 
impressive ta lk by v o n Neumann at the H i x o n Sympos ium, a special meet ing spun-of f the 
М а с у conferences to discuss mechanisms i n the bra in that correspond to behaviour in more 
technical detai l : " I confess that there is noth ing I envy Dr . v o n Neumann more than the fact 
that the machines w i t h w h i c h he has to cope are those for wh i ch he has, f r o m the 
beginn ing, a b lueprmt o f what the machine is supposed to do and h o w i t is supposed to do 
it . Unfor tunate ly for us i n the b io log ica l sciences - or at least, i n psychiatry - w e are 
presented w i t h an al ien, or enemy'ร machine [that is, the m i n d ] . W e do not k n o w exact ly 
what the machine is supposed to do and certainly we have no b luepr in t o f i t . " L l o y d A . 
Jeffress, ed. Cerebral Mechanisms in Behavior: The Hixon Symposium, proc. O f The 
H i x o n Sympos ium on Cerebral Mechanisms i n Behaviour , Sept. 1948， Ca l i fo rn ia Insti tute 
o f Techno logy (New Y o r k : John W i l e y , 1951) 32. 
3 3 Tu r i ng imagines a tr ipart i te device consist ing o f a machine, an in f in i te tape 
d iv ided into squares, and a head capable either o f mak ing a mark i n one o f those squares, 
erasing an exist ing mark , or m o v i n g the tape one square to the le f t or r ight . Tu r i ng showed 
that any mechanical procedure, i f adequately coded in the terms f i t t i ng üie machine 'ร 
b inary operat ion, can be model led b y the machine. A . M . T u r i n g , " O n Computable 
Numbers , w i t h an App l i ca t i on to the Entscheidungsproblem," Proceedings of the London 
Mathematical Society 42 (1936-7) : 230-65. W h e n War ren M c C u l l o c h and Wal ter Pitts 
suggested that a nerve cel l i n the bra in either does or does not produce an electr ical 
discharge across its synapse, and may do so i n a chain o f successive b inary events 
f o l l o w i n g log ica l l y f r o m each other, they essential ly proposed that a bra in is a T u r i n g 
mechanism. War ren ร . M c C u l l o c h and Wal ter Pit ts, " A Log ica l Calculus o f the Ideas 
Imminen t i n Nervous A c t i v i t y , " Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 5 (1943) : 115-33. 
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the М а с у conferences. The question here is whether intel l igence is a matter o f or ig ins 
and causes, w i t h brains capable o f developed th ink ing , or o f te leological ends, in terms o f 
produc ing sensible adaptive behaviours. 
A s m y sweeping h is tory suggests, the precise parad igm contests i n cybernetics are 
far more complex than represented here . 3 5 W i t h that prov iso in m i n d , i t is possible to say 
that cybernetics developed in three phases f o l l o w i n g the end o f the War . In the f i rst wave, 
and in accordance w i t h the neo log ism, cybernetics conceived o f indiv iduals as homeostatic 
systems, designed to main ta in equ i l i b r ium w i t h i n their envi ronment. Th is epistemology 
fo l l owed scient i f ic pro toco l i n consider ing the observer to be outside the si tuat ion they 
observe. Second-order cybernetics, instigated b y He inz v o n Foerster 'ร ambiguously t i t led 
Observing Systems ( l ook ing at systems, systems that observe) and dr iven by Humber to 
Maturana 'ร and Francisco Vare la 'ร w o r k on autopoiesis, recognised that not on ly does 
in fo rmat ion flow f r o m the system to the observer, i t can also loop through the observer . 3 6 
A s Hayleร summarises this phase, "Re f l ex i v i t y is the movement whereby that wh i ch has 
been used to generate a system is made 1 through a changed perspective, to become part o f 
the system i t generates." 3 7 I f so, this speaks to the reciprocal relat ionship between the user 
and the computer, i n w h i c h as we l l as the player cont ro l l ing the computer, the computer 
affects the player. Fma l l y , and impel led by the cont inued fa i lure to realise ar t i f ic ia l 
intel l igence, th i rd wave cybernetics moved away f r o m mode l l i ng machines on the human 
(a " t op d o w n " approach), towards ar t i f ic ia l l i fe that w o u l d evolve or emerge; according to 
some versions o f this " b o t t o m u p " mode o f p roduct ion , the universe or envi ronment can 
i tsel f be conceptual ised as a giant computer, w i t h l i fe as the cel lu lar automata runn ing 
upon i t . 3 8 
Norber t Wiener , for example, sees any automata that receives in fo rmat ion f r o m 
its envi ronment and responds appropriately to i t as a communica t ive system. Norber t 
Wiener , Cybernetics, or1 Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 2nd. 
ed. (New Y o r k : M . L T . Press, 1961) 39-44. 
3 5 See note 31 above fo r references to more systematic studies. 
3 6 He inz von Foerster, Observing Systems: Selected Papers of Heinz von Foerster 
(Seaside, C A : b tersys tems, 1981). 
3 7 Hay leร, Posthuman 8. 
3 8 Stephen W o l f r a m , л New Kind of Science (Champaign, I L : W o l f r a m Med ia , 
2002) . 
B r o w n 21 
G iven that i n The Human Use of Human Beings Wiener carries out cybernetic 
іпЇЄфгеІаЇІ0П5 o f f i d d s as diverse as ph i lo logy , the legal system and d ip lomacy, i t is 
legi t imate to treat cybernetics very b road l y . 3 9 The f ic t ions I examine reflect the fact that 
cybernetics essential ly names a d i rect ion rather than a fo rmu la fo r thought, an 
ident i f icat ion o f al legiance rather than a speci f ica l ly nameable method. A s w i t h D a v i d 
Porush's benchmark study o f cybernetic f i c t i on , The Soft Machine, I take cybernetics " t o 
embrace not on l y the in fo rmat ion sciences but a metaphor so deeply engrained i n our 
cul ture, so s i lent ly d r iven d o w n to the roots o f our imaginat ions, that i t achieves the status 
o f an element i n a new m y t h o l o g y . " 4 0 The my tho logy i n quest ion is the no t ion that people, 
and the cul tural products o f their m inds , such as l i terature, can be described in terms o f 
machines, and that intel l igence can correspondingly be reproduced tìirough ar t i f ic ia l 
programs. Though the specif ic approaches may vary across discipl ines, as Steve He ims 
suggests, the keynote o f the М а с у conferences was s imp ly " t o ident i fy i n a behaviour ist 
spir i t some o f those aspects o f what organisms do that can be analyzed i n terms o f what 
certain analogous machines d o . " 4 1 Even before the f i rs t М а с у conference, Wiener , w o r k i n g 
w i t h the medical doctor A r tu ro Rosenbleuth, had noted an a f f i n i t y between excessive 
feedback in mechanical systems (where each incremental act ion serves not to coalesce 
upon a goal but to deviate more w i l d l y f r o m i t ) and the pathological cond i t ion cal led 
"purpose t r e m o r . " 4 2 Because cybernetics focuses on te leology and behavioural effects 
rather than mater ia l causes, the fact that muscle spasms may be b io log ica l ly caused wh i l s t 
a mechanism l i ke a missi le a im ing system uses a d i f ferent engine is irrelevant. Regardless 
o f under ly ing ident i f icat ions, since the surface outcomes o f goal directed ᅳ or, i n this case, 
goal misdirected - feedback are comparable, the metaphor is inescapable. Once this axis 
l i nk ing a specif ic human cond i t ion to a phenomenon observable in mechanical systems is 
established, i t becomes on ly a smal l assumptive step to extend the metaphorical connect ion 
more general ly, so that the human as an organism is essential ly a feedback mechanism. 
This is why , a l though i t was shown to be empi r ica l l y unsound b y the 1960ร (as I explore in 
Norber t Wiener , The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society 
(London: Eyre and Spot t iswood, 1954). 
4 0 D a v i d Porush, The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction (London: Methuen , 1985) 
2. 
4 1 He ims 15. 
A . Rosenbleuth, N . Wiener and J. B i g e l o พ , "Behav io r , Риф08е, and Teleology, 
Philosophy of Science 10 (1943 ) : 18-24. 
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chapter 4)， the Tu r i ng test continues to dominate cul tura l ւոէշփ^էՅէւօոտ o f technology. 
The idea o f communica t ing w i t h a ta lk ing machine wh i ch appears superf ic ia l ly 
( te leologica l ly) l i ke our speaking selves, wh i ls t not necessarily be ing causally embodied or 
contro l led in the same neurological way , points to the core o f cybernet ic pr incip les. 
Acco rd ing to cybernet ics, intel l igence exists at a h igh level o f abstraction, rather than 
being a specif ic property o f venerable ind iv idua l bodies; bodies themselves, whether 
l i terary texts or those o f the human, are shown to be subject to manipu la t ion and alterat ion 
when other non-embodied and ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences or in format iona l systems intercept 
and flow t taough them. As N . Kather ine Hayleร has represented i t i n her study, when the 
bodies in question are human, they become v iewed as posthuman by the p r i v i l eg ing o f 
" in fo rmat iona l pattern over mater ial instant iat ion, so that embodiment i n a b io log ica l 
substrate is seen as an accident o f h is tory rather than an inev i tab i l i ty o f l i f e . " 4 4 I t is around 
this issue o f embodiment , then, that arguments fo r and against the ethics o f cybernetics 
seem to hinge. 
O n the one hand, Donna Haraway has argued for the situatedness o f knowledge and 
" the par t icu lar i ty and embodiment o f a l l v i s ion ( though not necessarily organic 
embodiment and inc lud ing technological med ia t ion ) . " Wh i l s t f i gu r ing the cyborg as a 
heterogeneous ident i ty capable o f transcending convent ional gender def in i t ions through 
technology, she urges us not to go so far as to submi t to " the tempt ing myths o f v is ion as a 
route to d isembodiment and second-b i r th ing . " 4 5 I n these fantasies, the ind iv idua l is 
characterised as a pure consciousness, w i t h the body a coincidental m e d i u m on w h i c h i t is 
instantiated. M a r v i n M i n s k y exempl i f ies such provocat ive ideals: 
A person is not a head and arms and legs. That ' ร t r i v ia l . A Person is a very 
large mult iprocessor w i t h a m i l l i o n t imes a m i l l i o n smal l parts, and these 
are arranged as a thousand computers...The most impor tant th ing about each 
person is the data, and the programs i n the data that are i n the bra in . A n d 
some day you w i l l be able to take a l l that data, and put i t on a l i t t le disk, and 
A . M . Tu r i ng , "Compu t i ng Mach inery and Inte l l igence," Mind 59 (1950) : 433-60. 
4 4 Hay leร, Posthuman շ. 
4 5 Donna Haraway, "Si tuated Knowledges: The Science Quest ion in Femin i sm and 
the Pr iv i lege o f Part ial Perspect ive," Feminist Studies 14 (1988) : 582. 
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store i t fo r a thousand years, and then tu rn i t on again and you w i l l be al ive 
in the four th m i l l e n n i u m or the f i f t h m i l l e n n i u m . 4 6 
Note that this sort o f argument takes the dual ist ic relat ionship between mater ia l i ty and 
spi r i tual i ty both ways. Soul - l i ke data is also a mater ia l or mechanical structure, i n the sense 
that i t must be stored on disks or i n neuro logica l impulses encoded l ike programs i n the 
physical bra in w h i c h can therefore be mod i f i ed or extrapolated. However , the mater ial 
body as a who le is u l t imate ly redundant, i n order that this spir i t , n o w operat ing as a 
symbol ic code, can transcend h is tory , f reely crossing the mi l lenn ia . (The un-noted 
l im i ta t ion is that such transcendence is st i l l restr icted b y the entropie universe - though 
even this is something that cybernetics m igh t ove rcome. 4 7 ) These cybemetic ians tu rn 
science and technology in to secular i terations o f what was fo rmer l y k n o w n as soul . I t is not 
surprising that D a v i d Nob le has contended that the enchantment w i t h technology is " roo ted 
i n rel ig ious myths and ancient imag in i ngs . " 4 8 I n this new domain , science can empi r ica l l y 
del iver the transcendence that re l ig ion could on l y speculate about, o f fe r ing pract ical 
solutions rather than mere narrat ive salves fo r the fear o f human temporal i ty . For example, 
Ray K u r z w e i l quite del iberately entit les his prophecy for computer intel l igence The Age of 
Spiritual Machines. 49 Throughout this thesis I w i l l refer to those af f i l ia ted to this v i e w as 
the cybernetic transcendentalists. A s we shall see i n m y discussion o f f i lms l i ke 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, w i t h its "star c h i l d , " the idea o f the demon as a d isembodied m i n d (or 
d isembodied force that can alter minds) is an appropriate way to explore the poss ib i l i ty o f 
cybernetic transcendence i n f i c t i on . O n the other hand, the mora l issue o f whether a 
conscious H a l can be discoimected (that is, executed), l i ke Stuart /Achi l les w h o wants his 
v i r tua l marr iage to be acknowledged as genuine, destabilises mora l norms. L ibera l 
human ism has depended on a c o m m o n no t ion o f what the human is and what human 
society should be, based on a Hobbesian correspondence between the ind iv idua l body and 
M a r v i n M i n s k y , " W h y Computer Science is the M o s t bnportant T h i n g that Has 
Happened to the Humani t ies i n 5,000 Years , " lecture, Nara, Japan, 15 M a y 1996. Quoted 
i n Hayleร, Posthuman 244. 
4 7 Hans Moravec , Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence 
(Cambr idge, M A : Harvard U P , 1988) 147-59. 
4 8 D a v i d Nob le , The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of 
Invention (New Y o r k : Penguin, 1999) 3. 
4 9 Ray K u r z w e i l , The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human 
Intelligence (New Y o r k : V ik ing -Pengu in , 1999). 
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the body pol i t ic . A s A l lucquère Rosanne Stone notes, "soc ia l beings, people, exist by 
v i r tue o f possessing b io log ica l bodies through w h i c h their existence is warranted in the 
body p o l i t i c . " 5 0 Bu t what about people w h o inhabi t mu l t ip le avatars, or intel l igences whose 
"b ra ins " are made f r o m microchips rather than cells? 
One immediate response to such posthumanism is to argue that i t does not represent 
a tota l juncture f r o m the past. N . Kather ine Hay leร , preeminent How We Became 
Posthuman demonstrates how posthumanism continues the legacies o f l iberal human ism 
rather than breaking f r o m i t systemat ica l ly . 5 1 Another response argues fo r the value o f 
embodied cogni t ion. Neuroscient ists such as An ton io Damasio stress the hol is t ic role o f 
the embodied bra in in th ink ing , such that the reproduct ion o f m i n d alone is insuf f ic ient to 
repl icate the human experience o f l i v i ng i n the w o r l d anchored i n а софогеаі centre (a 
pos i t ion advocated by A . ร . в у att i n A Whistling Woman1 w h i c h I study i n chapter 9 ) . 5 2 
Roger Penrose argues that consciousness is the product o f phys ica l , quantum mechanisms 
that cannot be simulated toough other, non-quantum media such as c i rcu i t boards . 5 3 
The u l t imate alternative to cybernetic transcendental ism is to deconstruct its 
poss ib i l i ty at its epistemological roots. I n his Chinese R o o m exper iment, for example, John 
Searle contends that in pr inc ip le human consciousness cannot be reproduced i n a machine 
because the translat ion process is i tsel f a shi f t f r o m the self-consciousness that 
characterises the human; jus t as syntax is not semantics, to be able to m i m i c th ink ing 
t feough a p rogram does not equate to actual ly t h i n k i n g . 5 4 M o r e general ly, there is an 
apparent disconnect between the "easy" p rob lem o f consciousness (the observat ion o f 
A l lucquère Rosanne Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of 
the Mechanical Age (Cambr idge, M A : M I T Press, 1995) 63. 
5 1 She observes, f o r example, that " the erasure o f embodiment is a feature c o m m o n 
to both the l iberal humanist subject and the cybernet ic posthuman. Ident i f ied w i t h the 
rat ional m i n d , the l iberal subject possessed a body but was not usual ly represented as being 
a body. On l y because the body is not ident i f ied w i t h the sel f is i t possible to c l a im fo r the 
l iberal subject its notor ious universal i ty , a c l a im that depends on erasing markers o f bod i l y 
d i f ference, inc lud ing sex, race, and ethn ic i ty . " H a y les, Posthuman 4 . 
5 2 A n t o n i o Damasio, Descartes ' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain 
(London : Picador, 1995); The Feeling of What Happens (London : V ๒ t a g e , 2000). 
5 3 Roger Penrose, The Emperor'ร New Mind: Concerning Computers1 Minds1 and 
the Laws of Physics (1989; O x f o r d : O x f o r d U P , 1999). 
5 4 John Searle, " M i n d s , Brains and Programs," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3.3 
(1980) : 417-57. He expanded his cr i t ique i n Minds1 Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith 
Lectures (London : B r i t i sh Broadcast ing Софога ї іоп , 1984). 
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neuro-chemical States and the implementation o f specific rules in artificial intelligence) 
and the " h a r d " p rob lem (how those discrete states g ive rise to the var iety o f conscious 
exper ience) . 5 5 Endors ing th is , the fact that ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence has fa i led to develop even 
a decade after Tu r i ng predicted i t w o u l d emerge m igh t suggest that the human m i n d is 
in t r ins ica l ly unavai lable fo r s imulat ion. Perhaps the most famous cr i t ic in this l ine remains 
Herbert Drey fus , w i t h his book What Computers Can Կ Do. 56 He contends that v is ions such 
as M i n s k y ' ร def lect attent ion away f r o m the w a y i n w h i c h cybernetics is changing humans 
i n the present, w i t h man 'ร mal leable nature ensur ing that even i f machines cannot th ink 
l i ke humans, "People have begun to th ink o f themselves as objects able to f i t in to the 
in f lex ib le calculat ions o f d isembodied machines." Rather than the computer p rov id ing an 
analogy fo r the human m i n d , the human m i n d is squeezed to accommodate the operat ional 
interfaces and l imi ta t ions o f the machine; w e r isk "no t the advent o f superintel l igent 
computers, but o f subintel l igent human be ings . " 5 7 I n a l l these examples, spir i tual 
speculations about the possib i l i ty o f instant iat ing m i n d in a d i f ferent m e d i u m are w ish fu l 
th ink ing that not on l y misunderstands the nature o f consciousness, but also deflects 
attention f r o m the mora l crises facmg human ism i n the present i n its attempt to negotiate 
the boundaries between man and machine. 
H o w , then, is this dialect ic between transcendence and embodiment f igured by 
l i terary f i c t i on , w i t h its under ly ing demonic poetics. For on the one hand, the l i terary text is 
a physical artefact - that is, a body o f prose - whose words intend to convey a l im i ted 
number o f semantic meanings. However , this mechanical language can be deployed i n 
such a w a y as to lead to indeterminate " v i r t u a l " effects i n the subject ive consciousness o f a 
reader w h o may draw di f ferent meanings out o f the same body o f text. W i l l i a m Gibson, 
w h o inaugurated the cyberpunk genre w i t h his 1984 nove l , Neuromancer, seems to have 
understood computers through the sort o f double perspective also t yp i f i ed in demonic 
possession. Watch ing f r o m the sidelines o f an amusement arcade, standing outside o f the 
D a v i d J. ^ha lmers , The conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory 
(New Y o r k : O x f o r d U P , 1996) x i - x i i i . 
5 6 The f i rs t ed i t ion o f the book was f i rs t publ ished i n 1972 but , an ind icat ion o f its 
ongoing importance, i t was republ ished in 1979 and 1992 as Huber t L. Drey fus , What 
Computers Still Can  yt Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambr idge, М А : МГГ Press, 
1992). 
5 7 Dreyfus 192. 
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system, Gibson saw something disconcert ing i n the close in te r tw in ing o f a player and 
game: 
I cou ld see i n the physical intensi ty o f their postures h o w rapt the k ids 
inside were. I t was l i ke one o f those closed systems out o f a Pynchon nove l : 
a feedback loop w i t h photons coming o f f the screens into the k i d ' s eyes, 
neurons m o v i n g through their bodies, and electrons m o v i n g toough the 
v ideo game. These k ids c lear ly believed i n the space games pro jec ted . 5 8 
A s I suggested earlier, seeing possession f r o m the outside can be disconcert ing, precisely 
because we have no way o f k n o w i n g what that experience is l i ke f r o m the perspective o f 
the possessed. However , Gibson 'ร use o f the w o r d " rap t " (or rapture) appropriately 
acknowledges the depth o f the p layer 'ร investment i n the game i n a way that, as for the 
man marr ied i n a M U D or as for the medieval poet possessed by the spir i t o f G o d , can 
seem h igh l y valuable f r o m their o w n po in t o f v iew . 
The cyberpunk genre inscribes this ambivalence. B y its styl ist ic novel ty , cyberpunk 
challenges ex is t ing l i terary standards, m i m i c k i n g the way i n w h i c h i n the novels 
themselves, the computer becomes the too l o f l iberat ion, f reeing the talented hacker f r o m 
the physical constraints and pover ty imposed upon h i m by an unfa i r capital ist system. 
Gibson typ ica l l y describes hackers as " cowboys , " representing them as uneasy outsiders, 
stuck ambiguously as neither heroes nor anti-heroes i n a way w h i c h m igh t also pertain to 
the sub-genre i tself, w h i c h dissolves, recombines and pastiches the body o f l i terary 
convent ions i n unusual ways. Th is is certainly evident i n the epochal moment when Gibson 
introduces cyberspace (his neologism) as: 
A consensual ha l luc inat ion experienced da i ly b y b i l l i ons o f legi t imate 
operators, i n every nat ion, b y ch i ld ren being taught mathemat ical 
concepts...A graphic representation o f data abstracted f r o m the banks o f 
every computer i n the human system. Unth inkab le complex i ty . L ines o f 
l igh t ranged in the nonspace o f the m i n d , clusters and constel lat ions o f data. 
L i k e c i ty l ights, receeding. . . 5 9 
O n the surface, the passage is disconcert ing i n its representation o f posthumani ty , 
appearing aesthetically radical i n its new verbal currency ("nonspace," "cyberspace") , and 
5 8 W i l l i a m Gibson, in terv iew w i t h La r r y McCa f fe r y , Storming the Reality Studio: A 
Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodern Science Fiction, ed. La r ry M c C a f f e r y (Durham, 
N C : D u k e U P , 1991) 272. Emphasis i n o r igmal . 
W i l l i a m Gibson, Neuromancer (1984; London : HarperCol l ins , 1994) 5 1 . 
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its verbless clauses. A t this leve l , people become d is turb ing ly mechanist ic. Since the w o r d 
computer o r ig ina l l y referred to a real person calculat ing astronomical tables, does "every 
computer i n the human system" refer to the d ig i ta l computers in the networks set up by 
humans, or are humans themselves become computers? 6 0 The reference to mathematics 
lends a double meaning to the w o r d "operator , " w h i c h can also describe the Boolean log ic 
operators ( A N D / O R / N O R ) that are the fundamental constituents o f p rogramming . Thus the 
ch i ldren are not on ly taught mathemat ical concepts v ia the cyberspace media, but rather 
they are the very log ica l f i l ters (the "operators") through wh i ch in fo rmat ion must pass, 
instant iat ing the system at root rather than s imp ly interact ing w i t h i t . Bu t this interpretat ion 
of the human as machine which results from a literal іпЇЄфге!аІіоп of the words is 
balanced by the way i n wh i ch such words combine i n cogn i t i ve ly appeal ing ways. I n 
c o m m o n w i t h cybernetic transcendental ism, the physical reduct ion o f the human as part o f 
the immater ia l ne twork is a necessary pr ice fo r the attainment o f a stellar sort o f re l ig ious 
ecstasy. Th is mode o f existence as in fo rmat ion tenders the experience o f " l ines o f l i gh t " 
w i t h data f o r m i n g "clusters and constel lat ions." Taken l i tera l ly , this m igh t seem to describe 
the actual data display o f a computer moni tor . However , the al l i terat ion i n phrases l i ke 
" l ines o f l i gh t " resonantly appeals to a poetic inner vo ice, ensuring that the meaning o f the 
passage is not conf ined to the superf ic ia l referent o f the pr inted wo rd . I n the uncanny 
likeness between poetic inspi rat ion and cybernet ic subject iv i ty , this poet ic qual i ty also 
constitutes a "consensual ha l luc ina t ion , " though un l i ke the l i teral ha l luc inat ion o f 
cyberspace this imp l i c i t one deceives b y the tonal qual i ty o f language. Objec t ive ly , Gibson 
sees the arcade player as t ied to the system. However , he acknowledges that f r o m the 
subject ive po in t o f v i ew o f the one w i t h i n the loop, such an experience can be rapturous. 
L i kew ise , wh i l s t i n the moment o f the reading experience we may be deterred by the 
vocabulary o f mechanism and mathematics, the way these words are sty l ish ly combined 
simultaneously induces persuasively poetic images. Hav ing said that, i n an unresolved 
osci l la t ion between human embodiment and posthuman d isembodiment that characterises 
the novel as a who le , the passage then pul ls back f r o m the Ьгіїж o f complete immers ion i n 
a hyperbo l ic cyberspace. Though "conste l la t ions" cues a proto typ ica l analogy w i t h stars 
that w o u l d be appropriate to such rel ig ious transcendence, G ibson instead makes a 
6 0 The O x f o r d Eng l ish D ic t ionary traces the w o r d computer back to Richard 
Bra i thwai te 'ร The Yong Mans Gleanings o f 1613: " I haue read the truest computer o f 
T imes , and the best A r i t hmet i c ian that euer breathed, and he reduceth thy dayes into a 
short number . " "Compute r , " The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. 
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metaphor ical connect ion to the urban and ar t i f ic ia l : rather than stars, the constel lat ions are 
" l i k e c i ty l ights , reced ing. " Th is shows how style can again be deployed i n order to f igure 
the d issolut ion o f embodiment i n a d i f ferent context. I n this case, G ibson breaches the 
boundaries o f a canonical body (cowboys and cybernetics, constel lat ions and c i ty l ights do 
not no rma l l y appear together) and o f syntax, the removal o f verbs i n a stream-of֊ 
consciousness effect. B u t not on ly does this style f igure the breakdown o f the convent ional 
human subject as opposed to the posthuman, styl ist ic novel ty is also something strongly 
associated w i t h the more t radi t ional idea o f mspi ra t ion and l i terary genius I out l ined 
earlier, i n w h i c h again the key feature is the poet or wr i te r ' ร wi l l ingness to g ive over their 
body (the hand that wr i tes) to a voice that originates f r o m somewhere beyond themselves, 
thereby produc ing something or ig ina l , o therwor ldy and sui generis. Tona l l y ebbing and 
flowing between mater ia l meanings and sensual impression, l i ke embodied humans 
passing as in format iona l constructs i n cyberspace, the passage marks the cybernet ic 
tensions between body and m i n d , mechanism and aesthetics, that resist reduct ion or one 
single determined meaning. Such a tension is also apparent i n demonic experiences. 
W h i l s t i t m igh t be tempt ing to see the dialect ic i n Neuromancer as analogous to the 
broader " t w o cu l tures" fracture between the sciences and the arts, i t is important to note 
that because o f the w a y cybernetics is in t r ins ica l ly in terd isc ip l inary, interpretations and 
representations o f posthumanism do not necessarily d iv ide a long this l i n e ᅳ G ibson 'ร 
observations and w r i t i n g encapsulate the double poss ib i l i ty o f subject ive and object ive 
modes o f percept ion. L i kew ise Norber t Wiener heralded the cybernet ic epistemology that 
represented humans as in fo rmat ion wh i ls t s imultaneously speaking up for t radi t ional 
humanist values o f respect for the body ( ind iv idua l and p o l i t i c ) . 6 1 Wh i l s t Wiener foresaw a 
future in w h i c h mechanical slaves w o u l d be able to pe r fo rm the economic w o r k w i thou t 
the mora l conf l ic ts invo lved i n keeping human slaves, he admit ted that, jus t as the f i rst 
industr ia l revo lu t ion devalued the w o r k o f the craf tsman, the second is "bound to devalue 
the human b ra in . " W i t h Belsen and H i rosh ima p rominen t l y in m i n d , Wiener admit ted that 
the new science "embraces technical developments w i t h great possibi l i t ies for good and 
e v i l . " 6 2 Rather than anti-science, Wiener ' ร keynote, l i ke the double trajectory o f 
Hayleร makes the case fo r Wiener as a humanist w h o almost re luctant ly 
inst igated the era o f the posthuman: Wiener ' ร wr i t ings " tes t i fy to bo th the exhi larat ion and 
the uneasiness that cybernetics generated when its boundary disrupt ions threatened to get 
out o f hand . " Hay leร, Posthuman 84-112. 
6 2 Wiener , Cybernetics 28. 
B r o w n 29 
cybernetics I mapped above, requires that the analyst adopt a Janus-face. Be ing a 
reactionary Ludd i te against the science and technology o f the cybernet ic age, ignores the 
possibi l i t ies they entai l fo r re th ink ing human ism. Such L u d d i s m fai ls to elaborate the 
condi t ions and effects w i t h w h i c h science and technology are inev i tab ly changing the 
human ᅳ l i ke the computer games' player - i n the present. A n analysis o f f i c t iona l 
metaphors w h i c h gets away f r o m construct ing the cybernet ic as s imp ly the gothic or 
monstrous other to the human migh t help to capture the ambiguous, mul t i faceted and 
systemic way i n w h i c h the existence o f computers i n the w o r l d has already changed the 
nature o f be ing human, whether fo r good or i l l . A s Veron ica Ho l l i nger argues, we need to 
"deconstruct the human/machine opposi t ion and begin to ask new questions about the ways 
i n w h i c h we and our technologies ' in ter face ' to produce what has become a mutual 
e v o l u t i o n . " 6 3 1 take interfaces here to refer not jus t to the one connect ing the computer user 
to the w o r l d beh ind the screen, but to al l those that cross discip l ines, s imulat ions and 
consciousnesses: the interface between art and science; the relat ionship between body and 
m i n d ; the connect ion or d isconnect ion between words on a page and meanings i n a m ind . I t 
is its place at the interface - the juncture between the object ive, outer w o r l d and the inner 
w o r l d o f subject ive consciousness - that makes the demon so appropriately situated in the 
cybernetic cond i t ion . U n l i k e the monster, the demon (whose nature is precisely to change 
natures f r o m w i t h i n so that percept ion o f real i ty outside the self is changed) provides a 
trope w h i c h engages p r imar i l y w i t h questions o f interface rather than category, o f 
epistemology rather than onto logy. Demons re ly on the open m i n d o f their possessee, but 
must also be іпІефгеЇЄ(1 diversely: even i f the f ina l authent ic i ty o f their message cannot be 
guaranteed because the demon is a s imulator (or d iss imulator) , demons - l i ke computers ― 
demand that w e interpret the relat ionship that exists between them and us. As Norber t 
Wiener saw i t , what marked cybernetics as a new disc ip l ine was that i t focused not on the 
intr insic nature o f things but on the systems o f feedback and communica t ion that regulate 
the behaviour o f any ent i ty , whether organic, mechanical or human. T o recover W iener ' ร 
ground between the poles o f M i n s k y and Drey fus , and to cont inue the cybernet ic t rad i t ion 
o f attending to the systems o f feedback rather than the onto logy o f the posthuman'ร 
otherness, w e need to read between the l ines o f novels l i ke Neuromancer and the 
ambiguous effects i t produces i n the minds o f its readers. W e need to focus not on the 
monsters but the demonic f ic t ions o f cybernetics. 
6 3 Veron ica Ho l l inger , "Cybernet ic Deconstruct ions: Cyberpunk and 
Postmodern ism," Mosaic 23.2 (1990) : 42. 
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Ontologies and Interfaces: The Monster and the D e m o n 
Reading some o f the c la ims o f computer scientists, i t is not d i f f i cu l t to see w h y 
cybernetics has fac i l i ta ted much apocalypt ic science f i c t i on . The cyberneticist Hans 
Moravec, for example, opens his prophet ic study Mind Children by p roc la iming that "ou r 
genes have f i na l l y outsmarted themselves. They have produced a weapon so power fu l i t 
w i l l vanquish the losers and winners a l ike . " The " w e a p o n " i n question is ar t i f ic ia l 
in te l l igence. 6 4 The post-b io logical future that Moravec envisions cou ld be гериф08Є ( і 
easily in to a Promethean narrat ive, i n wh i ch the overt promise o f technology also entails its 
unforeseen hazard. I n the f i l m / Robot, fo r example (der ived f r o m Isaac A s i m o v ' ร short 
story co l lec t ion) , robots attack humans because o f a log ica l conf l i c t i n the f i rs t ru le o f their 
p rogramming : " N o robot may ha rm humani ty , or through inact ion, a l low humani ty to 
come to h a r m . " 6 5 A s the robots realise unethical humans are the greatest threat to their o w n 
species, they must be eradicated b y the superior machines they o r ig ina l l y created. Th is 
sel f -cancel l ing future has of ten been g iven added potency b y l i n k i ng cybernetics to 
technologies w h i c h a l low otherwise disincarnate ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences to wreak phys ica l 
havoc. T w o o f the most s igni f icant have been nuclear weapons (as i n War Games or The 
Terminator) and genetic mod i f i ca t ion (Jurassic Park).66 A s the Terminator glowers w i t h 
its hu l k i ng meta l l ic f rame and g l o w i n g red eyes, or as the inqu is i t ive velociraptors are 
unleashed b y the theme park 'ร sabotaged computer system, cybernet ic f ic t ions slot w i t h i n a 
prototyp ica l scheme i n w h i c h monsters trope the social impact o f science. I t is certainly 
legi t imate to pay attent ion to these sorts o f ontologies - the di f ference between human, 
machine, and monster . 6 7 Indeed, that I w i l l do so throughout this thesis suggests that i t is 
Moravec 1. 
6 5 Isaac A s i m o v , ƒ ， Robot (1967; London : Voyager -Нафег , 1996) i x ; I， Robot, d ir . 
A l e x Proyaร, perf. W i l l Smi th , Br idget Moynahan, A l a n T u d y k , James C r o m w e l l and 
Bruce Greenwood, 20th Century Fox , 2004. 
6 6 War Games, d ir . John Badham, perf. Ma t thew Broder ick , Dabney Coleman, John 
W o o d , and A l l y Sheedy, 1983， D V D , M G M Entertainment, 2000; The Terminator, d ir . 
James Cameron, perf. A r n o l d Schwarzenegger, M ichae l B iehn , L i nda H a m i l t o n and Paul 
W i n f i e l d , 1984, D V D , M G M Entertainment, 2007; Jurassic Park, dir. Steven Spielberg, 
perf. Sam N e i l l , Laura D e m , Jef f G o l d b l u m and Richard A t tenborough, 1 9 9 2 ， 
videocassette, Un iversa l , 1992. 
j o n T u m e y , In Frankenstein's Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture 
(New Haven, C T : Ya le U P , 1998); K ings ley A m i s saw robots and androids as descendents 
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not possible to th ink about cybernetics w i thou t referr ing to construct ions o f al ter i ty. 
However , by concentrat ing on the outer nature o f malevolent ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences or 
man-machine hybr ids we r isk over look ing the current mutua l exchanges between 
cybernetics and the human in the present. B y look ing at f ic t ions that treat cybernetics i n 
terms o f demonism, I hope to show h o w cybernetics also condi t ions the histor ical 
experience o f be ing human i n a w o r l d whose real i ty has always seemed sometimes 
d i f f i cu l t to comprehend or def ine, even through such t radi t ional media as narrat ive. 
T o an unusual degree i n the f ic t ions I examine, the technologies o f narrat ive are 
in ter twined w i t h the scient i f ic outcomes the p lo t is intended to apprehend or cr i t ique, and 
this compl ica t ion lends i tsel f to a demonic analysis. The contrast between the ณ:-text o f 
Enl ightenment monsters, M a r y Shel ley 's Frankenstein, and Shel ley Jackson'ร hypertext 
nove l , Patchwork Girl, i l luminates this c lear l y . 6 8 M a r y Shel ley 'ร novel is i tsel f a 
b ib l iographic hyb r i d , comming l i ng and layer ing voices and genres, and thereby o f fe r ing 
di f ferent perspectives on the monster 'ร true self, w h i c h remains evasive. However , its 
condemnatory characterisation o f V i c to r F r a i i e n s t e i n means the readers are absolved o f 
responsibi l i ty for creat ing the monster i n any cogni t ive sense. The monster is, rather, seen 
as the result o f a specif ic ( i f haz i ly def ined) technological process contained w i t h i n the 
f i c t ion . However , cybernet ic f ic t ions regular ly acknowledge the relat ionship between their 
o w n mater ial textual i ty (or immater ia l hyper textual i ty) and the cybernet ic paradigm out o f 
wh i ch they are constructed. Patchwork Girl is an adaptat ion o f M a r y Shel ley 'ร or ig ina l and 
L. Frank B aum'ร The Patchwork Girl ofOz, punn ing ly authored by a hyb r i d ident i ty , 
Mary /She l ley (as in M a r y Shel ley or Shel ley Jackson). Th rough hyper l inks , Mary /She l ley 
weaves ambiguous relat ionships between authors and their creations, and between the 
textual or iginals and the der ivat ive Patchwork Girl w h i c h also, again ambiguously , refers 
to the name o f the ma in protagonist. C l i ck i ng the w o r d " h o p , " for example, leads to 
Patchwork G i r l descr ib ing herself as "a discont inuous trace, a dotted l i n e " ; the l i n k " s e w n " 
generates " I had sewn her, s t i tching deep into the n ight by candlel ight , un t i l the t iny b lack 
o f M a r y Shel ley 'ร or ig ina l monster i n his New Maps of Hell: A Survey of Science Fiction 
(London: Gol lancz, 1962) 33. 
6 8 M a r y Shel ley, Frankenstein1 or1 the Modern Prometheus, ed. M . K . Joseph (1818; 
Ox fo rd : O x f o r d U P , 1998); Shel ley Jackson, Patchwork Girl by Mary Shelley and Herself, 
C D - R O M (Water town, M A : Eastgate Systems, 1995). 
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stitches wavered into script and I began to feel that I was w r i t i n g . " As w e l l as mark ing the 
strange relat ionships between fem in i sm, sewing, w r i t i ng and bodies i n its narrat ive (so far 
as that term can apply to a story w i t h many possible paths), Patchwork Girl goes a step 
further than Frankenstein i n that not on ly does the ex is t ing hyb r id text ref lect the 
const i tut ion o f the created monster, but the process o f reading Patchwork Girl through 
selecting a hypertextual route is d i rect ly the process o f b i r th ing the "monster " ( w h o is, 
actual ly, not at al l monstrous). U n l i k e in the or ig ina l , here the reader or web browser is 
d i rect ly responsible fo r creat ing the other. A s N . Kather ine Hayleร observes, " A s the 
un i f ied subject is thus broken apart and reassembled as a mu l t i p l i c i t y , Patchwork Girl also 
h ighl ights the technologies that make the textual body i tsel f a m u l t i p l i c i t y . " 6 9 The 
hypertextual technique exploi ts the relat ionship between the message and the med ium, 
mak ing true Marsha l l M c L u h a n ' ร fo rmu la that the m e d i u m is the message. 7 0 Bu t can such 
cybernetic models also i n f o rm f ic t ions whose bodies are essential ly intact and 
convent ional , o f fe r ing a general ly coherent narrat ive structure? 
Interpret ing Heidegger 'ร cal l fo r art and l i terature to reveal the w a y that technology 
frames the phenomenal universe w i t h i n structures o f u t i l i t y , D a v i d Porush asserts that: 
Cybernet ic f i c t i on is precisely that mode o f expression most suited to 
reveal the essence o f technology: at once quite ak in to technology i tself , 
since the texts are fo rmed b y the appl icat ions, i ronic or otherwise, o f 
a lgor i thms bor rowed f r o m cybernetics 一 and at the same t ime most suited to 
reveal ing the t r u t h . 7 1 
Cybernetics has become such a power fu l episteme for th ink ing about the nature o f 
humani ty and semiot ics that even texts w h i c h are not apparently d i rect ly about cybernetics 
can nevertheless be mext r icab ly in fo rmed by i t , even produced through its mechanisms. 
That even these texts - wh i ch are not necessari ly generic science f i c t ion but are f i c t i on 
in formed b y the science - can reveal the essence o f technology indicates h o w deeply 
cybernetics has affected the general interests and representative forms o f postmodern 
narrative culture. Th is , then, explains w h y , w i t h the except ion o f System Shock and 
Patchwork Girl, I have chosen not to consider cybernet ic l i terature exp l i c i t l y produced or 
N . Kather ine Hayleร, My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjectivities and 
Literary Texts (Chicago: บ o f Chicago p ， 2005) 151 . 
Marsha l l M c L u h a n , Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London ; 
Rout ledge, 1964) 9. 
7 1 Porash 83. 
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generated by that technology ( f i l m does engage more closely w i t h i t , as expla ined be low) , 
and to avo id l ook ing at the most d i rect ly cont ingent relat ionships between cybernetics and 
l i terature, namely the changing nature o f textual i ty in an era o f hypertext and computer 
games. 7 2 For i n this cont ingent re lat ionship, we w o u l d natural ly expect that the essence o f 
technology is revealed by engaging w i t h exp l ic i t images o f such artefacts, whether i n the 
f o r m o f S hodan'ร character or the monster that sits at the centre o f Patchwork Gir ľ s web 
o f l inks. The nature o f cybernetics here is, to a degree, a lways go ing to be sel f-evident i f , 
as Sherry Tu rk le argues, computers are inherent ly sel f - ref lex ive f oc i i nv i t i ng us to consider 
the nature o f human psychology, even when they do not r un any exp l ic i t narrat ive o f 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence. Bu t even when technology is not used di rect ly and exp l i c i t l y to 
provoke the reader to ref lect on the relat ionship between narrat ive and scient i f ic craf t , the 
demon provides a metaphor that mediates the effects o f technology into otherwise 
convent ional ly-structured narratives. Whether represented i n pr in t or f i l m , the demonic 
sustains the poss ib i l i ty that the ident i ty be ing perceived or cr i t iqued is also that w h i c h 
al lows such percept ion to happen i n the f i rst place; i n other words, i t binds narrat ive 
technique to the scient i f ic other that the style is designed to apprehend, so that a monster-
m y t h o f technology w o u l d i l l og ica l l y deconstruct the very aesthetics that produces i t . 
I am here using demon (or, s t r ic t ly , daemon) in the Platonic sense. The Platonic 
universe is t r ipart i te, inhabi ted by gods, demons and men i n the regions o f Heaven, air and 
earth respect ively. Daemons are required to mediate between the metaphysical and the 
physical , convey ing prayers and sacrif ices, and rewards and messages, to and f r o m men 
and the gods . 7 3 B y the later Hel len is t ic per iod the Platonic de f in i t ion had been submerged 
beneath a pejorat ive v i ew o f the demon as malevolent , something con f i rmed by Jewish 
monothe ism w h i c h translated the demon into Hebrew as "unc lean s p i r i t . " 7 4 However , the 
daemonic poss ib i l i ty never went away, be ing transmuted i n Chr is t ian t rad i t ion in to the 
guise o f the angel , w h i c h inhabi ted a s imi lar sublunary sphere w i t h agency between fa l len 
There is a g row ing body o f theory i n re lat ion to etexts, hypertextual i ty , and 
computer games as l i terature. T w o o f the most in f luent ia l works i n the f i e l d f r o m w i t h i n 
convent ional l i terary studies are Espen J. Aarseth 1 Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic 
Literature (Ba l t imore: Johns Hopk ins U P , 1997) and Jerome M c G a n n , Radiant Textuality: 
Literature After the World Wide Web ( N e w Y o r k : Palgrave, 2001). 
7 3 Plato, The Symposium, trans. Wa l te r Ham i l t on (Harmondswor th : Penguin, 1951) 
81 
7 4 L .F. Har tman, " D e m o n ( i n the B i b l e ) , " The New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. 
Berard L. Marthaler , 2nd ed. v o l . 4 (Detro i t : Gale, 2003) 645-46. 
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man and G o d ( inversely, the pagan gods were degraded as be ing demons) ; as we l l as 
w i tchcra f t or the dev i l , possession cou ld be associated w i t h the sort o f Apos to l i c revelat ion 
that occurred through the H o l y spirit, a ve in that cont inued in Protestant t radi t ion (most 
voca l ly i n the Quakers or Muggle tons) . Though the close f o l k association between 
demon ism and wi tchcraf t may have ensured that the demon vernacular ly imp l ied ev i l , 
recent works l i ke Ph i l i p Pu l lman 'ร His Dark Materials t r i logy suggest that the Platonic 
daemon can st i l l mainta in its amora l i ty rather than immora l i t y , be ing s imp ly a technique or 
med ium fo r in t roducing a metaphysical (or, indeed, v i r tua l ) experience to the receptive 
se l f . 7 5 Indeed, in a l i teral sense there probably are ambivalent daemons lu rk ing on your 
very o w n computer, as in p rog ramming te rmino logy a daemon refers to a subroutine that is 
act ivated when certain condi t ions are m e t . 7 6 W h e n emai l appears demonica l ly to takeover 
your l i fe , remember that the "ma i le r -daemons" that route them o n servers are real ly 
ambivalent ! The fact that the demon is not c lear ly ev i l makes it open to complex ethical 
interpretat ions, ent i re ly fitting to ideas o f s imula t ion w i t h w h i c h i t is engaged w i t h on a 
double level . The negative connotat ion potent ia l ly applies to Shodan or Jackson'ร modern 
Frankenstein, but a conf l i c t arises as computers act as the daemonic intermediary for these 
games and hypertextual narratives. Th is daemonic/demonic tension is most clear i n 
cyberf ic t ions and computer games, bu t i t is also inherent i n re lat ion to l i terary inspirat ion 
and our engagement w i t h l i terary narratives. However , i t is in f i l m narratives that the 
daemonic/demonic і п іефіау is more apparent. 
I t is not iceable that many o f the plays w i t h i l lus ion in the early modern per iod 
invoked demons i n order to draw attent ion to the imp l i c i t l y daemonic nature o f the 
hal luc inatory device. For example, the Jesuit museum curator, showman and scholar, 
Athanasius K i rcher , constructed a magic lantern w h i c h projected images o f demons on to a 
screen. 7 7 A s Mar ina Warner suggests, the supernatural subject matter posited a strong 
association between the m ind ' s eye or the dream, and the powers o f the new machines o f 
Ph i l i p Pu l lman, His Dark Materials (London : Scholastic p, 2001). 
7 6 The OED defines daemon as " A p rogram (or part o f a program) , esp. w i t h i n a 
U n i x system, wh i ch runs i n the background w i thou t in tervent ion b y the user, either 
cont inuously or on l y when automat ica l ly activated by a part icular event or cond i t i on . " 
"daemon , " The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1989. 
7 7 For a descr ipt ion o f the museum, see Paula F ind len , "Sc ien t i f i c Spectacle in 
Baroque Rome: Athanasius K i rcher and the Roman Col lege M u s e u m , " Roma moderna e 
contemporanea з (1995) : 625-65. 
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i l lus ion. K i r che r ' ร magic lantern used the demonic to draw attention to its daemonical ly 
mediat ing power. Or, rather, the power that u l t imate ly resided w i t h the scientist, fo r i n this 
dynamic the dev i l ish ent i ty wh ich cou ld generate i l lus ion i n the m i n d o f the observer was 
tamed as a daemonic th ing , since un l i ke true possession the device could be swi tched o f f at 
its master'ร discret ion. Project ing and th row ing the grotesque away f r o m the observer and 
the inventor, such images and deceits reinstate the hierarchy o f the cont ro l l ing human self 
over the arbi t rary w o r l d o f demonic decept ion, to di f ferent iate between man and 
(super)nature, since the latter has been turned and manipulated to the fo rmer 's lud ic ends. 
Inher i t ing the legacy o f this mastery o f i l lus ion , the daemonic/demonic tension is most 
evident i n c inemat ic f ic t ions, because the f igura t ion o f a malevolent cybernetic technology 
is produced through the med ium o f the camera lens and, o f ten, d ig i ta l special effects. A s 
w i t h K i rcher ' ร magic lantern, Forbidden Planet, 2001: A Space Odyssey, Blade Runner 
and The Matrix ref lect on their daemonic m e d i u m , but do so in order to h igh l igh t the 
i ronical fact that they are cr i t ica l o f technology wh i l s t s imultaneously using it v isua l ly to 
realise a possible future w o r l d for their audiences. I n l ine w i t h postmodern theory, the self-
ref lect ion on the art i f ice o f c inematic i l l us ion-mak ing is designed to po in t to the 
imposs ib i l i t y o f const i tut ing a w o r l d outside o f representation or language, o f ob ject ive ly 
wi tnessing real i ty i n a way not f ramed or situated through the contro l o f an author or 
director. F i lms l i ke The Matrix project the demonic poss ib i l i ty o n screen not in order to 
tame it, but to propose that we real ly cou ld be l i v i ng i n a deceptive w o r l d o f images, 
impostures and i l lus ions, w i t h no way o f real is ing this through rat ional thought. A f t e r a l l , 
c inemat ic science has produced the special effects w h i c h a l l ow us to suspend our d isbel ief 
i n f i l m i c science f i c t i on , as w e hal lucinate future wor lds where, fo r a br ie f t ime, monstrous 
cyborgs appear real ly to exist. 
M y reading o f Neuromancer b r ie f l y demonstrated the ways in wh i ch the l i teral 
meanings o f words may be made ambiguous when vocabulary f r o m one genre 
unexpectedly is juxtaposed w i t h another. The subject ive effects o f hearing their poet ic, 
al l i terat ive qual i ty is in tension w i t h their l i teral representation o f people as unemot ional 
objects or machines, such that the empir ica l body o f the prose conf l ic ts w i t h the 
psychological effects that result f r o m it. The daemonic mechanism o f text results i n an 
uncertain demonics o f reading. A l t hough such daemonic/demonic maps o f textual 
mechanisms and cr i t iques are more d i f f i cu l t to analyse i n wr i t ten f i c t ion compared to the 
Mar ina Warner , Phantasmagoria: Spirit Visions1 Metaphors and Media into the 
Twenty֊First Century (New Yo rk : O x f o r d U P , 2006) 139. 
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computer game or c inemat ic f i c t i on , they are certa in ly present. I n Umber to Eco 's 
Foucault's Pendulum, fo r example, paranoid postmodernists produce through a computer 
the random intertextual connections that produce a compel l ing t ra i l o f clues about a secret 
conspiracy. Th is leads u l t imate ly to the demonic delusion that beneath the semblance o f 
real i ty lies a syncretic Plan. Just as Shel ley Jackson'ร hypertext causes the reader to 
constitute the monster, Foucault'ร Pendulum impl icates the computer- l ike wr i ters and 
readers in the process o f creating the strange subversions o f real i ty w i t h i n i t . Odd ly , g iven 
that, exp l ic i t l y , cybernet ic narratives contain messages about the dupl ic i tous effects o f 
cybernet ic media, they also remind that words do not m imet ica l l y ref lect the w o r l d o f 
s igni f ieds, but that meanings and real i ty are cont inua l ly distorted b y іп іефгеїа і іоп. The 
deceptions and manipulat ions o f narrat ive modes are, therefore, uncanny analogues to the 
ar t i f ic ia l s imulat ions, grotesque ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences, or d is turb ing android doubles 
presented w i t h i n them. 
Admi t t ed l y , however, almost al l these f ic t ions fa i l to exp l i c i t l y acknowledge the 
daemonic/demonic d is t inct ion, instead tak ing the vernacular term, demon, as their overt 
metaphor. Wha t sort o f creature is the more convent ional demon? A s the prehistory o f the 
demon has taken so many forms, de f in ing the demon i n any r ig id terms becomes i tsel f a 
demonica l ly obsessive act iv i ty . A r g u i n g against the Platonic t rad i t ion in w h i c h the demon 
was an " in termediate nature" between earth and heaven , 7 9 August ine contended in his 
f i f th -century The City of God that a l though demons do exist, their reason fo r existence is 
not to negotiate between god and man but to deceive and l ie , causing man to swerve f r o m 
mak ing true and direct suppl icat ion to G o d h imse l f . 8 0 In f luent ia l though The City of God 
was, though, i t d id not prevent the Renaissance rediscovery o f the Hermet ic system i n 
w h i c h the arts o f the unseen can cause physical effects on the w o r l d in real i ty (a be l ie f 
taken up b y the conspirators i n Foucault'ร Pendulum). Later, after the Reformat ion , 
dec id ing whether the demon was a tangible force or mere ly a false be l ie f f ed into Cathol ic 
and Protestant debates. For the former , the demon indicated the effectiveness o f r i tua l ( i n 
the exorc ism) and the importance o f signs o f the w o r k o f God and o f the priest as his agent. 
For the Protestant, the demon migh t indicate excessive Popery, and o f more impor t was the 
Plato, The Symposium 8 1 . 
8 0 August ine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R.w. Dyson , 
Cambr idge Texts i n the H is tory o f Po l i t i ca l Though t (Cambr idge: Cambr idge U P , 1998) 
especial ly 332-58. A good gloss on this passage is p rov ided by G.R. Evans, Augustine on 
Evil (Cambr idge: Cambr idge U P , 1982) 9 8 - 1 1 1 . 
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quiet spontaneity o f personal worsh ip ( though, odd ly , the inspirat ion o f the spir i t cou ld st i l l 
assume a demonic character). For m y purposes, i t suff ices to suggest that, l i ke the s imple 
computer i con that points to an associated program, the demon is a shortcut trope that 
produces one possib i l i ty above a l l : that o f be ing deceived, so that real i ty as we k n o w it 
becomes suspended behind an i l l us ion , albeit one that m igh t u l t imate ly reveal some more 
fundamental t ruth behind real i ty. Te l l i ng l y , the most important demon տ th ink ing about 
the relat ionship between science and the self invokes this possibi l i ty . Imag in ing that 
experience is an i l lus ion implanted by deceiv ing demons, Descartes realises that regardless 
o f the o r ig in o f sensations, the fact that there is an ident i ty do ing the exper iencing cannot 
be doubted. Across chapters 4 to 7， I argue that the reject ion o f Descartes' idea that i t is 
possible to break toough delusion toough rat ional sel f - ref lect ion is a key to postmodern 
phi losophy and narrat ive. Postmodern f ic t ions take up the possib i l i ty o f demonic deceit 
wh i l s t re jectmg the possib i l i ty o f empir ica l foundat iona l ism that results f r o m seeing 
through the delusion. The idea o f the demon as a deceptive agent inhabi t ing the m i n d o f 
the self and mak ing perceptions o f " t r u t h " and " the rea l " arbi t rary meshes w i t h a 
postmodern bel ie f that the w o r l d cannot transparently be k n o w n , except d i rough the 
d is tor t ing lens o f representational signif iers. W h e n these representations are inhabited by 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences ( in 2001), androids and repl icants (Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? and Blade Runner) and near-perfect v i r tua l s imulat ions (The Matrix), percept ion is 
made doub ly -d i f f i cu l t . 
The demon is a s imulator whose true nature is hard to determine once and fo r a l l , 
even as i t determines the perceptions o f the possessed. Cathol ic treatises on deal ing w i t h 
devi ls warned the priest against engaging i n discourse w i t h the demon; the dev i l should 
on ly be commanded to iden t i f y i tsel f b y name, and to exp la in w h y it entered the body, 
when it intends to leave, and how its departure w i l l be indicated. But , i n pract ice, i t seems 
that the very fact o f asking the dev i l its ident i ty authenticated for the demoniac that there 
was a dev i l inside, so that a v ic ious cyc le o f interrogat ion and leg i t imat ion o f its presence 
kept pushmg the f i na l exorc ism ever further away . 8 1 Thus the demon was essential ly 
const i tuted through the s imula t ion o f language, pro ject ing a "voca l i c b o d y " by 
vent r i loqu is ing through the demon iac . 8 2 A n uncanny compar ison between Jean Baudr i l la rd 
8 1 D.p. Walker , Unclean Spirits: Possession and Exorcism in France and England 
in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries (London : Scolar-Bemrose, 1981) 8. 
Steven Connor, Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism (Ox fo rd : 
O x f o r d U P , 2000). 
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and a case o f possession i n his French compatr iots four centuries prev ious ly strongly 
impl ies that demonism and postmodern ism are h igh l y compat ib le, hav ing to do w i t h the 
ab i l i ty o f language to consti tute delusion so conv inc ing ly that i t becomes impossib le to 
separate the true f r o m the false. Մ the real i ty o f the demon becomes that w h i c h is produced 
through language, then when postmodern ism argues that " r ea l i t y " is essentially a product 
o f d iscurs ively mediated thoughts, real i ty as a who le becomes demonic. 
I n 1634， in the French t o w n o f Loudun , a fract ious priest, U rba in Grandier, was 
burned at the stake for hav ing caused the demonic possession o f a group o f Ursu l ine nuns. 
A sexual ly attractive and po l i t i ca l l y wel l -connected f igure, Grandier appears to have 
of fended the prioress o f the t own ' ร convent, Jeanne des Agnes; he also rubbed against 
various other bourgeois fami l ies i n the t o w n , par t icu lar ly after an i l leg i t imate relat ionship 
w i t h the daughter o f the pub l i c prosecutor. In what began as a prank and ended w i t h 
Grandier 'ร execut ion, the nuns staged their o w n possession, confessing that their demons 
were brought by Grandier 'ร dev i l i sh intervent ion. Tak ing place w i t h i n a w ider ant i -
Huguenot ism under the pu rv iew o f Card ina l R ichel ieu, Grandier was f i na l l y executed. 
However , the nuns and prioress who were in i t ia l l y encouraged mere ly to simulate 
possession became so bound up i n produc ing the expected signi f iers o f demon ism that they 
genuinely bel ieved themselves to be possessed, according to a l l the codes fo r interpret ing 
such signs. The attention and money their case drew - as w e l l as the fact that i t spurred 
many o f the townspeople to convert back to Catho l i c ism - caused them to sustain the 
possession long after Grandier 'ร death. S imi la r l y , the exorcists Father Tranqu i l le , Father 
Lactance and Jean-Joseph Sur in , and Grandier 'ร torturer and inquis i tor D r . Mannour i , 
became obsessed w i t h Grandier 'ร apparent retent ion o f fa i th to the last and their o w n role 
i n the hoax, such that they a l l soon del i r ious ly bel ieved that they were themselves 
possessed by demons. The p rob lem here is that the forgery o f possession and the true 
possession sl ide in to each other a l l too easily, because it is impossible ֊ by the very nature 
o f the demon as ex is t ing w i t h i n the body o f another and pro ject ing his existence f r o m that 
pos i t ion - to ver i f y whether that other is t ru ly possessed through any empi r ica l method. A s 
Steven Connor summarises: 
The one s imula t ing the signs o f demonic possession is hard to d ist inguish 
f r o m the real v i c t i m o f demonic possession, because possession is an act o f 
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s imula t ion; the one w h o pretends to have a dev i l , pretends to have been 
occupied b y a spir i t whose nature i t is to pretend to existence. 8 3 
Producing a l l the true symptoms o f demon ism, the nuns o f L o u d u n cou ld not be described 
ob ject ive ly as possessed or mere ly s imula t ing possession because the symptoms i n the f i rst 
case have the ident ical qualit ies o f the fake, o f speaking i n the vo ice o f another. The double 
i rony here is that the book w h i c h popular ised the case, A ldous H u x l e y ' ร The Devils of 
Loudun, is a sort o f hoax condemning the hoax wr i t ten by an author famous for h is 
experiments i n pharmacological ha l l uc ina t i on . 8 4 The Devils of Loudun is a f i c t iona l h is tory 
grounded i n the archival documents, but us ing a great deal o f the novel is t 's interpolat ions 
to exp iam the psychological mo t i va t ion o f ind iv idua l characters. 8 5 
The quotat ion f r o m Connor, the histor ical example o f Loudun , and H u x l e y ' ร quasi-
f i c t i on , set up s t r ik ing harmonies w i t h one o f Jean Baudr i l la rd 'ร examples o f a s imulacrum. 
The daemoniacs o f L o u d u n m igh t w e l l be diagnosed as prescient postmodems, f i t t i ng as 
they do into Baudr i l la rd 'ร example o f a person fe ign ing i l lness, whose very act o f fe ign ing 
cou ld i tsel f be considered a syndrome: 
Is the s imulator sick or not , g iven that he produces " t r u e " symptoms?.. .For 
i f any symptom can be "p roduced , " and can no longer be taken as a fact o f 
nature, then every i l lness can be considered as simulatable and s imulated, 
and medic ine loses its meaning since i t on ly knows how to treat " r e a l " 
i l lnesses according to their object ive causes. 8 6 
I f the demon renders complex the relat ionship between the self and object ive real i ty , then 
c lear ly i t resonates w i t h the sensibi l i t ies o f the postmodern, such as Baudr i l la rd 's pervasive 
simulacra. The argument that language constructs a personal real i ty rather than m imet i ca l l y 
ref lect ing i t is embodied i n Loudun ' ร confessors who became subject to their o w n stories 
o f Grandier 'ร possession, w h i c h were then rewr i t ten by a twent ieth-century novel ist . 
W h i l s t the detachment o f the se!f f r o m the language i t produces was pos i t ive ly inf lected b y 
Steven Connor, " T o w a r d a N e w Demono logy , " Becoming Human: New 
Perspectives on the Inhuman Condition, ed. Paul Sheehan (Westpor t , C A : Praeger, 2003) 
104. 
8 4 A ldous Hux ley , The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell (New Y o r k : 
Perennial , 2004). 
8 5 A ldous Hux ley , The Devils of Loudun (London : Chatto, 1961). 
j ean Baudr i l la rd , Simulacra and Simulation^ trans. Shei la Faria Glaser ( 1 9 8 1 ; 
A n n A rbo r , M I : บ o f M i c h i g a n p， 1994). 
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the cul t o f inspirat ion discussed earlier, it is g iven such a benign spin because al l 
deceptions end i n a logos. For the Med ieva l scribe, the words fo r wh i ch he was m e d i u m 
stemmed f r o m , and pointed to, an absolute God . For the Romant ic , the power fu l veraci ty 
revealed by inspi rat ion was that the ego could transcend the mater ia l condit ions o f its 
culture. Descartes, hav ing gone through demonic decept ion, emerges at the other side to 
k n o w one th ing w i t h less doubt than before, the t ru th o f his o w n experienced existence. 
Postmodernism is more pessimist ic than this set o f interrelated bel iefs. For a postmodernist 
l i ke Baudr i l la rd , no th ing stands outside the textual or ideological mode o f its product ion. 
T ru th is essentially unver i f iab le , on ly temporar i ly assuming status due to the way i t is 
conceptualised in any g iven culture. As Baudr i l la rd m igh t have argued, the demon i n 
Loudun was a constmct o f language, as evidenced by the way the demons were 
perpetuated through the discourse o f the exorcists; i n a d i f ferent cul ture, as that f r o m w h i c h 
Hux ley wri tes about the case, w e m igh t be more inc l ined to see demons as the products o f 
the Freudian unconscious. Such cross-pol l inat ion between the demon and the postmodern 
i m p l y that questions about subject iv i ty and knowledge are immutab le , rather than 
consigned to a specif ic per iod as i t is determined by science and technology. 
Demon ic Fict ions 
Indeed, i t is this cross-pol l inat ion that provides some jus t i f i ca t ion for m y choice o f 
i l lustrat ive cybernetic f ic t ions. One o f the characteristics o f postmodern ism has been the 
collapse o f dist inct ions between h i gh and l o w art fo rms. As a consequence, science f i c t i on 
- wh i ch was ( r igh t ly or w rong ly ) dist inguished f r o m modern ism in the pre-War per iod -
comes into contact w i t h postmodern f ic t ions, w h i c h are in fo rmed both b y theory as w e l l as 
their o w n mtemal poetics. A s a consequence, as B r i an M c H a l e argues, there is a feedback 
loop in w h i c h science f i c t i on "der ives certain o f its elements f r o m postmodernist 
mainstream f i c t i on w h i c h i tsel f has, in its tu rn , already been 'science f i c t i on i zeď to some 
greater or lesser degree . " 8 7 Though par t icu lar ly true o f суЬефипк , this іп ЇефІау between 
" l i t e ra ry " and sub-genre f i c t i on (such as science f i c t ion) characterises the postmodern 
per iod general ly. T o look , then, at canonical postmodernists l i ke Thomas Pynchon, John 
Bar th , or W i l l i a m Burroughs, though they are certainly in fo rmed by cybernetic epistemes, 
r isks downp lay ing the more popular and more in f luent ia l genres in wh i ch cybernetic and 
postmodern ideas are mediated: l i terary science f i c t i on , computer games and, perhaps most 
B r ian M c H a l e , " P O S T c y b e r M O D E R N p u n k l S M , " Constructing Postmodernism 
(Rout ledge: London , 1992) 229. 
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impor tant ly , c inema. Because cybernetics has permeated culture at both a technological 
and phi losophica l leve l , we ought to be w i l l i n g to discuss the way a l l f ic t ions relate to the 
cybernetic age, not jus t those that have attached to them some anterior academic kudos. I 
have opened by look ing at a computer game, and I w i l l close in m y f ina l chapter b y 
examin ing Dean Koon tz ' s pu lp d i r i l le r , Demon Seed; i n several chapters I examine 
popular, but also h igh ly in f luent ia l , Ho l l j ovood science f i c t i on ; and wh i ls t wr i ters such as 
Umber to Eco and A . S . в y att are undoubtedly intel lectual authors, they have an uneasy 
relat ionship to the academy. A t once w o r k i n g w i t h academic l i terary theory and estranged 
f r o m i t , they fear that l i terary theory is potent ia l ly al ienat ing, c la im ing to of fer a science o f 
texts couched in a rhetor ical style that is far removed f r o m that o f the f i c t iona l works i t 
appropriates. However , because the idea o f computa t ion is fami l ia r to most readers in 
contemporary cul ture, its metaphors a l low authors or directors to embody and encode ideas 
about l i terary creat ion and semiot ics t r o u g h analogy rather than direct ph i losophica l 
d iscourse. 8 8 A s Sherry Tu rk le reports, students w h o are deterred b y the d i f f i cu l t y o f 
Derr ida can st i l l c l a im to understand the pr incip les o f deconstruct ion by exper iment ing 
w i t h hyper tex t . 8 9 I n whatever genre and regardless o f any pr ior prestige attached to them, 
contemporary f ic t ions that engage w i t h cybernetics recognise the pervasive nature o f the 
technology. They use i t as a c o m m o n focus b y w h i c h to explore and refresh phi losophical 
problems that prove (because o f their demonic bent) to be longstanding, rather than 
determined b y a technological or phi losophica l moment : language and representat ion; the 
m ind-body p rob lem; what is fundamenta l ly human as opposed to posthuman, monster or 
cyborg . Before m o v i n g into the f ic t ions themselves, however , the f i rst section o f this thesis 
aims to histor ic ise and universalise the cybernet ic paradigm. 
The next chapter places the demon as conceptual ised in postmoderni ty i n re lat ion to 
its theological h istory. Donna Haraway 'ร " C y b o r g Man i fes to " argues that the cyborg is so 
t igh t l y integrated w i t h technologies that i t shows - in accordance w i t h postmodern thought 
ᅳ that the object ive and the subject ive are false d ichotomies. Because a cyborg has no 
essential, stable body, the categories o f the real and the v i r tua l , true and false or, especial ly, 
female nature and male cul ture, break down . B y jux tapos ing Haraway 'ร postmodern w o r k 
8 8 Though I w i l l not cover i t speci f ica l ly here, D a v i d Lodge 's Thinks is a case in 
po in t , i n that the romance between a novel ist and a cogni t ive scientist is essential ly the 
excuse for a humorous but didact ic analysis o f the " t w o cul tures" p rob lem as i t relates to 
contemporary phi losophy o f m i n d i n academia. D a v i d Lodge, Thinks (London : Penguin, 
2002) . 
8 9 Tu rk le , Life on the Screen 17-8. 
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w i t h that o f a Renaissance specialist on teratology, the French anatomist Ambro ise Paré, I 
propose that the b io log ica l monsters o f that age f igured comparable anxieties about 
crossing boundaries o f subject ive and object ive phenomena, and hence potent ia l ly false 
and general ly true. Paré attempts to interpret monsters as signs or allegories o f God 's 
intent. However , wh i ls t monsters demonstrate the creat iv i ty o f God ' s imaginat ion 5 Pare 
avoids deal ing w i t h demons at length, because they imp l y that the w o r l d is supernatural, 
and can never be k n o w n empi r ica l ly and hence read al legor ical ly . Monsters are we i rd 
th ings w i t h i n nature that are nevertheless signs o f G o d ; demons are outside o f nature, and 
the tendency to bel ieve in demons indicates man 'ร wi l l ingness to be seduced by i l lus ions. 
B y cont ro l l ing the terms w i t h w h i c h the demon is said to exist, Paré makes it into a 
boundary marker d is t inguishing fact f r o m f i c t ion . Wh i l s t I do not a im p r imar i l y to push the 
advent o f cybernetics back տ t ime (such w o r k hav ing already been conducted elsewhere), 
b y engaging cybernetics w i t h the demon, I w i l l histor ic ise the science by de fau l t . 9 0 B y 
treat ing cybernetics in con junct ion w i t h the demonic trope, I suggest that the 
phenomenological issues about the relat ionship between the inner m i n d and the outer 
real i ty t h rown up by modern science are comparable w i t h those w h i c h existed under 
earl ier, theological condi t ions i n w h i c h the demon was said to exist. Chapter 2 infers that 
the phi losophies that underp in cybernetics have an o ld heritage, and that the ways i n w h i c h 
w e appreciate our relat ionship to these modern technologies are translations o f concerns 
about the relat ionship between an ar t i f ic ia l or o therwor ld ly agent and the m i n d that m igh t 
be affected b y i t . The demonic has proved to be a trans-histor ical force, and the presence o f 
the demonic in contemporary f i c t i on engaged w i t h cybernetics impl ies that th ink ing about 
possession or deception by simulat ions is not the preserve o f the d ig i ta l age alone. Rather, 
the metaphor ical idea o f the demon appeals to our tacit sense o f be ing i n , and o f s t ruggl ing 
to know , the real wo r l d . 
Chapter 3 exempl i f ies this b y showing h o w psychoanalysis explains that demons 
or iginate i n unconscious mot ivat ions. Psychoanalysis makes the demon avai lable as a 
metaphor w h i c h is no longer metaphysica l ly s igni f icant , but w h i c h st i l l describes the 
experience o f being human in the w o r l d . Rather than mark ing the boundary between the 
ob ject ive ly true and the subject ively false, the demons o f the unconscious imp l y that we 
9 0 For examples o f the h is tor ic isat ion o f cybernetics, see N e i l Rhodes and Jonathan 
Sawday, eds., The Renaissance Computer: Knowledge Technology in the First Age of Print 
(London : Rout ledge-Taylor , 2000) ; Ray Siemens and Susan Schr iebman, eds., A 
Companion to Digital Literary Studies (Ma iden , M A : B l ackwe l l , 2007)， especial ly 3-159. 
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construct our percept ion o f the w o r l d through pro ject ing our o w n latent desires and 
repressions upon its canvas. Monsters perceived to be "ou t there" are in real i ty signif iers o f 
the deceptive pressures exerted f r o m w i t h i n our o w n minds look ing out unrel iably onto the 
w o r l d . As postmodern aesthetics takes up - i n a way exempl i f i ed by Gabr ie l Jos ipov ic i 'ร 
no t ion o f the "demon o f analogy" - i f language is inherent ly deceiv ing, c leaving real i ty 
f r o m the w o r d , rather than connect ively a l legor ical , then in the new envi ronment 
al legor ical monsters must be treated as symbols o f personal sol ips ism rather than iconic 
others to the human. Th rough reading the seminal science f i c t i on f i l m Forbidden Planet 
(1956) against Freud's essays օ ո ճ Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis and 
" T h e 'Uncanny ' , " I show how cybernet ic technologies uncover our personal demons by 
exp la in ing the nature o f m i n d i n mater ial terms. Rework ing Shakespeare'ร The Tempest, 
the Cal iban f igure i n Forbidden Planet is not the product o f some immora l 
supernatural ism, but emanates f r o m the unconscious p r i m i t i v i s m o f the scientist as i t is 
mediated through a mind-reading technology. Here the technology provides a metaphor fo r 
the human: jus t as a robot is subject to p rogramming , so the conscious m i n d can never be 
i n contro l o f a self w h i c h is actual ly determined by evo lved psychological codes. T o 
al legorise technological power as monstrous is to fa i l to realise that technology is on ly 
act ing as the daemonic mediator o f our minds , i n w h i c h the real demons l ie. 
The narrat ive value o f the monster is that i t can be cr i t iqued, even as i t invites us to 
see in i t a ref lect ion o f our o w n nature or potent ia l . The demon, however , makes 
questionable the percept ion o f real i ty , so that such judgements o f d i f ference between the 
other and the self are a priori problemat ic. Broad ly speaking, the di f ference between the 
monsters and demons is one o f onto logy versus epistemology. Expos ing this d is t inct ion 
very we l l is Descartes' deceiv ing demon. I n chapter 4， I propose that the Tu r i ng test is 
essential ly a Cartesian test for the t ru th that can emerge f r o m an apparent (d is)s imulat ion. 
Just as Descartes derives rat ional ism b y start ing f r o m the potent ial deceptions o f demons, 
so Tu r i ng lays out the terms o f his thought exper iment so as to mainta in a realist 
epistemology when confronted w i t h ar t i f i c ia l ly inte l l igent mechanisms that appear human. 
Th i s , however , causes problems fo r our understanding o f the onto logy o f machines that 
appear to be conscious, but whose minds we can never qui te inhabi t i n order to judge the 
t ru th o f their being. I n Tu r ing ' s test, we can on ly k n o w consciousness through intent ional 
expressions, par t icu lar ly language, emanat ing f r o m it. A s w i t h demonic possession, the 
who le nature o f consciousness is that i t is so complex that understanding the material 
specif icat ions o f another m i n d does not a l l ow us to k n o w what i t is l i ke to be another f r o m 
the phenomenological po in t o f v i ew (Thomas N a g e ľ s argument i n his classic essay " W h a t 
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Is i t L i ke to Be a Ba t? " ) . Thus the s imula t ion o f consciousness is hard to d ist inguish f r o m 
true consciousness, and we cannot k n o w for sure whether a Tu r i ng machine is genuinely 
intel l igent. Indeed, human language cou ld i tsel f be the source o f a self-sustaining 
decept ion, rather than resolv ing the di f ference between man and machine. Th is 
epistemological barr ier means that i t is possible that f r o m w i t h i n the m i n d o f an android or 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence the w o r l d m igh t be perceived comparably to our o w n , and hence 
s imi lar sorts o f mora l cr i ter ia should apply to ar t i f ic ia l as to human consciousness. A s the 
f o l l o w i n g chapters assert, i t is here that f i c t i on can at least prov ide imaginat ive access to 
the w o r l d as i f through the eyes o f another, even a cybernetic double, and a l low us to 
understand the questions o f l ikeness f r o m the po in t o f v iew o f the cybernet ic other. 
The h istor ica l and phi losophica l boundaries sketched in chapters 2 to 4 suggest that 
encounters w i t h cybernet ic doubles raise epistemological issues, since cyborgs and 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences ini t iate perceptual shifts i n the human, rather than p rov ing to be 
de f in i t i ve ly abject. Consequent ly, f ic t ions that take up cybernet ic concerns lend themselves 
to the k i n d o f sceptical doubt about real i ty that characterises postmodern thought. Across 
chapters 5 to 7， I use seminal science f i c t ion f i lms to i l lustrate the advance o f postmodern 
epistemologies, at the expense o f Cartesian and Tur ing- type rat ional i ty . 
I n chapter 5， I show h o w the interpretat ion o f 2001: A Space Odyssey'ร H a l as a 
monster contradicts the broader aesthetics o f the narrat ive, w h i c h operates through what I 
t e rm a poetics o f possession. Th is aesthetics forces the f i l m ' ร v iewers to see the w o r l d 
through d i f ferent eyes: ape, man, star ch i l d , and machine. Ha l ' s possession o f a subject ive 
po in t o f v i e w is fundamental to the al legory o f 2001y w h i c h according to this revis ionist 
reading is intended not to raise onto logical questions about the di f ference between a 
machine based m i n d and an embodied human one, but epistemological problems: w h y do 
w e wor ry about d i f ference at a l l , i f m i n d is the telos o f universal evolut ion? A n d i f m i n d 
matters above embodiment , is i t j us t i f i ed to disconnect H a l , wh i l s t a l l ow ing B o w m a n , a 
cyborg spaceman, to be elevated as the "star ch i ld "? 
S imi la r l y , i n Ph i l ip K. D i c k ' ร Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (examined i n 
chapter 6) dist inct ions between human and andro id are not based on essentialist qualit ies o f 
embodiment or o r ig in . There is no th ing, on the surface, to d ist inguish for sure between the 
android and the human, a p rob lem D i c k articulates extensively i n h is essays and lectures. 
D i c k argues, however , that the theory o f m i n d , the ab i l i t y to imagine the w o r l d as i f 
9 1 Thomas Nage l , " W h a t Is i t L i k e to Be a Ba t , " The Philosophical Review 4 
(1974) : 435-50. 
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toough the m i n d o f another, is the factor that dist inguishes humans (or f u l l y conscious 
androids) f r o m affectless automata (or humans w h o have become androids i n their 
un th ink ing way o f l i v i ng in the modern wo r l d ) . I f we fa i l to consider the potent ial 
humani ty o f androids, we become l i ke them ourselves. However , the ab i l i t y to empathise is 
i tsel f a decept ion, requ i r ing us to suspend our o w n real i ty by s imula t ing another 
consciousness through the art i f ice o f text. Just as second-wave cybernetics was concerned 
w i t h the idea o f re f lex iv i ty , whereby " that w h i c h has been used to generate a system is 
made, th rough a changed perspective, to become part o f the system i t generates," 9 2 the 
reader is d rawn i n to perceive the w o r l d as i f th rough the eyes o f an andro id, thereby 
perpetuat ing the deception. 
Interest ingly, as they share comparable bel iefs about h o w i t is possible to k n o w 
what an ar t i f ic ia l double is th ink ing , 2001 and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
were both publ ished i n 1968. These t w o works prov ide a benchmark by w h i c h we can 
compare the way i n w h i c h R id ley Scot t 'ร 1982 adaptation o f D i c k ' ร nove l , the f i l m Blade 
Runner, t ums Tu r i ng ' ร concern at the level o f the ind iv idua l - h o w is i t possible to k n o w 
the di f ference between an android and a human? - into more general questions about the 
onto logy o f the w o r l d in general - is real i ty i tse l f ob ject ive ly out there, or is real i ty i n a 
sense constructed b y the m i n d o f the perceiver? D i c k shows that dist inct ions between 
android and human can be found through the lat ter 'ร ab i l i ty to empathise, even i f this 
means suspending our o w n v iew o f the w o r l d to see through the eyes o f an android double. 
I n a Baudr i l la rd ian ve in , however, Scott el iminates the mi r ro r , suggesting that image and 
or ig ina l are essential ly commensurate. A n y ph i losophy o f knowledge or any grounds for 
d is t inc t ion between the real ind iv idua l and the ar t i f ic ia l repl icant are i rrelevant, since 
real i ty is anyway inseparable f r o m the s imula t ion, because both are constructs o f discourse 
and representation. I n the context o f the hyperreal , therefore, we cannot prove our 
humani ty b y our ab i l i t y to j u m p empathet ical ly f r o m the doma in o f the human to that o f 
the ar t i f ic ia l m i n d , because the human and the s imu lacrum are essential ly ident ical . 
A s I explore in more detai l i n The Matrix (chapter 7)， w h i c h draws extensively 
upon Baudr i l la rd 's no t ion o f the s imulacrum, the demon is a metaphor fo r a postmodern 
cond i t ion i n wh i ch the self cannot k n o w the t ru th o f his o w n perceptions o f real i ty th rough 
object ive, Cartesian means. Bu t rather than couch ing such experiences i n the heady prose 
o f postmodern theory ᅳ o f w h i c h Baudr i l la rd 's o w n Simulacra and Simulation is a p r ime 
Hayleร, Posthuman 8. 
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example - the computer provides an accessible metaphor through w h i c h popular cul ture 
can examine the phi losophical p rob lem o f h o w to establish the " t r u t h " o f the w o r l d i n 
w h i c h we are embedded. The Matrix reconsiders the Cartesian epistemological f ramework 
o f deception i n the context o f an in fo rmat ion economy in w h i c h technologies l i ke c inema 
disguise the fact that we are purposiveless agents տ a broader commod i t y system o f late 
capi ta l ism. Bu t wh i ls t seemingly a Marx i s t cr i t ique, The Matrix i l lustrates the p rob lem o f 
analysis in postmodernism. I n late capi ta l ism, the product o f exchange is in fo rmat ion 
rather than tangib le goods, w h i c h means that cul ture too becomes compl i c i t i n the 
economy. So in The Matrix the economic system w h i c h the f i l m condemns by presenting i t 
as a demonica l ly deceiv ing ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence is also that wh i ch al lows this cr i t ique 
daemonica l ly to be rendered - through h igh tech computer graphics - i n the f i rst place. 
Ob jec t i v i sm is thus made impossible because o f this representational conf l ic t , and i t is this 
denial o f any external perspective for w h i c h the demon provides an epistemological t rope. 
I n the f ina l three chapters, I move f r o m cinemat ic science f i c t i on to look at more 
convent ional l i terary novels. These represent a d r i f t i n the contemporary canon away f r o m 
an o ld " t w o cu l tures" b inary , crossing the same sorts o f d isc ip l inary boundary l ines that are 
in f r inged b y cybernetics. These are not science f ic t ions, though f o l l o w i n g M c H a l e ' ร 
feedback loop they have been "science f i c t i on i zed" by the intercourse w i t h that genre v ia 
the c inemat ic f ic t ions above. Consequent ly, they cannot avo id being in fo rmed by science, 
even i f they are not determined b y it . O n the other hand, these f ic t ions, whose authors are 
uneasi ly related to academic l i terary theory, also qua l i f y the postmodern, ant i -scient i f ic 
conv ic t ion that no meaning or t ru th can ever be absolute. They tu rn to a science o f f i c t i on , 
to resist the theor isat ion o f f i c t ion . 
Umber to Eco and A . S . в y att assume that their readers (who may be in fo rmed by 
l i terary theories) are w i l l i n g and able to pe r fo rm sustained ref lect ion on the text, especial ly 
those w h i c h draw attent ion to their o w n textual condi t ions through metaf ic t ion. U n l i k e 
c inema, w h i c h we may watch passively and less cr i t i ca l ly , by ref lect ing on the way our 
minds are be ing manipulated and mediated by l i terary mechanisms, w e are able to see that 
f i c t i on is do ing something d i f ferent to the real w o r l d , so that by inference real i ty cannot 
i tsel f be a total s imulat ion, as i t is in The Matrix. Peter Singer observes that "E th ica l truths 
are not wr i t ten into the fabr ic o f the universe: to that extent the subject i v is է is correct...on 
the other hand, once there are beings w i t h desires, there are values that are not on ly the 
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subject ive values o f each ind i v idua l . " I n the same way , Eco and в y att ask whether the 
demon can be rejected as a total f igment o f the m i n d in the secular era. A s social values, 
shared narratives or tropes - o f wh i ch the demon is one ― surely must assume some sort o f 
ob jec t iv i ty , even i f this may be counter intu i t ive to an age o f secular science? As Freud 
observed, the wholesale reject ion o f demons i n a w o r l d whose myths have been purged by 
science is problemat ic when contemporary demons have been created in the m i n d o f a 
reader s imp ly through words on a page. Even i f the paranormal is not at w o r k i n physical 
real i ty, the demon can be said to exist i n the metaphor ical onto logy o f the nove l , but also to 
translate in to the human m i n d o f its reader ᅳ and since minds are the natural residence o f 
the demon, can demons not be said s t i l l to exist as they always have done, jus t that they are 
produced b y a structured f i c t i on and human cul ture rather than an unseen devi l? War ren 
M c C u l l o c h once said that the who le ambi t ion o f cybernetics was to answer the question 
" W h a t is a number that a man may k n o w i t : and what is a man that he may k n o w a 
number?" μ These f ic t ions attend to the f i rst element by asking "wha t is a story, that i t may 
be k n o w n b y a man? " B y d rawing attent ion to their narrat ive mechanisms t h o u g h 
metaf ic t ion , and by sett ing the k ra t iona l creat ion o f l i terary meaning against the concept o f 
computer-generated texts, they suggest that l i terature can defy both the determin ism o f 
cybernet ic sciences and the semiot ic pretence that the real is always evasive, a s imula t ion 
o f discourse rather than a tangible th ing inhabi ted b y an embodied self. For Eco and Byat t , 
the demon acts as a lens by wh i ch w e can ref lect on the mechanisms o f text, and the way a 
text mediates the object ive w o r l d in to a subject ive one i n the readerly consciousness, and 
the way language can be used to concretise a meaning about the experient ial w o r l d . 
I n Foucault*s Pendulum^ we f o l l o w a group o f conspirator ia l academics w h o 
perceive occul t s igni f icance i n the associations and l inks randomly generated by their 
computer, Abu la f ia . Bu t Eco makes us aware that authors ֊ inc lud ing h imse l f ᅳ are 
themselves w r i t i ng machines (machines that wr i te , w r i t i n g about machines), seducing 
readers in to convent ions or conspiracies about what a sign or text means. The occul t arts o f 
Hermet ic i sm contend that a single w o r d can lead to an exponent ial suite o f connections and 
meanings. Th is h istor ical example meets w i t h the concept o f a T A L E - S P I N sort o f 
automatic w r i t i ng machine (the Abu la f i a computer) able to churn out associations at 
9 3 Peter Singer, How Are We to Live: Ethics in an Age of Self Interest (Ox fo rd : 
Opus-Ox fo rd U P , 1997) 275. 
9 4 War ren M c C u l l o c h , Embodiments of Mind (1965; Cambr idge, M A : M I T Press, 
1988) 2. 
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random to produce the p lo t o f the novel. bOnically, it is precisely because they are 
arbitrary that they must therefore embody a meaningfu l t ruth about the way language 
works i n an etemal p lay o f s ign i f icat ion deferred f r o m f ina l al legorical meaning. Eco 's 
nove l , however , u l t imate ly encourages us to reject much o f the i r rat ional i ty that 
characterises postmodern ism and Hermet ic i sm al ike. H e argues that though texts may be 
mechanisms for produc ing mul t ip le տէշփաէՅէւօոտ, this does not mean that al l 
іпїефгеІаїІ0П8 are as good or bad as another, as his postmodern conspirators bel ieve. 
Rather, b y i nvok ing Shannon'ร in fo rmat ion theory, Eco requires careful and sceptical 
readers to d iscr iminate between irrelevant noise and signi f icant codes o f l im i ted semiosis. 
W h i l s t Eco invi tes us to see his characters as paranoid mdiv idua ls w h o take 
postmodernist and Hermet ic thought to an extreme, the abi l i ty to empathise w i t h their 
p l igh t even i f w e do not share i t is remarkable. Indeed, for Ph i l i p K. D i c k , i n Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?, the ab i l i t y to empathise w i t h an android is, we i rd ly , the p roo f o f 
our humani ty , our sympathet ic warmth that our mechanical doubles lack. S im i la r l y , fo r 
A . ร . Byat t , the m i n d o f a schizoptoenic possessed b y demons deserves our attention. She 
causes us to enter that other consciousness through language, w h i c h is something neither 
cogni t ive science nor ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence can achieve through their reduct ionist methods. 
Tbrough attending to the phenomenological effects o f language, her novel A Whistling 
Woman shows toough that the a lgor i thmic mode l o f m i n d extrapolated by cogni t ive 
scientists cannot g ive rise to the manifest , fantastic consciousness o f this psychiatr ic 
patient, or, fo r that matter, any imaginat ive m i n d , such as that o f an inquis i t ive reader. 
Cogn i t i ve scientists i n the novel ponder where exact ly in the m i n d metaphors and images 
are created. A s imi lar question is asked o f the demon as i t occurs i n the text o f the l i terary 
nove l . 
M y f ina l chapter proper, on A . ร . B y a t ť s Possession, provides a coda that recalls 
many o f the themes o f this thesis. Super f ic ia l ly , the novel appears to be concerned w i t h the 
relat ionship between past and present, and between postmodern c r i t i c ism and the 
inexpl icable cul t that surrounds a creative artefact as opposed to a facs imi le or 
reproduct ion. However , i n l ine w i t h m y argument that cybernetics has become a dominant 
theme o f post-war f i c t i on such that even novels not concerned d i rect ly w i t h science are 
necessarily i n fo rmed b y i t , the nove l 's superf ic ia l interests are based on under ly ing 
cybernetic epistemologies, inc lud ing genetics, in fo rmat ion theory and chaos theory. Wh i l s t 
acknowledg ing that the novel warns against impos ing meanings on a wo rk , this chapter 
tests how far i t is possible to push the hypothesis that the occasional references to science 
B r o w n 49 
and technology i n Possession realise that postmodernist cul ture is the product o f a sub­
culture o f cybernet ics. 9 5 
Matter Matters 
I opened this chapter w i t h a semi- f ic t ional account. I close w i t h a true story. In 
2006, the Br i ton N e i l Entwis t le k i l l ed his w i f e and daughter, shattering what had seemed, 
on the surface, to be their t ranqui l f a m i l y existence i n suburban Amer ica . A t his t r ia l , i t 
emerged that Entwis t le had l i ved a double existence. He had cul t ivated an onl ine persona 
as a successful web entrepreneur, as compensat ion fo r his anxiety that he was or ig ina l ly a 
s imple miner 'ร son f r o m Yorksh i re . Escaping to his nat ive England after the event, 
Entwis t le explained in a phone conversat ion w i t h an Amer i can pol ice o f f icer that he had 
not even cr ied for the deaths o f his w i f e and daughter: " I th ink i t ' s because I ' m here. I t 
almost doesn' t seem real. I t ' s jus t a v o i d . " 9 6 The r isk o f cybernetic games is total 
immers ion in the v i r tua l w o r l d beyond the screen. B y contrast, a response to l i terature and, 
i n a d i f ferent manner, f i l m takes place w i t h a cr i t ica l distance, as i t is conducted w i t h a 
double-consciousness. For i n l i terature and f i l m we must s imultaneously suspend our 
d isbel ief and inhabit the f i c t iona l w o r l d as if it is real, wh i ls t we must also mainta in some 
connect ion to real i ty in order to recognise i t as a created f i c t i on , wh i ch b y the v i r tue o f its 
special f o r m can te l l us something unique about real i ty that we cannot otherwise access in 
the everyday w o r l d . I t is learning h o w to en joy the s imula t ion w i t h a double consciousness 
- remember ing the real even as w e enter the f i c t iona l - that postmodern f ic t ions can help 
us w i t h . Though i t w o u l d be r id icu lous to c l a im they can prevent murder or extreme 
ոշնՄօտւտ, w i t h thei r characteristic se l f - re f lex iv i ty and scept ic ism as to the t ru th o f the 
real i ty we perceive, postmodern f ic t ions can help us to realise the importance o f 
understanding the way i n wh i ch our subject iv i ty is constructed and affected by language, 
and correspondingly also through cybernet ic interfaces, and to remember the dev i l ish 
stakes o f los ing the real i ty game. 
Though I have discussed demons and technology at length i n the present chapter 1 
I have barely referred to the a f f in i t y between telepathy and telegraphy in the V ic to r ian 
per iod. Th is is because extensive mater ia l has already been wr i t ten on this specif ic 
h is tor ica l topic. One paradigmat ic study is Pamela Thurschwe l l , Literature, Technology 
and Magical Thinking, 1880-1920 (Cambr idge: Cambr idge U P , 2001) . 
9 6 Jonathan Raban, "Just T w o C l i cks , " London Review of Books 30.16 (2008) : 3-9. 
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Chapter 2. Demons and Cyborgs: Ambro i se Paré and Dorma Hârawav 
The Re-Enchantment o f Nature 
Cybernet ics has been accompanied by predictable anxieties that the human is 
reduced to an essentialist machine, wh i l s t monstrous but superior technologies may assume 
our mant le as the most developed f o r m o f l i fe . O n the other hand, cybernet ic 
transcendental ism encapsulates a spir i tual be l ie f that such technologies w i l l enable us to 
escape f r o m the body ent i rely, transcending nature itself. Caught awkward l y between 
advancement and regression, the posthuman r isks becoming immersed in an in format iona l 
existence that relates w i t h ethical uncertainty to the embodiment o f the l ibera l humanist . 
The way i n w h i c h the demon f igures the anxieties and possibi l i t ies o f the cybernet ic 
sciences suggests that the in fo rmat ion age has led to the recovery o f pre-Enl ightenment 
f rameworks o f knowledge and sel fhood w h i c h a l l ow space for emot ions, bel iefs, even 
spir i t and soul , i n the comprehension o f the w o r l d . A s Bruno Latour has observed, the 
separation o f nonhuman nature and human cul ture in the Enl ightenment is a conceptual 
d iv ide. I n actual i ty, the an toopo log i ca l mat r ix consists o f "hyb r i d actants" w h i c h show the 
binaries o f subject and object, or art ist ic representation and object ive facts, to be 
problemat ic d ichotomies, since they straddle and move between bo th categories. 1 The 
ar t i f ic ia l i ty o f this const i tu t ion has, Latour argues, been exposed b y a contemporary era 
inhabited b y technological hybr ids: genet ical ly mod i f i ed organisms, test tube babies, and 
cyborgs. A s a consequence, Latour concludes, w e can be said never to have been modern 
in the strong sense imp l ied by the Enl ightenment mode l o f knowledge that segregates 
nature and cul ture, wh i l s t seeking to transcend the former through technology. 
Th i s chapter shows h o w cybernetics has invo lved the recuperation o f pre-modern 
themes, par t icu lar ly the idea o f demonic possession. Th is provides the histor ical bedrock 
against w h i c h to bounce analyses o f the metaphor in f ic t ions examined i n subsequent 
chapters. Here, I show that Donna Haraway 'ร postmodern idea o f the cyborg as an agent 
that embodies both science and emot ion marks a return to pre-Enl ightenment concepts 
according to w h i c h empir ica l knowledge is situated in re lat ion to a subject ive observer, 
rather than abstracted b y the object ive, passionless witness honoured by ra t ional ism. W i t h 
a doctorate i n b io logy , Haraway is not w h o l l y against scient i f ic not ions o f the self as be ing 
i n part a mater ia l construct. However , she also argues that such rat ional and b io log ica l 
1 B runo Latour , We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Hert fordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993) 6. 
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models as genetics are not incompat ib le w i t h more flexible not ions o f the self as something 
produced by nurture and social discourse. I n a s imi lar way, the science o f monsters i n the 
Renaissance represents an attempt to show both the un i ty o f God ' s creat ion as i t operates 
according to f i xed and immutab le laws, but also its fecundi ty and divers i ty w h i c h must 
provoke an abstract sense o f wonder i n the power o f the d iv ine. The іп Їеф Іау between 
demons and monsters i n the Renaissance shows that good knowledge - w h i c h is to say 
knowledge that shows the beneficent m i n d o f God - relies on a l l ow ing the student o f 
nature to perceive i t as ref lect ing God 's mora l i t y (a cul tural idea) wh i l s t also operat ing 
according to certain f i xed laws (a rat ional concept) b y wh i ch the demon 'ร power to deceive 
is necessarily proscr ibed. 
A Mani fes to fo r Monsters 
A l t h o u g h I have been pos i t ing a phenomenologica l a f f in i t y between v i r tua l 
environments and demonic or spir i tual ist ic experiences, i t is nevertheless remarkable to 
discover that the f i rst proper log ica l computer, Charles Babbage's Ana ly t i ca l Eng ine, was 
used to demonstrate the probabi l i ty o f mi rac les. 2 L i k e many scientists in the Enl ightenment 
t rad i t ion, the pioneer o f the modern computer bel ieved that science and technology of fered 
a means to reach closer to the nature and w i l l o f G o d , w i t h the engineer or scientist 
assuming the role o f a second A d a m : 
the advancement o f man i n the knowledge o f the structure o f the works o f 
the Creator, m igh t furn ish cont inual ly increasing proofs o f its authent ic i ty; 
and. . .thus by the due employment o f our facult ies, we migh t not mere ly 
redeem revelat ion f r o m the ravages o f t ime, but g ive to i t a degree o f force 
strengthening w i t h every accession to our knowledge. 3 
A c c o r d m g to Enl ightenment ideology, the m i n d o f man reflects that o f G o d ; fo r Descartes, 
indeed, i t was the fact that our minds are made in the image o f God 's that w e can be 
conf ident in our ab i l i ty to perceive the w o r l d object ive ly . I t is i ronic, therefore, that 
2 Babbage showed that his calculat ing machine could be used to produce a 
cont inuous sequence o f numbers f r o m 1 to 100 000 0 0 1 , at w h i c h po in t the machine w o u l d 
suddenly swi tch to add 10 000 to make 100 010 002. T o a naïve observer, such a change 
w o u l d appear miraculous, though the mi rac le w o u l d have been produced in accordance 
w i t h a rat ional l aw, in this case the programmer 'ร in i t ia l sett ing o f the machine. I n a s imi lar 
way the creat ion o f higher animals out o f an apparently predictable order o f vegetable 
forms should be considered a mi rac le , albeit a natural ly effected one. Charles Babbage, 
The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise: A Fragment, 2nd ed. (London: John Mur ray , 1838) 34-44. 
3 Babbage 139. 
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Babbage'ร d isc ip l ine w o u l d develop i n such a way as to break such ax iomat ic connections 
between science and the d iv ine. B y perce iv ing nature as the instant iat ion o f in fo rmat ion i n 
its o w n r ight , cybernetics - l i ke evo lu t ionary science before i t ֊ undercuts the status o f the 
w o r l d as a book or code i n wh i ch can be read the w o r k o f a d iv ine designer beyond the 
phys ica l . 4 Rather than Babbage'ร dual ist ic explanat ion in w h i c h the m i n d o f man is l i ke 
that o f God , w i t h matter something to be rejected i n the ascension to heaven, cybernetics 
perceives a l l matter as essential ly instantiat ions o f non-physical in format ion . The " h u m a n " 
s imp ly happens to be one phys io log ica l incarnat ion o f m i n d , brought about t r o u g h the 
evolut ionary lot tery o f genetic in fo rmat ion , rather than mou lded f r o m nature i n an ido l i c 
image o f the d iv ine. M a n is placed i n a quant i f iable, in format iona l relat ionship to other 
lower organisms whose genes he shares, rather than i n an anthropic hierarchy that reflects 
his special status i n God 'ร creation. I n the cybernet ic age, the vert ical chain that connects a 
creator to nature and human culture is broken, and a new, secular mani festo is required to 
take its place. Such a manifesto must t ry to accept the f ind ings o f modern science and 
acknowledge that we are the b io log ica l outcome o f a dispassionate process o f genetic 
evo lu t ion , and that our most d is t inguishing feature as a species, consciousness, is 
u l t imate ly j us t a cybernet ic system l i ke any other. A t the same t ime, i t must construct a 
no t ion o f the human w h i c h reflects the fact that we st i l l in tu i t i ve ly feel more than the sum 
o f genetic or cogni t ive a lgor i thms, even i n an ostensibly secularised age. 
A rguab l y the most prominent document to take up this challenge f r o m a 
postmodern perspective is Donna Haraway 'ร 1985 femin is t cr i t ique, " A Cyborg 
Man i fes to . " 5 Here Haraway ident i f ies a tension between objects (wh ich are both the 
mater ia l products o f capi ta l ism, and the theoret ical entit ies encountered b y science) and 
4 Though this v i ew can st i l l be countered, most recent ly through the movement o f 
b i te l l igent Des ign. 
5 Donna Haraway, " A Cyborg Mani fes to : Science, Technology, and Social ist-
Femin i sm i n the Late Twen t ieณ Century , " Simians, Cyborgs1 and Women: The 
Reinvention of Nature (New Y o r k : Rout ledge, 1991) 149-81 , rpt. o f "Man i fes to fo r 
Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Social ist Femin i sm in the 1980ร," Socialist Review 80 
(1985) : 65-108. A l t hough Haraway 'ร essay has a femin is t intent, at tempting to f i nd a 
m idd le way between b io log ica l essential ism i n construct ions o f gender, and social 
const ruct iv ism that denies any c o m m o n ground for ident i ty , i n m y jux tapos i t ion o f 
Haraway 'ร essay w i t h Renaissance concepts o f the demon, I w i l l largely bypass this 
femin is t angle. Instead, I w i l l focus more on the way in w h i c h the trope o f the " c y b o r g " 
mediates between nature and nurture at a level w h i c h tells us much about the way i n w h i c h 
cybernetic science is open to ideas o f the demon, and thus to the re-enchantment o f nature 
by a l l ow ing a role for the emotions i n construct ing knowledge. 
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subjects (as this te rm applies both to the servants o f capi ta l ism, and to the ind iv idua l , 
gendered identi t ies w h o are erased b y science'ร strong claims to ob jec t iv i ty ) . In fo rmed by 
social const ruct iv ism, subjects and objects are fused together i n Haraway 'ร i ronic trope o f 
the cyborg: 
A cyborg is a cybernet ic organism, a hyb r id o f machine and organism, a 
creature o f social real i ty as w e l l as a creature o f f i c t ion . Social real i ty is 
l i ved social relat ions, our most important po l i t i ca l construct ion, a w o r l d -
changing f i c t i on . . .L iberat ion rests on the construct ion o f the consciousness, 
the imaginat ive apprehension, o f oppression, and so o f possib i l i ty . The 
cyborg is a matter o f f i c t i on and l i ved experience that changes what counts 
as women 'ร experience i n the late twent ie th сепШгу. Th is is a struggle over 
l i f e and death, but the boundary between science f i c t i on and social real i ty is 
an opt ical i l l us ion . 6 
I n her attempt to get away f r o m the b inary th ink ing that separates the male and the female 
or object and subject, Haraway looks to the dua l ism o f the organic and inorganic wh i ch has 
become destabil ised b y cybernetic science and technology. A s Haraway argues, " B y the 
late twent ie th century.. .we are al l chimeras, theor ized and fabricated hybr ids o f machine 
and organism; i n short, we are cyborgs . " 7 Her ch imera is characteristic o f the Janus-face o f 
posthumanism presented i n chapter 1. O n the opt imis t ic side, the cyborg c i t izen m igh t be 
able to p lay or subvert t radi t ional identi t ies o f gender or race b y assuming through genetic 
engineering or cyberspace avatars an alternative ident i ty that disguises their embodiment 
by w h i c h their d i f ference m igh t be discerned. The cyborg makes us aware o f the "par t ia l , 
fluid, sometimes aspect o f sex and sexual exper ience," thereby deconstruct ing the 
b io log ica l essential ism so fundamental to male-dominated h is tory . 8 O n the other hand, such 
a no t ion reminds us o f the fantasies o f the monstrous other w h i c h have contr ibuted to the 
subjugat ion o f the woman . Ideal ly , the cyborg fals i f ies the d ichotomy between the 
object ive and subject ive, i n wh i ch w o m a n was denoted as nature and body, man as 
object ive m i n d o f science and culture. However , rather than erasing subject iv i ty as 
scient i f ic method does, the cyborg knows that al l knowledge is situated f r o m the po in t o f 
v i ew o f an embodied observer. K n o w i n g their o w n being to be condi t ioned by external 
6 Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i fes to " 149. 
7 Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i f es to " 149. 
8 Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i fes to " 180. 
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technologies such as drugs, enhanced v is ion , ul t rasonic scans, and computer interfaces, 
such an agent w i l l be forced to take direct responsib i l i ty fo r the applications o f science, 
act ing as a "modest wi tness," a te rm Haraway develops i n her later w o r k . 9 Haraway 'ร 
cyborg emerges at a t ime when cybernetics argues that we are constructs o f ephemeral 
in fo rmat ion rather than possessing an innate and stable physical nature, a bel ie f that is 
g iven added emphasis b y the wave o f social const ruct iv ism emerging f r o m the humanit ies 
wh i ch argues that categories such as " w o m a n " are ideological not ions rather than referr ing 
to any b io log ica l onto logy o f gender. However , Haraway appears to want to keep 
embodiment i n the no t ion o f the self, because this bo th accords w i t h our egocentric be l ie f 
that humans are special i n compar ison to the rest o f nature, and because the w o r l d o f nature 
is always seen f r o m the po in t o f v i ew o f an ind iv idua l be ing w i t h i n i t . 
W i t hou t deny ing that cybernetics establishes innovat ive epistemologies and 
technological creatures, I want in this chapter to measure the degree to w h i c h Haraway 'ร 
cyborg can be said to be w h o l l y revolut ionary. I t is certainly on ly recent ly that the cyborg 
or b io log ica l hyb r i d has become material isable through our appreciat ion o f the c o m m o n 
codes (genetic, cybernet ic, neurological) that a l low the in te rming l ing o f species, or o f 
organisms w i t h technology. Bu t as N . Kather ine Hayleร points out, we do not have to be 
l i teral cyborgs, w i t h technology intervening upon our bodies, i n order to become 
posthuman, since "new models o f subject iv i ty emerg ing f r o m such f ie lds as cogni t ive 
science and ar t i f ic ia l l i f e imp ly that even a b io log ica l l y unaltered Homo sapiens counts as 
posthuman. The def in ing characteristics invo lve the construct ion o f subject iv i ty , not the 
presence o f nonb io log ica l componen ts . " 1 0 Indeed, i n re ferr ing to science f i c t i on Haraway 
herself acknowledges that the cyborg is a concept rather than an actual ent i ty o f the 
present. I f , therefore, i t is the conceptual rather than physical boundaries between humans 
and technology that af fect subject iv i ty i n the posthuman era, then even in an age o f less 
power fu l technologies w e migh t f i n d other theoret ical condi t ions that s imi la r ly cause 
constructions o f human subject iv i ty to be predicated on v i r tua l experiences. A s "a f i c t i on 
mapping our social and bod i l y real i ty and as an imaginat ive resource suggesting some very 
f ru i t f u l coup l ings , " Haraway 'ร cyborg is one example o f the chimera crossing nature and 
9 Donna J. Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium. 
FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™: Feminism and Technoscience (New Y o r k : 
Rout ledge, 1997). 
Hay leร , Posthuman 4 . 
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culture to w h i c h Latour draws attention. However , when Haraway proposes that recent 
technoscience offers something "vast ly d i f ferent f r o m the const i tut ional arrangements that 
established the separations o f nature and society proper to 'modern i t y ' as early modern 
Europeans and their o f f sp r ing understood that h istor ical con f igura t ion , " is the paradigm 
real ly so radical as i t appears? 1 2 B y f i nd ing conceptual ancestors to the cyborg, to what 
extent can w e be said to have never been modern, to paraphrase Latour , and hence not to 
be radical ly posthumanl 
Possible comparators to the postmodern cyborg may be found i n early modern 
teratology. Terato logy covers monsters, demons, mutant b i r ths, hybr ids , strange creatures 
f r o m distant lands - a l l entit ies that traverse the boundaries d is t inguishing science and 
culture. In the physico- theological d iagram, the status o f the monster i n a natural w o r l d that 
supposedly images God ' ร m i n d and ԲԱՓ0Տ6Տ is c lear ly problemat ic , and debates about 
h o w to situate monsters also invo lve the t r i cky negot iat ion o f epistemological and 
theological l im i ts . Renaissance wri ters seeking to understand the ro le o f monsters, freaks 
and marvels were forced to interrogate the relat ionship between the book o f nature 
inscribed w i t h God 'ร mora l purposes, and the w o r l d o f Fal len human cul ture, w h i c h m igh t 
cause monstrosi ty to come about. T o the more theological ly-educated m i n d , for example, 
things treated pejorat ive ly as "monsters" m igh t actual ly reveal the h idden and intr icate 
structure o f their Creator 'ร m ind . The der ivat ion o f the w o r d monstrum from monere ᅳ to 
warn or threaten ᅳ indicates that the monster was not s imp ly a s igni f ier o f de formi ty in 
itself, but rather cou ld be a sign or portent o f some event to come or o f d i vme w i l l . In other 
contexts, though, monsters could be perceived as the consequence o f human immora l i t y 
rather than der iv ing f r o m the w i l l o f G o d ; in part icular a th ing can be w rong l y perceived as 
monstrous toough the demonic implantat ion o f delusion i n the beholder. A l t hough 
Haraway asserts that " T h e cyborg is our onto logy ; i t gives us our p o l i t i c s , " 1 3 monsters i n 
the Renaissance hence prov ided s imi la r ly po l i t ic ised bodies wh i ch connected the 
subject ive w o r l d o f human culture to nature, and hence to the d iv ine creator. 
Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i fes to " 150. 
Haraway, Modest JNitness 43. Haraway is using "cons t i t u t i on " f o l l o w i n g 
La tour ' ร def in i t ion . 
1 3 Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i fes to " 150. 
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One exemplary w o r k on the subject in Renaissance science is of fered b y the 1573 
co l lect ion On Monsters and Marvels, by Ambro ise Paré . 1 4 A s ch ief surgeon to both 
Charles I X and Henr i I I I , Paré was the most prominent medica l man o f his era. The v i ew 
that nature is constructed and t ru th fabr icated, rather than out there wa i t i ng to be 
discovered and art iculated, is key to postmodern construct ions o f science. I t is on l y w i t h i n 
such an epistemological f ramework that the cyborg can be conceptual ised as a po l i t i ca l , as 
we l l as a technological , agent. However , even in Paré'ร per iod we can perceive an anxiety 
about the real i ty o f monsters. Pare is aware that things w h i c h are superf ic ia l ly f reakish but 
nevertheless rat ional ly expl icable migh t be falsely construed as "mons t rous" by a non-
sceptical observer w i t h a superstit ious m i n d possessed by demons. The epistemological 
concern that truths about nature m igh t be forged b y the human imaginat ion rather than 
exist ing through God 's design to be revealed through natural science is evidenced b y 
Paré'ร d i f ferent ia t ion between monsters, w h i c h are part o f the theatre o f nature, and 
demons, w h i c h s t i l l operate according to natural laws but w h i c h to the unenl ightened 
perceiver may appear to be supernatural and therefore beyond God 's contro l . Paré 
understands that the presence o f demons in the norma l w o r l d m igh t suggest that " rea l i t y " is 
subject ively concocted b y the imaginat ion. Science (as then def ined) and the mora l and 
theological interpretations that result f r o m it m igh t thus be an inev i tab ly defeated project. 
Thus Pare explains that demons can intervene i n nature on l y b y m o d i f y i n g the perspective 
o f the i l l -educated observer, no t by phys ica l ly creat ing monsters themselves toough 
supernatural causes. I n para l le l , God 's contract w i t h man (his potentia Dei ordináta) agrees 
to l i m i t the ro le o f his potent ia l ly in f in i te creative power {potentia Dei absoluta) so that 
though i n theory he cou ld pe r fo rm any act, i n pract ice G o d tends to operate according to 
f i xed natural laws o f causa l i ty . 1 5 The structure o f Paré's compend ium is designed to locate 
1 4 Ambro i se Paré, On Monsters and Marvels, trans, and in t rod . Janis L. Pall ister 
(Chicago: U o f Chicago p， 1982). A l l subsequent parenthetical page references i n this 
chapter refer to this ed i t ion and translat ion. The def in i t i ve French edi t ion is Ambro ise Paré, 
Des Monstres et Prodiges, ed. Jean Céard (Geneva: L ib ra i r ie D roz , 1971). 
15 Potentia Dei ordinata is thus a solut ion to the o l d theological p rob lem o f h o w an 
omnipotent and omniscient being can nevertheless permi t people free w i l l , as most 
famously expressed b y Boeth ius: " I f God foresees a l l things ^ i d cannot be mistaken i n any 
way , what Providence has foreseen as a future event must happen. So that i f f r o m eterni ty 
Providence foreknows not on ly men 'ร actions but also their thoughts and desires, there w i l l 
be no f reedom o f w i l l . N o act ion or desire w i l l be able to exist other than that w h i c h God 's 
in fa l l ib le Providence has foreseen. For i f they were changed and made di f ferent f r o m h o w 
they were foreseen, there w i l l be no sure foreknowledge o f the future, on ly an uncertain 
op in ion ; and this I do not th ink can be bel ieved o f G o d . " Boeth ius, The Consolation of 
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the ind iv idua l "sc ient is t " i n relat ion to nature and to contain its fecundi ty in accordance 
w i t h God 's covenant w i t h man to l i m i t his a lmighty potent ia l . I n the same way, Haraway 's 
cyborg models the ideal modern scientist as a modest witness w h o is aware o f their hyb r id 
standpoint across both nature and cul ture. 
Co l lec tmg Nature 
The Renaissance theory o f generat ion f o l l owed Ar is to t le : al l l i v i ng beings were 
d i v ine ly fo rmed, w i t h the female cont r ibut ing matter to the embryo , wh i l s t the male 
endows i t w i t h f o r m and v i t a l i t y . 1 6 Ar is to t le evacuates any portentous s ign i f icat ion f r o m 
the monster, w i t h the monster s imp ly a th ing that goes against the general case wh i l s t not 
be ing against nature ent i re ly. Monsters are caused by the fa i lure o f the generative male 
seed to dominate the mater ia l secretion o f the f ema le . 1 7 A r is to t le 'ร aet iology intersected the 
Augus tm ian t rad i t ion i n w h i c h monsters were evidence o f the creative power o f a 
риф08ІУе God . A l t hough benign, and therefore not monstrous i n the vernacular sense o f 
the abject, their strangeness d id embody signi f icance. A s August ine 'ร in f luent ia l aesthetic 
o f concordia discors argued, " the beauty o f this w o r l d [ is ] enhanced by the opposi t ion o f 
contraries, composed, as i t were, by an eloquence not o f words, but o f t h i ngs . " 1 8 Th is sort 
o f v i ew w o u l d be inher i ted by the l ikes o f Babbage as he delved deep into the structure o f 
the w o r l d through science. Bu t the p rob lem before the scient i f ic revo lu t ion was h o w it was 
possible to t ie an autonomous aet iological development ( i f monsters are created as part o f 
nature, rather than against nature i n the supernaturalist t rad i t ion) to their d iv ine 
portentousness w h i c h impl ies that G o d h imse l f has a l lowed a de fo rmi ty to come about. For 
Philosophy, trans, and in t rod. V i c to r Wat ts , revised ed. (London : Penguin, 1999) 119-20. 
A m o s Funkenstein argues that modern science emerged f r o m the secularisation o f the 
concept o f potentia Dei ordinata. A m o s Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific 
Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Pr inceton: Pr inceton U P , 
1986) 129-50. 
1 6 M ichae l Hagner, "En l ightened Monsters , " The Sciences in Enlightened Europe4 
ed. W i l l i a m Clark , Jan Go l i nsk i , and S imon Schaffer (Chicago: บ o f Chicago p， 1999) 
175-217. 
1 7 Ar is to t le , Generation of Animals, trans. A . L. Peck (London : He inemann, 1943) 
417. 
1 8 August ine 472. 
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whenever monsters are accounted fo r in terms o f natural rather than metaphysical 
generat ion, the puzzle becomes one o f their s igni f icance. I f monsters are not monstra - i n 
the sense o f showing or warn ing o f some event to come - what exact ly do they s igni fy? I f 
no th ing, w h y then do they exist at al l i n a d iv ine ly ordered na tu re? 1 9 
I f these issues prov ided oppor tun i ty for debate, some epistemic stabi l i ty cou ld be 
found in the practice o f c lassi f icat ion and co l lect ion o f monsters. A s Thomas Kau fmann 
describes, the Kuns^mmer, or cabinet o f curiosi t ies, prov ided a symbol ic theatre o f the 
w o r l d in w h i c h by systematising nature for display the col lector equated command o f 
knowledge w i t h po l i t i ca l p o w e r . 2 0 B y i ncoφora t i ng monstrosit ies and deformit ies in to the 
col lect ions o f scholars and physicians, monsters cou ld at least be natural ised. C iv i l i sed and 
ref ined v iewers were aware that they were a problemat ic part o f nature, rather than the 
result o f any dev i l ish generation f r o m the supernatural sphere, outside o f nature and thus 
beyond the contro l o f God . For example, Peter I o f Russia had one o f the most extensive 
col lect ions o f the seventeenth century. H e argued that " the unlearned hide [monsters] 
because they bel ieve that such bir ths or ig inate f r o m the dev i l by w i tchcra f t and sodomy. 
Bu t this is impossib le because the creator o f a l l l i v i ng things is G o d and not the dev i l , who 
has no power over any i n d i v i d u a l . " 2 1 Though demarcated as d i f ferent , the monster need not 
necessarily be monstrous, s imp ly a dev ia t ion w i t h i n the boundaries o f norma l expectat ion; 
demons, however , though their ev i l may h igh l igh t the good b y way o f contrast, also s ign i fy 
an unnatural magic whose forces w o r k to separate man f r o m true knowledge o f his creator. 
B y d is t inguishing we i rd but expl icable monsters f r o m demons or the w o r k o f the dev i l , the 
rat ional ist ic spectator cou ld t ry to make the monster seem, by compar ison, more 
normat ive, and hence w i t h i n God 's p lan. The practice o f d isp lay ing monsters in books or 
cases imp l i c i t l y deconstructed the poss ib i l i ty o f occul t generat ion, such that objects i n a 
co l lec t ion lost their a larming potent ia l and, as M ichae l Hagner puts i t , "represented their 
o w n subord ina t ion . " 2 2 Inversely, as Zak iya Hanaf i explains, the domina t ion o f nature 
toough the theatrum naturae exhaust ively placed "a l l things i n re lat ion to each other and 
Zak iya Hana f i , The Monster in the Machine: Magic1 Medicine1 and the 
Marvelous in the Time of the Scientific Revolution (Durham, N C : Duke U P , 2000) 27. 
2 0 Thomas DaCosta Kau fmann , " F r o m Mastery o f the W o r l d to Mastery o f Nature: 
The Kuns^mmer, Pol i t ics, and Science," The Mastery of Nature: Aspects of Art1 Science, 
and Humanism in the Renaissance (Pr inceton, N J : Pr inceton U P , 1993) 174-94. 
2 1 Q td . i n Hagner 183. 
2 2 Hagner 186. 
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the who le , w i t h the except ion o f one creature: [ M a n ] , standing at the centre.' The modern 
scient i f ic method impl ies an erasure o f subject iv i ty . I n the Newton ian universe, f o r 
example, there is no causal relat ionship between the observer and the observed so that the 
second law o f mo t i on holds for any observer o f any physical object. B y contrast, as Hanaf i 
explains, the encyclopaedic method constitutes a personal science, a l l ow ing M a n to 
spatialise his hierarchical p r imacy teough b r ing ing the monstrous into p r o x i m i t y w i t h 
h imsel f , wh i l s t s imultaneously keeping i t at a safely object ive distance through the glass o f 
the cabinet, specimen ja r , or anatomical d raw ing . Thus the Renaissance v iewer o f monsters 
occupies a pos i t ion not un l i ke Haraway 'ร cyborg . The cyborg is heterogeneous, able to 
occupy d i f ferent perspectives on nature through app ly ing d i f ferent augmentations or 
accessing alternative interfaces. I n this sense, as Haraway argues, as i n the scient i f ic 
method and representation, the ind iv idua l transcends their personal subject ive standpoint to 
reach a universal t ru th. O n the other hand, such heterogeneity reminds that nature is always 
mediated and constructed t r o u g h a part icular lens: his or her v iew o f the w o r l d f r o m the 
standpoint o f a body (or bodies) affects the percept ion o f nature out there. S im i la r l y , the 
Renaissance scientist denied claims that the monster cou ld be supernatural ly generated by 
col lect ing them and contextual is ing each specimen against others. A t the same t ime, they 
were self-aware that such a structure put themselves at the centre o f the natural universe i n 
the way Hanaf i argues. Thus the monster was also a lens or s ign through w h i c h cou ld be 
read the fact that G o d beyond nature and t ime had made M a n so special i n the f i rs t place, 
the on ly one able to col lect the monsters that a l low M a n to spatialise the hierarchy o f 
Ar is to t le 'ร scala naturae, T feough produc ing a coherent body o f knowledge out o f the 
mu l t ip le bodies o f the monstrous, the natural ist ensured a situated science that located his 
embodied self i n relat ion to God 's unseen purposes. 
Paré's Monsters 
T y p i f y i n g this co l lect ive mode, rather than in i t ia t ing his o w n studies o f ind iv idua l 
cases or exp lo r ing a single case in detai l Ambro i se Pare compi led f r o m other sources. 
Since its style and content represent a synthesis o f other treatises on the subject, On 
Monsters is one o f the paradigmat ic books on monsters o f the Renaissance. F o l l o w i n g 
August ine 'ร lead, the rare and unusual fo rms i n the book prove the creative var iety o f 
God 's universe, speaking o f H is wondrous fecundi ty . I n this sense, there is no th ing 
2 3 Hanaf i 5 
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grotesque in nature, except as perceived and considered as such by the i r rat ional observer. 
Thus Paré'ร f i rst de f in i t ion is between monsters w h i c h "are things that appear outside the 
course o f Na tu re" and marvels wh i ch "are things w h i c h happen that are complete ly against 
Nature" (3) . A s w i t h other col lect ions (such as Peter ľ s ) , the structure o f the book 
demarcates the grotesque that can nevertheless be natural ised by conta in ing i t w i t h i n the 
hermetic env i ronment o f the col la t ive ed i t ion, f r o m the demonic that cannot, because the 
demon works through produc ing the i l lus ion o f the miraculous or supernatural. S ign i f y i ng 
this, a l though lack ing a reduct ive exper imental approach, Pare is intent on accumulat ing 
data regarding the causes o f monsters, w h i c h are discussed through analogies, and w h i c h 
are systematical ly grouped i n the book 's chapter structure according to s imi la r categories 
o f or ig in . For example, a section on h o w an excess quant i ty o f " seed" leads to superf luous 
l imbs, is f o l l owed b y chapters on mu l t ip le b i r ths, and then hermaphrodi tes; these 
androgynes lead h i m natural ly in to a discussion o f transsexual w o m e n w h o "degenerate" 
into men. M o d e r n scient i f ic w r i t i ng is selective rather than encyclopaedic, mark ing t ru th 
toough the paradigmat ic exper iment whose law extends to al l other relevant cases through 
abstract formulae. I n contrast, as I have argued above, the Renaissance mode l o f scient i f ic 
practice saw organisat ion and compi la t ion as essential to va l idat ing data; edi tor ia l and 
authorial decisions thereby p lay a key role i n the construct ion o f t ru th. Thus , wh i l s t On 
Monsters is part o f a popular per iod l i terature on the grotesque and is not a taxonomy or 
scient i f ic thesis i n the modern sense o f the te rm, i t should certainly be read as contextual ly 
a serious development o f knowledge rather than as a prur ient picture book, wh i ch i t may 
appear to be today. 
I n the opening to the book , Pare lists thir teen speci f ic reasons for de fo rmi ty (there 
are, he says, other human reasons but none that are "su f f i c ien t or p robab le" to detai l ) . The 
f i rs t is the g lory o f God . For example, the b l i n d man i n Saint John was born unsighted not 
because o f the s in o f h is father or mother, but " i n order that the works o f G o d migh t be 
magni f ied in h i m " (4) . Monsters and marvel lous creatures also result f r o m the wra th o f 
God , " w h o penni ts fathers and mothers to produce such abominat ions f r o m the disorder 
that they make i n copu la t i on / ' such as hav ing sexual intercourse dur ing menstruat ion, 
wh ich is fo rb idden in Lev i t icus 16 (5) . Bu t i n spite o f these t w o examples, the cause o f 
direct d iv ine intervent ion is re lat ive ly absent, because o f the theological d i l emma produced 
by posi t ing any direct relat ionship between the aet io logy o f a monster and the beneficent 
m i n d o f G o d who migh t potent ia l ly have created them. A l though Pare polemicises at 
length against counterfei t beggars fe ign ing disease to obta in alms, he tends not to moral ise 
monstrosi ty against B ib l i ca l conventions i n an al legor ical way. For the bu l k o f the book 
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nature is treated as autonomous and acting according to l im i ted physical laws, rather than 
metaphysical or mora l causali ty. 
A l t hough these laws are technical ly incorrect b y the standards o f modern b io logy , i t 
is not hard to enter the imaginat ion o f the Renaissance scholar. I n a d i f ferent cul tura l 
system, i t is easy to imagine some o f the reasons as be ing w h o l l y plausible. Th is is because 
un l ike cybernetics or genetics wh i ch segregates in fo rmat ion f r o m the body i n w h i c h i t is 
embedded, aet io logy here is s ingular ly mater ia l : b lows to the w o m b , hereditary i l lness, 
rot ten or m i x e d or too great a quant i ty o f seed, the narrowness o f the w o m b , the irregular 
posture o f the mother al l can cause monstrous o f fspr ing . These fa l l under the Ar is to te l ian 
category o f accidens, c i rcumstant ia l quali t ies d is t inguishing one ind iv idua l o f a species 
f r o m another, and as George H o f f m a n n observes, this category o f mut i la t ions is the most 
empi r ica l ly founded one, since accidens rel ies on cont ingent cause and e f fec t . 2 4 Cer ta in ly , 
there is a begu i l ing c lar i ty to these causes, w h i c h perceive a logical and single sequence 
o f development. For example, according to Hippocrates, f r o m a տ ս տ Խ տ o f seed mu l t i p le 
bir ths or superf luous organs or l imbs w i l l result ; l i kewise i t can lead to a fus ing o f organs 
or conjo ined tw ins , because nature wants to create t w o ch i ldren but the seed is constrained 
and must be "coagulated into a g lobe" f r o m w h i c h conjo ined twins w i l l be born. I f the 
menses contain the mater ia l f o r m o f the adult body, i t is in tu i t ive that too much "seed" 
should result i n a mu l t ip l i ca t ion or compression o f the being, or that more seed produces 
twms. I t is equal ly rat ional that a mother w i t h an odd posture w i l l develop o f fspr ing who 
are phys ica l ly tw is ted, since as Hippocrates observes " i t is inevi table that a body w h i c h 
moves i n a smal l place should become mut i la ted and l ack i ng " (42) . Cause and ef fect are 
clear ly l i nked in this aet io logy, w h i c h is more inst inct ive ly appeal ing than the genetic v i e w 
that a code o f four chemical components (denine, thymine , cytosine and guanine) m igh t 
contain the instruct ions fo r bu i l d ing the f u l l comp lex i t y o f organic l i f e ; that a minu te error 
i n this code at the moment o f fer t i l isat ion m igh t cause muta t ion ; or that through genetic 
engineering a cow migh t be fused w i t h a human embryo to concoct a chimera. 
Evo lu t ionary genetics is a cybernetic episteme, i n that i t assumes nature is 
essentially abstract in fo rmat ion , w i t h the physical organism s imp ly the instant iat ion o f that 
genetic code upon an organic substrate. W i t h i n such a f ramework , beings are def ined not 
according to any innate, stable real i ty i n their o w n space and t ime, but w i t h reference to the 
2 4 George H o f f m a n n , "Monsters and M o d a l Log i c A m o n g French Natural ists o f the 
Renaissance," South Central Review 10.2 (1993) : 36-8了 
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type of in fo rmat ion they encapsulate. F rom the genetic point o f v iew , the fly and the 
human are bo th bags o f data whose sole purpose is fa i th fu l l y (or sel f ishly, i n D a w k i n s ' 
argument) to reproduce that data, most o f w h i c h is c o m m o n across both species. 
Nevertheless, f r o m the perspective o f the human, the fly continues to seem a very d i f ferent 
creature. The reduct ion o f al l l i f e to a k i n d o f w r i t i n g o f four chemical components seems 
radical when compared to the Renaissance alternative in w h i c h there is one hierarchical 
order o f development in a mul t i fa r ious natural w o r l d , an order w h i c h places humans at the 
top , and accounts fo r deviat ions f r o m the n o r m as being due to observable, mater ial causes. 
L o o k i n g at the images i n Paré'ร compend ium, our inst inct ive reactions to the 
Siamese t w i n in the sixteenth century and a current genetic hyb r id are probably qui te 
s imi lar , bo th i nvok ing what M a r y M idge ley terms the " y u k factor , " the inst inct ive react ion 
to anyth ing that deviates f r o m the n o r m s . 2 6 Responses to genetic science are of ten 
impuls ive rather than log ica l . For example, wh i l s t battery egg fa rm ing is commonplace i n 
spite o f the suf fer ing i t causes fo r the b i rds, the publ ic react w i t h greater revuls ion to the 
possib i l i ty that a ch icken m igh t be genet ical ly mod i f i ed to become a non-sentient egg 
lay ing machine w h i c h cannot feel p a i n . 2 7 Acco rd ing to the f i rst standard, the animal has 
few onto logicai r ights. Cont rad ic tor i ly , i n the second example i t is fe l t that the b io log ica l 
hyb r id should not be developed precisely because it violates the animal 's ancestral 
integr i ty. The battery ch icken is v iewed simultaneously as a genet ic-chemical machine for 
lay ing eggs and as an an imal w i t h an integr i ty that must be preserved. The science and 
ambit ions o f contemporary geneticists are in tension w i t h our cu l tura l , " f o l k " 
understandings o f nature, since wh i l s t the former a im to remove subject iv i ty f r o m the 
relat ionship between science and the w o r l d by descr ib ing organisms such as man i n 
quanti tat ive terms, our ethical appreciations o f the wo r l d re ly on a fluid, qual i tat ive no t ion 
o f the subject. For economic purposes we may reduce the qual i ty o f sel fhood and 
autonomy i n one si tuat ion (as i n the economical battery hen), wh i l s t emphasising sentience 
i n another (as in our preference for the ch icken over the egg-machine). The l inear aet io logy 
o f monstrosi ty in Paré'ร case a l lows fo r a more ph i losophica l ly consistent f raming o f the 
T y p i f y i n g this alternative perspective i n wh i ch the agent is perceived f r o m the 
po in t o f v i ew o f its genetic in fo rmat ion IS R ichard Dawk ins , ทั๊e Selfish Gene, 30th 
Anniversary Ed i t i on (1976; O x f o r d : O x f o r d U P , 2003). 
2 6 M a r y M i d g l e y , The Myths We Live By (London : Rout ledge, 2004) 105. 
2 7 Bernice Bovenkerk , "B rave N e w Bi rds : The Use o f ' A n i m a l In tegr i ty ' i n A n i m a l 
E th ics , " The Hastings Center Report 32Л (2002) : 16-22. 
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fo lksy , " y u k " response. Because development takes place along a single plane o f be ing and 
causality, rather than the double level o f genetic in fo rmat ion and embodied organism, i n 
his explorat ion, Paré is comparably sensitive to anyth ing i n v io la t ion o f natural in tegr i ty , 
regardless o f its part icular v isual f o r m : strange bir ths caused by developmental forces, gal l 
stones or objects passed through the gut, and devious fake beggars al l have the same 
onto logicai status. I n the order ing, tone, and mora l lessons d rawn f r o m his examples, Pare 
seems to f i n d al l deviat ions equal ly remarkable, wh i l s t the uncanny th ing about genetic 
science is that something w h i c h seems so d i f ferent to the human 一 even "monst rous , " l i ke a 
headless ch icken - m igh t actual ly have much i n c o m m o n w i t h us. 
A l t hough Renaissance theories o f generat ion are very d i f ferent to genetics i n 
technical terms, that the Renaissance theory seems more commonsensical even i f 
mater ia l is t ical ly w r o n g impl ies that the attempt o f the " C y b o r g Man i fes to " to br idge the 
gap between cybernet ic nature and embodied cul ture is one to wh i ch we migh t be anyway 
attuned, since we tend to construct myths o f o r i g i n , f o r m and development that f i t w i t h our 
c o m m o n social knowledge. T h o u g h the manifesto fo r posthumanism seems to break new 
ground, potent ia l ly a mani festo may denote less the revelat ion o f something that must be 
achieved at a l l costs, and more the exp l icat ion o f the condi t ions for change that were to 
some degree always there, i f suppressed or bur ied , and w h i c h must now be revealed and 
energised. Haraway 'ร cyborg is an attempt to reconci le the knowledge that we are pure ly 
in format iona l enti t ies, as considered b y cybernetics or postmodern theory, w i t h the tacit 
feeling that humans are onto log ica l ly d i f ferent , p r iv i leged above the rest o f nature. She 
attempts to produce a mode l fo r knowledge that is situated w i t h i n the domain o f human 
experience, rather than abstracted as pure ly rat ional discourse, w h i c h is t rad i t ional ly the 
preserve o f the (a l legedly) object ive male. The cyborg frames abstract science w i t h i n 
embodied cul ture ( through technologies l i ke the ul t rasound scan), reveal ing that a l though 
something l i ke b i r th is the outcome o f a genetic process, i t is st i l l perceived f r o m the 
egocentric pos i t ion o f an embodied observer, a "modest wi tness." Paré's w o r k impl ies that 
we were in a sense always ready to become such cyborgs, to f rame nature w i t h i n a system 
o f cause and effect wh i ch a l lows man to be located i n a pr iv i leged pos i t ion above the fly or 
the chicken. The di f ference is that, i n the Renaissance, the v i ew that humans are dominant 
over nature is սոժ6փւոոշ(1 by a scient i f ic causal i ty in w h i c h organisms exist on one 
onto logicai plane under God , w i t h man made i n H is image. B y contrast, i n the era o f 
genetics the fact that i n fo rmat ion is separated f r o m its embodiment i n a specif ic organism 
makes it d i f f i cu l t to reconci le genetics w i t h our taci t assumption that nature is h ierarchical , 
descendmg f r o m human to the ch icken, but not m o v i n g hor izonta l ly so that the genetic 
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information of the human is almost identical to that of the different-looking 
animal . Haraway observes that i n the late twent ie th century we are "a l l chimeras, theorised 
and fabricated hybr ids o f machine and o r g a n i s m . " 2 8 Though this part icular cybernet ic 
incarnation may be novel, it appeals to our tendency to construct myths of origin that view 
nature being ԱՈԺ6Փ1ՈՈ6(1 by a single creative rule, or chain of being which places man in 
hierarchy over it. The cyborg a l lows us to mark our d i f ference tiirough ev idencing our 
technological prowess, whilst at the same time the fact that we can merge successfully with 
technology acknowledges that humans, like computers or other organisms, are essentially 
cybernetic systems, children of information. 
Renaissance theories o f generation are begu i l ing ly s imple, as an ind iv idua l s imp ly 
expands, ba l loon l i ke , f r o m its germ to adult f o r m . The act o f w r i t i ng about monsters 
implies that the categories of normal and monstrous are stable, since anything excluded 
f r o m the book on monsters is by imp l i ca t ion not monstrous. Th is i l lustrates the general 
epistemological problem of the encyclopaedic and inductive approach, as opposed to the 
empmcist's deductive model in which the same rule can apply to superficially different 
phenomena. For example, even though coral m igh t appear more l i ke a rock than an an imal , 
because it includes genetic matter it must be categorised as an organic rather than a 
geological specimen. The def in i t ion o f monstrous and normal is less absolute, be ing 
def ined b y the ideologica l preconceptions o f an ind iv idua l author. The nature (or un -
nature) of the monster provides at times a moral capital, as in the couple'ร offspring which 
shows God 's wrath at their ignorance o f the rules o f menstruat ion in Lev i t icus 16. Th is 
asserts the existence of an original divine message to man which can be read in certain 
aspects o f the wo r l d . O n the other hand, this concocts a theological p rob lem: i f the laws o f 
nature established by G o d a l low for accidental developments through hazard or 
i r regular i ty, this impl ies he is not a l l -good; but i f God does not cause such developments, 
this impl ies he is not a lmighty . As Paré observes i n a condenmat ion o f astrological 
explanations fo r aberrat ion, " G o d is not t ied nor subject to f o l l o w i n g the order H e has 
established i n Nature, nor i n the movement o f stars and planets" (73) . T o resolve this 
contradict ion, the emphasis is placed not on G o d who causes monsters b y warp ing 
development at a microscopic stage of the process like a tinkering Dei absoluta ֊ though 
H e could potent ia l ly do this - but an embodied and autonomous secular cul ture: the way i n 
w h i c h a w o m a n sits dur ing pregnancy, for example. Thus i m p l y i n g that w e migh t al l 
Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i fes to " 150. 
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generate the abnormal f r o m the germ o f the d iv ine or ig ina l seed, a l l nature potent ia l ly 
becomes monstrous under the manipulat ions o f a human culture out o f the logocentr ic 
cont ro l o f God . O n the other hand, such a v i ew w o u l d undercut the status o f the 
theologica l ly educated and po l i t i ca l l y el i te person able to witness the natural monsters w i t h 
object ive dispassion, not fear ing their occul t possib i l i ty . I f secular cul ture can produce 
monsters, what standpoint f r o m w i t h i n culture a l lows analysis o f their al legorical impor t 
w i t h reference both to mora l i t y and the m i n d o f God? For Pare, establ ishing such an 
epistemological ground depends on cont ro l l ing and sel f - ref lex ive ly mark ing a d is t inc t ion 
between real i ty and s imula t ion, a boundary l ine patro l led b y the demon. 
The Real and the V i r t ua l : Monst rous A l l ego ry and the Demon ic Imaginat ion 
George H o f f m a n n argues that a l though it is tempt ing to see Paré'ร descript ive 
observations and apparent concern w i t h causal i ty as predic t ing scient i f ic method, he draws 
substantial ly on the Ar is to te l ian d is t inc t ion between the "necessary" and the "poss ib l e . " 2 9 
Because neither Ar is to t le nor Paré break these d o w n further in to a d is t inc t ion between 
things actual ly observed (and therefore more l i ke l y to be possible) and speculative things 
(such as angels), Paré af fords the same onto log ica l status to a l l the subjects he covers. 
A r g u i n g that "Nature has disported herself i n order to cause the grandeur o f her works to 
be admi red , " Pare saw God 's power as l imi t less (potentia Dei absoluta) rather than l im i ted 
by any covenant w i t h man (potentia Dei ordinata). H o f f m a n n concludes b y observing that 
Paré migh t be best understood i n terms o f l i terary magic real ism, wh i ch entertains the 
sense o f the w o r l d as that w h i c h m igh t be possible, w i thou t regard to causal logic or to the 
actual i ty o f the present . 3 0 
However , H o f f m a n n is w rong to situate Pare i n this sort o f context, as an 
imaginat ive f i c t i on maker w h o sees the w o r l d as the v i r tua l and fecund mani festat ion o f a 
potentia Dei absoluta. In specif ic cases, such as the be l ie f that there are seven ind iv idua l 
cells w i t h i n a woman 'ร w o m b w h i c h accounts fo r mu l t ip le b i r ths, Paré's personal 
observations and his jud ic ious evaluat ion o f other authorit ies do cause h i m to reject certain 
second hand accounts as impossible (25-26) . I have already stressed that the col lect ion o f 
monsters normal ised them w i t h i n nature, regardless o f the veraci ty o f any explanat ion as to 
their o r ig in i n the f i rs t place. Even so, almost every case i n On Monsters is g iven a date 
2 9 G. H o f f m a n n 38. 
3 0 G. H o f f m a n n 43 . 
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and place o f observat ion, t y ing the examples to real ist ic h is tor ica l contexts and i m p l y i n g 
that Paré is concerned to do more than s imp ly compi le in order to subordinate the 
monstrous. Rather, his ambi t ion is to rat ionalise. I n this ve in , a l though nature'ร var iety 
m igh t be analogous to the creative m i n d o f a lm igh ty G o d , Paré makes a cr i t ica l d is t inc t ion 
between nature and the supernatural, a d iscr iminat ion w h i c h does anticipate that more 
fo rma l l y inscr ibed by the modern " t w o cu l tures" separation o f the real (those things 
legi t imately studied b y science) f r o m the v i r tua l (magical real ism, for example, studied by 
the humani t ies) . Such a d iscr iminat ion is made by d rawing a boundary l ine between the 
monster w h i c h can be accounted for b y mater ia l causes, and the monster w h i c h appears to 
have been produced b y the supernatural w o r k o f the dev i l . Pare br ings the demon d o w n to 
earth, showing h o w demonica l ly produced monsters are actual ly i l lus ions w i thou t physical 
cause. Th is d iv is ion anticipates Enl ightenment science'ร break f r o m Ar is to t le 'ร moda l 
log ic , and its epistemic d is t inc t ion between science and cul ture. 
I n The City of G o J , August ine argues that demons are "ent i re ly al ien to jus t ice, 
swol len w i t h pr ide, l i v i d w i t h envy, and subtle i n deceit ." I n h is scheme, demons do 
v i v i d l y exist as fa l len angels and, l i ke monsters w h i c h h igh l igh t the beauty o f creat ion, 
they prov ide a reveal ing շ օ ս ո է շ փ օ ա է to the good. However , un l i ke monsters w h i c h , to the 
sceptic, are passive evidence o f God 's true nature, demons may act ively " h o l d sway, as 
over prisoners and subjects, over the many men w h o are c lear ly unwor thy to share in the 
true r e l i g i o n . " 3 1 Wh i l s t monsters embody unintended but reveal ing errors, demons result 
f r o m the deliberate ev i l o f the dev i l . Impor tant ly , however, demons on ly appear to operate 
i n a supernatural or miraculous way ; i n actual i ty, their effects are produced by the same 
sorts o f natural causes that account f o r monstrosi ty. Th is is precisely Peter ľ s argument 
exempl i f ied above. W e also recol lect that Paré'ร very f i rst d is t inc t ion in On Monsters and 
Marvels was between monsters that appear outside nature and marvels that are against 
nature, a d is t inct ion necessary to t ie nature to the mora l G o d who created i t , and to 
anticipate the reader o f the book as a c iv i l i sed sceptic rather than uneducated 
supernaturalist. Later in the book, Paré maintains this August in ian t rad i t ion: 
N o w these Demons can i n many manners and fashions deceive our 
earthbound heaviness, b y reason o f the subtlety o f their essence and mal ice 
o f their w i l l ; fo r they obscure the eyes o f men w i t h th ick clouds that 
scramble our minds g idd i l y and deceive us by satanic impostures, 
August ine 344-45. 
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corrupt ing our imaginat ions through their buf fooner ies and impiet ies. They 
are "doc to rs " i n falsehoods ᅳ the roots o f mal ice - and in al l wickedness to 
seduce and deceive us and prevaricators o f t ru th ; and, to say i t i n a w o r d , 
they have incomparable sk i l l i n deceits, for they transmute themselves i n a 
thousand ways and heap on the bodies o f l i v i ng persons a thousand strange 
things. (91) 
Paré acknowledges the existence o f demons and their ab i l i t y to possess the body and to 
cause i t to expel bizarre objects: kn ives, hair bal ls , nai ls, through the stomach, mou th or 
w o m b . However , un l i ke the other monstrous aetiologies i n w h i c h cause and ef fect result 
f r o m the ind iv idua l ' s development, here the spectacular effects produced by demons 
originate not i n causes in the body o f the possessed, but i n the minds o f the observers; they 
are "done through the clevemess o f the dev i l , w h o deceived the persons present through 
their facul ty o f s igh t " (96) . The imp l i ca t ion here is that the ref ined reader o f Paré's w o r k 
w i l l be able to remain sceptical, refusing to entertain the v i r tua l and strange real i ty 
concocted b y the dev i l . 
Th is is ent i re ly consistent w i t h theological convent ion w h i c h considered the dev i l 
to be a v i r tua l creature, in that he both possessed the same powers as G o d wh i l s t be ing 
simultaneously his antithesis. A s Stuart C lark explains, the dev i l ' s power was rat ional ised 
as being the ab i l i t y to create deception w i t h the permiss ion o f God , and to simulate d iv ine 
powers w i thou t possessing their intr insic basis and hence ambiguously sharing their 
mo ra l i t y . 3 2 Thus , f o r example, possessions were construed as be ing permi t ted by G o d so 
that the priest per fo rming a successful exorc ism migh t ed i f y and assert the value o f h is role 
in exposing ev i l ' s l im i ta t i ons . 3 3 In ef fect, the dev i l is sel f -deceiv ing i n be l iev ing h imse l f to 
have true power w h e n he possesses on ly its i l lus ion . So G o d cou ld i n pr inc ip le cont ro l 
demons, since they are but s imulat ions o f the power o f ev i l w i thou t true base. Further, 
marvels w o r k through the m ind ' s eye o f the superstit ious witness, and do not therefore 
3 2 Stuart C lark , "Demons , Natura l Mag ic , and the V i r t ua l l y Real : V isua l Paradox in 
Ear ly M o d e r n Europe , " Paracelsian Moments: Science1 Medicine and Astrology in Early 
Modern Europe, ed! Gerh i l d Scholz W i l l i a m s and Charles D. Gunnoe Jr. (K i rKsv i l le , M O : 
T ruman State U P , 2002) 223-45. I n his vast survey Thinking with Demons, C lark expands 
on the value o f the dev i l (and wi tchcraf t and demono logy) i n a theological and cul tura l 
log ic w h i c h was structured according to opposites and inversions. 
A s D.p . Wa lke r has shown, the r i tua l o f demonic exorc ism consequently became 
a p rov ing ground fo r Catho l i c ism to combat Protestant ism i n sixteenth-century France, 
wh i l s t i n Eng land the rat ional isat ion o f demons asserted Protestant ism against Popish 
per format iv i ty . Wa lke r 6. 
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have any real physical cause and hence c la im to a l legor ica l ly reveal a mora l or theological 
t ru th in the way monsters m igh t (as i n Paré's reading o f Lev i t icus 16). Because demons 
can on ly do what G o d permi ts , they are preternatural rather than supernatural (beyond 
nature'ร laws) , and i t is on l y a human fa l lacy that perceives their actions to be miraculous 
(that is, outside o f nature) rather than, l i ke monsters, against the usual norms o f nature but 
not w h o l l y unna tu ra l . 3 4 The a im of natural physics at this t ime "was to demyst i f y demonic 
pretensions by subject ing them to careful and essential ly negative scrut iny - sort ing out, in 
part icular, jus t where the l im i t s o f demonic ef f icacy v ia second causes were reached and 
the rea lm o f fantasy and delusion b e g a n . " 3 5 I n the h is tory o f science, Paré'ร scept ic ism 
regarding demons, even wh i l s t he talks at length about monsters, anticipates the later 
attempts in the seventeenth century to understand the demonic i n rat ional terms as the 
result o f physical i l lness and personal fabr icat ion ᅳ part icular ly , as Steven Connor has 
shown, through exposing the dramatic staging o f demonic vo ices . 3 6 The fact that, f o r al l his 
cont inual cur ios i ty about strange nature, Paré demotes demons to produc ing the appearance 
o f monstrous entit ies, rather than actual ly causing supernatural events to occur, suggests 
that he is enter ing the "secular at t i tude" wh i ch is fundamental to modern sc ience. 3 7 
However , though tempt ing, i t w o u l d be w rong to present Paré'ร w o r k as be ing 
der ived f r o m any sort o f rat ional ly Cartesian log ic . Rather, his emphasis on the veraci ty o f 
monsters and his downp lay ing o f deceiv ing demons stems f r o m theological conventions. In 
this sense, Paré'ร demons remain h y b r i d actants, in that they produce a quasi-scient i f ic 
epistemology - in the passage quoted above Paré pr iv i leges t ru th above decept ion - but 
they do so f r o m a cu l tura l standpoint (rel ig ious be l ie f ) , rather than f r o m the absolute facts 
encoded i n the w o r l d w h i c h object ive science can discern w i thou t bias or re la t iv ism. Paré 
attempts to categorise according to f o rma l pr incip les o f monstrosi ty. Thus incorporat ing 
the demon w i t h i n the same text m igh t destroy any broader mora l meanmg that emerges 
both f r o m its celebratory display o f God ' s creat iv i ty, and f r o m its containment o f monsters 
by decontextual is ing them on the page as objects o f spectacle. I f demons, too, are la id out 
3 4 For a detai led analysis o f the way i n wh i ch demons worked to pe r fo rm 
marvel lous feats that nevertheless were not miraculous, or supernatural, see ร . C lark , 
Thinking with Demons, especial ly 161—78. 
3 5 ร . Clark , Thinking with Demons 153. 
3 6 Connor, Dumbstruck 153-225. 
Thomas Goldste in , Dawn of Modern Science (Boston: Hough ton , 1980) 43 . 
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as further evidence Ol U o ď s imaginat ive abundance or potentia Dei absoluta, the imp l i c i t 
poss ib i l i ty is that i t is demons who have hoaxed the witnesses o f monsters w h o m Paré 
collates into be l iev ing they were seeing monstrous things. Thus monsters w o u l d not 
actual ly exist i n their e tymolog ica l sense o f showing or te l l ing , f o r the w o r l d w o u l d be 
populated on ly b y demonic i l lus ion-mongers. O n the other hand, to keep demons outside 
the category o f the natural is paradoxical ly to g ive them a freer l icence. A s Steven Co imor 
notes, demons are: 
accursed because o f the power they have o f imp lan t ing va in and false ideas. 
Bu t what i f one o f these ideas was the idea that there are demons, and that 
they have power over us?...If the very idea o f the counter fe i t ing demonic 
were i tsel f a counterfei t , then where w o u l d be its o r ig in , and who cou ld be 
he ld responsible for the counter fe i t? 3 8 
I f the demon as a potent ia l ly counterfei t counterfei ter is not bound to the ru le o f G o d , then 
it exists i n an onto log ica l l imbo . The best compromise Paré can make is to keep the 
demonic as a v i r tua l force, capable o f produc ing cogni t ive or v isual i l lus ions but not 
physical actions. Therefore, nature alone remains the sole code to the d iv ine m i n d , w i t h its 
rel iable and l inear contingencies in w h i c h monsters result f r o m unusual s i t t ing posi t ions, 
for example. 
Indeed, the fact that Paré is not object ive i n the modern sense is clear by his attitude 
towards women . Further segregating nature and the dev i l , Paré (again f o l l o w i n g Classical 
t radi t ion) rejects the idea that human monsters can be produced as the o f fspr ing o f demons 
and w o m a n (49). Odd ly , though, Paré also ident i f ies the maternal imaginat ion as one factor 
i n monstrosi ty. L i k e many authorit ies o f his t ime, he draws on Hippocrates ' argument that 
lengthy contemplat ion o f an object can cause b i r thmarks w i t h a s imi lar impr in t , a be l ie f 
g iven added credence by the recent re in t roduct ion o f Hermet ic ideas into Western thought. 
For example, Paré cites Damascene's attestation o f a mother w h o , hav ing looked too 
intent ly at the image o f St. John dressed i n skins, conceived a g i r l " f u r r y as a 
bear...deformed and h ideous" (38). B u t i f the demonic deceptions o f the imagmat ion are 
g iven on l y a b r ie f space i n On Monsters, how then to account for these special cases o f 
m i n d af fect ing matter? The Ar is to te l ian t rad i t ion treats the mother as s imp ly the passive 
receptacle fo r the male seed wh i ch contains the f o r m o f the ch i l d , so there is a 
contradict ion in a w o r k w h i c h otherwise inherits Ar is to t le , wh i ls t also c la im ing that 
Connor, Dumbstruck 96. 
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because the mother is responsible for the cont inuat ion o f the species she is also 
accountable fo r monstrous accidents. 3 9 Paré is unsel fconsciously misogynis t ic on this 
point , no t ing : 
h o w dangerous it is to disturb a pregnant woman , to show her or remind her 
o f some food w h i c h she cannot en joy immediate ly , and indeed to show 
them animals, or even pictures o f them, when they are deformed and 
monstrous. For w h i c h I ' m expect ing someone to object to me that I 
therefore shouldn ' t have inserted anyth ing l i ke this in to m y book on 
reproduct ion. Bu t I w i l l answer h i m i n a w o r d , that I do not wr i te fo r 
w o m e n at a l l . Le t us return to our subject. (55) 
Even though monsters cannot be produced through demon-human copulat ion, the maternal 
imaginat ion is subject to the impr in t ing o f s imulacra on the med ium o f their bodies and 
those embryos they carry. The monster stands as a mora l rebuke to the excessive 
psychology o f the w o m a n (just as late nineteenth and early twent ieth-century feminists 
were medical ised as be ing "hys ter ica l " ) . Natura l ly , not being subject to pregnancy, the 
male v iewer remains protected f r o m such cause and effect. I n a se l f - fu l f i l l i ng c i rc le, this 
spectacular p icture book o f monsters both authenticates the super ior i ty o f the male witness, 
and the scient i f ic credentials o f the wr i te r w h o presents i t fo r h i m w i thou t h imse l f 
becoming deformed through baroque excess. A s Hana f i wr i tes, glossing the very s imi lar 
v iews o f the early seventeenth-century scholar, Giambatt is ta del la Porta, " the w o m a n 
l i teral ly makes o f her body a laboratory, turns her procreat ive capacities in to a scient i f ic 
endeavour whose results make up the data," in this case con f i rm ing the Hermet ic 
hypothesis that intangible sight o f an object can cause it to be produced i n ac tua l i t y . 4 0 A s 
w i t h the KunstMmmer, though, the contro l cont r ived through perspective leaves the 
prob lem o f generat ion i n its wake. Paré'ร e l is ion o f the precise mechanism that a l lows the 
mother 'ร imag inat ion to affect the physical embryo i n accordance w i t h Ar is to t le suggests 
that as theology was i l l og ica l , i t was forced to protect i tsel f by sexual prejudice, exc lud ing 
one commun i t y o f readers who migh t potent ia l ly comp la in about this causal contradict ion. 
Mar ie-Helene Huet , " L i v i n g Images: Monst ros i ty and Representation, 
Representations 4 (1983) : 73, JSTOR, 16 Sept. 2008 
<ht tp : / /www. js tor .org/s table/2928548>. 
4 0 Hana f i 58. 
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The D e m o n and the Cyborg 
Pare'ร f ina l point in the quotat ion above, where he does not wr i te for w o m e n , 
returns me to where I began this analysis o f Paré'ร monster compend ium, by emphasising 
the way i n w h i c h w r i t i ng as an act cuts the author o f f f r o m the demonic delusion and 
monstrous superst i t ion. T o wr i te fo r w o m e n is to wr i t e for those in league w i t h the dev i l , as 
indicated b y the unrestrained power o f the female imaginat ion. I n a s imi lar ve in , the 
medieval natural ist is cautious that one factor i n monstrosi ty may be a surplus o f the 
imaginat ion, or the devi ls and demons w h o corrupt i t . Paré is aware o f the power o f w r i t i n g 
to contr ibute towards this extension o f the m i n d beyond the confmes o f language, tò m i m i c 
dev i l ish decept ion through the human creative imaginat ion. Thus he restrains f r o m te l l ing 
o f the "great loathsomeness" o f addi t ional monsters o f any part icular type (73). The fact 
that monsters cannot be themselves generated by demons, and that the text on monsters 
must not be a l lowed to become a d iabol ic surplus o f the imaginat ion, indicates that t ru th 
inheres i n monsters in their o w n r ight , w i t h God 's mora l purpose potent ia l ly legible i n their 
nature. I n a modern age o f epistemological and d isc ip l inary boundaries, one is either 
w h o l l y a mater ial ist or w h o l l y a myst ic (or else one holds some pos i t ion poised uneasi ly 
between the t w o , such as Intel l igent Des ign) . A n d i f one holds a bel ief i n G o d or monsters, 
w h y not also i n demons? Bu t i n the Renaissance, theocentr ism can be mainta ined 
s imul taneously w i t h an imaginat ive restraint, such that on ly G o d can be t ru l y supernatural 
wh i l s t the w o r k o f the dev i l is conf ined to the product ion o f i l lus ion . 
H o w , then, does the demon/monster d is t inc t ion as a way o f c la im ing the 
epistemology o f Renaissance science relate to the contemporary cyborg? A s indicated b y 
Pare'ร contradictory treatment o f the female imaginat ion , the demon is imp l i c i t l y an 
ideological construct ion, wh i ls t the monster marks the object ive nature that, though 
diverse, is causal ly stable. S imi la r ly , rather than being a def in i te ident i ty const i tuted 
through speci f ic technological models, the cyborg exists when ideology and science come 
into conjunct ion. For Haraway, some versions o f the cyborg are const i tuted o f "no th ing but 
signals, electromagnetic waves, a section o f a spect rum. . .Cyborgs are ether, quintessence." 
L i k e Paré'ร demons w h i c h assume psychologica l fo rms , these varieties o f cyborg are 
dangerous, because they are "as hard to see po l i t i ca l l y as mater ia l ly . They are about 
consciousness - or its s imu la t i on . " 4 1 As i n her cr i t ique o f "second b i r t h i ng , " Haraway has 
Haraway, * 'Cyborg Man i f es to " 153. 
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i n m i n d the cybernetic transcendentalists here, who deny the value o f embodiment 
en t i re ly . 4 2 
A t issue in the Renaissance monster is onto logy, w i t h the book designed to col lect 
and def ine those characteristics that mark in them a deviat ion f r o m the n o r m . A t issue in 
the demon or cyborg , however , is not so much what i t is innately, as to h o w i t situates the 
observer i n a way that makes i t d i f f i cu l t to understand that w o r l d order according to 
determinable logics - theo logy in Paré'ร case, social po l i t ics in Нага way ' ร . O f part icular 
concern to Haraway is the way i n w h i c h modern science m igh t refuse to succumb to 
sociological analysis or cr i t ique because i t deals w i t h pure in fo rmat ion , t ransmit ted 
instantaneously in a mu l t imed ia wo r l d . Understanding the w a y i n wh i ch cybernet ic 
technologies st i l l embody ideologies o f sexual d i f ference, rather than transcending 
embodiment as cybemetic ists l i ke M i n s k y c la im, may be d i f f i cu l t i n this context. B o t h 
demons and cyborgs are epistemological creatures w h i c h foreground the ways i n w h i c h 
science establishes its bases o f knowledge and frames o f reference. Just as the exclus ion o f 
the demon validates the importance o f the science o f the monstrous, and the author i ty o f 
the wr i ter who seeks to rat ional ise the latter, so too the existence o f cyborgs presents us 
w i t h monstrous images (chicken-factor ies) that p rovoke us to consider the social stakes o f 
scient i f ic and technological advances, even i f those sciences are ostensibly s tudying the 
immater ia l w o r l d o f i n fo rmat ion (such as genes). Haraway calls fo r the cyborg to be seen 
as an epistemological ent i ty , f raming our scient i f ic knowledge i n relat ion to a w o r l d o f 
embodied human i n d i v i d u a l s r J Epis temologica l f raming o f things that m igh t or m igh t not 
be considered monstrous is the w o r k per formed b y Paré'ร demon or b y Haraway 'ร cyborg 
w h i c h reside on the boundaries o f knowledge, between nature and culture. A s I suggested 
i n chapter 1， when th ink ing about posthumanism we ought not jus t to consider its 
constructions o f otherness but the w a y those entit ies l i ke monstrous robots and cybernet ic 
hybr ids i n f o r m us about our o w n modes o f construct ing knowledge; hence w h y the demon, 
as an inherent ly epistemological agent, provides a useful trope. 
W i t h this connect ion, though, w e must acknowledge the te l l ing di f ference between 
the sixteenth and twent ie th centuries. Whereas Haraway sees the cyborg as capable o f 
ra is ing consciousness o f science i n society precisely because i t seems so provocat ive, even 
science f i c t iona l , Paré sees the demon as a concept that must be proscr ibed, even i f i t 
4 2 See chapter 1， note 45 . 
4 3 Haraway, " C y b o r g Man i f es to " 160-61. 
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cannot be erased. Paré'ร demons are designed to separate the real f r o m the v i r tua l , to deny 
the role o f the dev i l i n creating monsters by keeping his w o r k as a v i r tua l one. Second-
wave cybernetics, however , argues that i n a sense the w o r l d is on ly ever knowab le f r o m a 
subject ive, v i r tual ised standpoint. Humber to Maturana 'ร seminal paper " W h a t the Frog 'ร 
Eye Tel ls the Frog 'ร B r a i n " shows that a f rog is barely capable o f perceiv ing large, static 
objects, but wel l -adapted to perceiv ing smal l , fast objects (such as flies).44 A s N . Kather ine 
Hayleร glosses the exper iment, " T h e results imp l ied that the f rog 'ร perceptual system does 
not so much register real i ty as construct i t . " 4 5 Just as Heisenberg'ร uncertainty pr inc ip le i n 
physics shows that the act o f measurement changes the behaviour o f the part ic le under 
observat ion, so the b io logy o f a cybernetic agent - whether f r og or human - potent ia l ly 
determines percept ion before the w o r l d is raised to consciousness, such that the w o r l d w e 
k n o w is not necessarily the w o r l d as i t phys ica l ly is. Poised between the physical and the 
metaphysical , the deceptive demon intervenes between rea l i ty and the m ind . Cybernet ics, 
however, іпсофогаЇЄ8 deception within the in fo rmat ion receptor that is the bra in , so that 
object ive facts about the state o f a system are act ive ly determined rather than passively 
witnessed by the observer w i t h i n that same hermeneutic. Th is demonic possib i l i ty appears 
to be what Haraway is w o r k i n g towards in exp la in ing that the danger o f the posthuman 
condi t ion is that, conceptualised as a being o f i n fo rmat ion rather than tangible matter, i t 
resists understanding and po l i t i ca l deconstruct ion. A n d such perceptual instabi l i ty is 
certainly true o f Freud's іп іефге їа і іоп o f demons as project ions o f the sel f -deceiv ing ego, 
w h i c h I examine in the next chapter. But , as I shall go on to argue here, cybernetics also 
provides a technological con f i rmat ion o f the suspic ion that sneaks around Paré'ร wo rk : the 
possib i l i ty that the m i n d is not able to perceive the w o r l d i n an undistorted way, so that 
nature is act ively created rather than mimet i ca l l y ref lected b y language. 
For Haraway, the under ly ing boundary breakdowns that make the cyborg a 
possib i l i ty bo th as analogy and real ident i ty are üueefo ld : the breach i n dist inct ions 
between human and an ima l ; the leaky d is t inc t ion between animal and machine; and the 
imprecise boundary between physical and non-physica l . S im i la r l y leaky dist inct ions seem 
to pervade the science o f Ambro ise Paré. However , i n the Renaissance the d is t inc t ion 
4 4 J.Y. Le t t v i n , H.R. Maturana, พ.ร. M c C u l l o c h , and พ.н. Pit ts, " W h a t the F rog 'ร 
Eye Tel ls the Frog 'ร B r a i n , " Proceedings of the Institute for Radio Engineers 47.11 
(1959): 1940-59. Humber to R. Maturana expanded these ideas about Ше re l iab i l i t y o f 
observation i n "Rea l i ty : The Search for Ob jec t i v i t y or the Quest for a Compe l l i ng 
A rgumen t , " Пе Irish Journal of Psychology 9.1 (1988) : 25-82. 
Hayleร, Posthuman 135. 
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between a v i r tua l i ty perpetuated by demons and the l im i ted aet io logy o f the physical 
monster produced in accordance w i t h potentia Dei ordinata, can on ly be preserved through 
the regulatory author i ty o f the Church, wh i ch makes the causal log ic contradictory w i t h 
regards to women . I t is the absence o f such an external author is ing agency, rather than the 
epistemological condi t ions i t controls, w h i c h most sharply dist inguishes Renaissance 
science f r o m the postmodern trope o f the cyborg . Though i t is dictated by theological 
rather than sexual concerns, Pare is something l i ke Haraway 'ร idealised modest witness, 
tak ing responsibi l i ty fo r his o w n observations, recognis ing that the process o f science is 
not jus t a one-way move o f reading the w o r l d f r o m a pos i t ion outside culture, a cul ture o f 
no culture. Rather, the natural ist knows he exists w i t h i n a culture o f author i ty and theology 
that can reciprocal ly affect that w o r l d t r o u g h the practice o f his prototyp ica l science. A t 
the same t ime , and un l i ke Haraway 'ร femin is t cyborg , Paré does not ref lect on the 
contradict ion that results: that he both denies the poss ib i l i ty o f demonic decept ion wh i ls t 
b laming the maternal imaginat ion for causing st igmat ic b i r thmarks. Th is l im i ts the 
possib i l i ty o f treat ing Renaissance monsters and the posthuman cyborg as uncanny dyads, 
even i f the paradoxes i n the former ref lect an epistemological uncertainty that does 
resonate power fu l l y w i t h Haraway 'ร mot iva t ion fo r creat ing the latter. 
Simul taneously a prur ient spectacular o f the grotesque 1 and an attempt at serious 
natural science, Paré'ร w o r k is ch imer ica l , poised between the rat ional isat ion o f the 
monster and the imaginat ive f i c t i on o f the demon, s t r iv ing to mainta in a mater ial ist ic 
account o f development w i thou t αηά6φ1αγ ίη§ the ro le o f an onmipotent but benign deity. 
Faced w i t h contradic t ion, Paré moves to categorise and cover the range o f the monstrous i n 
his theatre o f nature. Haraway 'ร postmodern ism also manifests i tsel f i n generic hybr id i t y . 
Her " C y b o r g Man i f es to " appeals to a science f ic t iona l mode l in order to posi t a new 
epistemology for science in the (post)human w o r l d . Sty l is t ica l ly , bo th Pare and Haraway 
ref lect a t ime when re l ig ious and secular epistemologies undergo flux, and when 
d isc ip l inary boundaries are threatened b y shifts i n the entit ies w i t h wh i ch they should 
convent ional ly concern themselves: physical monsters or metaphysical demons, the body 
or the m i n d , organic beings or in format iona l cyborgs. I n a contemporary age when rat ional 
models o f the self (as i n cybernetics) butt against models o f the self as a l inguis t ic 
construct (as i n postmodernism) the resul t ing turbulence provides the condi t ions i n wh i ch 
demons can breed in f i c t i on . 
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Chapter 3. Monsters f r o m the I d : Psychoanalyt ic Demons and Uncarmy Technology in 
Forbidden Planet 
Secular Օ օ ա օ ռ տ 
W e saw in the previous chapter that Pare epis temologica l ly grounded his science by 
d is t inguishing between monsters as the products o f nature and demons as supernatural 
beings capable o f deceiv ing a non-sceptical or over ly imaginat ive observer. Pare refutes 
the dev i l ish supposi t ion that " rea l i t y " is a total demonic delusion in w h i c h dist inct ions 
between the trae and the false, and hence good and ev i l , break down . For Pare, the 
d is t inc t ion between monsters and demons marks the di f ference between the fecund natural 
w o r l d that can nevertheless be re l iab ly read because o f potentia Dei ordinata, and the 
in f in i te ly deceptive w o r k o f the dev i l . Bu t whereas i t m igh t seem a remarkably modern 
move to treat demons as speculative or fantastic entit ies outside the domain o f science, 
w h y is i t , then, that demons cont inue to be discussed even i n modern , secularised society 
and culture? 
One clue can be found in an 1897 letter f r o m S igmund Freud to W i l h e l m Fleiss, i n 
w h i c h Freud noted that his "brand-new theory o f the pr imary or ig ins o f hyster ia" was 
already fami l ia r f r o m numerous accounts o f demonic possession over the centuries. The 
medieval theory, Freud c la ims, "was ident ical w i t h our theory o f a fo re ign body and the 
spl i t t ing o f consciousness." 1 Though demonic possession supports Freud 'ร theoretical 
interpretat ion o f the unconscious, the imp l i ca t ion is that since the unconscious is part o f 
our inner nature, the demon is a trope or metaphor w h i c h appeals so power fu l l y to our 
experience o f be ing in the w o r l d that i t cou ld never real ly be eradicated unless our 
psychology was to undergo a total revo lu t ion . A l t hough the іШефге Їа Ї іоп o f demonic 
symptoms, such as speaking i n voices, had begun to expose them as del iberately contr ived 
or accountable through phys io log ica l causes by the late seventeenth century, 2 i t was 
psychology w h i c h f ina l l y closed the case against supernatural or metaphysical causality. 
The New Catholic Encyclopedia concedes that the or thodox pos i t ion on "possession" is 
that: 
1 S igmund Freud, " T o W i l h e l m Fle iss," 17 Jan. 1897, The Complete Letters of 
Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fleiss 1887-1904, trans, and ed. Jef f rey Moussa ie f f Masson 
(Cambr idge, M A : Belknap p， 1985) 224-25. 
2 Connor , Dumbstruck 209. 
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The present, more detai led knowledge o f the universe has forever destroyed 
the crude concept o f a three-storied w o r l d i n w h i c h angels and demons 
mater ial ize w i t h ingenuous frequency. Psychiatry, moreover, has shown that 
the work ings o f the subconscious exp la in many, i f not most, o f the 
abnormal condi t ions that earl ier generations had attr ibuted to d iabol ical 
act iv i ty . For these reasons and because the need to reorient theology along 
more posi t ive l ines has been recognized, demono logy has not been the 
object o f very much serious study i n the 20th century. 3 
TTirough the no t ion o f the unconscious, Freud locates demon ism in a f ramework i n w h i c h 
real i ty and the imaginat ion b lend into each other, i m p l y i n g that we can never be sure o f the 
re l iab i l i t y o f our o w n perspective on the wo r l d . A l t hough even Catho l i c ism concedes that 
they do not exist as actual entit ies mediat ing between the subject ive self and object ive 
real i ty, demons st i l l occupy a s igni f icant pos i t ion as metaphors o f l u rk ing repressions 
wh i ch have the potent ia l to cause an overlap between the psychologica l and the physical . 
Wha t w e had taken to be an object ive real i ty - a real i ty that seems visceral when 
confronted b y monsters - is actual ly const i tuted subject ively, Ä r o u g h our inner demons o f 
protect ive sel f-delusion. Such a v i ew appeals to a taci t fear - one present i n Paré'ร t ime but 
s ign i f icant ly exacerbated b y the existence o f cybernet ic v i r tua l wor lds and ar t i f ic ia l 
doubles - that the w o r l d we perceive is not real ly the w o r l d as i t is. Thus demons trope and 
describe this experience even though they may not exist i n actual i ty, wh i l s t psychoanalysis, 
though an imperfect science, resonates w i t h our experience o f a w o r l d w h i c h seems never 
t ru ly apprehensible. I n this chapter, I explore this b y re fer r ing f i rs t l y to Freud'ร aet io logical 
study, A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis (1923) , and then to his classic 
essay on " T h e ' U n c a n n y ' " (1919) , w h i c h is concerned w i t h the strange that is nevertheless 
somehow fami l i a r . 4 A n d what cou ld be more uncanny than an andro id or ar t i f ic ia l 
intel l igence that resembles ourselves wh i ls t be ing in ternal ly mechanical? 
L J . E lmer , " D e m o n (Theo logy o f ) , " The New Catholic Encyclopedia, ed. Berard 
L. Marthaler , 2nd ed. v o l . 4 (Detro i t : Gale, 2003) 649. Th is appears to be a reprmt o f the 
or ig ina l art ic le f r o m the f i rs t ed i t ion o f the Encyclopedia, publ ished in 1967. 
4 S igmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny ' , " The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological WorL· of Sigmund Freud, trans. James s trachey, v o l . 17 (London : Hogar th 
p， 1955) 219-52; S igmund Freud, A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James 
Strachey, v o l . 19 (London : Hogar th p, 1961) 72-105. 
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Internal is ing the demon as a psychologica l rather than metaphysical phenomenon 
a l lows the demonic to be redeployed w i t h i n cybernet ic f ic t ions whose central concern is 
the relat ionship between the human and the ar t i f ic ia l mode l or s imula t ion in an otherwise 
rat ional , scient i f ic and technological envi ronment . I f Athanasius K i rcher had once 
projected demons to i l lustrate his mastery o f i l l us ion , this new interpretat ion o f demons 
br ings them t ru ly under the power o f technology, products o f a scient i f ic rather than 
dev i l i sh spir i t . A s A d a m Phi l ips c la ims, through reading the correspondence between 
Freud and Sandor Ferenczi (Freud's psychoanalyt ic col laborator) , " i t is clear that sexual i ty 
and the unconscious were the new, sc ient i f ica l ly prestigious words for the occult , o f that 
w h i c h is beyond our capacity fo r knowledge, fo r the we i rd , unaccountable effects people 
have on each other. I n psychoanalysis the supernatural returns as the ero t ic . " 5 Freud's 
reading o f demons al lows us to understand w h y the concept resonates i n the cybernet ic era, 
a l though as m y іп Іефге Їа Ї іоп o f the 1950ร science f i c t i on Forbidden Planet shows տ the 
second ha l f o f this chapter, cybernet ic technology also h igh l igh t the def ic i ts in Freud'ร 
account o f the unconscious, par t icu lar ly i n re lat ion to the uncanny. B y rework ing 
Shakespeare'ร The Tempest i n the context o f space, this landmark f i l m appears to be an 
al legory o f the unnatural power o f science w h i c h destroys an otherwise Edenic pastoral. 
However , the f i l m subverts its o w n convent ions, attesting to the va l id i ty o f evolut ionary 
and psychoanalyt ic sciences. I n part icular, i t is explained that the " C a l i b a n " monster arises 
not f r o m some metaphysical , mora l or supernatural force, but emanates p lausib ly f r o m the 
m i n d o f the scientist w h o is l inked to a cybernet ic technology. Rather than the monstrous, 
Cal iban f igures the human and his scient i f ic m i n d . T o be human is to be determined b y 
psycholog ica l , b io log ica l and l inguist ic codes and, indeed, to perceive otherwise is to be 
subject to the most subversive demon o f a l l : sel f -delusion. 
Psychoanalysis 'and the Demon ic Pro ject ion o f the Unconscious 
Cybernet ic science i tsel f rejected psychoanalyt ic ideas, as they were represented at 
the М а с у Conferences by the psychiatr ist Lawrence Kub ie . Freudian not ions o f the l i b ido 
or unconscious were essential ly unquant i f iable whereas, b y tak ing in fo rmat ion as the 
fundamental un i t o f the d isc ip l ine, cybernetics cou ld treat m i n d i n terms o f mathematics. 
D r a w i n g on Shannon'ร w o r k i n cod i f y ing the amount o f in fo rmat ion contained in any 
message regardless o f its meaning or med ium, cybernetics was able to treat communica t ion 
5 A d a m Phi l l ips , Terrors and Experts (London : Faber, 1995) 19. 
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in an object ive way , whereas the r isk i n psychoanalyt ic communica t ion was always that the 
analyst was pro ject ing his o w n desires onto the analysand. 6 O n the other hand, the 
psychoanalyt ic be l ie f that f ic t ions appeal to the unconscious as w e l l as to the conscious 
through thei r generat ion o f latent as w e l l as exp l ic i t meanings in forms narratives l i ke 2007, 
w i t h its dream- l ike sequences; further, wr i ters l i ke Ph i l i p K. D i c k , Umber to Eco and A .S . 
В y att d isplay their awareness o f psychoanalysis i n their representation o f paranoiac or 
schizophrenic characters. In relat ing cybernet ic science to the demonic or the monstrous in 
cul ture, psychoanalysis remains a crucia l f r amework . 7 Freud encourages us to recognise 
the internal fractures o f psychological be ing i n ways attuned to discourses o f the demonic. 
Though Paré also argues that decept ion occurs i n the m i n d o f the observer rather than 
through a supernatural force i n the w o r l d , i n a shi f t f r o m Paré'ร w r i t i ng decept ion now has 
its source not i n the single D e v i l but i n a universal , neurot ic demon w i t h i n . A s such, 
dist inct ions between self and other, nature and cul ture, or imaginat ion and real i ty are 
recapitulated as the conscious and the unconscious. Th is dual ism marks a gap between the 
super f ic ia l ly human and the self actual ly i n fonned by under ly ing codes o f wh i ch he or she 
is not aware, par t icu lar ly b io log ica l and cogni t ive Programmings w h i c h i m p l y that the 
dif ferences between the ind iv idua l and the machine, w h i c h is also code-dr iven, are not 
clear-cut. Be ing confronted w i t h the machine as m i r ro r o f the self, rather than its other, is 
thus an uncanny experience. 
M y benchmark for Freud 'ร іп їефге Їа Ї іоп o f demons is his 1923 case study, A 
Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis. C o m i n g as i t does after Freud's last great 
For the dif ferences and debates between the psychoanalyt ic school and the more 
mater ia l ly m inded cybemet ic ians, see He ims 115-63. 
7 Another , w h i c h I shall not examine at length, is evo lu t ion , w h i c h contends that 
dist inct ions between species (and hence between monsters and normal nature) are 
essential ly arbi t rary, the product o f man 's v i ew o f the w o r l d rather than any innate 
onto logy. A s G i l l i an Beer has noted, " I n The Origin D a r w i n remarked that 'monstrosit ies 
cannot be separated b y any clear l ine o f d is t inc t ion f r o m mere var iat ions. ' A monster may 
be a f o r m out o f accord w i t h the envi ronment in w h i c h i t must l ive. Change the 
envi ronment , the monster ( i t seemed) may become apt, even normat ive . " G i l l i an Beer, 
Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (Ox fo rd : Clarendon, 1996) 124-5. B i o -
technical constructs l i ke the cyborg re ly on our k n o w i n g that man can be j o i n e d to 
machine, or genet ical ly adapted to mesh w i t h other species; and the monstrous cyborgs o f 
f i c t i on require us to admi t that the boundary l ines between our selves and the machine are 
not clear cut. Thus i n the envi ronment o f space or the factory floor, fo r example, a robot 
may appear ent i re ly wel l -adapted and funct iona l , and it is on ly when i t comes to Earth or 
escapes into society that the th ing becomes monstrous. Isaac A s i m o v ' ร stories (see chapter 
1， note 65) stage this contextual shi f t on several occasions. 
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theoretical w o r k , The Ego and the Id, this exempl i f ies Freud's developed f o r m o f 
psychoanalysis. 8 In this case, Freud analyses a painter, Christopher Ha i tzmann w h o , i n 
1668, signed a b lood pact w i t h the dev i l , becoming his son and v o w i n g to g ive h i m his 
body and soul n ine years later. I n 1677, the ter r i f ied Ha i tzmann asked fo r the intercession 
o f the V i r g i n Ma ry , who freed h i m . Ha i tzmann 'ร archived d iary and his paint ings o f the 
apparit ions o f Satan test i fy to the sinceri ty o f his bel ief i n both the dev i l and the miracle. 
Contemporary commentators - inc lud ing the monks to w h o m Ha i tzmann had fled i n 1677 
֊ т Їефге їес і the case as ev idencing the danger o f un ion w i t h the dev i l , but i n his reading 
Freud strips away the al legor ical impor t , exp la in ing instead that: 
The states o f possession correspond to our neuroses, for the explanat ion o f 
wh i ch we once more have recourse to psychical powers. I n our eyes, the 
demons are bad and reprehensible wishes, derivat ives o f inst inctual 
impulses that have been repudiated and repressed. W e mere ly e l iminate the 
pro ject ion o f these mental entit ies in to the external w o r l d w h i c h the midd le 
ages carr ied out ; instead, we regard them as hav ing arisen i n the pat ient 'ร 
internal l i f e , where they have their abode. 9 
Rather than supernatural agents act ively sent into the w o r l d in order to prov ide a 
cautionary tale about ev i l , demons or iginate w i t h i n the ind iv idua l and are projected onto 
the screen o f real i ty (Freud's w o r d "p ro jec t i on " w i l l take on a l i teral s igni f icance i n m y 
discussion o f the actual screens o f c inematic science f i c t i on later in this chapter). Those 
agents Paré places outside o f nature, Freud argues are human nature. A s a result, the 
psychoanalyst o f demons is h imse l f possessed because neurosis is w i t h i n a l l - note Freud's 
use o f the f i rst-person p lu ra l , " ou r , " i n the quotat ion above - and this sel f - ref lex ive effect 
must make i t questionable whether any consciousness can h te rp re t another object ive ly . I f 
al l are subject to the imoostures o f demonic delusion, there is perhaps no stable ground 
f r o m w h i c h author i tat ive ly to observe the self and the w o r l d . 1 0 A s Lawrence Kub ie 
Freud conf ident ly explains that he w i l l not engage i n a po lemic jus t i f i ca t ion for 
using psychoanalysis i n re lat ion to the archive, since its status even among " the more 
obtuse" o f his contemporaries is increasingly assured and " n o understandmg o f the 
neurot ic states can be reached w i thou t the help o f psycho-analysis." Freud, Demonological 
Neurosis 84. 
9 Freud, Demonological Neurosis 72. 
1 0 Indeed, any t ime Freud stepped into his wa i t i ng r o o m o f Berggasse 19， he w o u l d 
have seen his copy o f Fusel i 'ร The Nightmare hanging on the wall» its incubus gr inn ing out 
at the psychoanalyst as i f to remind h i m that he, l i ke the unfortunate rec l in ing woman , is 
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admit ted, the analyst must t ry to remain "as far as possible a d u m m y i n a store w i n d o w on 
w h o m the patient drapes his fantasies...a screen on w h i c h the patient projects the shadows 
out o f his o w n pas t . " 1 1 Whereas Paré'ร mul t i fa r ious book o f monsters authenticates the 
super ior i ty o f the educated, sceptical, male reader, no such object ive and ideal ised reader is 
conceived i n psychoanalysis. Th is is w h y the archiva l study appeals to Freud, since 
histor ical studies "p rov ide a g l impse o f phylogenet ic foundat ions.. .presenting them to the 
observer w i t h re lat ive ly l i t t le d is tor t ion or obscu r i t y . " 1 2 
Here, Freud's diagnosis is that the melanchol ic painter, w h o had recent ly lost his 
father, took the dev i l as a father substitute. A s D a v i d Thu rn glosses i t , " the lost object has 
been іпсофога Їес і in to the ego, d i v i d m g i t , t ransforming the conf l i c t between the ego and 
the loved person into a raging conf l i c t w i t h i n the ego itself, thereby sett ing the stage fo r a 
fantasy o f demonic possess ion. " 1 3 The per iod o f n ine years correlates w i t h the durat ion o f 
pregnancy exp la in ing w h y , though ostensibly p lay ing the part o f father substitute, 
Ha i tzmann 'ร paint ings also depict the dev i l w i t h monstrous breasts. Th is analysis o f the 
sexual desires latent beh ind the imaginat ion is typ ica l o f Freud'ร phal locentr ic bestiary o f 
the unconscious m i n d . He enables a rework ing o f the trope o f possession w i t h i n the 
boundaries o f the human self rather than tu rn ing to external metaphysical or re l ig ious 
narratives. The encounter w i t h the outer demon is rea l ly an uncanny encounter w i t h the 
repressions i n the self. Th is passage, then, inverts the terms o f Paré's science. I n the 
Renaissance, the monster evidences the ab i l i t y o f the natural ist to іп іефге Ї and іпсофога Їе 
nature i n a w a y that, b y systematising and categoris ing them, makes monsters inert i n the 
human context wh i l s t p rov id ing evidence o f God ' s abundant creat iv i ty as exercised f r o m 
plagued b y bad dreams. F ray l ing , Nightmare 1 1 . The or ig ina l paint ing is Henry Fusel i , The 
Nightmare, Det ro i t Inst i tute o f the Ar ts , Detro i t . 
1 1 Lawrence ร . Kub ie , "Prob lems and Techniques o f Psychoanalyt ic Va l i da t i on and 
Progress," Psychoanalysis as Science: The Hixon Lectures on the Scientific Status of 
Psychoanalysis, ed. E. P u m p i a n - M i n d l i n (New Y o r k : Basic, 1952) 59. 
1 2 D a v i d H . T h u m , ' T i d e i k o m m i B ib l io thek : Freud'ร 'Demono log ica l Neuros is ' , " 
Modern Language Notes 108 (1993) : 8 5 1 . The use o f the archival reading to escape the 
controversy o f re la t iv ism compares w i t h evo lu t ion 'ร attent ion to the fossi l record as the 
most rel iable indicator o f species' development and relatedness. 
1 3 T h u r n 856. 
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his d iv ine sphere. The demon represents the l im i ts o f that епЇефгІБе. Since they produce 
their effects v ia the imaginat ion, to categorise or col late demons is to legi t imate and maybe 
propagate their deceptive capacity, thereby undermin ing the induct ive method, the 
co l la t ion o f other scient i f ic authorit ies and stories not observed at f i rst hand. For Freud, 
however, the self or ego always constructs its o w n w o r l d v i r tua l l y or demonica l ly , such 
that mater ia l monsters and demons as depicted i n Ha i tzmann 'ร art are merely the 
analogical mani festat ion o f an unconscious mot i va t ion w i t h i n . 
O f course, one cou ld argue that Freud's conceptual isat ion o f demons is empi r i ca l l y 
suspect, and i t is no t surpr ismg that contemporary psychiatry has tended to іпсофога їе 
demon ism as jus t one subset o f schizophrenia and dissociat ion d isorder . 1 4 O n the other 
hand, I commented i n the chapter 2 that we imp l i c i t l y c l i ng to a hierarchical onto logy o f 
monsters despite neo -Darw in i sm, and hence can sympathise readi ly w i t h Paré's 
pre format ion ism; s imi la r ly , psychoanalysis of fers a w a y o f t h ink ing about demons w h i c h , 
though i t may not be phys io log ica l ly or neuro log ica l ly accurate, st i l l meshes w i t h the way 
in wh i ch w e tac i t ly relate to the w o r l d and the experience o f l i v i ng in it. Freud straddles the 
pre-Enl ightenment parad igm i n w h i c h knowledge is const i tuted in accordance w i t h 
everyday experience - i n w h i c h the foetus is the pre formed vers ion o f the adult, or in 
wh i ch demonic deceptions do appear to happen ᅳ and a modern rat ional ism w h i c h tries to 
account f o r effects b y mater ial causes. W h i l s t incorrect levels o f dopamine m igh t be the 
real cause o f depression or schizophrenia, i t is demons w h i c h appeal as metaphors or 
embodiments o f a cond i t ion o f existence ᅳ th ink , for example, o f Church i l l ' s in famous 
"b lack d o g " depression, or o f the "demon d r i n k . " 1 5 Regardless o f its hard t ru th , therefore, 
what matters about the psychoanal Jl;ic aet io logy o f demons is the fact that i t makes i t 
legi t imate to ta lk about demons as metaphors emerg ing f r o m the human consciousness or 
unconscious, w i thou t appearing to make any strong c la im as to their metaphysical o r ig in . 
I n fact, i n " T h e ' U n c a n n y ' , " an essay I w i l l treat i n more depth i n a moment , Freud is 
perfect ly w i l l i n g to admi t that by ascr ibing maladies such as epi lepsy and madness to 
demons, the M i d d l e Ages had their psychology almost cor rec t . 1 6 W i t h i n cul tural naՄatives, 
1 4 For a survey o f these approaches, see Ph i l i p M . Coons, "The Di f fe rent ia l 
Diagnosis o f Possession States," Dissociation 6 (1993) : 213 -21 . 
1 5 M o r e recent ly, A n d r e w So lomon recorded his experiences w i t h a demonica l ly 
personi f ied depression in The Noonday Demon: An Anatomy of Depression (London : 
V in tage, 2002) . 
1 6 Freud, ' T h e ' U n c a n n y ' " 243. 
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psychoanalyt ic demons sympathet ical ly exp la in the uncertain and mediated relat ionship 
between real i ty and the self, or between representations or s imulat ions and the real. A s 
Steven Connor observes, rat ional ism can never exorcise the demon since, as human reason 
is freed f r o m the threat o f the object ive dev i l on the outside, this identi f ies "an even more 
dangerous threat to reason on the inside, in the endogenous tendency o f the human m i n d to 
entangle i tsel f i n fantasy, imposture and i l l u s i on " ; thus " W h e n devi ls become mere ly 
f igurat ive, f igurat iveness can start to seem demonic . Rather than devi ls being d rawn into 
dialogue, d ia logue i tsel f starts to have a dev i l i sh aspect . " 1 7 As this chapter and the previous 
one have evidenced, the al legorical impulse, the desire to perceive the object ive w o r l d as 
re f lectmg some meanmgfu l higher scheme, is co lou r fu l l y i l lustrated in the hermeneutics o f 
monsters and demons. W h e n psychoanalysis assumes prominence i n cul ture, i f not i n 
mainstream science, its content ion that demons are extrapolat ions emanating f r o m the 
human m i n d , rather than modes o f revelat ion coming f r o m a metaphysical d i rect ion, 
therefore becomes a signal o f sel f-delusion as exercised through narratives. Stories o f the 
supernatural i n the w o r l d are actual ly reincarnations o f our o w n fears. Thus psychoanalyt ic 
demons must i n f o r m f i c t i on about its o w n l imi ta t ions as an al legory or representation o f 
the real. 
I f postmodern ism has invo lved the deconstruct ion o f a master- or meta-narrat ive, 
and the denial that language can mimet ica l l y reproduce the w o r l d i n a direct 
correspondence between signif iers and s ign i f ied , i t should be clear w h y not on ly 
psychoanalysis ( through Lacan) , but also demons, have appealed to l i terary cr i t ics. For 
example, tak ing up Freud in his 1971 study o f modern f i c t i on , The World and the Book, 
Gabrie l Jos ipov ic i argues that the medieval l i terary universe was bu i l t on a series o f 
analogies: between physical and spir i tual wor lds , secular and sacred history, the h is tory o f 
the universe and o f the ind iv idua l , between the natural cyc le and the Chr is t ian year and, 
u n d e φ i n n i n g a l l these, between G o d and man, w h o is made i n God ' s image . 1 8 The modern 
nove l , however , admirably embraces the decl ine o f a l legory. Its realist ic conversational 
f o r m sucks the reader in to the delusion that the narrat ive is true to l i fe as the reader 
experiences i t , w i t h the narrat ive be ing taken fo r real i ty . However , b y then d raw ing 
attention to i tsel f as a story chosen and wr i t ten as one among many possible alternatives -
as the strong metaf ic t ional element o f contemporary narrat ive of ten does - we are forced to 
1 7 Connor , ' T o w a r d a N e w D e m o n o l o g y " 107. 
Gabr ie l Jos ipov ic i , lhe World and the Book: A Study of Modern Fiction 
(London: M a c m i l l a n , 1971). 
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acknowledge that what w e had taken for real i ty was mere ly a f i c t i on seen through 
spectacles o f delusion. Thus in modern l i terature, Jos ipov ic i argues, analogy (wh i ch 
Connor terms more general ly as f igura l i t y ) has become "demon ic , " since analogy no 
longer points outwards, f r o m art to some rel ig ious value external to i t , but looks inward ly , 
interrogat ing the psychology o f the reader: 
For to discover correspondence i n the w o r l d around us does not lead to the 
sensation that we are inhabi t ing a meaningfu l universe; on the contrary, i t 
leads to the feel ing that what w e had taken to be the " w o r l d " is on ly the 
pro ject ion o f our pr ivate compuls ions: analogy becomes a s ign o f 
dement ia . 1 9 
Instead o f the f ic t iona l analogy embody ing i n the text some t ruth that stands i n real i ty 
outside o f the page, at tent ion is n o w paid to the extent to w h i c h language can be said to be 
a m imet i c representation o f a t ru th " o u t there 1 " or whether the w o r l d is a lways already a 
l inguis t ic construct, the "p ro j ec t i on " (that w o r d again) o f a personal narrat ive or "pr iva te 
compuls ions" onto an essential ly b lank canvas. However , even i f f i c t i on no longer 
provides an index to metaphysical t ruths, i t can protect us f r o m the misguided bel ie f that 
there is shared, and hence object ive, meaning i n the real w o r l d . Narrat ive self-
consciousness thereby protects us f r o m the very real sol ips ism w h i c h is not to k n o w that 
one is in a state o f so l i ps i sm. 2 0 
Exemp l i f y i ng jus t such a sel f - ref lex ive shi f t i n the demonic is the 1956 science 
f i c t i on f i l m , Forbidden Planet} 1 A s an adaptation o f Shakespeare'ร The Tempest, this 
hand i ly also corresponds to the d i f ferent representations o f the demonic between Pare 
(whose On Monsters precedes The Tempest on l y by around fo r ty years) and F r e u d . 2 2 For 
Forbidden Planet embodies the monstrous as the "p ro jec t i on " o f something demonic 
w i t h i n the self, i n accordance w i t h Freud's demonolog ica l analysis. However , the 
pro ject ion here is i ron ica l l y l i teral ised, as i t is produced t feough cybernet ic technologies o f 
1 9 Jos ipov ic i 299. 
2 0 Jos ipov ic i 307. 
21 Forbidden Planet, dir. Fred M c L e o d W i l c o x , perf. Wal ter Pidgeon, A n n e 
Francis, Lesl ie N ie lson and Warren Stevens, 1956, D V D , Warner Brothers Entertainment, 
2007. 
Though possible, i t appears un l i ke ly that Paré's On Monsters provides a source 
for Shakespeare'ร representation o f Cal iban. Jef f rey Cahan, "Ambro i se Paré'ร On 
Monsters as a Possible Source for Ca l iban , " Early Modern Literary Studies 3.1 (1997) : 4֊ 
1 1 , 2 Jan. 2007 < ht tp: / /extra.shu.ac.uk/emlร/03" l /kahatemp.html>. 
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cinema. Therefore, rather than being passive media a l legor ical ly presenting a narrat ive, this 
cybernet ic f i c t i on forces us - through its med ium as we l l as its message - to ref lect on the 
mechanist ic const i tu t ion o f the human self. 
Monsters f r o m the I d : Forbidden Planet, Cybernet ic Med ia and The D e m o n o f Ana logy 
In Shakespeare'ร p lay, the ab i l i t y to enter imaginat ive ly in to the v i r tua l w o r l d o f the 
drama, and to d ist inguish between i l l us ion and real i ty is cr i t ica l to its pol i t ics."^ Cal iban is 
the central f igure here. A s the o f fsp r ing o f a demon and a woman , precisely the sort o f 
conjunct ion Pare says is impossib le, he provides a focus fo r d i f ferent possible perspectives. 
Is he natural or supernatural? A savage or a spir i t? A t t imes he seems human i n f o r m -
M i randa notes that Ferdinand is the th i rd man she has ever seen, i m p l y i n g Cal iban must be 
the second - but Prospero claims he is " A f reck led whe lp , hag-born ֊ not honoured w i t h / A 
human shape" (1.2.283-4). T r i ncu lo asks, " W h a t have we here, a man or a f i s h " (2.2.25), 
before h id ing under Cal iban 'ร gaberdine and therefore conf ront ing bemused Stefano w i t h a 
beast w i t h four legs and t w o mouths. Wh i l s t Prospero sees Cal iban 'ร ou tward hideousness 
as evidence o f an inner spir i tual de formi ty , others take a less moral is t ic v i ew and see 
Cal iban as r ipe fo r commerc ia l exp lo i ta t ion. 
However , jus t as the d ivers i ty o f the monster compend ium val idated the standpoint 
o f the natural ist who produced it , the d ivers i ty exhib i ted by Cal iban reiterates the 
super ior i ty o f the perspective o f the sceptical v iewer and, v i ta l l y , l is tener . 2 4 I n Ar is to t le 'ร 
De Anima, vo ice is the denotat ion o f "an ensouled th ing , " wh i l s t sound is the mere 
evidence o f expi rat ion w i thou t mean ing . 2 5 W h e n Cal iban 'ร pr inc ipa l " p r o f i t " f r o m the 
language Prospero teaches h i m is s imple utterance, k n o w i n g " h o w to curse" (1.2.366), he 
is l ikened to the beast rather than the human, since the ab i l i ty to use language is absolute 
rather than be ing dependent on the relat ive pos i t ion o f the observer. A t the opposite end o f 
W i l l i a m Shakespeare, The Tempest, The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete 
Works, ed. Stanley We l l s , Gary Tay lo r , John Jowett and W i l l i a m Mon tgomery (Ox fo rd : 
Clarendon, 1998) 1169-89. 
2 4 A l i s o n T h o m e argues that b y exh ib i tmg fantastic and diverse elements in a self-
contained manner, and by the use o f such staging devices as scenery the perspect ivai sight 
l ines o f w h i c h converged on the k i n g watch ing at the centre, masque condi t ions the 
supernatural as a temporary p lay designed to h igh l igh t po l i t i ca l author i ty. A l i s o n T h o m e , 
''The Tempest and the A r t o f Masque , " Vision and Rhetoric in Shakespeare: Looking 
Through Language (Basingstoke: M a c m i l l a n , 2000) 198-225. 
/vr istot le, De Anima, trans, and in t rod. H u g h Lawson-Tancred (Harmondswor th : 
Pengum, 1986) 178-9. 
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the l inguis t ic spectrum, Prospero'ร loss o f M i l a n was a consequence o f his self-absorbed 
study o f books, as a phi losopher rather than a po l i t i ca l pragmatist. Thus the in i t ia l ab i l i ty to 
d is t inguish between i l lus ion and real i ty , something conf i rmed b y the cur ta in 'ร drop at 
w h i c h the audience's " indu lgence" sets Prospero " f r e e " (Epi logue.20) , validates a 
h ierarchy o f power i n wh i ch Cal iban is at the bo t tom. The Tempest allegorises the 
di f ference between the heterogeneous w o r l d o f speculative theatre, and the assured 
po l i t i ca l status o f those who v i ew the di f ferences w i t h i n i t , par t icu lar ly those embodied i n 
Cal iban. I t is this sort o f d i f ference between the v i r tua l and the real that is e l ided i n 
Forbidden Planet, w i t h technology media t ing between m i n d and matter so as to locate the 
monstrous not i n a w o r l d that can u l t imate ly v i ewed object ive ly but i n the psychological 
demons w i t h i n the self. 
Wh i l s t invest igat ing the loss o f contact w i t h the colonists o f the planet A l t a i r I V , 
the crew o f Un i ted Planets Cruiser C -57D f i nd the w o r l d inhabi ted on ly by the ph i lo log is t 
Dr . M o r b i u ร , his beaut i fu l daughter, A l ta i ra , and their obedient robot-but ler , Robby. The i r 
outpost appears to be a pastoral i dy l l . A l ta i ra ' ร fr iends are tame beasts and the w o r l d is cast 
i n a go lden g low. T h e intervent ion o f the space ship disturbs this paradise, as the crew seek 
to indoctr inate A l ta i ra in to the sexual w o r l d ( i t is not coincidental that the successful suitor 
o f this symbol ic Eve is the Captain, named J. J. Adams) . I n terms o f character, then, 
Forbidden Planet seems s imp ly to map Shakespeare'ร characters onto those o f the future. 
Prospero becomes Morb iuร , M i randa becomes A l ta i ra , Sebastian becomes Adams, A r i e l 
becomes Robby the Robot , T r i ncu lo becomes the ship 's comic , drunken cook, and Cal iban 
becomeร...who? The absence o f a monstrous other f r o m the moment the crew encroaches 
on the is land is a v i ta l sign o f d i f ference f r o m The Tempest. Rather than representing 
Cal iban as a monstrous f o r m , the existence o f the monster is created through the presence 
o f t w o scient i f ic flows - evo lu t ion and psychoanalysis - as these are mediated and 
t ransformed through a power fu l cybernet ic technology. Thus Cal iban becomes a demon o f 
the unconscious l i teral ised on screen, and rather than mark ing the boundary between the 
v i r tua l p lay and the po l i t ica l real i ty (as Cal iban does in The Tempest), this monster 
allegorises our sel f-decept ion i n re lat ion to technology: rather than p rov ing our ab i l i t y to 
transcend our o w n nature, to become posthuman, the more advanced that technology 
becomes the more i t evidences that humans are determinist ic and mater ia l ist ic entit ies 
dr iven b y b io log ica l and cogni t ive programs. 
A l t a i r was once inhabi ted by the K r e l l , an al ien species w h o were not on l y 
technologica l ly but also eth ical ly far advanced o f humans, hav ing become "a c iv i l i sa t ion 
w i thou t i ns t rumen ta l i t i es ' according to M o r b i u ร . Real is ing the dreams o f the cybernet ic 
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transcendentalists, the K r e l l developed a m i n d reading device or "p last ic educator" that 
a l lows the measurement o f the ind iv idua l ' s under ly ing IQ， and the holographic 
representation o f inner thoughts. Further, in fo rmat ion can be planted and extracted d i rect ly 
f r o m a bra in interfaced w i t h the machine; the pro ject 'ร c l imax - the "supreme discovery 
that wou ld c r o w n their c i v i l i sa t i on " - was to a l low consciousness to be g iven mater ial f o r m 
anywhere o n the planet through harnessing the energy o f a massive subterranean power 
plant. However , w i t h this f ina l exper iment, the K r e l l were w iped out. Wh i l s t Morb iuร 
in i t i a l l y explains that fo r the K r e l l the id is an "obsolete te rm once used to describe the 
subconscious m i n d , " i t is revealed that the their intel lects were s t i l l contaminated w i t h 
unconscious wishes. The race was thus destroyed instant ly by the power i t unleashed, 
wh i l s t the technology was lef t intact, so that i t can now be used to manifest whatever is i n 
Morb ius ' s m i n d . As Morb ius ' s hatred for the crew grows as they demand he share his 
knowledge, and as he grows jealous o f the Captain A d a m s ' relat ionship w i t h M i randa , the 
machine renders his sleeping nightmares as a giant t iger w h i c h f i rs t sabotages the ship, 
then k i l l s the ship's engineer. A s his m i n d is mediated A r o u g h the K r e l l ' ร mater ia l isat ion 
technology, the hor r i f ied Captain excla ims to Morb iuร that "The th ing out there, i t ' s y o u . " 
I cannot c la im that the directors or screenwriters had speci f ica l ly read the 
"Demono log i ca l Neuros is . " However , g iven that that w o r k is paradigmat ic o f Freud 'ร 
th ink ing , i t is not s u φ г i s ш g that this concept o f the external monster revealed to be the 
pro ject ion o f the inner sel f tal l ies so c losely w i t h psychoanalysis. Further, wh i l s t the 
K r e l l ' ร mater ia l isat ion technology may be pure ly speculat ive, the technology o f the c inema 
that a l lows the monster to be rendered through (at that t ime) special effects indicates the 
potent ia l o f the screen to tap in to its audiences' fears and confront them w i t h their direct 
v isua l analogues in ways impossib le i n convent ional media such as theatre. I n The 
Tempest, Ca l iban is concocted toough language and metaphor w h i c h , i ron ica l ly , he 
h imse l f cannot w ie ld appropriately. I n Forbidden Planet, however , the fact that the v iewer 
is impl icated i n the cybernet ic technology being ostensibly cr i t iqued elides dif ferences 
between themselves and the f i c t iona l monster. A s w e l l as being a device that makes 
psychoanalyt ic theory mani fest , the technological media t ion o f the m i n d o f Morb iuร 
t r o u g h the K r e l l device, or o f the authored narrat ive through the c inema projector, also 
therefore reveal a flaw i n Freud'ร attempt to locate our i r rat ional fear o f the "uncanny " in 
repressed desires and complexes, rather than i n technology i n its o w n r ight . Forbidden 
Planet bo th uses psychoanalysis in its pro ject ion o f demons, wh i l s t deviat ing f r o m i t i n 
re lat ion to the uncanny nature o f technology. 
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I n his famous essay on "The ' U n c a n n y ' " - publ ished four years before The 
Demonological Neurosis ᅳ Freud begins by no t ing the way i n w h i c h the de f in i t i on o f 
heimlich blends in to its opposite, so that the heimlich or homely can also s ign i fy the out o f 
sight or concealed. A s w i t h the archival study o f demons, the value o f such e tymolog ica l 
ւ ո է շ տ ա է ս է ւ օ ո is that language, as the col lect ive product o f human egos, encodes its o w n 
unconsciousness and dup l i c i t y w i thou t r isk o f the psychoanalyst impos ing his o w n 
repressions, as he m igh t do w i t h a human patient. G iven the way i n w h i c h the uncanny is -
uncanni ly ! ᅳ encoded in a c o m m o n w o r d , i t is surely not coincidental that Morb ius ' s 
or ig ina l d isc ip l ine is as a ph i lo log is t , and that his isolat ion and pure concentrat ion on the 
scient i f ic texts lef t behind b y the K r e l l ( l i ke Prospero absorbed w i t h his books i n M i l a n ) is 
the o r ig in o f both his power and his d o w n f a l l . 2 6 Th is lexicographical focus feeds toough 
f r o m The Tempest to Forbidden Planet v ia the uncanny; but the subst i tut ion o f a real ist ic 
(or p laus ib ly conceptualised) technology fo r Prospero'ร "a i r y sp i r i ts" in the f o r m o f a 
cybernetic m i n d device h ighl ights Forbidden Planeťs u l t imate deviat ion f r o m Freud'ร 
uncanny. 
I n the essay, Freud goes on to study E.T.A. H o f f m a n n ' ร short story, " T h e Sand 
M a n , " arguing that i t is not the presence o f O l y m p i a , the elaborate c lockwork lover o f 
Nathanie l , w h i c h is the source o f the uncanny atmosphere o f the s to ry . 2 7 Ems t Jentsch'ร 
content ion that the uncanny derives f r o m intel lectual uncertainty as to the inner nature o f 
the apparently l i v i n g do l l is on ly one, insuf f ic ient part o f the exp lanat ion . 2 8 Rather, the 
general fear is o f be ing robbed o f one'ร eyes, w i t h b l i nd ing anxiety being a mani festat ion 
o f the under ly ing castrat ion complex (Freud here notes the se l f -b l ind ing o f Oedipus). T o 
make his argument wo rk , Freud argues that the story is i tsel f an authorial eye, p rov id ing an 
apparent decept ion i n w h i c h we, as rat ional ists, expect Nathanie l 's story to be a pure 
2 6 Seth Lerer speculates that Morb ius ' s status as a ph i lo log is t is relevant, g iven the 
f i l m ' ร moment i n the late 1950ร. He too relates the l i teral idea ot the return o f the repressed 
to M o r b i u ร ' vocat ion, not ing that Freud's essay on " T h e ' บ ท c a i m y ' " reveals through 
lexicographic and ph i lo log ica l research that tne heimlich and unneimlich are one and the 
same. Seth Lerer, Forbidden Planet and the Terrors o f Ph i l o logy , " Raritan 19.3 (2000) : 
73-86, Literature Online, 15 M a y 2008 < ht tp : / / l ion.chadwyck.co.uk/>. 
2 7 E.T.A. H o f f m a n n , " T h e Sandman," The Golden Pot and Other Tales, trans, and 
ed. R i tch ie Robertson (Ox fo rd : Ox fo rd U P , 1992) 85-118. 
L·iTicst Jci i tscł i " Z u r Psychologie des "Uiiheiiwlichen ，， PsychıcıtTisch՜ 
Neurologische Wochenschrift 8.22 (1906) : 195-98; 8.23 (1906) : 203-05. The art icle was 
on ly recent ly translated into Engl ish as Ernest Jentsch, " O n the Psychology o f the 
Uncanny , " trans. R o y Sellars, Angelaki 2.1 (1995) : 7-16. 
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fantasy or ig ina t ing i n his nurse'ร ch i ldhood stories about the sand man and his association 
o f the sand man w i t h his father 'ร t ru l y repuls ive f r iend , Coppel l iuร. W e go along w i t h the 
fantasy anyway, but the uncanny effect is produced as w e see through the story - l i te ra l ly 
and f igura t ive ly - and realise that i t was actual ly true: Coppola, the opt ic ian who implanted 
O l ymp ia ' ร eyes, rea l ly was the long- lost Coppel l iuร . A s Freud argues, t s W e perceive that 
he [Ho f fmann ] intends to make us, too, look through the demon opt ic ian 'ร spectacles or 
spy-glass - perhaps, indeed, that the author in his o w n person once peered t taough such an 
ins t rument . " 2 9 The uncanny is the be l ie f that what we had thought to be fantasy, the dreams 
o f a scared ch i ld , is actual ly true because it appealร to our o w n . genuine, unconscious 
anxiet ies; as Freud argues later in the essay, " a n uncanny effect is of ten and easily 
produced when the d is t inct ion between imaginat ion and real i ty is ef faced, as when 
something that we have hi therto regarded as imaginary appears before us i n r e a l i t y . " 3 0 The 
story 'ร potent ia l fantasy is grounded i n the real existence o f the uncanny as a latent fear o f 
castration, here focal ised through the eyes as analogues o f the genitals. 
However , m y і т е ф г е І а Ї і о п o f Forbidden Planet impl ies that Freud'ร emphasis on 
castration complex downplays the impact o f the encounter w i t h the technological double 
per se. Whereas Freud argues that the uncaiminess o f the animated do l l is jus t one 
symptomat ic element o f an unconscious complex , Jentsch singles out "doubt as to whether 
an apparently l i v i n g be ing is animate and, conversely, doubt as to whether or not a l i feless 
object may not i n fact be animate" as the part icular source for the uncanny sensat ion. 3 1 
Freud argues that the uncanny erupts to the surface o f ' T h e Sand M a n " when what w e had 
taken to be jus t a fantasy or bad dream is con f i rmed as be ing a factual narrat ive, because i t 
relates to our unconscious i d . However , Forbidden Planet is uncanny precisely because it 
is so real ist ic, made to seem bel ievable through the technological power o f c inema. I n this 
c inemat ic f ramework , the presence o f a rea l is t ic - look ing robot makes analogous c la ims fo r 
h o w the human m i n d and body works - l i ke a machine or ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence. Thus 
Forbidden Planet subverts Freud's d is t inc t ion between the real ly uncanny, w h i c h can 
invar iab ly be traced to something fami l ia r that has been repressed, and the aesthetically 
uncanny, w h i c h m igh t show simi lar symptoms wh i l s t not producing the uncanny effect 
(the animated dead, for example, is a w i sh fu l f i lmen t in Snow White, rather than uncanny 
2 9 Freud, " T h e ' U n c a n n y ' " 230. 
3 0 Freud, ' T h e ' U n c a n n y ' " 244. 
3 1 Jentsch, " O n the Psychology o f the Uncanny " 1 1 . 
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as i t is i n the real- l i fe idea o f the ghost). Wh i l s t l i terary f i c t i on a l lows for re f lect ion on the 
part o f the reader as to the fantastic nature o f what he or she is reading, because a f i l m 
cannot general ly be suspended or paused i t is v iewed i n a less analyt ical or re f lex ive mode. 
U n l i k e l i terary f i c t i on , f i l m migh t reproduce the strong semblance o f real i ty through 
intense audio-v isual mechanisms even wh i ls t remain ing f i c t ion . The d is t inct ion between 
fact and fantasy, the b lu r r ing o f wh i ch Freud c la ims lies at the heart o f the uncanny 
revelat ion i n "The Sand M a n , " is thereby undermined. 
Freud also argues that the real isat ion that such a fantastic event real ly seems to 
have happened ties the uncanny to an im ism, the ongoing but suppressed be l ie f i n the 
"omnipotence o f thoughts. " C iv i l i sa t ion has repressed the bel ie f that the w o r l d is peopled 
w i t h the spir i ts o f human beings; that thoughts can produce effects in real i ty (mag ic ) ; and 
that outside persons and things possess magica l powers. For the rat ional ist , "every th ing 
w h i c h n o w strikes us as 'uncanny ' fu l f i l s the cond i t ion o f touching those residues o f 
animist ic menta l ac t iv i ty w i t h i n us and b r ing ing them to express ion . " 3 2 Bu t in Forbidden 
Planet, an im ism is precisely what the science and technology o f c iv i l i sa t ion permits - i t is 
indeed what the K r e l ľ s u l t imate mind-mani festa t ion device aims for - rather than being a 
p r im i t i ve be l ie f that c iv i l i sa t ion rationalises away and represses. Thus as the d is t inc t ion 
between fact and fantasy is b lur red by real ist ic c inema and science f i c t ion , correspondingly 
the future c iv i l i sa t ion i t imagines uses science and technology not to suppress but to create 
animist ic effects. Techno logy populates the w o r l d w i t h the monstrous, Caliban-esque 
spir i ts o f Mo rb iuร (doub ly so i n the sense that these are rendered real ist ical ly on screen 
d i rough advanced special effects), and the K r e l l machine is a device for fac i l i ta t ing the 
"omnipotence o f thoughts" i n mater ial ways that cou ld be plausible, out there in the as yet 
unexplored universe inhabi ted by advanced al ien c iv i l isat ions. Rather than being contrary 
to an im ism, an al ien body o f knowledge could a f fo rd magical possibi l i t ies, i f w e observe 
A r thu r c. Clarke 's m a x i m that any suf f ic ien t ly advanced technology is indist inguishable 
f r o m magic ( I revisi t this in detai l i n chapter 5) . O f course, one cou ld st i l l argue that, w i t h 
jus t a l i t t le ref lect ion, we are aware that the K r e l l do not real ly exist and that, as Freud 
argues, because the " rea l i t y " o f the f i c t iona l w o r l d is determined b y the wr i te r (here a 
d i rector) , whether we feel a story is uncanny or not depends on the f ramework and nature 
o f the f i c t i on . Just as Morb iuร realises the monster is the pro ject ion o f his inner demons, 
we realise the p lot o f the f i l m projects and makes exp l ic i t our o w n inner repressions. 
3 2 Freud, " T h e ' U n c a n n y ' " 2 4 0 - 1 . 
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Techno logy is jus t a narrat ive device, coincidental to the real source o f the uncanny, wh i ch 
is the effacement o f fantasy and fact. However , this v i e w in w h i c h there is noth ing 
uncanny i n the technology per se except insofar as i t is f ramed w i t h i n f i c t i on , is tempered 
by that f i c t i on 'ร close relat ionship to science. A s a benchmark i n that generic canon, 
Forbidden Planet is an ef fect ive science f i c t i on not because o f its element o f the fantastic, 
but because the f i c t i on is produced i n con junct ion w i t h empir ica l real i ty. A n i m i s m , the 
f i l m impl ies, is possible not on ly in this speculat ive, fantasy w o r l d , but i n real i ty. The 
K re l l ' s fu tur is t ic , animist ic technology is t ied to an sc ient i f ica l ly plausible past, i n the f o r m 
o f evolut ionary determin ism, and this offers a mater ia l rather than psychological basis for 
the d is turb ing qua l i ty o f the f i l m . 
Discussing the puzz l ing shape o f the I d monster 'ร giant c law, the Doctor suggests 
that i t indicates an arboreal creature able to w a l k on t w o legs, preparing us fo r the 
parad igm o f evo lu t ion i n M o r b i u ร , ร concession at the end: " the beast, the mindless 
p r im i t i ve , even the K r e l l evo lved f r o m that beg inn ing . " The K r e l l may have mastered the 
art o f repl icat ing mater ial i n the future, but i t is the b io log ica l l y determin ing forces o f the 
past that caused their c iv i l i sa t ion to imp lode, b y shaping their minds to pursue v io len t ends, 
jus t as i t shaped their bodies to be huge and tr iangular. I n the c l imact ic f ina l scene when 
Morb iuร , Captain Adams and A l ta i ra are trapped i n the K r e l ľ s laboratory, the beast almost 
breaks through the steel doors to k i l l them a l l . I n the visceral terror induced by the beast's 
assault, Forbidden Planet moralises that a l though ideas migh t be made manifest through 
contro l led technological solut ions, the m i n d is i tsel f a physical th ing embody ing the 
archaeology o f evo lu t ion , a nature w h i c h remains more power fu l than the technology that 
tries to transcend i t . The cr i t ica l f igure here, i n a w a y unant ic ipated g iven his apparent 
benign i ty , is Robby the Robot. Robby ties together psychoanalysis, whose empi r ica l c la ims 
may be suspect, to the real ist ic explanat ion o f evo lu t ion , and relates the f i c t iona l premise 
o f the f i c t i on , i n w h i c h an im ism migh t exist i n a non- t roub l ing way , to the empir ica l w o r l d 
o f the scient i f ic present, i n wh i ch an im ism describes our experiences o f technology. O n 
one level , Robby is a mere but ler w h o obedient ly synthesises a l imi t less supply o f wh i sky 
for the ship 's astonished and del ighted cook. However , jus t as the K r e l l device makes 
concrete monsters out o f psychological demons, Robby becomes a paral lel mediat ing agent 
w h o shows that the al legory is actual ly se l f - ref lex ive i n re lat ion to human b io logy . 
F o l l o w i n g Isaac A s i m o v ' ร law o f robo t i cs , 3 3 Robby is an ent i rely safe piece o f 
technology, constramed by a humanist ethics that is translated fo r h i m into a s imple, 
See chapter 1， note 65. 
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logical program. In part icular, Robby is designed w i t h t w o instruct ions: to f o l l o w orders 
and not to ha rm any rat ional be ing; he w i l l self-destruct when these come into conf l ic t , 
such as i f he is ordered to k i l l some one. Super f ic ia l ly , Robby , w i t h his c lunk ing metal 
body and b l i nk i ng l ights, seems complete ly but ben ign ly inhuman, mere ly an advanced 
too l that amazes the explorers when they f i rst make contact w i t h h i m . However , the c l imax 
o f the f i l m draws Robby and the human uncanni ly together so that the cybernet ic science 
Robby embodies is seen also to operate w i t h i n the b io log ica l ly -cond i t ioned human m i n d . 
I n the c l imact ic scene, as the Id monster üireatens to k i l l Mo rb iuร , A l ta i ra and Adams, the 
more Morb ius ' s p r im i t i ve terror overwhelms his conscious intel lect, the more the machine 
delivers power to the monstrous manifestat ion o f his unconsciousness. A s the v ic ious cyc le 
provocat ive ly m im ics Robby 's self-destruct loop, the paral lel impl ies that man is 
essentially a machine serving the w i l l o f inner emot ions and evolved d r i ves . 3 5 Though 
Robby 'ร behaviour may be ս ո ժ շ փ ւ ո ո շ ճ b y a d ig i ta l code, there is also a code o f sorts i n 
the bra in o f Mo rb iuร . Robby ' ร benign but d i f ferent robot ic otherness switches into a 
ma l ign analogy fo r the way the self is dr iven; as the machine a l lows us to see Morb ius ' s 
unconscious made manifest , we are forced to іп Їефге Ї the w o r l d not th rough ontologies o f 
di f ference (human and machine, self and monster) but subject ively, w i t h d i f ference 
constructed to make it seem as i f humans are at the top o f the hierarchy o f contro l . 
Acco rd ing to psychoanalyt ic logic, the process o f " i den t i f i ca t i on " that a l lows the 
fo rmat ion and cont inual re format ion o f the self requires the subst i tut ion o f one subject iv i ty 
for another, so that i t is no longer possible to d is tmguish the or ig ina l f r o m the mode l : 
the subject assimilates an aspect, proper ty or attr ibute o f the other and is 
t ransformed, w h o l l y or par t ia l ly , after the mode l the other provides. It is by 
means o f a series o f ident i f icat ions that the personal i ty is const i tuted and 
spec i f i ed . 3 6 
Possibly, the name Robby is a nod to A s i m o v ' ร short story, "Robb ie , " i n w h i c h a 
ch i ld 'ร robot compan ion proves the fears o f her parents to be baseless, as he risks h is o w n 
being i n order to save her l i fe . A s i m o v , I， Robot 13-37. 
3 5 Though w e l l before R ichard D a w k i n s ' The Selfish Gene, i t is hard not to posi t an 
anachronist ic connect ion to the metaphor la id out i n that 1976 wo rk , i n wh i ch Dawk ins 
describes the " rep l i ca tors" (genes) w h i c h n o w " s w a r m i n huge colonies, safe inside 
gigantic lumber ing robots, sealed o f f f r o m the outside world7communicating w i t h i t b y 
tortuous indirect routes, manipu la t ing it by remote con t ro l . " Dawk ins 19—20. 
3 6 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontal is, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Dona ld 
N icho lson-Smi th (New Y o r k : Nor ton , 1973) 205. 
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I n this way, machines are not on ly metaphors or mir rors o f the human in a one-way 
process - the process Descartes envisaged when he described the body in mechanical terms 
but the m i n d i n terms o f non-mechanism, or soul - but a t w o - w a y process, such that the 
more l i ke man machines become, the more machin ie seems the human. Th is reading o f 
Forbidden Planet lends some credence to the hypothesis o f Japanese robot ic ist , Mashahi ro 
M o r i who def ined the "ипса ішу va l l ey " that separates humans f r o m their robot ic doub les . 3 7 
M o r i argues that dur ing the p r im i t i ve phases o f robot ics, when robots seem unl ike humans, 
we w i l l be capable o f emot ional response to them (to test this hypothesis, I dare anyone to 
watch ing P ixar 'ร recent f i l m Wall-Е to fa i l to invest sentiment i n its heroic waste-disposing 
cuboid r o b o t ) . 3 8 However , at a po in t o f strong resemblance we w i l l become repulsed by 
them. As in m y o w n argument, M o r i seems to draw more f r o m Jentsch than f r o m Freud, 
for Jentsch argues that " the f iner the mechanism and the truer to nature the fo rma l 
reproduct ion, the more st rongly w i l l the special ef fect make its appearance." 3 9 A s we shall 
see i n chapter 6， the latter response is certainly at w o r k i n Ph i l i p K. D i c k ' ร w o r k on 
androids, wh i ch per fect ly m i r ro r the human on the surface wh i l s t hav ing none o f the 
concern for other humans beneath the sk in , and w h i c h are consequently a l l the more 
disturbing. However , Forbidden Planet inverts M o r i ' ร d iagram through focus ing on the 
unconscious and the mental rather than the superf ic ia l ly phys ica l . The uncanny va l ley we 
descend into here is not that Robby looks l i ke the human - he is c lear ly not so, w i t h h is 
rotat ing aerials and c lumsy gait - but that despite the v is ib le di f ference the human is l i ke 
the robot beneath the sk in , i n be ing dr iven by comparably determin ing logics - the law o f 
robot ics i n Robby ' ร case, the rule o f the unconscious i n Morb ius ' s . 
Even as i t uses the psychoanalysis o f A Demonological Neurosis i n its 
representation o f Ca l iban, then, Forbidden Planet tums to a new episteme contrary to " T h e 
' U n c a n n y ' " to relate technology and the human. One way i t m igh t be іпІефгеЇес і is as a 
medi ta t ion on the anxiety o f Amer i can culture i n the 1950ร, in w h i c h I Q stood as the 
def in ing mark o f potent ia l : an I Q score cou ld prov ide grounds fo r progression to h igher 
ձ 1 Mashahko M o r i , " T h e Uncanny Va l l ey , " Energy 7.4 (1970) : 33—5, CogSci 2005 
Workshop: Towards the Mechanisms of Android Science9 trans. K a r l F. M a c D o n n a n and 
Takashi M ina to , 2005, 12 Sept. 2008 < 
ht tp: / /www.androidscience.coni / theuncannyval ley/proceedings2005/uncannyval ley.html>. 
38 Wall֊E1 dir. A n d r e w Stanton, perf. B e n Bert t , El issa Kn igh t and Jef f Gar l in , W a l t 
D isney Pictures, 2008. 
3 9 Jentsch, " O n the Psychology o f the Uncanny " 12. 
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education, val idate racial pre judice, or be used to exclude certain groups o f immigrants. 
Us ing the device, M o r b i u ร , Adams and the ship 'ร doctor compete to measure their IQ， and 
Morb iuร suggests that the "p last ic educator" works by increasing his I Q capacity. Bu t i f , i n 
the absence o f such a fantastic device, people are real ly determined b y ingrained cogni t ive 
attributes as robots are the result o f their p rogramming , the v iewer o f the t ime, though 
want ing to ident i fy w i t h the handsome captain, may have feared that he m igh t real ly be 
l i ke the hapless cook. Th is sort o f determin ism undermines the v iab i l i t y o f the self-made 
man so intr insic to the Amer i can dream, a dream realised anew i n the pioneer f ront ier o f 
space i n post-war science f i c t i on . Odd ly , Stephen Jay Gou ld ' ร later cr i t ique o f re i f icat ion, 
the tendency to convert abstract concepts l i ke intel l igence into ob jec t ive ly measurable 
entit ies such as I Q , m igh t be seen i n conjunct ion w i t h Freud'ร cr i t ique o f animist ic 
th ink ing . The di f ference is that whereas Freud contends that c iv i l i sa t ion suppresses bel ie f 
i n the omnipotence o f thoughts, Gou ld argues that the use o f scient i f ic ideas i n society 
asserts the hard effects o f thought , mak ing abstract concepts such as m i n d into b io log ica l l y 
determinate entities i n the w o r l d . 4 0 Such embodiment or an imat ion o f the mathemat ica l ly 
abstract is precisely what we perceive in Robby. 
Though the idea that " the th ing out there, i t ' ร y o u " super f ic ia l ly connotes the 
pro ject ion o f the demonic unconscious through technology, technology is not jus t as 
passive lens for an essential ly Frankensteinian horror story that happens to take place in a 
futur is t ic sett ing. Rather the media are precisely the po in t or message at the centre o f a 
f i c t i on w h i c h explains that we are more l i ke the double o f determinist ic technology than 
unique selves w i t h an unconscious w h i c h , be ing uncontro l lable, also marks our 
independence f r o m nature. Freud saw O l y m p i a as a lens - one o f many i n " T h e Sandman" 
- through w h i c h to perceive the unconscious castration complex , rather than being at the 
centre o f the narrat ive. Forbidden Planet7 however , sees inorganic technology as precisely 
the p r ime and advanced source o f our b io log ica l l y p r ima l and regressive fears. I n 
d is t inguishing between the ef fect o f the uncanny i n real i ty (wh i ch is grounded i n the 
repression b y c iv i l i sa t ion o f p r im i t i ve instincts, and the personal repression o f castration 
complexes) and the fact that those same things wh i ch should invoke an uncanny effect do 
not necessarily do so i n f i c t i on , Freud emphasises that: 
The creative wr i te r can also choose a sett ing w h i c h though less imaginary 
than the w o r l d o f f a i r y tales, does yet d i f fe r f r o m the real w o r l d b y 
Stephen Jay Gou ld , The Mismeasure of Man, revised and expanded ed. 
(Harmondswor th : Penguin, 1997). 
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admi t t ing superior spir i tual beings such as daemonic spir i ts or ghosts o f the 
dead. So long as they remain w i t h i n their sett ing o f poetic real i ty , such 
f igures lose any uncanniness wh i ch they m igh t possess. 4 1 
I have argued here that Forbidden Planet makes this d is t inc t ion between the real and the 
f ic t ional problemat ic b y crossing the real and the imaginary in the hyb r i d genre o f science 
f i c t ion , par t icu lar ly o f the c inemat ic k i n d w h i c h manifests real i ty i n v i v i d colour and l ive 
act ion. It introduces the capacity o f the demonic not on ly in to the technology w h i c h 
literalises Morb ius ' s inner demons ( in l ine w i t h psychoanalyt ic f ramework la id out i n 
Freud's "Demono log ica l Neuros is" ) , but also into technology w h i c h sel f - ref lex ive ly 
indicates our o w n deluded be l ie f i n our independence, contrary to b io log ica l and cogni t ive 
determinism. Th is conf rontat ion w i t h the uncanny in the double rea l ly is an intel lectual 
encounter, and the technology and its investment w i t h an im ism - the l i fe in the robot, the 
spir i t made mater ial Ä r o u g h the m i n d device, l i fe rendered bel ievably on the c inema 
screen - suggest that this sort o f conf l ic t does have a greater ro le to p lay i n produc ing the 
phenomenology o f cybernet ic f ic t ions than Freud suggests i n his reading o f "The 
Sandman." There is something uncanny to be mediated t feough the machine itself, not jus t 
i n the way the machine provides a metaphor or analogue fo r some other sexual repression. 
Rather than being an Edenic al legory against technology, the f i l m stands as a demonic 
narrat ive that interfaces the technology and the human as comparably mediat ing or 
daemonic devices: the K r e l l machine mediates the unconscious, the human is an embodied 
med ium for b io log ica l determinat ions. A t the same t ime, as I argued i n chapter 1， there is 
noth ing pejorat ive ly demonic i n technology per se - h o w cou ld Robby be described as 
monstrous, w i t h his b lobby arms? Rather, the f i l m draws attent ion to the interfaces 
between the technological and the human, relations that make the machine in to a mi r ro r o f 
ourselves. Thus technology alone (and not any deeper castration complex) suff ices to 
produce a sel f - ref lex ive, uncanny effect because i t forces us to acknowledge - through the 
animist ic manifestat ions o f psychology in the K r e l l device or ar t i f ic ia l or robot ic 
intel l igence - the determined nature o f our being. Cybernet ics alters our perceptions o f 
real i ty as they are condi t ioned b y a m i n d w h i c h is not made i n God ' s image, but w h i c h is 
the product o f mater ia l , rat ional mechanisms. T o echo Jos ipov ic i , the product ion o f the 
f ic t ional w o r l d out there as corresponding w i t h some grand, d iv ine design turns out to be 
the pro ject ion o f our pr ivate compuls ions and desires. The desire to al legorise thus 
4 1 Freud, "The ' U n c a n n y ' " 250. 
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becomes a s ign o f dement ia, and the ab i l i ty to animate minds through technology is the 
new root o f the uncanny effect i n f i c t ion . 
Conc lus ion: The T h i n g Out There, I t ' s Y o u 
The experience o f the v i r tua l and the real, the personal and the object ive, is 
described and f ramed b y the idea o f the uncanny, the th ing encountered i n h istor ical fact 
be ing g iven a tw is t i n a new context. Wha t cou ld be more uncanny than a computer that 
appears to have a consciousness model led on the human turn ing on its o w n makers? Or an 
for the inner emotions o f a human? Or the postmodernist w h o deconstructs language, on ly 
to discover that the language o f genetic inheri tance constitutes her very self, as happens to 
M a u d in Possession! O r the way in w h i c h a v i r tua l w o r l d is somehow onto log ica l ly 
d i f ferent , even though i t is a perfect s imu lacrum indist inguishable f r o m real i ty , as i n The 
Matrix! I n psycholog is ing the doubleness o f the cybernet ic " t h i ng out there," subject iv i ty 
is disrupted, so that the al legor ical scheme that marks a connect ion between the w o r l d and 
its representation i n discourse or symbo l becomes impossible. The m i n d is a lways 
mediat ing, w i t h technologies l i ke the mater ia l isat ion device g i v ing such media t ion a new 
energy. The technological other ― " the th ing out there" - resembles us in an uncanny way 一 
" i t ' s y o u ! " - but because i t also manipulates or affects our subject iv i ty , i t becomes hard to 
achieve the epistemological foundat ions b y wh i ch the di f ference can be discerned. I t is 
such a paradox that, I argue i n the next chapter, underl ies the T u r i n g test w h i c h inheri ts the 
d i lemmas raised by Descartes* perceptual ly deceiv ing demon. However , whereas the latter 
provides for the foundat ions o f modern ra t ional ism, Tu r mg 's w o r k is problemat ic because 
it relies on the bel ie f that language can prov ide direct and absolute access to the inner 
consciousness o f the A I w h i c h decept ively seems human. 
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ChaDter 4. Deceiv ingJDemons: Descartes._Turine and Postmodernism 
I f Forbidden Planet is one o f the f i rs t science f i c t ion f i lms to engage w i t h 
cybernetic issues in the ph i losophica l sense i n w h i c h they developed after the Second 
W o r l d War , 1 across the next four chapters I want to explore sh i f t ing cul tural reactions to 
cybernetic technologies by examin ing four other benchmark f ic t ions (three o f them 
cinemat ic) spanning th i r ty y ears: 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) ; Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep (1968) ; Blade Runner (1982) ; and The Matrix (1999) . These move w i t h 
progressive pessimism about Enl ightenment models o f knowledge, towards a postmodern 
cul ture o f s imulacra i n w h i c h reason is unable to d iscr iminate between human or ig inals 
and cybernetic doubles, or the real w o r l d and the i l lus ion. The deconstruct ion o f the 
rat ional ly-attainable t ru th about a stable and f in i te real i ty culminates in The Matrix, i n 
w h i c h i t appears impossible to see through the demonic ha l luc inat ion generated b y the 
machine. As suggested in the previous t w o chapters, the invocat ion o f the demon as a 
metaphor signals a mismatch between rat ional apprehensions o f the w o r l d , and the tacit, 
human perspective. I n the present chapter, I extend this contradict ion by l ook ing at 
Descartes' deceiv ing demon, w h i c h is a f igure and phi losophical puzzle d rawn upon b y 
these postmodern f ic t ions. Here, I compare Descartes' demon to Tu r i ng ' ร test for a ta lk ing , 
inte l l igent computer. Bu t I argue that wh i l s t Descartes' and Tu r i ng ' s tests inc l ine towards 
scient i f ical ly stable judgements o f real i ty , cybernetics as mediated tìirough the aesthetics o f 
postmodernism proposes a d i f ferent epistemology. Because the nature o f real i ty is 
construed as psycholog ica l ly and d iscurs ively constructed, the no t ion o f what is ar t i f ic ia l 
and what is true becomes arbi trary, ideologica l and subject ive. Th is is par t icu lar ly so in 
re lat ion to Tu r ing ' s in f luent ia l concept ion o f ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, fo r according to Tu r i ng 
success is achieved when a machine is able to deceive a human t r o u g h diss imulatory 
language. 
There were, o f course, earl ier f i lms and f ic t ions representing robots and 
computers. The w o r d " r o b o t " was i n fact co ined by the č a p e k brothers i n their 1923 p lay 
R. U.R. (standing for Rossum'ร Universa l Robots) in wh i ch mechanical robots al legorise 
the state o f factory workers. Carel č a p e k and Josef čapek , R, U.R., R. U.R. and the Insect 
Play, trans, p. Selver (1923; London : O x f o r d U P , 1961) 1-104. One other key f i l m to 
antedate cybernetics wh i l s t be ing a benchmark i n f i l m science f i c t i on general ly is 
Metropolis1 d ir . Fr i tz Lang , perf. A l f r e d A b e l , Br iget te H e l m and Gustav Fröh l i ch , 1927, 
D V D , Eureka V ideo , 2003. Metropolis heav i ly in f luenced R id ley Scott 's Blade Runner9 
w h i c h I discuss տ chapter 6. 
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Descartes to T u r i n g 
I n his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes considers the prevalence o f the 
false beliefs w h i c h he has fo rmer l y he ld . 2 I n the f i rs t medi ta t ion, he asks whether i t is 
therefore possible that real i ty as he apprehends it is an i l lus ion or dream conjured by an a l l -
power fu l deceiv ing demon; and i f no th ing is "ou t there" or real , how can he be certain o f 
his o w n personal existence? In his second medi ta t ion, Descartes famous ly concludes that 
in order to be deceived, there must a priori be a th ink ing ident i ty capable o f being subject 
to such a cogni t ive hoax. In t r igu ing ly , Descartes' deceiv ing demon reveals the fineness o f 
the l ine separating the absence o f a stable foundat ion for t ru th , or re la t iv ism, f r o m certain 
grounds for knowledge, the one absolute that cannot be doubted. O n the one hand, to 
Descartes i t appears superf ic ia l ly possible that the real w o r l d is a lways mediated through 
agents o f decept ion, whether demons or dreams, since these appear so prevalent i n l i fe . O n 
the other hand, i f even in spite o f these condi t ions and pressures there is s t i l l one th ing that 
cannot be doubted ֊ i n this case, the fact that there exists a be ing do ing the th ink ing in the 
f i rst place - then rat ional ism receives even greater reinforcement. Th is is because as the 
cogi to resolves i tsel f to the a x i o m " I th ink , I ex is t , " we need also to ask about the nature o f 
the " Г wh i ch per forms the th ink ing . T o determine this is automat ical ly to consider a 
centred ego w h i c h is capable not on l y o f d is t inguish ing real i ty f r o m decept ion, but also the 
self f r o m the other objects in the w o r l d that m igh t seem to resemble i t i n some way. Th is is 
un l ike the psychoanalyt ic interpretat ion o f demons, w h i c h suggests that demons are 
projected f r o m w i t h i n the self 's unconscious, so that the self and demons "ou t there" are 
essential ly one and the same. B y contrast, the Cartesian ego, wh i l s t potent ia l ly subject to 
decept ion, at least knows i tsel f to be at the centre o f its phenomenal universe l ook ing out 
onto the w o r l d f r o m a stable base, and hence better able to d is t inguish real i ty f r o m 
demonic d iss imulat ion. 
However , i n re lat ion to m ind -body dua l ism the cogi to does embody an uneasy 
tension between theology and rat ional i ty . Th is tension ensures the cogi to suffers under the 
presence o f cybernet ics, and the potent ia l ly deceptive demons produced b y science and 
technology. A s John Cot t ingham observes, fo r theological reasons dual ism is natural ly 
appeal ing, since i f Descartes is r ight that the conscious m i n d is an іпсофогеа і substance 
w i t h a d i f ferent (and pr iv i leged) onto logy compared to the matter o f real i ty , bod i l y death 
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy^ The Philosophical Works of 
Descartes^ trans. El izabeth ร . Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, v o l . 1 (Cambr idge: Cambr idge 
U P , 1931) 131-199. 
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becomes r e l e v a n t g iven the prospect o f an immor ta l soul . However , i n mak ing this 
cleavage w i thou t conv inc ing ly so lv ing the p rob lem o f h o w m i n d and body interact in a 
synergist ic way, Descartes ascribes to mechanism anyth ing requ i r ing interact ion w i t h 
external real i ty: not on ly d igest ion, c i rcu la t ion, the movement o f the l imbs, but also 
sensation, memory and the passions. A s Cot t ingham explains i t , " the purely physical 
processes o f the animal spir i ts, and the mechanical processing o f \Խ fantasie or 'corporeal 
imag ina t i on , " ' can produce a r i ch array o f behaviour w h i c h is ent i re ly "appropr iate to the 
objects o f its senses and internal pass ions." 4 Is i t not possible, then, for G o d to construct a 
mater ia l ly complex th ink ing , ta lk ing machine - a " h u m a n " be ing - who as a w h o l l y 
mater ia l ent i ty w o u l d not be possessed o f a soul wh i l s t s t i l l be ing an intent ional , conscious 
agent? Descartes he ld that there is no d is t inc t ion i n k i n d between mechanisms and l i v i ng 
but stupid creatures, but that man is d i f ferent iated i n k i n d f r o m the latter because o f his 
possession o f consciousness. Refer r ing to language as the special ly d is t inguishing cr i ter ia 
between humans and animals w i thou t reason (recal l ing the Ar is to te l ian argument) , 
Descartes asserts that even i f im i ta t ive machines cou ld be bu i l t to resemble bod i l y actions 
(and even states l i ke passion or memory ) , they cou ld not use words i n any mean ingfu l , 
se l f - ref lex ive sense: 
For w e can easi ly understand a machine 'ร be ing const i tuted so that i t can 
utter words, and even emi t some responses to act ion on it o f a corporeal 
k i n d , w h i c h br ings about a change in its organs.. .But i t never happens that 
i t arranges its speech i n var ious ways, i n order to rep ly appropriately to 
everyth ing that may be said i n its presence, as even the lowest type o f man 
can do. 
However , s t ick ing to this d is t inc t ion between man and an imal or bod i l y mechanism, 
Descartes can on ly f ina l l y ru le out the possib i l i ty o f an inte l l igent mechanism on pragmatic 
grounds: 
For wh i l e reason is a universal instrument w h i c h can serve fo r al l 
contingencies, these [physica l ] organs have need o f some special adaptation 
for every part icular act ion. F r o m this i t f o l l ows that i t is mora l l y impossible 
John Cot t ingham, "Cartesian Dua l i sm: Theo logy, Metaphysics, and Science," The 
Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cot t ingham (Cambr idge: Cambr idge U P , 
1992) 236-57. 
4 Cot t ingham 238. 
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that there should be suf f ic ient d ivers i ty in any machine to a l low it to act in 
al l the events o f l i fe in the same way as our reason causes us to act. 5 
Whi l s t some machines cou ld be classed as a l i v i ng th ings, since the body is essentially a 
mechanism, the grounds fo r d is t inct ion between a human and an intel l igent machine are 
pragmatic rather than log ica l , the need for "enough di f ferent organs" presupposing that 
such cogni t ive complex i t y cou ld not be ar t i f i c ia l ly constructed. Descartes goes on to argue 
that machines w o u l d also be exposed by their inab i l i t y to reason, and to apply this 
"universal ins t rument" to situations other than those fo r w h i c h they had been speci f ical ly 
intended or designed. I n his o w n t ime, the log ica l gaps i n Descartes' argument were 
compensated fo r b y technological impract ical i t ies. Even when in 1769 Pierre Jaquet-Droz 
constructed his c l ockwork do l l , " T h e Scr ibe," wh i ch cou ld wr i t e out the words " j e pense 
donc j e suis," this was on ly a cheeky test o f Cartesian th ink ing rather than a serious 
phi losophical underm in ing . 6 However , i n the previous chapter I suggested that the advent 
o f animist ic technologies i n c inema showed that Freud was w r o n g to argue that the 
automata is not uncanny i n its o w n r ight . I n staging direct confrontat ions w i t h mechanical 
doubles, therefore, cybernetics makes qual i tat ive challenges to Cartesian dual ism and the 
self-deluded bel ie f that m i n d is not mechanism but somehow transcends mater ia l ism. The 
attempt to separate the immater ia l soul (or m ind ) f r o m a mater ia l ly produced cogni t ive 
ent i ty must be seriously undermined in the modern era o f the neural cortex and integrated 
c i rcui ts, w h i c h seem to be candidates for sources w h i c h in practice are physical structures 
but w h i c h cannot i n Cartesian theory be also possessed o f a sou l . 7 The feasib i l i ty o f a 
Chr is t ian man made i n God ' s image comes under pressure w i t h the prospect o f a cogni t ive 
machine (or electro-chemical bra in) made in the pattern o f man 'ร m i n d . 8 Cartesian dual ism 
is thus self-defeating. B y at tempt ing to carve a special space fo r a transcendent soul , it 
5 René Descartes, Discourse on Method^ Haldane and Ross 116. 
6 F ray lmg 43. 
7 Cot t ingham 250. 
8 1 speculate that i t is on ly because the natural w o r l d is readi ly perceivable wh i l s t 
the M R I scanner or A I programs are re lat ive ly specialised that the contest between science 
and re l ig ion is current ly so centred on evo lu t ion and creat ionism. I f and when ar t i f ic ia l 
intel l igence - the machine w i t h "enough d i f ferent organs to make it act i n a l l the 
contingencies o f l i fe տ the way i n w h i c h our reason makes us act " - is developed and is a 
c o m m o n feature o f the human, and hence ethical , w o r l d , i t too w i l l become a key 
Rorschach test fo r acceptance o f either the theology o f the transcendental soul or the 
phys ica l ism o f the sciences. 
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a l lows that anyth ing judged capable o f th ink ing and responding reasonably as i t is 
perceived f r o m the perspective o f an ex is t ing human inter locutor must therefore be 
possessed o f a soul , regardless o f the h idden mater ia l substrate on w h i c h i t is founded, 
whether organic or c lockwork or s i l i con matter. Speech signals agency; anyth ing that can 
engage i n d ia logue is thus also assumed to be able to assert egocentr ical ly that " I th ink , 
therefore I a m . " 
Th is paradox feeds through to the key foundat ional narrat ive o f ar t i f ic ia l computer 
intel l igence: the Tu r i ng test. 9 Tu r i ng is not concerned w i t h the wholesale quest ion o f 
consciousness, since for h i m the question o f whether a machine can th ink is " t oo 
meaningless" to deserve discussion. However , mer i t i ng discussion and empi r ica l test ing is 
the " Im i t a t i on Game. " Can a computer pe r fo rm w e l l enough to imi tate a human speaker, 
such that an inter locutor communica t ing on l y th rough a teletype interface is unable to say 
w h i c h is wh ich? Tu r i ng predicts such a capable s imula t ion cou ld be bu i l t by the year 2000 
(a s igni f icant date when related to H a l in 2001). The cogi to and the T u r i n g test resemble 
each other i n emphasising effects rather than mater ia l or ig ins, since respect ively th ink ing 
and/or communica t ing are necessary and suf f ic ient condi t ions by w h i c h we can presuppose 
conscious ex is tence. 1 0 I n classical ly Cartesian fashion, T u r i n g separates m i n d and body: 
" the new p rob lem has the advantage o f d rawing a fa i r l y sharp l ine between the physical 
and the intel lectual capacities o f a m a n . " 1 1 Acco rd ing to Tu r i ng , i f the machine can deceive 
a human inter locutor in to th ink ing that i t is human, then it must be conscious by default ; 
therefore i t is something other than mere an imal or mechanism. However , the cost o f this 
d iscr iminat ion is to emphasise the demonica l ly deceptive nature o f the rat ional machine as 
perceived (or misperceived) b y the human. 
I n his Meditations, Descartes can assume a readerly f ramework i n wh i ch G o d is 
in tu i ted to exist and in wh i ch his potent ia l power to deceive M a n is pragmat ica l ly 
restrained b y potentia Dei ordinata. Just as Ambro ise Paré uses demons to draw the 
boundary lmes between the real and the v i r tua l and the r ight o f the authorial m i n d to treat 
A , M . Tu r i ng , "Compu t i ng Mach ine ry and Inte l l igence," Mind 59.236 (1950) : 
433-60. 
1 0 S im i la r l y the universal Tu r i ng machine is a procedural abstraction rather than a 
specif ic object to be bu i l t through def ined mechanisms. Tu r i ng does not say that h is 
universal machine has to be constructed i n any speci f ic way (such as w i t h transistors or 
Boolean log ic gates) i n order to produce the ef fect o f computat ion. See chapter 1， note 33. 
1 1 Tu r i ng , "Compu t i ng Mach ine ry " 434. 
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the former but not the latter, so the more Descartes constructs the possib i l i ty o f a " to ta l 
sys tem" o f demonic deceit, the more ar t i f ic ia l such a construct ion seems as an authored 
f i c t ion , such that to destabil ise one aspect o f the foundat ions, in this case through the 
cogi to, is to collapse the who le edi f ice. B y contrast, the demon receives a mater ia l 
instant iat ion in the cybernetic machine, w i t h decept ion now being located i n the l inguist ic 
interactions between the machine and its inter locutor. Decept ion is embedded at the heart 
o f the T u r i n g test i n a double way , since in the pre l im inary stage the interrogator has to t ry 
and te l l a man and a w o m a n apart, w i t h the man t r y ing to pass fo r the other sex. I t is on ly 
then that the question o f what w o u l d happen i f the man were replaced b y a machine is 
posed. A s Dupuy observes, the "machine now has not s imp ly to simulate the behaviour o f 
a human being ( i n this case a woman) but indeed the ab i l i t y o f a human being ( i n this case 
a man) to simulate the behaviour o f another human being ( i n this case a w o m a n ) . " 1 2 One is 
reminded here o f the fake-of-a-fake ef fect i n the L o u d u n case, i n wh i ch the human forgery 
o f a demon ( i tsel f a hoaxer) became self֊peφetuating. A s w i t h the rel ig ious possession, the 
Tu r i ng machine potent ia l ly exercises a deceit for " p o l i t i c a l " gain, demonstrat ing merely 
the symptoms o f s imula t ion w i thou t genuine cause. Th is t ime, however , i t is a machine, 
not a po l i t i c ian , staging the deceit. B y bu ry ing the cause o f the machine 's result beneath 
the epiphenomenon o f a forgery , there need be no mater ia l speci f icat ion for how the 
machine produces consciousness, b ideed, the machine does not have to produce 
consciousness a long the human model at a l l , s imp ly the apparent report ing o f conscious 
states i n the f o r m o f language so that the human is deceived into th ink ing the machine to 
be another human who is h i m - (or her-) self a fake. Here is evidenced the p rob lem o f 
cybernet ics ' emphasis on teleologies o f feedback (whether a th ing responds in te l l igent ly to 
its env i ronment) rather than the more convent ional physical sciences o f causal i ty (how a 
th ing acts i n the w a y it does). Cybernetics looks at homeostat ic outcomes, f r o m the 
adjustment o f a thermostat to its envi ronment to the adaptation o f a conversat ion to an 
inter locutor, b i te l l igence in a cybernet ic system is not invested in its mater ia l nature (its 
"embod imen t " ) as i t was i n Descartes, but in its in fo rmed and dynamic responses to an 
environment. F r o m the cybernetic po in t o f v iew , i f a thermostat switches o f f as a r o o m 
warms, i t counts as intel l igent. I n the more ambit ious case o f the Tu r i ng test, outcomes are 
abstracted f r o m the med ium by wh i ch the or ig ina l cause is produced (the human 
inter locutor sees on ly a teletype, not the body o f his human conversat ional ist or the 
Dupuy , The Mechanization of the Mind 4 1 . 
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electronic box o f the computer one) and conveyed through discourse to a human 
іп їефге їег. 
The prob lem o f this shi f t o f emphasis f r o m mechanism to in fo rmat ion , and f r o m 
causes to ef fects, can be seen in relat ion to one candidate that d id successful ly deceive 
some human inter locutors: Joseph We izenbaum'ร E L I Z A psychotherapist . 1 3 E L I Z A 
appeared to ho ld a rat ional discourse ef fect ive ly . Bu t its p rogramming was not model led on 
human consciousness but on a psychologists ' awareness o f how naive humans are when 
ho ld ing a conversat ion. D r a w i n g humans into conversat ion, E L I Z A ' s t r i ck was to ask 
questions w h i c h were s imp ly reiterations o f answers suppl ied prev iously b y the human 
part icipant. Since E L I Z A was always the in i t iator w h o asked the f i rs t question - typ ica l ly 
" H o w can I help y o u ? " - the human was always reactive, unw i t t i ng l y supply ing the raw 
in fo rmat ion , or keywords , w h i c h E L I Z A cou ld then refashion into further questions 
through basic a lgor i thmic ru les . 1 4 Th is h istor ical example ties Tu r i ng together w i t h 
Joseph Weizenbaum, " E L I Z A : A Computer Program fo r the Study o f Natural 
Language Commun ica t i on Between M a n and Mach ine , " Communications of the 
Association for Computing Machinery 9.1 (1966) : 35-36. 
1 4 A typ ica l conversat ion, as ci ted i n We izenbaum'ร or ig ina l paper, runs: 
H U M A N . M e n are a l l a l ike. 
E L I Z A . In what way 
H U M A N . They ' r e always bugg ing us about something or other. 
E L I Z A . Can you th ink o f a specif ic example 
b i U M A N . W e l l , m y boy f r iend made me come here. 
E L I Z A . Y o u r boy f r iend made you come here 
H U M A N . He says ľ m depressed much o f the t ime. 
E L I Z A . I am son*y to hear you are depressed 
H U M A N . I t ' s t rue. I am unhappy. 
E L I Z A . D o you th ink coming here w i l l help you not to be unhappy 
H U M A N . I need some help , that much seems certain. 
E L I Z A . Wha t w o u l d i t mean to you i f you got some help 
H U M A N . Perhaps I cou ld learn to get a long w i t h m y mother. 
E L I Z A . Te l l me more about your f a m i l y 
H U M A N . M y mother takes care o f me. 
E L I Z A . W h o else i n your f am i l y takes care o f you 
H U M A N . M y father. 
E L I Z A . Y o u r father 
H U M A N . Y o u are l ike m y father i n some ways. 
E L I Z A . Wha t resemblance do you see 
H U M A N . Y o u are not very aggressive but I th ink you don ' t want me to 
not ice that. 
E L I Z A . Wha t makes you th ink I am not very aggressive 
H U M A N . Y o u don ' t argue w i t h me. 
E L I Z A . W h y do you thinK I don ' t argue w i t h you 
H U M A N . Y o u are afraid o f me. 
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Drey fus 's argument that cybernetics w o u l d herald not the dawn o f machine intel l igence, 
but the decl ine o f M a n ' ร ― fo r E L I Z A passes the Im i ta t ion Game not through strategies o f 
natural language and fluid reason, but by assuming the uncr i t ica l nature o f the human 
in terrogator . 1 5 A s Weizenbaum noted, heurist ic p rogramming enables machines: 
to behave in wondrous ways, o f ten suf f ic ient to dazzle even the most 
experienced observer. B u t once a part icular p rogram is unmasked, once its 
inner work ings are expla ined i n language suf f ic ient ly p la in to induce 
understanding, its magic crumbles away; i t stands revealed as a mere 
co l lec t ion o f procedures, each quite comprehens ib le . 1 6 
E L I Z A dislodges Descartes' myth ica l logos o f human language, jus t as the demon disturbs 
by refus ing to be exposed as true (o f metaphysical o r ig in ) or false (a hoax рефеШаїес і by 
the demoniac). Steven Connor observes that arguments against the existence o f the 
demonic always b r i ng it back into existence "because the power to hoax people in to 
be l iev ing i n the power o f demons, along w i t h people 'ร capacity to delude themselves into 
this bel ief , are themselves essential ly d e m o n i c . " 1 7 Comparab ly , E L I Z A - l i ke Tu r i ng test 
machines i n general - is a demonic device that seduces into be l iev ing i n the existence o f a 
central bu t indecipherable intel l igence at w o r k in the computer - a ghost i n the machine -
wh i l s t actual ly ind icat ing (as Paré, Freud and Jos ipov ic i argue) that the human w h o is 
subject to the hoax is also, doub ly damning ly , the real source o f the delusion. 
E L I Z A . Does it please y o u to bel ieve I am afraid o f you 
H U M A N . M y father is afra id o f everybody. 
E L I Z A . Wha t else comes to m i n d when you th ink o f your father 
H U M A N . Bul l ies . 
E L I Z A . Does that have anyth ing to do w i t h the fact that your boy f r iend 
made you come here. (Weizenbaum 36-37) 
1 5 M o r e pos i t ive ly , though, E l i za 'ร success may also suggest that language'ร 
adaptive value l ies not so much i n the rat ional content i t conveys than i n its capacity to 
socialise groups t r o u g h the practice o f ta lk ing . Indeed, psychotherapy does not a i m to 
def ine a pat ient 's cond i t ion through rat ional ly stating the p rob lem, but to t ransferr ing 
anxieties f r o m patient to therapist through a generalised ta lk ing cure w h i c h i n the process 
o f connect ion also exposes the repressed crisis. 
1 6 We izenbaum 35. 
1 7 Connor , Dumbstruck 101 
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A s I suggested above, Descartes' argument is balanced precariously between 
re la t iv ism and empi r i c i sm, w i t h its success re ly ing as much on his rhetor ical sk i l l and 
appeal to human experience as log ica l closure ( fo r example, he leaves open the issue o f 
how phys io log ica l ly minds and bodies interact). S im i la r l y , the Tu r i ng test appeals to our 
innate assumption - one enforced by Descartes ᅳ that language is the superf ic ial evidence 
o f consciousness. N o t on ly does Tu r i ng not speci fy how precisely such consciousness must 
be const i tuted archi tectural ly, his avoidance o f reference to structure in favour o f his 
emphasis on l inguis t ic effect c i rcumvents this need at a l l . The cogi to asserts ind iv idua l i ty : I 
th ink , therefore ƒ exist. Bu t i f w e measure the success o f machines b y their ab i l i ty to use 
language such that they can speak to hoax the human, then we must suppose by Descartes' 
or T u r m g ' ร log ic that there is some conscious ego f r o m w h i c h such appearances o f thought 
are emanat ing. Thus no matter h o w consciousness is actual ly produced, whether f r o m a 
s i l icon, c l ockwork or human o r ig in , the appearance o f intel l igence according to Tu r i ng in 
practice (and Descartes i n theory) must equate to an ' T ' do ing the th ink ing i n the f i rs t 
place I f effects rather than or ig ins matter, then our inst inct ive category system w h i c h 
supposes the organic as natural and the inorganic as not breaks d o w n . Further, i f the Tu r i ng 
test supplies the correct c r i ter ion for measuring consciousness, m igh t i t not equal ly be the 
case that as we l l as the machine being model led o n the human, human consciousness is a 
mere potent iat ion o f a machin ie process that m igh t therefore be manipulated, subject to 
art i f ice and decept ion by cybernet ic inf luences because i t is ar t i f ic ia l i n the f i rs t place? 
Back in the seventeenth century, Descartes answers re luctant ly but a f f i rmat ive ly to his 
theological paradox, though he is protected b y the fact that such deceptions seem 
technologica l ly impossib le i n a t ime when the most advanced automata were mere ly 
c lockwork cur iosi t ies. W e , however , cannot be so sure in re lat ion to Tur ing ' s thought 
exper iment fo r w h i c h cybernet ic machines may w e l l be bu i l t and whose inner 
p rogramming remains inv is ib le to the human, at the level o f code rather than cogs. I n this 
new w o r l d , cybernetics i ron ica l ly promises to deconstruct the rat ional grounds by w h i c h to 
discr iminate between the humans i t studies and the machines i t produces. Thus i f 
ontologies o f organic d i f ference are not suf f ic ient to narrate the human as normat ive 
against the machine as monster, cybernetics must be perceived i n a demonic f rame o f 
m i n d . 
1968 to 1999 
I t should be clear w h y this paradox, when taken into f i c t i on , a l lows that aesthetic to 
both val idate and represent the postmodern cond i t ion . The concept that a machine w h i c h 
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hoaxes the human may not be i tsel f conscious at root, wh i l s t s t i l l successfully exposing the 
unconscious fa i l ings o f human language to grasp t ruth, adds weight to the supposi t ion that 
our knowledge o f ü le w o r l d is cont ingent on ideologica l or encultured predisposit ions 
rather than any def in i t i ve , b io log ica l ontologies o f human (normal ) and machine (monster) , 
or o f real i ty and the s imulat ion. The question in the f ic t ions from 1968 to 1999 is not 
whether this p rob lem exists - i n a way that i t d id not fo r Descartes - but the degree to 
w h i c h some no t ion o f the human and the real can st i l l be found even i n a w o r l d o f ar t i f ic ia l 
doubles. Broad ly speaking, the t w o earlier f ic t ions assert that some sort o f Cartesian-type 
fundamental t ru th about the nature o f the human can be st i l l be located, wh i l s t the later t w o 
reject this foundat ion and argue that the no t ion o f the " h u m a n " as opposed to the 
"mach ine " is a social construct. 
I n 2007 : A Space Odyssey, interstellar space provides the arena i n w h i c h man 
experiences bo th his psychologica l potent ial and his bod i l y f rag i l i t y . T feough the ident i ty 
o f Ha l as a purer f o r m o f intel lect, 2001 argues fo r a dramatic shi f t i n the ambi t ion o f 
science, away f r o m technologies that enhance or cyborgise the body in a part ia l and 
compromised way (the sorts o f technologies inherent i n space explorat ion) , towards 
mak ing the body redundant in favour o f a pure ly conceptual , even transcendent m i n d that 
can occupy and f i t the cosmologica l universe as a near-d iv ine ent i ty. Such a spir i tual ist ic 
te leology runs counter to scient i f ic ra t ional ism, but i t is expressed by a f i l m aesthetics that 
I ca l l a "demon ic poetics o f possession." Representing Ha l as a sort o f E L I Z A program, 
2001 forces us to acknowledge that the appearance o f consciousness log ica l ly ensures that 
we should treat i t responsibly according to the terms o f universal humanism, no matter 
whether i t is embodied or founded upon s i l icon chips. B y Descartes' or Tu r i ng ' ร log ic , a 
th ing appearing in te l l igent must therefore be so; this is a step we are manipulated and 
seduced into tak ing b y K u b r i c k ' ร intr icate camera w o r k in 200Լ wh i ch switches us 
d iscomfor t ing ly but sympathet ical ly in to Ha l ' s po in t o f v i ew , wh i l s t representing B o w m a n 
as monstrous i n his existence as an astronaut-cyborg. K u b r i c k inverts the outcome ( though 
as I w i l l argue his f i l m resembles the mode) o f the Meditations4 by fo rc ing us to possess 
H a l , rather than ob ject ive ly observ ing Ha l as a machine possessed b y psychot ic 
mal funct ion . 
A l s o publ ished in 1968， Ph i l i p к ᅳ D i c k ' ร Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
spatialises minds to show how their closed in ter ior i ty - w i thou t telepathy, we cannot see 
d i rect ly into the minds o f others - nevertheless provides a si tuat ion by wh i ch the essence 
o f humani ty can be ver i f ied against ar t i f ic ia l doubles that seem uncanni ly human. I f 2001 
crit iques the idea that machines can appear conscious w i thou t be ing so i n their funct iona l 
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o r ig in , Ph i l i p К . D i c k is concerned that machines can o f fe r some o f the phenomenological 
effects o f consciousness ( inc lud ing the Tur ing - type ab i l i t y to deceive) w i thou t any o f the 
corresponding compensations, par t icu lar ly the ab i l i t y to empathise w i t h the m i n d o f 
another agent suf fer ing under s imi lar condi t ions. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
maintains no ideological object ion to the possib i l i ty that machines migh t become human. 
Indeed, b io log ica l l y D i c k ' ร androids essential ly are human. Where the human di f ference is 
found , however , is in the ab i l i ty to empathise w i t h another self, imag in ing oneself as i f 
through the eyes o f a d i f ferent agent - be i t andro id or human - through a f i c t iona l 
pro ject ion o f theory o f m i n d . A s D i c k c la imed, i f a machine were act ively to help a human 
in need, then it w o u l d count as human, wh i l s t a human w h o fai ls to consider the feel ings o f 
another counts as machine, or android, b ideed, sat i r ical ly D i c k shows that mank ind is 
increasingly mechanised: addicted to drugs, absorbed b y te lev is ion game shows, fanat ical 
i n its re l ig ious bel iefs. Consider ing the minds o f others, though, is an act iv i ty the nove l 
does par excellence i n a non-determinist ic way . I t thus dist inguishes the reader f r o m the 
androids or affectless humans w i t h i n i t . Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? argues that 
the ab i l i ty to occupy the subject iv i ty o f another is ax iomat ica l ly mora l , that possession o f 
other minds is i tsel f a humanist ic act. I n do ing this, D i c k stages several Cartesian 
deceptions, when the reader is confronted w i t h the possib i l i ty that i t w o u l d be impossible 
to choose between self and other, and that the nove l is i tse l f one example o f a total 
decept ion rather than p roo f o f the reader'ร humani ty . However , b y pu l l i ng us through these 
l im ina l moments ( just as Descartes emerges f r o m his "dece iv ing demon" ) , we are restored 
to conf idence in the onto log ica l boundaries between andro id and human, and f i c t i on and 
real i ty. 
U l t ima te ly , bo th 2001: A Space Odyssey and Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? argue that th rough confrontat ion w i t h the apparent dup l i c i t y represented b y the 
future A I or andro id w h o seems to pattern the human, that wh i ch constitutes the t ru l y 
human in the present moment can be perceived more de f in i t i ve ly than before. They take 
the reader and v iewer through Cartesian demonic deceptions, where the cybernet ic other 
seems to resemble the human self, such that the sel f ( inc lud ing the human reader) becomes 
possessed b y the quali t ies (or possesses the m i n d o f ) the ar t i f ic ia l technology. I n 200Լ the 
v iewer is induced to occupy Ha l ' s perspective on B o w m a n , w i t h the spaceman seeming the 
more monstrously mechanical than the d isembodied cogni t ive intel l igence. In Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? we come to possess Deckard 'ร m i n d as i f he, too , is an andro id, 
more inhuman(e) than those he assassinates. However , the crucia l d i f ference f r o m their 
more intensely postmodern с о и т е ф а й в is that both these works a l low the reader or v iewer 
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to progress through and beyond these moments, so as to create secure foundat ions fo r 
humani ty . The v is ion o f a goth ical ly mechanised B o w m a n in 2001 points towards the 
transcendence o f m ind over body i n a way that w i l l c i rcumvent the paradoxes o f 
cyborgisat ion. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? promotes a humanist v iew o f 
l i terary f i c t i on as serving i n and o f i tsel f a mora l purpose, as i t a l lows us to see as i f f r o m 
the standpoint o f the other in precisely the empathie performance the androids are 
incapable of. Ou r abi l i ty to be deceived by f i c t i on is not a threatening double 
consciousness to pattern the threatening double o f the andro id; i t is rather evidence o f our 
ab i l i ty to deploy our minds to mora l ends. 
B y contrast, i n R id ley Scot t 'ร 1982 adaptat ion o f D i c k ' ร book, Blade Runner, space 
is la id out not as the boundless in f in i tude o f the interstellar or mental , but as the 
claustrophobic c i ty . Layer ing futur is t ic upon goth ic architecture i n an urban diaspora, 
ident i ty becomes uncertain i n a culture o f doubles and representations - a cul ture 
incarnated in the ar t i f ic ia l repl icant who is phys ica l ly and cogn i t i ve ly indist inguishable 
f r o m the blade runner w h o must nevertheless detect di f ference and destroy the " f ake . " 
Scott 's imag in ing o f Los Angeles i n 2019 blurs the dist inct ions between real i ty and 
s imula t ion; f i c t i on thus becomes yet more evidence o f a Baudr i l la rd ian cul ture o f 
reproduct ion, rather than the key to human di f ference f r o m the machine. Symptomat ic o f 
this is the way i n wh i ch Blade Runner el iminates the demonic deceptions that are present 
i n D i c k ' ร or ig ina l . Whereas by seeing tìirough his deceptions D i c k creates an 
epistemologica! f ramework in w h i c h the de f in i t i ve ly human can be placed, Scott 's f i l m is 
self-conscious about its o w n mechanisms for fo rg ing ( i n bo th senses) a narrat ive but i t 
refuses to o f fe r any standpoint outside the f i c t i on wh i ch al lows us to ref lect on the t ru th o f 
the f i c t i on i n compar ison to real i ty. I n part icular, i t is impossible to te l l whether Deckard is 
or is not a repl icant. B y contrast, i n a cr i t ica l momen t i n Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep! D i c k tføeatens that this is the case w i t h his character, but u l t imate ly we emerge 
f r o m the decept ion more conf ident o f Deckard 'ร human i ty than we were before. 
Stretching the epistemological conf l i c t o f Blade Runner to an extreme is The 
Matrix, the subject o f chapter 7. I n accordance w i t h postmodern theory, this proposes that 
real i ty is a lways already a s imulat ion, w i t h f i l m i tsel f a cont r ibut ion to a cul ture o f 
reproduct ion that proves on ly the imposs ib i l i t y o f object ive cr i t ique or d iscr iminat ions 
between self and other. The ar t i f ic ia l p rogram, the M a t r i x , m imics the ideological 
structures o f rea l -wor ld capi ta l ism w h i c h provides the hermeneutic f ramework fo r cul ture 
at the end o f the twent ie th century. Blade Runner and The Matrix argue that human 
identi t ies are always already so bound to late capi ta l ism that s imulat ions are jus t one more 
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aspect o f the general automat ion o f mank ind fo r economic purposes. Simulat ions - and 
these movies are w a r i l y self-conscious that f i l m i tsel f is one such s imula t ion - become not 
an escape f r o m or cr i t ique o f the current moment i n h is tory, but mere ly plunge us deeper 
into the deceptions o f the late capital ist moment. 
I n l ook ing at the narratives f r o m 1968 to 1999, then, I perceive an in tens i fy ing 
reject ion o f Tu r i ng ' ร thought exper iment, since i n the age o f cybernetics as envisaged by 
speculative f i c t i on machines can appear conscious w i thou t be ing so i n their funct ional 
o r ig in ; or, i n the case o f Ph i l i p K. D i c k ' ร works , they can be conscious i n a log ica l sense 
but tu rn that ab i l i ty to disingenuous ends because they lack emot ional sympathy. B y the 
last t w o decades o f the twent ie th century, even as ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence seems more o f a 
technical challenge than dur ing the 1960ร when Tu r i ng imagined i t to be imminent , under 
the aesthetics and theories o f postmodernism such technological d i lemmas correspond to a 
more general doubt not on ly about the di f ference between real i ty and s imulat ion or human 
and mode l , but whether any di f ference can be measured at a l l under the epistemological 
condi t ions o f social const ruct iv ism. Rather than mark ing the di f ference between ar t i f ic ia l 
minds and intel l igent humans, language is always already a deceptive representation that 
therefore cannot prov ide access to any real i ty outside itself. The theological logos that 
Descartes calls upon to break th rough decept ion to the t ru th o f the cogi to is unavai lable to 
us i n The Matrix. For wh i l s t Descartes argues that an omnipotent but benevolent G o d 
w o u l d not a l low such deceptions to take place, the presence o f the cybernetic 
consciousness provides an alternative o r ig in fo r decept ion i n mani fest and omnipotent 
computer systems w h i c h govern late capi ta l ism. I n the late twent ie th century, in its 
dystopian v i s ion o f ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, The Matrix envisions the v iew o f Baudr i l la rd , 
whose concept o f the hyperreal t i l ts Descartes' p ivo ta l decept ion into doubt rather than 
t ruth: " i t is now impossible to isolate the process of the real, or to prove the r e a l . " 1 8 
Postmodern Onto logy 
I f Descartes and Tu r i ng prov ide the grounding phi losophies o f Enl ightenment and 
cybernetic sciences respect ively, these f i c t ions ' reactions to these epistemes track the 
aesthetic movements that cu lminate i n postmodernism. Frederic Jameson rough ly 
periodises science f i c t i on , w i t h the 1960ร dominated by subject iv i ty (as in Ph i l ip кᅳ D i c k ' ร 
w o r k ) m o v i n g through aesthetic or speculative f i c t i on o f the late 1960ร to late 1970ร, and 
Baudr i l la rd , Simulacra 2 1 ; emphasis i n or ig ina l . 
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entering the era o f cyberpunk w i t h 1984'ร Neuromancer. СуЬефипк ― w h i c h has been 
inf luenced b y Blade Runner'ร cityscape and o f w h i c h The Matrix is an ideal example ᅳ is 
"a general per iod break w h i c h is also consistent, not on ly w i t h the neo-conservative 
revo lu t ion and g lobal isat ion, but also w i t h the rise o f commerc ia l fantasy as a generic 
compet i tor and u l t imate v ic tor in the f i e ld o f mass c u l t u r e . " 1 9 Wh i l s t Jameson sees 
postmodernism as bound to the economic log ic o f late capi ta l ism, over the next three 
chapters I w i l l use an alternative mode l o f d i f ference, wh i l s t keeping Jameson'ร late 
capital ist context i n m ind . The p rob lem w i t h presenting суЬефипк as a per iod break is that 
i t impl ies cybernetic concepts have on ly recently made their way into f i c t i on , whereas the 
fact that the texts I examine draw on the Cartesian heritage suggest an older f ramework for 
understanding issues o f s imu la t ion and m i n d that is not bound to economic h is tory or 
technological developments. The suspicion that reason alone does not prov ide a rel iable 
means o f seeing through demonic decept ion has a long heritage that is re inv igorated b y the 
new experient ial f i e ld o f the personal computer. Add i t i ona l l y , cybernetics has been 
developing f r o m the 1940ร to the present. I f there has been a shi f t i t has not been so much 
in the qual i tat ive nature o f the technologies i n themselves or the economic condi t ions in 
wh i ch they are produced ( indeed i t cou ld be argued that, w i t h its or ig ins in Second W o r l d 
War missi le guidance systems, cybernetics was always a product o f late capi ta l ism) as in 
their pervasiveness. A s Sherry Tu rk le has observed, the Tu r i ng exper iment is no longer 
per formed in academic laboratories, but by everyone w h o switches on and interacts w i t h 
their PC, something The Matrix realises and exploi ts i n mak ing postmodern phi losophy 
avai lable to its ant icipated youth audience. I n l ook ing at t w o texts f r o m 1968， one o f wh i ch 
has been adapted i n a postmodern f i l m , Blade Runner, and a l l o f wh i ch inf luence The 
Matrix, we have ideal narratives toough wh i ch to study the generic accret ion o f styles and 
phi losophies that nudge cybernet ic f ic t ions into a fu l ly -deve loped postmodernism. 
Rather than app ly ing any a priori de f in i t ion o f postmodern ism, and then p lac ing 
these f ic t ions w i t h i n or outside that box , in si tuatmg m y texts w i t h i n the broader 
phi losophical , l i terary, sc ient i f ic and social movements I w i l l d raw on a mode l that sees 
postmodernism as a shi f t i n emphasis rather than a categorical revo lu t ion . I n B r i an 
M c H a l e ' ร Postmodernist Fiction, the postmodern accretion o f d i f ferent styles o f discourse 
and text a l l have ancestral traces i n modern ism w i t h the di f ference being the extent and 
Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia1 and 
Other Science Fictions (London: Verso , 2005) 93. 
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intensity o f their dep loymen t . 2 0 General ly speaking, the dominant o f modernist f i c t i on is 
epistemological , as i t foregrounds questions about the ա է շ փ ա է ս է ւ օ ո and the re l iab i l i t y o f 
knowledge. Characterist ic modernist devices include the mu l t i p l i ca t ion and jux tapos i t ion 
o f perspectives, heterogeneity o f styles and narrat ive modes, and the transfer o f 
epistemological issues experienced by the characters onto the reader ( fo r example, 
Faulkner 'ร d is locat ing o f chronologies w h i c h render the p lo t hard to f o l l o w h is tor ica l ly ) . 
B y contrast, the dominant o f postmodernist f i c t i on is ontologicaL These f ic t ions engage 
w i t h questions about the status o f wor lds , bo th as l i terary constructs and the real wo r l d i n 
general: 
Wha t is a wor ld? Wha t k inds o f w o r l d are there and h o w are they 
constituted? Wha t happens when di f ferent k inds o f w o r l d are placed i n 
confrontat ion, or when boundaries between wor lds are violated? Wha t is the 
mode o f existence o f a text, and what is the mode o f existence o f the w o r l d 
(or wor lds) i t p ro jec ts? 2 1 
However , neither modern ism or postmodernism, nor epistemology or on to logy , are 
mutua l l y exclusive, as M c H a l e goes on to observe: 
push epistemological questions far enough and they " t i p over " into 
onto logicai questions. B y the same token, push onto log ica i questions far 
enough and they t ip over into epistemological questions - the sequence is 
not l inear and unid i rect ional , but b id i rect ional and revers ib le . 2 2 
Nevertheless, because o f the l inear nature o f text (or, one m igh t add w i t h some 
qual i f icat ions, f i l m ) , one set o f questions has to be asked before the other can be 
formula ted, and so narrat ive s lows d o w n the process by w h i c h the swi tch takes place. 
M c H a l e ' ร mode l is useful because i t places the Cartesian issue o f epis temology at the 
centre o f contemporary f i c t i on . However , i t also acknowledges that because one set o f 
questions necessarily entails the other, the change we are look ing fo r i n the move to 
postmodern ism is not the presence or absence but the style, p r io r i t y and interchange o f 
each aspect. I n this case, doubt about one facet o f the w o r l d leads u l t imate ly to the 
v io la t ion o f the onto log ica i s tabi l i ty o f wor lds and epistemology i n general. 
B r i an M c H a l e , Postmodernist Fiction (London : Rout ledge, 1987). 
M c H a l e , Postmodernist Fiction 10. 
M c H a l e , Postmodernist Fiction 1 1 . 
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A s I observed in re lat ion to Tu r i ng , the proto-subjects that are characterist ical ly 
found i n cybernet ic f ic t ions i n w h i c h the machine is f igura t ive ly (and sometimes 
b io log ica l l y ) const i tuted o f human elements i n onto log ica l ly conf l ic ted ways, also 
challenge epistemologica! values as they operate through deception. I t is not surpr is ing, 
then, that characters in cybernet ic f ic t ions f i n d that when confronted w i t h the intel l igent 
computer or andro id , they enter a feedback system. Questions about onto logy ֊ whether an 
agent is human or machine or android ― t ip into the more general onto log ica l p rob lem o f 
what i t is to be human; this i n turn leads to the epistemological quest ion o f how w e can 
ve r i f y whether another human or technology is conscious i n the same way as ourselves; 
this then leads to the question o f whether i t is possible to k n o w anyth ing for certain about 
the w o r l d i n pr inc ip le , w h i c h recursively in forms the beg inn ing o f the process o f conf l i c t 
between the human and his cybernetic other. Broad ly speaking, between 1968 and 1999， 
pr io r i t y shifts f r o m local questions o f technology ᅳ an onto logy o f ident i t ies, where 
computers and humans are seen in close p rox im i t y - towards the wholesale quest ion about 
the onto logy o f wor lds i n general. The issue o f whether a part icular machine is inte l l igent 
is a m inor p rob lem (or m inor symptom) o f the more general issue o f h o w to k n o w that the 
w o r l d is as we perceive i t . For example, 2001 c r i t ica l ly invi tes us to discuss whether Ha l 
speci f ical ly is conscious and therefore an agent w i t h r ights l i ke the human; such a question 
t ips into epistemology: h o w can w e c la im to have absolute knowledge o f the w o r l d when 
we are l im i ted by our bodies, and perceive H a l as abject s imp ly because he is not 
corporeal? Should w e not a im to transcend embodiment ent i re ly, v i e w i n g nature f r o m the 
pos i t ion o f the pure ly rat ional m i n d o f the star-chi ld o f the f inale? Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? suggests that an onto logy based o n or ig ins is i r relevant i n determin ing the 
nature o f androids, w h i c h are i n any case b io log ica l l y human. I t is, rather, the ab i l i t y to 
empathise that dist inguishes the human f r o m the android, the true f r o m the false. I t remains 
va l id even under moments o f extreme pressure when Deckard 'ร personal crisis threatens to 
make us doubt the veraci ty o f the nove l ' s w o r l d as a who le , since i t appears fo r a moment 
as i f the human bounty hunter t r o u g h whose eyes we have experienced the novel is 
actual ly h imse l f an andro id. Though both texts flirt w i t h the idea that the other is not so 
onto log ica l ly d i f ferent as appears on the surface, they u l t imate ly agree that a stable 
epistemology fo r t ru th i n general is attainable, though it may be d i f f i cu l t to f i n d or 
art iculate. Th is is comparable to the ef fect o f Descartes' Meditations i n w h i c h by coming 
to the b r i nk o f doubt, he recovers a more fundamental sense o f human t ru th . 
B y contrast, the key issues i n Blade Runner and The Matrix are whether the w o r l d 
i tsel f is at the g lobal onto log ica l level an ar t i f ic ia l construct, regardless o f the status o f the 
B r o w n 112 
ar t i f ic ia l macnines w h i c h inhabit i t . The Matrix starts w i t h a general onto log ica l quest ion -
what i f " rea l i t y " is a computer s imulat ion? - and never provides epistemological 
foundat ions b y wh i ch the t ru th or fa ls i ty o f this supposi t ion can be judged loca l ly , by the 
ind iv idua l v iewer. Further, i t is taken fo r granted that the Ma t r i x is t ru ly an inte l l igent and 
conscious computer, bypassing the Tu r i ng measurement ent i rely. Th is technical question is 
irrelevant i n re lat ion to the broader supposi t ion that, i n a contemporary in fo rmat ion 
society, we migh t be l i v i ng in a s imula t ion w i thou t being able to k n o w it. The Matrix 
invokes the spectre o f a Cartesian deceiv ing demon, but denies the external referent b y 
w h i c h the deceit can be overcome: the computer-generated spectacle is so perfect a 
s imulacrum that i t is impossible to obta in a v i e w f r o m nowhere that a l lows the object ive 
judgement o f its t ru th or fa ls i ty. The Matrix exposes jus t h o w f ragi le the foundat ions for 
knowledge are; the coro l la ry is that i t becomes impossible to theorise and cr i t ic ise social , 
po l i t i ca l and economic reali t ies o f the present w i thou t partaking o f those systems. Here, as 
in Blade Runner, the true existence o f l o w key deceiv ing machines i n real i ty - par t icu lar ly 
H o l l y w o o d f i lms 一 suggests the imposs ib i l i t y o f p rov ing the way those same human 
subjects who are absorbed by c inema are also unconsciously bound to a capital ist 
enterprise. 
The Tu r i ng test proposes that we can either d ist inguish between the human self and 
the created other, or that such dist inct ions are irrelevant because that other is essential ly 
human in any case (and therefore not Other) because it is able to use language. 
Postmodernism can be seen as a re ject ion o f the tools ( theological , empi r ica l , rhetor ical) to 
see more or less through such deceit that were avai lable to Descartes, and the acceptance 
that w e are always already subject to deceit th rough precisely these mechanisms, 
par t icu lar ly language itself. In The Matrix, we are unable to break through the hermet ic 
system o f representation tìirough recourse to other narratives w h i c h j us t i f y or evaluate the 
onto logy o f the other. A s Istvan Csicsery-Ronay concludes, " b y the t ime w e get to 
cyberpunk, real i ty has become a case o f nerves...The distance required for re f lect ion is 
squeezed out as the w o r l d implodes: when hal lucinat ions and real i ty col lapse into each 
other, there is no place f r o m w h i c h to re f l ec t . " 2 3 Cyberpunk, o f w h i c h The Matrix is an 
ideal example that assimilates the styles o f its generic predecessors, is thus the apotheosis 
o f the postmodern cond i t ion , and the antithesis o f Descartes' and Tu r i ng ' ร 
foundat ional ism. 
2 3 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, "Cyberpunk and Neuromant ic ism, ' ' Mississippi Review 
2.3 (1996), 15 Ju ly 2008 <ht tp : / /www.miss iss ipp i rev ieพ.com/1996/ is tvan.h tml>. 
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Chapter 5. A l l A n y Conscious Ent i t y Can Hope to D o : M i n d and Matter in 2001: A Space 
Odyssey 
A m o n g the stars lies the proper study o f mank ind ; Pope'ร aphor ism gave 
on ly part o f the t ruth, for the proper study o f mank ind is not mere ly M a n , 
bu t b i te l l i gence . 2 4 
Poetics o f Possession 
I n his commentar ies on 2001: A Space Odyssey^ 5 Stanley Kub r i c k orientated the 
f i l m abstrusely, l i ken ing i t to music and poetry as a subject ive experience that "h i ts the 
v iewer at an inner level o f consciousness." 2 6 2001 l im i t s dialogue i n order to depr ive the 
v iewer o f a s imple al legor ical index to its meaning, and l ike the rhetor ical mode o f the 
Meditations, the f i l m makes claims to knowledge not so much through def in i t ive log ica l 
statements, but through encouraging the audience to acquiesce to its narrat ive techniques, 
i ą A r thu r c. Clarke, The Promise of Space ( London : Hodder, 1968) 307. 
2 5 Because 2001 was in i t ia l l y conceptual ised as a f i l m , and because it is the 
cinematic vers ion w h i c h has proved most in f luent ia l on subsequent science f i c t i on , I w i l l 
centre m y argument around the f i l m rather than A r thu r c. C larke 'ร nove l , us ing 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, d i r . Stanley Kub r i ck , perf. Ke i r Du l l ea and Gary L o c k w o o d , Turner 
Entertainment, 1968, D V D , Warner H o m e V ideo , 2 0 0 1 . However , I w i l l emp loy the book 
at t imes to elaborate or make clear a point w h i c h the f i l m ' ร v isual metaphor is ing and lack 
o f narrat ive vo ice can necessarily on l y imp ly . Such a transfer o f material between the t w o 
is appropriate i n this case ᅳ more so than w i t h other f i l m i c adaptations o f novels ᅳ because 
they were wr i t ten concurrent ly and w i t h the cross-pol l inat ion o f ideas between the two . I n 
1964， Kub r i c k was scout ing fo r the oppor tun i ty to make a science f i c t i on f i l m , to f o l l o w up 
the success o f his Dr. Strangelove. Hav ing been approached by Kubr i ck , Clarke sent h i m 
his 1948 short story " T h e Sent ine l , " wh i ch p rov ided the start ing po in t for 200L Rather 
than produc ing a screenplay f r o m the outset, C larke wrote the f i rst draft o f the nove l w i t h a 
f i l m i n m i n d ; by 1965， tlaough, the nove l and screenplay were be ing wr i t ten 
simultaneously, w i t h constant feedback between the manuscripts, and between Clarke and 
Kubr ick . C larke 's f ina l vers ion o f the novel was publ ished after the release o f the f i l m . 
Wh i l s t I w i l l discuss be low the dif ferences that accrue through the demands o f the d i f ferent 
genres - par t icu lar ly s igni f icant when concerning the idea o f psychological possession that 
renders on the page but no t d i rect ly on the screen ֊ there is on ly one further essential 
di f ference to note. I n the nove l , Discovery flies to Saturn v ia a slmgshot o f Jupiter; fo r 
special effects and budgetary reasons, i n the f i l m the target is Jupiter itself. For more on the 
germinat ion and product ion o f book and f i l m , see A r thu r c. Clarke, The Խտէ Worlds of 
2001 (London : S idgw ick and Jackson, 1972) 29-49. References to the nove l are der ived 
f r om Ar thu r c. Clarke, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968; London : Orb i t -L i t t l e , 2007) . A l l 
parenthetical page references i n this chapter refer to this ed i t ion o f the text. 
2 6 Stanley Kub r i ck , in terv iew w i t h Joseph Ge imis , The Film Director as Superstar, 
ed. Joseph Geimis (London : Seeker, 1971) 302. 
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partaking o f that experience o f thought֊in֊the֊process֊of-happening in an attempt to reach 
the same conclusions ās its or ig ina l author . 2 7 Rather than a un i f ied p lot , the f i l m el ic i ts a 
phenomenology o f absorpt ion b y sight, sound and symbol , bistead o f narrat ing d i rect ly , the 
f i l m poeticises and meditates on a number o f levels: prototyp ica l v isual images, especial ly 
the c i rc le, repeat i n d i f ferent contexts; the musical score switches between aggressive 
modern ism and the classical canon; the soundscape both lu l ls and haunts; an extended 
stream o f coloured images simulates B o w m a n ' ร t r ip (the double meaning in re lat ion to 
drugs is not unintent ional) through the star p o r t a l . 2 8 
Whi l s t K u b r i c k ' s hermeneutics and the (ant i )narrat ive strategies o f the f i l m i tsel f 
w o u l d seem to warn against impos ing meaning or extract ing part icular images f r o m the 
who le , this is precisely what has occvured i n re lat ion to one o f its central characters, the 
Heur is t ica l ly -programmed A lgo r i t hm ic Computer 9000, vernacular ly k n o w n as Ha l . I n the 
canon o f cybernet ic f ic t ions, Ha l stands as perhaps the paradigmatic emblem o f malevolent 
computer intel l igence. H a l ' s iconic red " e y e " has been deployed i n adverts fo r the A p p l e 
Mac in tosh, w h i c h w i t t i l y explo i ted fears about the M i l l e n n i u m B u g ( "Dave, w i l l you 
remember the year 2000 when computers began to misbehave?.. .Only Mac in tosh was 
designed to func t ion p e r f e c t l y " ) ; 2 9 i t is reproduced i n the cameras o f System Shock 2， 
already discussed in chapter 1 ; the deadpan nature o f Ha l ' s voice is m im icked by A r n o l d 
Schwarzenegger' ร Terminator ; and, most recent ly, H a l cameos as the mutineer autopi lot i n 
P ixar 'ร cartoon about robots, Wall-E. 30 I t is not surpr is ing that Ha l has inspired later 
narratives, since he is so clear ly situated i n a h is tor ica l t radi t ion. A s Ha l appears to be 
As Bemard W i l l i a m s observes, the Meditations are not meant to be a treatise but 
are "an exercise i n th inking. . . the ' ľ that appears throughout them f r o m the f i rst sentence 
on does not speci f ica l ly represent [Descartes]: i t represents anyone who w i l l step into the 
pos i t ion i t marks, the pos i t ion o f the th inker w h o is prepared to reconsider and recast his or 
her bel iefs, as Descartes supposed we migh t , f r o m the ground u p . " Bernard W i l l i a m s , 
"b i t roduc tory Essay," Meditations on First Philosophy, with Selections from the 
Objections and Replies9 b y René Descartes, trans. John Cot t ingham (Cambr idge: 
Cambr idge U P , 1986) v i i . 
2 8 The f i l m was par t icu lar ly popular w i t h h ippies, w i t h c inema owners repor t ing 
that as the f ina l sl i t-scan section approached, people w o u l d leave their seats and l ie at tihe 
f ront , absorbed the huge Cinerama screen. John Lennon al legedly watched i t every week. 
Jerome A g e l , The Making of Kubrick's 2001 (New Y o r k : Signet, 1970) 275-78. 
2 9 The v ideo can st i l l be seen at " H A L 9000 A p p l e A d , " 1999, You Tube, 21 June 
2008 <h t tp : / /www.you tube .com/wa tch?v=nHJkAYdT7qo> . 
3 0 See chapter 3， note 38. 
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mak ing errors, Poole notes that the fact that the 9000 series has had a perfect record up to 
this po in t "sounds a l i t t le l i ke famous last words . " The cl iché expects us to treat H a l as 
another example o f technology at tacking its maker, inher i t ing f r o m the go lem o f Prague to 
the ur-text o f Enl ightenment monstrosi ty , Frankenstein. I f the gothic general ly sublimates 
the rat ional m i n d in favour o f a bod i l y react ion to the narrat ive o f monsters, i t is no t hard to 
appreciate w h y this f o r m m igh t lend i tself to stories o f technology wh i ch , i n the guise o f 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences, seem so perverse precisely because they are w h o l l y rat ional objects 
w i thou t body, unable to experience the same types o f embodied emot ion w e are capable o f 
exper iencing as human v iewers. Though there is certainly an element o f this dialect ic at 
w o r k i n 200Լ this chapter contends that the monster does not necessarily o f fer the best 
template for ш t e φ r e t i ռ g H a l , and that the ef fect o f the f i l m ' s broader aesthetics is to 
devalue софогеа І і Їу i n man , b y dual is t ica l ly emphasising the potent ial o f m i n d over body. 
A l t h o u g h the f i l m is 140 minutes i n length, the sect ion aboard Discovery lasts less than 
ha l f th is , precisely one hour. I t is c lear ly the most essential narrat ive chapter o f the f i l m , 
but H a l does not dominate the f i l m to the extent imp l ied b y the extract ion o f his iconic eye 
as a synecdoche for the p lo t as a w h o l e . 3 1 B y examin ing the f i l m i n its entirety i t becomes 
clear that to read Ha l as a prototyp ica l monster, and to perceive through this lens that 2001 
is a s imple warn ing against technology, is to el ide the signi f icance o f the complex narrat ive 
contexts i n wh i ch Ha l appears. Rather than a d iametr ic Other to the human, Ha l is jus t one 
f igurat ive element o f a more complex relat ionship between science, technology and the 
human mind-body relat ionship. 
Th is revis ionist reading sees Ha l as cont r ibut ing to the f i l m ' ร w ider poetics w h i c h 
forces the v iewer into a pos i t ion o f cogni t ive medi ta t ion rather than direct analysis. As w e 
observed i n chapter 2， monsters - whether Renaissance or cyborg , hopefu l or degenerate -
are always epistemological ly s t imula t ing, but epistemology can be submerged beneath an 
innate " y u k " response to the agent's mater ia l onto logy. Such automatic revu ls ion certainly 
characterises reactions to H a l , but these seem mis judged in re lat ion to a f i l m not so much 
about technology per se, as about the epistemological foundat ions for science and the 
nature o f knowledge that technology embodies. I n th is, the demonic f ramework is he lp fu l 
because demons are w h o l l y epistemological creatures, w i t h no onto log ica i f o r m except as 
Some reviews o f the t ime thought Ha l was s imp ly a stereotyped plot device, i n 
w h i c h the o ld man-machine conf l i c t was padding to f i l l the t ime, co inc identa l ly necessary 
to g ive the impression o f the vast t ime needed to transverse space. The most notable o f 
these condemnatory reviews was Stanley K a u f f m a n n , "Los t m the Stars," rev. o f 2001: A 
Space Odyssey, d ir . Stanley Kub r i ck , The New Republic 4 M a y 1968: 24-25. 
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mediated through the subject iv i ty o f the agent they possess. Thus demons can be read both 
w i t h i n the various personalit ies o f the f i l m ᅳ par t icu lar ly H a l and B o w m a n - and also i n 
re lat ion to the f i l m ' s ambiguous aesthetic structures designed to el ic i t a phi losophical 
response i n the v iewer , par t icu lar ly through its poetics o f possession. A l t hough іпЇЄфгеІіп§ 
the f i l m risks dissecting something designed against deconstruct ion, cr i t ic is ing Ha l i n the 
abstruse f ramework o f a poetics o f possession rather than monstrous al legory is more in 
keeping w i t h the psychologica l ef fect that 2007 : A Space Odyssey induces as we watch i t . 
Th is is part icu lar ly so because the section i nvo l v i ng H a l is structural ly enclosed b y very 
exp l ic i t rework ings o f Cartesian deception tests. Rather than compar ing H a l to the 
onto logy o f Frankenstein'ร monster, this h is tor ica l connect ion treats Ha l A r o u g h an 
epistemological lens in l ine w i t h Descartes' o r ig ina l demon w h i c h , as we saw in the 
previous chapter, poses predominant ly epistemological questions when related to the 
Tu r i ng test. I t is this angle that is lost by extrapolat ing Ha l as synopt ic for 2001 general ly, 
and that can be recovered b y examin ing Ha l w i t h i n a demonic context. 
Homeostasis and Ep is temology 
Even though the f i l m portrays nature i n a rat ional ist ic way ( through its deployment 
o f the realit ies o f evo lu t ion, computer science and space explorat ion) , according to Kub r i c k 
the f i l m provides something o f an oxymoron , i n that i t attempts to del iver " a scient i f ic 
de f in i t ion o f G o d . " 3 2 The key m o t i f that connects metaphysics to science is the c i rc le or 
cycle. The รนท and moon or Jupiter are al igned in the shots o f al l three monol i ths , and are 
emblemat ic o f Zoroastr ianism, the etemal struggle between l igh t and darkness. Appear ing 
w i t h the ref ra in o f Richard Strauss'ร Also sprach Zarathustra, w h i c h was der ived f r o m 
Nietzsche'ร book on the Übermensch, the s imple image o f the sunrise and circ le/cycle 
ensures that the visual and musical economy o f the f i l m satisfies K u b r i c k ' ร paradoxical 
ambi t ion for i t by tapping a mythopoet ics inherent to many re l ig ions (the move f r o m chaos 
to order, then back tiirough to apocalypse to revelat ion, for example) . Circles abound i n the 
f i l m : a spinning bone becomes a rotat ing satel l i te; a pen orbits i n the zero grav i ty o f a 
spaceship; the doughnut - r ing space stat ion is accompanied by the music o f the wa l tz ; the 
deck o f Discovery rotates cont inua l ly ; access hatches are c i rcular ; the spherical pods d r i f t 
towards the broken satell i te d ish ; f ina l l y , Hál， s red, f isheye lens reflects and bends the 
wor ld . Cycles l ikewise structure the plot , as the f i l m moves f r o m the b i r th o f modern man 
Kubr i ck , in terv iew w i t h Joseph u e l m i ร 305. 
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f r o m ape, through technological adul thood, before return ing to the foetal stage o f the "star 
c h i l d . " G iven K u b r i c k ' ร pos i t ion ing o f God w i t h i n a rat ional f ramework , these recursive 
analogies should not necessarily be read through a pure ly rel ig ious lens. Rather, the cycles 
and chapter d iv is ions mark homeostasis, where a set o f paradigms and condi t ions for l i v i ng 
are re lat ive ly stable, and i n response to wh i ch humans do not change fundamenta l ly , on ly 
incremental ly . The monol i ths , however, reposi t ion man w i t h i n a d i f ferent cycle or suite o f 
paradigms. A r thu r c. C larke 'ร famous m a x i m that "any suf f ic ient ly advanced technology 
is indist inguishable f r o m magic and w i l l have a certain i r rat ional qua l i t y " seems appl icable 
here, b r ing ing the f i l m ' ร rat ional ist ic v is ion i n l ine w i t h the metaphysics o f d i v i n i t y . 3 3 The 
d iv ine or magical is whatever lies beyond our comprehension, but i t is not onto log ica l ly 
dist inct as super-mtuml; rather, the magical is beyond our concept ion o f the natural so far 
as our current paradigms construe that term. I t l ies beyond our ab i l i t y to accommodate the 
abnormal into current ly normat ive frames o f understanding, but i t does not s ign i fy the 
general c i rcumvent ion o f natural physics. Th is is quite s imi lar to Paré's treatment o f 
demons i n chapter 2， where demons are construed as able to produce their effects not by 
miraculous powers outside o f nature, but by manipu la t ing the m i n d o f a human observer 
w i t h i n nature. However , Robby the robot shows that an im ism is no longer a p r im i t i ve but a 
scient i f ic poss ib i l i ty in the era o f cybernet ic science. Rather than magic representing 
repressed earlier bel iefs, the animist ic technologies o f cybernetics point to the most 
advanced achievements o f c iv i l i sa t ion. Indeed, science f i c t i on cou ld be said to be valuable 
not because o f the specif ic futures i t imagines, but because in a w o r l d where science seems 
to have rat ional ised and expla ined so much i t reminds that seemingly magical experiences 
st i l l exist to be uncovered tiirough science, at w h i c h po in t , however , they w i l l no longer 
seem so supernatura l . 3 4 So the f i l m ' ร medi tat ive poetics induces not knowledge or a 
part icular de f in i t ion o f technology, but a phenomenologica l f ramework w i t h i n w h i c h 
technology and its relat ionship to the human can be placed, so that science as 
3 3 A r thu r c. Clarke, Profiles of the Future: An Enquiry into the Limits of the 
Possible, 2nd ed. (London : Pan, 1973) 2 1 . C larke 'ร fu tu re- look ing m a x i m has been 
h is tor ica l ly val idated by the histor ical w o r k o f D a v i d Nob le or E r i k Dav is , who have 
shown that science is an essential ly re l ig ious endeavour, not on l y i n terms o f its desire to 
transcend the human cond i t ion , but i n the En l ightenment 'ร or ig ins in rel ig ious and myst ica l 
bel ief. 
3 4 A s Isaac A s i m o v put i t , the crucia l th ing about science f i c t i on is its percept ion o f 
change through technology. However , i t is not the part icular change i t predicts that makes 
i t important , but that i t predicts change i n the f i rs t place. Isaac A s i m o v , " M y O w n V i e w , " 
Asimov on Science Fiction (London : Panther-Granada, 1984) 17-18. 
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conceptual ised in the future takes on some o f the properties o f the magica l f r o m the po in t 
o f v i ew o f the present, w i t h its part ial science and relat ive homeostasis. Th is dialect ic is 
indicated b y the sharp contrast between the circular metaphors and recursive narrat ive 
structure o f the f i l m , and the perfect mathemat ical rectangles o f the monol i ths , w h i c h 
appear before each transi t ion to a new chapter. Rather than ins t i l l ing specif ic knowledge or 
in t roduc ing new technologies - science clear ly develops independently o f the monol i ths , as 
s igni f ied b y the morph ing o f the sp inning bone into a satell i te - the monol i ths s ign i fy the 
emergence o f new orders o f m i n d that a l l ow man to leap beyond his current homeostasis or 
cycle. The attempt to def ine G o d i n scient i f ic terms, and to treat technology as magic, 
s ignif ies that K u b r i c k and Clarke 'ร emphasis is no t on the opposi t ion between local 
ontologies ( i n w h i c h the d iv ine is supernatural and a technology l i ke Ha l is the product o f 
science), but rather on the way these di f ferences are const i tuted at root f r o m human 
epistemology and ideology. The impor tant project o f science f i c t ion , w h i c h should 
d idact ica l ly feed into science itself, is to change the v iews o f the human o n the w o r l d , 
rather than the w o r l d itself. 
I n this ve in , D o n Daniels notes the a f f i n i t y between 2001 and the ideas o f A r thu r 
Koest ier 'ร 1955 essay "The T ra i l o f the D inosaur . " Daniels argues that 2001 deals w i t h 
"Koes t ie r ' ร suggestion that the modern d i l emma results f r o m an intel lectual t r i umph i n 
technology and a t ragic fa i lure o f mora l intel l igence in app ly ing that technology towards 
the sustenance and enhancement o f t r u t h . " 3 5 Koest ler contrasts advanced nuclear 
technology w i t h the inversely p r im i t i ve mora l i t y o f modern mank ind , and argues fo r a 
reor ientat ing " m u t a t i o n " in humani ty to compare to the En l igh tenment . 3 6 Just as muta t ion 
in b io logy sees evo lu t ion as punctuated by radical genetic changes, the poss ib i l i ty o f 
muta t ion i n the socio logy o f science problematises the Hegel ian trajectory i n w h i c h science 
develops i n a l inear and mater ial fashion to enhance the mechanical body. Instead, the ideal 
o f muta t ion embodied in the monol i ths o f 2001 and projected against the backdrop o f 
space is immater ia l and ahistor ical: to direct the ambi t ion o f science and concepts o f 
knowledge towards a telos o f pure menta l ism - a science o f " G o d " - rather than to the 
augmentat ion o f an exist ing body, whether ind iv idua l , po l i t i c or a body o f knowledge. Th is 
3 5 D o n Daniels, " A Skeleton K e y to 2001 г Sight and Sound 40 (1970/71) : 29. 
3 6 A r t hu r Koest ler, "The T ra i l o f the Dinosaur , " The Trail of the Dinosaur and 
Other Essays (London : Co l l ins , 1955) 232-53. Koest ler speculates that " the conquest o f 
іп Їеф Іапе Іагу space w i l l cause a Copernican revo lu t ion m reverse, the emergence o f a new 
type o f cosmic consciousness" (252). 
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ideologica l leap to a new s t ruc toe o f m i n d w i thou t matter is c o m m o n to ar t i f ic ia l 
intel l igence and the pos i t ion o f the cybernet ic transcendentalists (discussed in chapter 1); i t 
is also the sort o f qual i tat ive shif t envisaged b y Marsha l l M c L u h a n , whose inf luent ia l 
te lecommunicat ions analysis subt i t led The Extensions of Man had been publ ished i n 1964, 
fou r years before 2001 was re leased. 3 7 For these thinkers, posthumanism denotes a 
paradigmat ic di f ference f r o m the human , rather than s imp ly the cyborg enhancement o f an 
otherwise normat ive human or ig ina l . I n re lat ion to H a l , his ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence seems to 
po in t towards the transcendence o f m i n d over body (since Ha l ' s m i n d is not dependent on 
a b io log ica l substrate). However , the representation o f Ha l as a k i n d o f petulant ch i l d also 
reveals the l imi ta t ions i n ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence as i t stood i n the late 1960ร, c l ing ing , 
through Tu r i ng ' s test, to the Enl ightenment be l ie f that the human provides the or ig ina l 
w h i c h science must subsequently mode l and technology f i na l l y improve. Indeed, B o w m a n , 
as a cyborg in a spacesuit, becomes more monstrous than H a l towards the close o f the f i l m . 
Therefore, 2001 incl ines towards posthumanism i n its abstract sense, vacat ing human ism 
i n favour o f something else ent i re ly beyond the or ig ina l body. I n presenting this changed 
concept ion o f " g o o d " science as be ing that w h i c h transcends nature - to a degree that may 
appear magica l or spir i tual f r o m the perspective o f the present ֊ the monol i ths are cast as 
demonic devices. I n a rei terat ion o f Descartes' achievement o f reason out o f delusion, they 
possess the m i n d o f the human o f the moment arid, i n fo rc ing the subject to break through 
the hoaxes they perpetuate, the monol i ths provoke them to subsequent orders o f be ing that 
are sequential ly less bod ied, c l imax ing w i t h the star ch i ld . 
The Demon ic Mono l i t hs 
The homeostasis o f the ape men at the start o f the f i l m is signal led by the entropie 
landscape, and the way i n w h i c h the f i l m fades i n and out o f snapshots o f the t r ibe 'ร l i fe as 
a perpetual batt le fo r surv iva l . I n C la rke 'ร nove l , the f i rst mono l i t h wh i ch breaks this cycle 
is encountered b y the ape-men in exp l i c i t l y demonic terms. The mono l i t h takes over 
Moon-Watche r ' ร consciousness: 
He seemed to be a th ing possessed, s t ruggl ing against some spir i t or demon 
who had taken over cont ro l o f his body. He was pant ing fo r breath, and his 
eyes were f u l l o f terror as he t r ied to force his f ingers to make movements 
more complex than any that they had ever attempted before. (32) 
See chapter 1， note 70. 
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For reasons u n k n o w n to h i m , Moon-Watcher learns to th row stones and u l t imate ly he is 
able to connect this act ion w i t h the k i l l i n g o f a p i g . He does not s imp ly learn to use 
weapons and tools in an evolut ionary progression; rather his phi losophical f ramework 
shifts so that he now objectivises w i l d l i f e , at taining the modern recogni t ion that Nature is 
his for the tak ing as a superior being inhabi t ing technological Cu l tu re . 3 8 I n the f i l m , the 
flick o f the camera f r o m a carcass to a fa l l i ng tapir (presumably k i l l ed b y the bone weapon 
taken f r o m the skeleton) demands that we as v iewers produce a causal connect ion that 
patterns that re lat ion o f cause (the weapon) to ef fect (meat) w h i c h Moon-Watcher 
achieves. Moon-Watche r ' ร inferent ial deduct ion is evidenced exp l i c i t l y b y the book ' ร 
omniscient narrator. However , one o f the ironies o f the demonic is that the demon receives 
its existence sole ly f r o m and w i t h i n the pos i t ion o f the m i n d it occupies, so cannot be 
represented ob ject ive ly or physical ly . A s such, the representation o f possession i n a l i terary 
f o r m - w h i c h is capable o f accessing and narrat ing other mental processes - does not 
easily translate through the perspective o f the camera. Thus the soundtrack becomes the 
means by w h i c h Kub r i c k represents demonic possession. 
Each encounter w i t h the three monol i ths is accompanied by excerpts f r o m Gyo rg i 
L ige t i ' ร atonal mus ic {Atmosphères, Requiem, Lux Aeterna, Aventures), w h i c h altemates 
between the pure ly instrumental , w i t h a cumulat ive sound l i ke a swarm o f buzz ing insects, 
and the choral . A s Dav id Patterson explains its use at this po in t , " i ts dense texture recal l [ร] 
the opening overture, wh i l e its inc lus ion o f voices is the f i rs t metaphoric ind icat ion o f the 
presence o f a self-aware al ien ' o t h e r ' . " 3 9 However , f r o m a phenomenologica l standpoint, 
the music is i tse l f a l ien, a sound rather than a musical ref ra in. Th is contrasts w i t h the 
melod ic excerpt f r o m Richard Strauss'ร Also sprach Zarathustra wh i ch accompanies the 
epiphanic scene when the ape man wie lds the bone as a weapon, toowing it t r iumphant ly 
in the air where i t t ransforms into a space satell i te. Though aware o f the mevi table 
d i f f i cu l t y o f ar t icu lat ing meaning f r o m music, I w o u l d suggest that the L i ge t i score -
wh i ch comes close to mere static - is designed to induce a k i n d o f cr i t ica l suspension, as 
Th is is made clearer in the book, i n w h i c h the leopard in i t i a l l y accepted as a 
symbol o f uncontro l lab le fate is then hunted. N o w wie lded on a st ick, his skul l becomes a 
godly to tem to te r r i f y the unevolved tr ibe across the river. A g a i n , this f i ts w i t h C larke 'ร 
de f in i t ion o f magic as anyth ing we cannot conceptualise as hav ing been achieved b y 
physical means, bu t w h i c h is therefore not necessarily supernatural. 
For a l l o f the f o l l o w i n g interpretat ion o f the musica l d i rect ion and references, I 
am guided by D a v i d พ . Patterson, " M u s i c , Structure and Metaphor in Stanley K u b r i c k ' ร 
2001: A Space Odyssey; 9 American Music 22 (2004) : 444-74, JSTOR, 8 Ap r . 2008 
<ht tp: / /www. js tor .org/s table/3592986>. 
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we struggle to detect the convent ion o f music beneath the modernist noise, before we are 
released into a new phase o f order and sequence s ign i f ied b y Strauss'ร canonical melody. 
The move f r o m the atonal Atmosphères to the Zarathustra theme enacts a phenomenology 
o f d i f f i cu l t y and ease that correlates not s imp ly w i t h the idea o f cumulat ive progress f r o m 
ape to man, but w i t h the mutat ionist one, as we shi f t f r o m one musical f o r m w h i c h lacks 
structure to the c iv i l i sed order o f symphonic amb i t ion encapsulated i n Strauss. The 
soundtrack is not the passive accompaniment to p r imary on-screen act ion; rather, the 
discrepancy between the t w o tones draws attent ion to the music i n its o w n r ight , and the 
way noise punctuates in to structured, rat ional me lody . 
The th i rd experience o f deception fo l l ows the star gate sequence, w i t h its 
mu l t i co lour effects streammg towards the v iewer i n a hal luc inogenic way . A g a i n , i n the 
book this passage i n the hote l r o o m is treated in an over t ly demonic way , as the moment is 
f ramed as a Cartesian decept ion to m i m i c the f i rst . Hav ing t ravel led through the star por ta l , 
B o w m a n is bemused to f i n d h imse l f in an apparently perfect repl ica o f a fo rmu la ic hotel 
room: 
I t was real - or else a phan tom o f the senses so superbly cont r ived that there 
was no way o f d is t inguishing i t f r o m real i ty. Perhaps it was some k i n d o f 
test; i f so, not on ly his fate but that o f the human race m igh t w e l l depend 
upon his actions i n the next f ew minutes. (224) 
The hotel r o o m is a gedanken exper iment; once perceived as a f i c t i on rather than real i ty , i t 
a l lows B o w m a n access to the universe beyond t ime and matter as a pure m i n d o f reason 
wh i ch stands beyond the possib i l i ty o f fur ther decept ion. B o w m a n is idealised as an 
Enl ightenment menta l i ty , transcending his embod iment to become a Cartesian ent i ty o f 
soul or m ind . A g a i n , i n the paral lel scene i n the f i l m , the camera poses questions about 
subject iv i ty that are epistemological i n character, asking us to question our knowledge o f 
the w o r l d i t presents. Accompan ied b y a soundscape o f gurg l ing water and quasi-choral 
song reminiscent o f L i g e t i , the f i l m runs through a series o f perspectivai shi f ts, i n a 
temporal narrat ive o f a pecul iar sort. These take us through f i ve successive stages o f 
B o w m a n ' ร development, un t i l the cycle (both for B o w m a n and, symbol ica l ly , fo r man) is 
complete w i t h h is foetal advance as a "star c h i l d , " a being o f energy rather than matter. 
The scene opens w i t h a v i e w f r o m B o w m a n ' ร pod , l ook ing across a hotel r o o m at an older 
version o f h imse l f (who , fo r s impl ic i ty , may be denoted as B o w m a n 2) . The camera then 
switches to an object ive v iew, w i t h the pod and B o w m a n 1 now absent. W e then v i ew f r o m 
B o w m a n 2's perspective the back o f an o ld man s i t t ing at a d in ing table, w h o tums to the 
camera to reveal h imse l f as an older prospect o f B o w m a n 2. The camera then switches to 
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an object ive perspective, f r o m wh i ch B o w m a n 2 is now absent. B o w m a n 3， hav ing 
knocked a glass f r o m the d in ing table, n o w looks towards the bed, i n w h i c h a dy ing 
B o w m a n 4 l ies. A g a i n , the move f r o m the subject ive perspective, l ook ing over B o w m a n 
3's shoulder, to the object ive, erases the former f r o m the room. The f i na l , subject ive angle 
is f r o m B o w m a n 4 ' ร v iewpo in t l ook ing towards the f ina l mono l i t h to appear i n the f i l m . 
F r o m here, the camera assumes the object ive perspective f r o m the po in t o f v i ew o f the 
mono l i t h i tself, w i t h B o w m a n 4 now a foetus floating through space. The fact that this 
f ina l moment is accompanied b y the Zarathustra theme signals that this development can 
be read i n Nietzschean terms as a cyc l ica l recurrence o f that perspectivai adjustment wh i ch 
catalysed the apes' evo lu t ion to rat ional man. Where the ape-men transcended nature, the 
star ch i ld transcends matter. 
Where , then, does ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence f i t i n re lat ion to the f i rs t and f ina l l im ina l 
moments? Ha l acts as a k i n d o f thought exper iment that puts the burden o f interpretat ion 
on the v iewer rather than - as the f i rst and f ina l monol i ths do - on the characters w i t h i n the 
f i l m . A t f i rs t Ha l provokes at an onto log ica i level through b lend ing categories i n a way 
characterist ic o f monstrous models or hybr ids, w h i c h ask about the di f ference between self 
and other. I n this case, Ha l seems intel l igent but intel lect is something w e associate on ly 
w i t h the embodied human and not w i t h the d ig i ta l computer. As we move tíirough the f i l m , 
however , the prob lem o f categorisation affects our epistemological perspective upon h i m . 
U l t ima te ly , jus t as the stabi l i ty o f real i ty f r o m an embodied v iewpo in t is questioned by our 
fleeting entrances into B o w m a n ' ร mu l t ip le perspectives at the end, here w e are induced by 
the camera's perspective to possess H a l subject ively, l i te ra l ly seeing the w o r l d o f the 
spaceship toough his eyes. Symbo l i ca l l y , w e transcend the presupposit ions o f embodiment 
to occupy Hál，s m i n d , becoming the ghosts i n his non-corporeal machine. Th is leads us to 
consider not what H a l is, but what he signif ies about the nature o f thought and the 
construct ion o f scient i f ic knowledge, bo th as a body o f facts and as i t applies to the 
cyborgised human body. One o f the keystones o f the Enl ightenment mani festo is that 
successful science means produc ing a representative or physical mode l o f nature, i nc ludmg 
the human. Ha l destabilises this foundat ion, par t icu lar ly through p rov id ing a cr i t ique o f the 
Tu r i ng test. A s we saw prev iously , the T u r i n g test relies on deceit, and so its in terpolat ion 
here makes i t analogous to the exp l ic i t Cartesian deceptions propagated b y the f i rs t and 
f ina l monol i ths . 
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Ha l and the L imi ta t ions o f the Tu r i ng Test 
Ha l makes his appearance f o l l o w i n g the in tervent ion o f the second mono l i t h , w h i c h 
is excavated on the moon . A g a i n through the correlat ive o f sound, the signal emanat ing 
f r o m i t overwhelms the scientists w i t h a burst o f radiat ion, causing them to grasp their 
heads as i f their inter ior consciousness is be ing taken over f r o m w i t h i n . However , D o n 
Daniels notes that whereas the f i rst and f ina l monol i ths s ign i fy and st imulate an 
evolut ionary muta t ion , the second mono l i t h represents the stasis o f science, ensuring the 
trajectory o f the f i l m fai ls to trace the Enl ightenment l ine o f essential Hegel ian progress. 
U n l i k e the ape-men who are w o k e n b y the mono l i t h ' s arr ival and who touch i t i n their 
cur ios i ty , here the astronauts pose before i t fo r the camera, tourists rather than scientists. 
The i r mundane actions are at odds w i t h the expectat ion f ramed by their j ou rney to i t , w h i c h 
is again accompanied b y the L ige t i score, though w h i c h is not on this occasion f o l l owed b y 
the Zarathustra theme. A s Daniels argues, the moment suggests that evo lu t ion is 
incomplete, and that wh i ls t technology has developed, intel l igence as an abstract measure 
remains p r im i t i ve : "The spacemen have explo i ted their rat ional talent: otherwise, part o f 
the capacity granted the apes goes u n f u l f i l l e d . " 4 0 For example, Discovery, the spaceship i n 
the next section, seems comparable to the vehicles that take F l oyd to the mono l i t h on the 
m o o n ; there is no mutat ionist leap to m i r ro r the ape-man'ร reconceptual isat ion o f his place 
in the natural h ierarchy, w h i c h led to a bone becoming a satell i te. I f the f i l m u l t imate ly 
looks towards the posthuman, its central chapters are r i ven w i t h Nietzsche'ร i rony o f 
h indsight : " W h a t is the ape to man? A j e s t or a t hmg o f shame. So shall man be to 
Superman - a j e s t or a th ing o f shame. " 4 1 I t is w i t h i n this m idd le section wh i ch imp l i c i t l y 
cr i t iques Enl ightenment l inear progress, rather than the f i rst and f ina l sections w i t h their 
leaps out o f a homeostat ic cycle, that H a l is situated. 
Ha l is int roduced at the very start o f the Jupiter chapter through a B B C in terv iew 
w i t h " the s ix th member o f the Discovery crew... the H . A . L . 9000 computer wh i ch can 
reproduce, though some experts s t i l l prefer to use the w o r d m i m i c , most o f the act ivi t ies o f 
the human bra in , and w i t h incalculably greater speed and re l iab i l i t y . " The interv iewer asks 
Ha l i f he is content w i t h his ro le , g iven his vast processing power , to w h i c h Ha l repl ies, " I 
am put t ing myse l f to the fu l lest possible use, w h i c h is a l l , I th ink , that any conscious ent i ty 
can ever hope to do . " A s the B B C observer notes, tu rn ing n o w to Poole: 
4 0 Daniels 3 1 . 
Fr iedr ich พ . Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. A . T i l l e (London : Dent. 
1958) 5. 
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I n ta lk ing to the computer, one gets the sense that he is capable o f emot ional 
responses. For example, when I asked h i m about his abi l i t ies, I sensed a 
certain pr ide i n his answer about his accuracy and perfect ion. D o you 
bel ieve that Ha l has genuine emotions? 
Poole responds: 
W e l l he acts l i ke he has genuine emot ions. O f course he's programmed that 
way to make i t easier fo r us to ta lk to h i m . Bu t as to whether or not he has 
real feel ings, that 's somethmg I don ' t th ink anyone can t ru th fu l l y answer. 
Witness the ambigu i ty w i t h w h i c h Ha l is іпІефгеЇесІ i n al l the responses by the humans. 
The interv iewer notes the pedantry o f vocabulary deployed by the "exper ts" discussing 
whether Ha l " m i m i c s " or " reproduces" human emot ions: is Ha l essentially human in h is 
emot ions, and jus t embodied d i f fe rent ly , or does he mere ly simulate emotions w i thou t 
af fect ive depth? Ha l asserts h imse l f as a "conscious ent i ty , " but the vo ice in w h i c h he does 
this is so passionless that the in terv iewer 'ร next statement is jus t i f iab ly ambivalent. Ha l can 
on ly be "sensed" to be capable o f emot ion , something Poole conf i rms in suggesting that i f 
he does act l i ke he has genuine emot ions i t is the result o f p rogramming , but there is no 
object ive way o f va l idat ing whether he really has emot ions. 
Such, o f course, is the p rob lem w i t h the T u r i n g test, wh i ch takes place through 
teletype, mak ing language rather than emot ional tone the marker o f intel lect. The d i f f i cu l t y 
o f answer ing this categorical issue therefore draws attention to a central p rob lem for 
cybernetic science w o r k i n g w i t h i n the Enl ightenment paradigm. Science asserts its 
understanding o f a phenomenon by its ab i l i t y to construct a corresponding symbol ic 
mode l , whether mathemat ical or phys ica l . For T u r i n g , as w e have seen, ends take 
precedence over means. Once science had produced an ar t i f ic ia l m i n d capable o f 
repl icat ing human language such that the human or ig ina l and computer mode l were 
indist inguishable f r o m each other i n discourse, th is imp l ied the successful mode l l i ng o f 
m i n d , regardless o f any s imi lar i ty or d i f ference between the s i l icon bra in and the human 
organic one. Today , hav ing realised the problems o f this method, ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence is 
interdiscip l inary, d raw ing heav i ly on psychology and neuroscience to create potent ia l 
candidate programs. I n part, the re ject ion o f Tu r i ng ' s approach came about because, rather 
than empi r ica l understanding o f cause and effect, the Tu r i ng test rel ies on the opposite: the 
ab i l i ty o f a machine to deceive. I f the human can be duped in to be l iev ing that the computer 
model led on his o w n m i n d is responding in te l l igent ly and fluidly, then it must necessarily 
be conscious according to that normat ive human scale; paradoxical ly , though, i f the 
processes that underp in that deception are shown to be essential ly a phenomenological con 
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w i thou t empir ica l depth, then this also impl ies the imper fect ion o f the human agent on 
w h i c h the machine is apparently perfect ly model led . 
I n 1966, just t w o years before the release o f 200Լ Jospeh Weizenbaum'ร " E L I Z A " 
emerged to challenge Tu r ing ' s assumption, as I discussed i n the previous chapter . 4 2 
Though it has not been prev iously noted, i t is not inconceivable that Ha l is i n part inspired 
by Weizenbaum'ร psychotherapist program. A l t hough none o f Kub r i c k or C larke 'ร 
recol lect ions o f the f i l m i n g speci f ica l ly references E L I Z A , M a r v i n M i n s k y was an advisor 
on the product ion o f 2001 and he w o u l d almost certainly have read Weizenbaum'ร paper i n 
the Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. 43 A n d even i f Ha l is not 
a direct response to E L I Z A , reading H a l i n terms o f the moment ш ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence 
h is tory that E L I Z A represents is s t i l l instruct ive. Wh i l s t We izenbaum'ร program d id 
momentar i l y dupe people in to be l iev ing i t to be sentient, i n cybernet ic h is tory E L I Z A is 
most s igni f icant fo r i l lustrat ing the inadequacy o f the Tu r i ng test as the benchmark o f 
computer in te l l igence. 4 4 I n Tur ing 's thought exper iment, the focus on outcomes means that 
i t is possible for a machine to emulate inte l l igence w i thou t necessarily be ing self-aware 
that i t is act ing so, wh i ch is, surely, one o f the key cr i ter ia for consciousness. E L I Z A ' ร 
ab i l i t y to appear sentient relies not on any integral aspect o f its p rogramming , but on the 
naivety o f those conversing w i t h i t ; the t r ick o f E L I Z A is to on ly ask questions w h i c h are 
modi f icat ions o f human statements, and once revealed the i l lus ion draws attent ion not so 
much to E L I Z A ' s def ic i ts as to the human tendency to process language'ร semantic content 
unref lect ive ly . The fa i lure or success o f ar t i f i c ia l intel l igence according to Tu r i ng ' ร 
f ramework is u l t imate ly a judgement not so much o f cybernet ic capacities as human 
nature. Rather than ref lect ing on the fai lures and l imi ta t ions o f technology, as an E L I Z A -
type (possibly EL IZA - i nsp i r ed ) ent i ty , Ha l ref lects pr inc ipa l ly on the l im i t ed status o f the 
4 2 See chapter 4 , note 13. A l t hough E L I Z A preceded 2001, Ha l has become an 
inspirat ional f igure for programmers o f more recent chatbots, such as M ichae l M a u l d i n , 
w h o noted " W e had a l l seen 2001: A Space Odyssey, and the idea o f be ing able to ta lk to 
your computer became an obsession, border ing o n fanat ic ism, fo r a smal l group o f 
researchers." D a v i d Pescovitz, "Sons and Daughters o f Ha l Go On l i ne , " The New York 
Times, 18 Mar . 1999, 9 Jun. 2008 <http: / /query.nyt imes.com/search/>. 
4 3 M a r v i n M i n s k y , "Scient ist on the Set: A n b i te rv iew w i t h M a r v i n M i n s k y , " Haľs 
Legacy: 2001 ，s Computer as Dream and Reality, ed. D a v i d G. Stork (Cambr idge, M A : 
Massachusetts Inst i tute o f Techno logy, 1997) 15 -31 . 
4 4 Rather than a im ing to construct heterarchical ly inte l l igent systems, computer 
science n o w focused on hon ing processes to achieve specif ic, pract ical goals. B lay W h i t b y , 
' T h e Tu r i ng Test: A ľ s Biggest B l i n d A l l e y , " Machines and Thought: The Legacy of Alan 
Turing, e d . P J . R . M i l l i c a n a n d A . C lark , v o l . 1 (Ox fo rd : Clarendon p， 1996) 53-62. 
B r o w n 126 
Enl ightenment man w h o has created a Tu r i ng s imula t ion o f emot ion w i thou t understanding 
whether that emot ion emerges f r o m a genuine consciousness, or whether i t is mere ly a 
s imu lacrum o f human feel ings, the p rob lem discussed i n the B B C interv iew. 
I t is w i t h i n this context that Ha l ' s ch i ld - l i ke reversion can be read. In analysing the 
music o f the f i l m , Patterson іп!ефгеЇ8 Ha l ' s dy ing "Da i sy B e l l " song i n re lat ion to 
synthetic speech. A notor ious ly met iculous director, K u b r i c k researched the music for the 
f i l m careful ly , reportedly l is tening to an extensive range o f modernist , electronic, and 
concrete m u s i c . 4 5 G i ven K u b r i c k ' ร enthusiasm, Patterson speculates that i t is " l i k e l y that 
one o f the LPs that K u b r i c k heard wh i l e shaping the soundtrack for 2001 was Music from 
Mathematics (Decca D L 9103), a co l lect ion o f the most technologica l ly advanced 
computer music o f its t ime, created on and p layed b y the I B M 7090 computer and d ig i ta l 
to sound t ransducer . " 4 6 A track designed b y M a x Mathews (a computer specialist at Be l l 
Telephone Laborator ies) prov ided one o f the f i rst examples o f vo ice synthesis, no t on ly 
speaking but s inging a tune: "Da i sy B e l l . " Ha l ' s rend i t ion o f this piece thus becomes i ronic 
i n a double sense. No t on l y is the technologica l ly advanced computer regressing to a ch i ld 
l i ke state i n the f i l m ' ร v is ion o f the future, that ch i ld l i ke state symbolises the technological 
in fan t i l i sm o f the present. 
Looked at ob ject ive ly , then, the mode l does not s ign i fy the success o f science, since 
jus t because an ar t i f ic ia l agent displays the superf ic ia l traits o f cogn i t ion does not mean 
that the ent i ty is conscious at root. I ron ica l ly , 2001 assents to the Cartesian v iew, i n that 
not to k n o w precisely h o w a m i n d is consti tuted is to be capable o f mere ly automatic 
m im ic r y , devo id o f soul . The di f ference is that whereas for Descartes theological 
or thodoxy ensures that such a be ing wou ld be depr ived o f mora l agency, i n 2001 our 
sensibi l i ty about Ha l stands on the unstable g round o f scient i f ic ethics, as imp l ied by the 
ambiguous in terv iew that introduces h i m . Such grounds are unstable because al though 
success according to T u r i n g is determined b y the object ive observat ion o f a mode l ' s 
behaviour, that does not equal ly enable us to enter subject ively in to the mot iva t iona l 
agency that produces consciousness. However , f i c t i on , even c inema, can a l low us to enter 
other minds. 
4 5 A g e l 65. 
4 6 Patterson 466. 
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Th is epistemological capacity o f the f i l m i c imaginat ion is evidenced in the 
exchange between B o w m a n and Poole in the soundproofed pod, w h i c h takes place after 
H a l appears to have w rong l y diagnosed the fa i lure o f the antenna: 
B O W M A N . N o 9000 computer 'ร ever been disconnected before. 
P O O L E . W e l l , no 9000 computer 'ร ever fa i led before. 
B O W M A N . That ' ร not what I mean. 
P O O L E . No? 
B O W M A N . W e l l , I ' m not so sure what h e ' d th ink about i t . 
The camera then switches to Ha l ' s eye v iew, focus ing on B o w m a n and Poole 's m o v i n g 
l ips w h i c h Ha l is presumably able to read. A s the later hotel scene poses epistemological 
questions by swi tch ing between object ive and subject ive perspectives, here the camera 
w o r k blends an ethical quest ion about what Ha l is , in to an epistemological one. Pr ior to 
this moment , what has been d is turb ing about entering Ha l ' s perspective is that i t s ignif ies 
calculat ion w i thou t clear purpose, ant ic ipat ing narrat ive consequences w h i c h seem 
ominous but wh i ch cannot be predicted, since H a l is k n o w n on ly as an object ive effect o f 
b l i nk ing l ights and status reports. W h e n we look at B o w m a n and Poole, v icar ious ly 
ü i rough Ha l ' s eye, we k n o w that something w i l l happen to them but have no means o f 
in tu i t ing what - a classic technique o f horror c inema. However , as w e are suddenly j o l t ed 
into Ha l ' ร agency b y seeing through his eyes, this later moment is not at al l gothic. B y 
swi tch ing into Ha l ' s perspective f o l l o w i n g that crucia l re f lex ive quest ion, K u b r i c k enacts a 
v isual rhetor ic w h i c h bypasses the horror effect. B y asking us to concentrate on what Ha l 
w o u l d th ink about be ing disconnected - and by g i v ing us t ime to consider the issue in the 
15 minute intermiss ion that immedia te ly fo l l ows - the f i l m dupes us into admi t t ing b y 
imp l i ca t ion something we may have wanted to resist i n the previous per iod: that Ha l is 
th ink ing at al l (not jus t " m i m i c k i n g " th ink ing , as some scientists quaint ly prefer to say). B y 
the close o f this section, we are placed subject ively w i t h i n the m i n d o f an ent i ty a l legedly 
capable on ly o f dispassionate ob jec t iv i ty , or whose consciousness i t is impossible to 
val idate. Contrary to the ambivalence w i t h wh i ch the in terv iewer and Poole introduce H a l , 
i f at this point w e refuse to accept the va l id i ty o f Hál，s eye v i ew o f the w o r l d , then the f i l m 
i tsel f is compromised or negated, since that v iew is the on l y one we are a l lowed. W i t h o u t 
Ha l ' s eye v iew, there w o u l d be no f i l m at this po in t , jus t as after leaving that v i ew w e are 
presented w i t h the b lank screen o f the intermission. The ethical coro l la ry is that since Ha l 
can th ink because he can (must) render his v iew o f the w o r l d to us, he cannot s imp ly be 
turned of f . I f w e are angered b y Ha l ' s tu rn ing o f f the l i fe support system o f the h ibernat ing 
crew, surely this conscious machine cannot jus t be disconnected. I n answer to B o w m a n ' ร 
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question, Ha l w o u l d understandably not th ink w e l l o f i t . So what started as a question o f 
Ha l ' s onto logy as a product o f human science and as a mode l o f the human m i n d spi l ls in to 
an epistemological one about our o w n ideologica l v i ew o f the wo r l d . The moment we see 
through H a ľ s eyes we admi t imp l i c i t l y that he inhabits an embodied m i n d (o f sorts) f r o m 
w h i c h i t is possible to see; this fact changes our v i ew o f Ha l f r o m a ma l func t ion ing 
machine (who can be swi tched o f f ) to а риф08ІУе character who must be conceptual ised as 
such. 
Whereas H a ľ s atonal voice had prev ious ly rendered h i m as an affectless ent i ty , 
f r o m this po in t onwards i t switches to the tragic ( l i tera l ly Ar is to te l ian, comming l i ng fear 
and p i ty ) as he is denied the voice to render h is anxiety. Ha l ' s f ina l words that should 
convey passion can do so on ly on a funct ional level , the program te l l ing us about its o w n 
states: " M y m i n d is go ing. There 's no quest ion about i t . I can feel it. I can feel i t . I can feel 
i t . I 'm a f ra id . " Ye t hav ing been able to see the w o r l d f r o m that centre o f consciousness, w e 
in tu i t that this should be read as more than a rat ional reportage o f a mechanical fa i lure. The 
l i teral and the subconscious meanings are somewhat di f ferent. Even i f the tone is 
super f ic ia l ly affectless, the repet i t ion and pace g ive Ha l ' s "dea th " scene a poet ic qual i ty , 
perhaps even resembl ing a death a r i a . 4 7 The pathetic "Da i sy B e l l " song w h i c h fo l l ows puts 
H a l i n the context o f a murdered ch i ld , but one unable to render his o w n cry fo r he lp as a 
cry, on ly as func t ion . Ye t , paradoxical ly , i t is B o w m a n who seems the more ant i-heroic 
ind iv idua l i n his tone o f vo ice, even as this emerges f r o m mot ives that we can more 
immedia te ly empathise w i t h . Exasperated by Ha l ' s behaviour, he can on ly take the last 
resort o f the parent: " H a l , I w o n ' t argue w i t h you any more. Open the doors. " Inversely to 
the real isat ion that Ha l has a centre o f consciousness even i f he lacks an organic body , the 
empowerment o f B o w m a n ' s body through space technology comes at the expense o f his 
rat ional m i n d . Hav ing entered H a ľ s subject iv i ty i n a way that forces us to realise the 
l imi ta t ions o f our o w n v iew o f the status o f the machine, the representation o f B o w m a n 
f r o m an object ive po in t o f v i ew indicates the compromised status o f the human as cyborg. 
The astronaut treats technology as a mere too l or in fer ior , a ch i l d , when i n actual i ty 
i t is coexistent w i t h his very being i n this new context o f space. M y use o f the specif ic te rm 
cyborg here is in tent ional , fo r i t was a neo log ism coined eight years before the release o f 
200Լ i n an art icle ent i t led "Cyborgs and Space." Here, the authors Man f red Clyneร and 
Nathan K l i n e prov ide an opening gambi t that seems appropriate to 2001 as I have 
For this ішефге їа і іоп, see Patterson 463-7. 
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interpreted i t : "Space travel challenges mank ind not on ly technologica l ly but also 
spi r i tual ly , i n that i t invites man to take an active part i n his o w n b io log ica l e v o l u t i o n . " 4 8 
Argu ing that increased understanding o f cybernetic homeostasis w i l l make i t easier to 
adapt man 'ร body to any envi ronment , especial ly space, they gave the name cyborg to " the 
exogenously extended organizat ional complex func t ion ing as an integrated homeostatic 
system unconsc ious ly . " 4 9 Th is de f in i t ion is paraphrased in the nove l version o f 2001, i n 
wh i ch B o w m a n is h imse l f a technological ly extended ent i ty who has "establ ished a v i r tua l 
symbiosis w i t h the ship. H e was aware instant ly, even i f not always unconsciously, when 
there was any change i n the normal r h y t h m o f its f unc t i on ing " (160) . However , wh i l s t this 
may mark 200ľ s a f f i n i t y w i t h cybernetics in the 1960ร, u l t imate ly the narrat ive scope sees 
i t move past C lyneร , and K l i n e ' ร focus on phys io log ica l adaptations (their art icle focuses 
almost exc lus ively on augmentations o f the body i n a host i le env i ronment) to look towards 
a p romot ion o f the m i n d as an immater ia l th ing , w i thou t the need, therefore, fo r support ive 
technological mechanisms. 
Ac to r Ke i r Du l lea plays B o w m a n i n a remarkably wooden, affectless way i n the 
f i l m . Part icular ly after he is locked out b y H a l , the camera draws attent ion to his eyes, 
over lay ing them w i t h l ights cast f r o m the consoles i n the pod (Figure 1). A s B o w m a n calls 
w i t h increasing urgency fo r Hál， the sound elides into " H e l l , " but the on ly evidence o f 
d iabo l ism the camera a l lows us to witness is w i t h i n the pod, not w i t h i n Discovery. G iven 
Kub r i ck ' s attent ion to detai l , i t is not too fanc i fu l to suggest that B o w m a n ' ร red spacesuit, 
and the precise way i n w h i c h the l ights flicker upon h i m , is designed to dehumanise h i m , to 
make B o w m a n f i t incongruously w i t h i n the archetypal narrat ive o f the automata as the 
monster. I t is the mechanised human, B o w m a n , not the now-humanised mechanism, H a l , 
who is cast l i tera l ly and f igura t i ve ly in the gothic l ight . H a l models the l imi ta t ions o f the 
Tu r i ng test, and by a l l ow ing us to see the w o r l d as i f t feough his eyes the camera occupies 
a pos i t ion science cannot, since i t can on ly record the effects o f consciousness. Bu t i f Ha l 
stands as a conscious ent i ty i n his o w n r ight , B o w m a n embodies the paradoxes o f an 
incomplete scient i f ic revo lu t ion in w h i c h the human m i n d is de l imi ted in compar ison to the 
intel l igent machine, but w h i c h is trapped w i t h i n a body that cannot l i ve without mechanical 
augmentat ion. A s N o r m a n Ma i l e r observed in his retrospective study o f the A p o l l o 11 
moon landings, Ճ Fire on the Moon, N A S A astronauts were so h igh l y t rained and 
4 8 Man f red E. Clyneร and Nathan ร . K l i ne , "Cyborgs and Space," Astronautics 
(1960): 26. 
4 9 Clyneร and K l i n e 27. 
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integrated to technological systems that a l though they stood at the summi t o f 
Enl ightenment ambi t ion , they fa i led to appreciate the fu l l symbol ic impor t o f this moment . 
Locked into w ide r mechanical systems, M a i l e r observed that " the psycho logy o f machines 
begins where humans are more machine l ike i n their actions than the machines they 
emp loy , " something B o w m a n embodies and H a l , i ron ica l ly , d isembodies . 5 0 
• է ՜ 
Fig . 1. 2001: A Space Odyssey, d ir . Stanley Kub r i ck , perf. Ke i r Du l lea and Gary 
L o c k w o o d , Turner Entertainment, 1968, D V D , Warner H o m e V ideo , 2 0 0 1 . 
Whether f ic t ional or scient i f ic , cybernetic narratives tend to the i ron ic , as they 
s imul taneously anticipate the advance o f ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence wh i l s t exposing the human 's 
l im i ted capacities in re lat ion to the models created i n his o w n image. They also tend to the 
paradoxical , as the ar t i f i c ia l intel l igence is represented w i t h i n a discourse o f monstrous 
horror, wh i l s t the human cl ings desperately to a be l i e f i n innate, natural human ism contrary 
to the evidence o f his o w n technological extensions: B o w m a n tries to eradicate Ha l even as 
he relies on the advanced cyborg system o f the spacesuit and spaceship. The solut ion to 
both contradict ions is to e l iminate the body, a l l ow ing us to perceive m i n d as an idealised 
Platonic ent i ty , whether founded on s i l i con, carbon or, indeed, w i thou t mater ia l substrate at 
a l l . A s the novel narrates i t , the " m a g i c a l " or God- l i ke success o f the aliens l ies i n their 
move from inhabi t ing technology as a k i n d o f cyborg enhancement ( in the w a y B o w m a n 
does, or as Clyneร and K l i n e argue for) towards a total transcendence o f any bod i l y 
grounding: 
No rman M a i 1er5 A Fire on the Moon (London : We iden fe ld , 1970) 105. 
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The f i rst explorers o f Earth had long since come to the l im i t s o f flesh and 
b lood ; as soon as their machines were better than their bodies, i t was t ime to 
move. First their b ra in , and then their thoughts alone, they transferred into 
sh in ing new homes o f metal and plastic. 
I n these, they roamed among the stars. They no longer bu i l t spaceships. 
They were spaceships. (200; emphasis i n or ig ina l ) 
Such a radical v i s ion is b y no means unique among the scient i f ic commun i t y , whether i n 
f i c t i on or research. I n chapter 1， I exempl i f i ed the desires o f the cybernet ic 
transcendentalists in w h i c h minds are transferred into machines so that they w o u l d become 
immor ta l . Since computer science i n the 1960ร was dr iven through the space programme, i t 
is not surpr is ing to f i nd re l ig ious transcendence embedded i n the culture o f N A S A as w e l l . 
For example, the aerospace engineer T o m Henderson imagined that " w i t h a new immor ta l 
body I w i l l l i ve o n earth but not as a man ; I w i l l be able to t ravel i n space w i thou t a 
spaceship. " 5 1 I n the 1930ร, O la f Stapleton, i n Last and First Men, imagines immor ta l 
"G ian t В ra ins," sustained mechanica l ly so that their consciousness or centre o f awareness 
can exist at any po in t in space. 5 2 A s Clarke notes approv ing ly : 
Th is is an important po in t w h i c h we - w h o carry our brains around i n the 
same f ragi le structure as our eyes, ears and other sense-organs, o f ten w i t h 
disastrous results - may easily fa i l to appreciate. G iven perfected 
te lecommunicat ions, a f i xed bra in is no handicap, but rather the reverse. 
Y o u r present b ra in . . .communicates w i t h the outer w o r l d and receives its 
impressions o f i t over the telephone wires o f the central nervous 
system.. . Y o u w o u l d never k n o w the di f ference i f those " w i r e s " were 
actual ly hundreds or thousands o f mi les long , or inc luded mob i le radio 
l inks , and your bra in never moved at a l l . 5 3 
Fina l l y , go ing back to The War of the Worlds (1898) , H .G. We l l s envisages evo lu t ion as 
progressing towards the development o f m i n d w i thou t bodies, as the aliens are 
predominant ly brains supported by mechanical carapaces. 5 4 There is a ph i losophica l hope 
5 1 Nob le 132. 
5 2 O la f Stapleton, Last and First Men (1930; London : Go l lancz-Or ion , 2003) . 
5 3 Clarke, Profiles 214. 
H.G. Wells， The War of the Worlds, ed. M a r t i n A . Danahay (Ontar io : Broadview, 
2003) 146-7. A l s o see m y art ic le "Rereading Posthumanism in The War of the Worlds and 
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in these vis ions that crosses the changing histor ical condi t ions in wh i ch their authors l i ved : 
Imper ia l decl ine, w o r l d wars, the atomic age, and the rise o f te lecommunicat ions. The i r 
v iews resist h istory and spatial i ty: b y tak ing the m i n d out o f the body, subject iv i ty 
becomes heterogeneous and ahistor ical . T o see the m i n d as transcendent is to no longer 
need the technologies that are designed to enhance the body (to a l low it to w o r k i n deep 
space, fo r example) but wh i ch also can destroy i t (as malevolent computers or atomic 
bombs migh t ) because o f the body 'ร inherent f rag i l i t y . I ron ica l ly accommodat ing Cartesian 
m ind-body dua l ism, even as they reject Descartes' onto logical d is t inc t ion between rat ional 
man and the dumb machine, posthuman vis ions foresee emancipat ion f r o m the body as 
necessary and even inevi table i n our relat ionship w i t h cybernetic technologies that permi t 
in fo rmat ion to transcend incarnat ion. M ichae l Mateas is, therefore, right to pos i t ion H a l 
w i t h i n the l im ina l zone when human ism is being re l inquished but posthumanism has not 
been c la imed: " I n A I eschatology there is an intermediate per iod before machine 
intel l igence surpasses the human, a per iod in w h i c h human and machine intel l igence w o r k 
together in t igh t ly integrated human-machine symbiosis. Th is is the era o f the cyborg , the 
era i n w h i c h w e l i ve n o w . " 5 5 
A l t hough 200ľ % c l imax o f the star ch i ld may look very s imi lar to not ions o f 
transcendent spir i t or soul , and therefore ant i thet ical to science, i t is іпсофогаїесі i n a 
rat ional ist ic way once the ambi t ion o f science is shi f ted towards creating new forms o f 
m i n d rather than to app ly ing technology as an appendix to the embodied human. There is 
an odd a f f in i t y between opt imis t ic posthumanism and Chr is t ian eschatology, and so the 
oxymoron ic al legory o f a "sc ient i f ic de f in i t i on o f G o d , " rather than being anarchist ic, is an 
appropriate dialect ic b y w h i c h to include the other problemat ic dual isms that the f i l m 
argues must be eradicated i n order fo r such transcendence to be realised: m i n d and body, 
ar t i f ic ia l and human consciousness, objects and subjects, science and technology. The 
t rade-of f fo r seeing m i n d as transcendent and the body as o f decreasing relevance is that 
along the way we must a l low agency to anyth ing possessed o f a " m i n d , " regardless o f the 
Independence Day; y eSharp 12 (2008) , 11 Dec. 2008 
<ht tp: / /www.gla.ac.uk/departments/eshaφ/ issues/12winter2008technologyandhumani ty />. 
5 5 M ichae l Mateas, "Read ing H a l : Representation and A r t i f i c i a l In te l l igence," 
Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey ： New Essays9 ed. Robert Ko l ke r (New Y o r k : 
O x f o r d U P , 2006) 113. 
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mater ial substrate on w h i c h that m i n d is founded. Th is is something W e l l s ' narrator in The 
War of the Worlds refuses to concede, as he is repel led by his sight o f the aliens in ject ing 
human b lood d i rect ly into their bra in structures, and so can on ly represent them as things 
o f uncontro l led v io lence. I t is also something that the v iewer o f 2001 f inds chal lenging, as 
w e want to reject Ha l ' s conscious agency and to legi t imate his "d isconnec t ion" even as we 
f rame as "murde rous " the violence done to the софогеаі crew. H a ľ s apparent lack o f 
fleshy centre is the source o f our fascinat ion and horror , as he seems unaware o f the 
importance and f rag i l i t y o f the human bodies he is supposed to incubate. W e are to rn here 
between t w o opposing trajectories fo r humani ty . O n the one hand, i f we treat Ha l as not 
human because he is inorganic, we must admi t that the human pos i t ion i n the twent ie th 
century is not so far evolved f r o m the f i rst ape-men, st i l l w i t h i n the tense batt le o f Cul ture 
against Nature, rather than transcending b io logy . O n the other hand, i f w e feel that the very 
first ape-men lacked the consciousness that designates humani ty , and that the 
epistemologica! muta t ion tr iggered b y that f i rs t mono l i t h was the emergence o f self-
re f lex iv i t y , then by this cr i ter ia an in te l l igent machine must also be a l lowed to share the 
w o r l d w i t h humans. The early attempts o f cybernetics (as in the Tu r i ng test) t r ied to model 
the machine on the human m i n d , and met w i t h an conceptual l i m i t i n that a seemingly 
successful mode l w o u l d be produced, but we w o u l d k n o w noth ing about the true 
consciousness o f the machine. It is m i n d itself, not its appearances, w h i c h must be the 
proper focus o f science, not "mere ly M a n , but In te l l igence," to reiterate Clarke 'ร v iew . I n 
this posthuman tu rn , the body is a mere container for m i n d . Bu t th is , o f course, requires a 
reor ientat ion o f our anthropical ly ordered universe. A s a paradigm shi f t , posthumanism 
may u l t imate ly be ranked w i t h D a r w i n i s m and Copernicanism, w i t h the latter t w o be ing 
the revolut ions rendered by the f i rs t t w o phases o f the f i l m (the ape-men and the move to 
space), and the former being the muta t ion we are encouraged to take for ourselves by 
responding to H a l and B o w m a n in unconvent ional ways. 
TTirough its Da rw in ian long v i ew , panoramic camera wo rk , and cut t ing o f dialogue, 
2001 obsolesces the ind iv idua l i n the context o f expanded spatial and temporal and, 
consequently, mora l hor izons. Narrat ive characterisation is skeletal ly draf ted, p r imar i l y 
tìirough the use o f v ideo conversations (F loyd to his daughter on her b i r thday, B o w m a n ' ร 
parents to h i m on his) w h i c h are rather inane, reveal ing l i t t le about the intr insic bel iefs or 
mot ivat ions o f the character. Further, characters who seem to be central, such as Dr . F loyd , 
suddenly drop out o f the narrat ive. M o s t d is turb ing ly , Poole is seen to d ie as a spinning 
spacesuit rather than a suf fer ing man (we never see his dead face) wh i l s t the h ibernat ing 
c rewmen die not i n evident pa in, but as the decaying traces on a heart moni tor . B o w m a n ' ร 
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miss ion to recover Poole is i l log ica l , a mora l n icety i n the context o f a f i l m wh i ch 
deindividual ises character. B y reducing the inf luence o f any one human, this defies our 
desire to condemn H a l f o r p lo t t ing the murder o f h is human creators in any mora l l y causal 
sense. Rather than fet ishis ing the body o f the un ique ind iv idua l , we are encouraged to 
occupy a v iew f r o m nowhere w h i c h , as in the Cto is t ian t rad i t ion, sees the s in and suf fer ing 
o f the ind iv idua l as necessary for redempt ion i n a t ime and space beyond the ind iv idua l , 
whether af ter l i fe , revelat ion or rebir th as a "star c h i l d . " A s i n the Chr is t ian af ter l i fe to ld 
through the story o f the resurrect ion, H a ľ s murder o f Poole is necessary to h igh l igh t 
Bowman ' s transcendence f r o m his weak embodiment . Ma tch ing the aesthetic f o r m to this 
teleology, the poetics o f possession by w h i c h the f i l m renders the f ina l "star c h i l d " chapter 
is indeed d isembody ing, i n that i t denies any one stable centre f r o m w h i c h the w o r l d is 
v iewed. I n the hotel r o o m , the camera is perspect ival ly relat ive, seeing both f r o m w i t h m 
Bowman ' s corporeal centre and l ook ing at his changing body f r o m the outside. 
Add i t i ona l l y , the way i n w h i c h music and v isual imagery substitute for dialogue and 
un i f ied p lo t d ist inguish the f i l m ' ร aesthetic f r o m a body o f temporal facts, generating 
medi tat ive rather than causal effects. Forma l l y , then, the f i l m patterns the demonica l ly 
possessing ef fect o f the monol i ths , w i t h an epistemological intent to put m i n d over matter. 
I n hav ing their mutat ional ef fect, breaking man out o f his homeostasis, the 
monol i ths s ign i fy the need to constitute good science as the understanding o f m i n d in the 
abstract, and technology as the product ion o f ever less embodied minds , rather than 
compromised cyborg bodies. The f i l m ' ร f i rst t w o phases take us f r o m Homo erectus to 
Homo faber. However , H a l is intended to direct the attent ion o f v iewers w h o l ive i n that 
cyborg era to the stage beyond, that label led as the posthuman. The true posthuman cou ld 
do away w i t h technological interfaces altogether, since he or she w o u l d be w h o l l y 
immanent i n the cybernet ic w o r l d i n w h i c h in fo rmat ion exists independently o f a part icular 
substrate. A s i t is, o f course, cybernetics is current ly orientated w i t h a double standard: the 
machine must be humanised, and the human mechanised, i n order to a l low both to coexist 
in space, wh i ch was the key testing ground fo r cybernet ic technologies i n the 1960ร. Bo th 
identit ies are compromised in the process: the machine, s inging Da isy Be l l l i ke the I B M 
computer or asking questions l i ke E L I Z A , is more l im i ted than it m igh t be; the man is 
mora l l y compromised by his rel iance on some machines, and his contradictory wi l l ingness 
to disconnect others even though they may be conscious, w i t h ethical decisions orientated 
around a quaint mora l concern for the body. 
B y the close o f the Discovery chapter, B o w m a n changes places w i t h H a l , so that 
the human is the more monstrous f igure i n the f i l m . Whereas w e are a l lowed to possess 
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H a ľ s consciousness, see the wo r l d as i f through his eyes i n wi tnessing the conversat ion in 
the pod, after the intermiss ion as B o w m a n seeks to destroy Ha l w e ma in l y see B o w m a n 
object ive ly cast i n flickering red l ights, rarely take his subject ive point o f v iew. I t is on ly 
once he travels th rough the star gate and enters the hotel ha l luc inat ion that we reoccupy the 
m i n d o f B o w m a n through the perspectivai sw i tch ing , as i f he reaches a new understanding 
o f the place o f his consciousness i n this new experience o f m i n d w i thout temporal body. 
The sh i f t ing camera impl ies new conceptual f rameworks i n w h i c h the object ive categories 
that d ist inguish man and machine become less relevant than the eradicat ion o f such 
perspectives oņ d i f ference altogether, w h i c h seem ar t i f i c ia l , a lways transient. Onto log ica i 
markers o f d i f ference ᅳ especial ly tempora l i ty and софогеаІ і Їу ᅳ are erased in the narrat ive 
structure. I n the Discovery section w i t h H a l , the f i l m generates its o w n symbo l ic mono l i t h 
experience, f ram ing our discourses o f technology and the human i n ways that m i m i c those 
tr iggered by the real a l ien artefacts before and after i t . Our need is not to produce 
knowledge or new technology, but to reconceptualise the ambi t ion o f science. Techno logy 
should not a im s imp ly to augment the f ragi le human body; rather, the body i tsel f must 
become redundant as w e enter into a space o f dreams, whether interstel lar, cybernet ic or 
aesthetic. 
Is 2001 A Pos tmodem F i lm? 
Even though I hope to have produced a coherent reading o f the f i l m , ա է շ փ ա է ^ 
2001 remains a contradictory process, and one a lways risks fa l l i ng into the intent ional 
fa l lacy K u b r i c k condemned: 
H o w much w o u l d we appreciate La Gioconda today i f Leonardo had 
wr i t ten at the bo t tom o f the canvas: "Th i s lady is sm i lmg s l ight ly because 
she has rot ten tee th" - or "because she'ร h id ing a secret f r o m her lover"? It 
w o u l d shut o f f the v iewer 'ร appreciat ion and shackle h i m to a " rea l i t y " 
other than his o w n . I don ' t want that to happen to 2001. 56 
2001 is l iberated f r o m the shackles o f a l legory, such that i t resists іп ІефгеЇаІ іоп i n any 
def in i t ive manner. Gabr ie l Jos ipov ic i 'ร m a x i m applies here, as the desire to al legorise 
becomes a demonic pursui t o f a centre for meaning that w i l l not be found "ou t there" 
because i t is a lways forged subject ively. I n this respect i t defies logocent r ic ism in the way 
we are attuned to in postmodern ism. Though I have t r ied to tease out the poetics o f 
Stanley K u b r i c k , In terv iew w i t h Er ic Nordern , The Making of Kubrick's 2001 
ed. Jerome A g e l ( N e w Y o r k : Signet, 1970) 329. 
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possession w i t h wh i ch i t seeks to seduce the v iewer , because i t constructs arguments 
through medi tat ive char isma rather than log ic , this poetics makes it a sl ippery wo rk . Wh i l s t 
this mode m igh t be al igned w i t h that o f the Cartesian mediat ions, there is something 
counter-rat ional i n examin ing science w i t h i n an aesthetics o f indeterminacy, or a poetics o f 
possession. Indeed, the idea o f a "sc ient i f ic de f in i t i on o f G o d " can we l l be placed i n the 
trajectory o f postmodern theory, w h i c h considers emp i r i c i sm i tsel f to be l ingu is t ica l ly and 
ideologica l ly founded i n j u s t the same way as the d iv ine is a cul tura l construct rather than 
absolute logos. I t also appeals to the psychoanalyt ic v i e w that meaning is constructed or 
projected onto the w o r l d or onto a text or f i c t i on through the subconscious, rather than the 
w o r l d or the text hav ing a stable meaning or real i ty. The poetics o f possession, and 
K u b r i c k ' ร advice to his v iewers and cr i t ics, certa in ly impl ies we should attempt to in tu i t 
the meaning o f the f i l m as i t taps our deep psychology, rather than at tempt ing to layer 
іпІефгеїаІІ0П8 deliberately upon it. 
O n the other hand, for al l its fo rma l ambivalence, i n its v isual f i de l i t y 2001 also 
values real ist ic representation i n a way that encodes Enl ightenment values. I n this respect, 
2001 maintains the modernist heritage o f science f i c t i on as a genre that aims to env is ion 
what science m igh t produce, at the expense o f the ind iv idua l . A s we saw earl ier, i n 
Forbidden Planet characters con fo rm to the stereotypes o f A Tempest i n order that the 
technology can be foregrounded; and al though I have been arguing that technology has an 
uncanny ef fect , the m i n d confronted w i t h this ef fect is t yp ica l l y that o f the v iewer rather 
than the f ic t iona l character, w h o tends to be emot iona l ly shal low. A s Br ian M c H a l e 
ident i f ies, one characterist ic device o f modern ism is to transfer the epistemologica! issues 
experienced b y the characters onto the reader. Th is is the effect Ha l has, f o r whereas the 
monol i ths themselves provoke new paradigms i n the characters that confront them, Ha l 
forces the v iewer to undergo a s im i la r l y subversive demonic experience o f possession. 
However , even as i t occupies var ious perspectives, inc lud ing that o f H a l , to destabil ise the 
basis upon w h i c h we norma l l y understand m i n d , the camera does not ref lect on its o w n 
ident i ty. Acco rd ing to M c H a l e , un l i ke postmodern f i c t i on most science f i c t i on - un t i l we 
get to cyberpunk - evades the self-referential consequences o f the "on to log ica i p lu ra l i sm 
and exper imenta l i sm" i t presents. 5 7 Rather, the camera is a rel iable witness to the w o r l d i t 
envisions. I n the v isual real ism o f the chapters before the star gate, and K u b r i c k and 
Clarke 'ร consul tat ion o f scient i f ic sources i n imag in ing space science, 2001 does not 
B r ian M c H a l e , "E lements o f a Poetics o f СуЬефипк , " Critique 33 (1992) : 158. 
B r o w n 137 
possess the se l f - re f lex iv i ty so central to the postmodern aesthetic. I t therefore never quite 
establishes the feedback loop whereby local judgements about the di f ference between man 
and machine become general judgements about the onto logy o f real i ty i n pr inc ip le . B y 
contrast, postmodern ism of ten deploys local ontologies o f d i f ference as mise֊en-abyme fo r 
the more general p rob lem o f representing a w o r l d that cannot be perceived object ive ly . 
Such, I argue in chapter 7, is the standpoint o f The Matrix. I f суЬефипк enables the 
coexistence o f mu l t ip le , superimposed wor lds (such as cyberspace and physical rea l i ty) , i n 
this context, questions about onto logy entai l questions about subject iv i ty . I f w e can ask 
about what sort o f real i ty this represents, w e must eventual ly ask w h i c h self is inhabi t ing i t ; 
conversely, questions about the re l iab i l i t y o f the sel f at the centre o f the narrat ive 
consciousness entai l doubt about the poss ib i l i ty o f perceiv ing or representing real i ty in 
general. I t is w i t h this dialect ic i n m i n d that w e tu rn to Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? 
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Chapter 6. Th is Empathy Busmess: K n o w i n g M i n d s i n Ph i l ip K. D i c k ' ร Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep? and R id ley Scott 's Blade Runner 
B y " a n d r o i d " I do not mean a sincere attempt to create i n the laboratory a 
human be ing . . .1 mean a th ing somehow generated to deceive us in a cruel 
way , to cause us to th ink i t to be one o f ourselves.. .Their handshake is the 
gr ip o f death, and their smi le has the coldness o f the grave. 1 
I t is i n m y op in ion , therefore, best to avo id al l quest ion-begging epithets 
such as " l i f e , " " s o u l , " " v i t a l i s m , " and the l i ke , and say mere ly in connect ion 
w i t h machines that there is no reason w h y they may not resemble human 
beings i n representing pockets o f decreasing entropy i n a f ramework i n 
w h i c h the large entropy tends to increase. 2 
^ d r o i d Decept ions 
A l t h o u g h Ph i l i p K. D i c k ' ร essay " M a n , A n d r o i d and M a c h m e " ( f r o m w h i c h m y 
f i rst epigraph is taken) casts the android in gothic terms that echo fears o f the zombie , D i c k 
is not real ly squeamish about the " a n d r o i d " because i t originates i n the laboratory rather 
than in nature. As w i t h Norber t W iener ' ร analogy between man and machine (the second 
epigraph), questions o f natura l ism are irrelevant. W iener ' ร cybernetics sees al l enti t ies, 
whether organic or mechanical , i n te leological terms, as the instant iat ion o f feedback and 
communica t ion responses to a thermodynamic envi ronment ; s imi lar ly , the dif ferences 
between man and machine i n D i c k ' ร w o r k are abstract rather than mater ia l , since androids 
are jus t one more example o f the dup l i c i t y inherent in a w o r l d o f s imulacra, where 
percept ion is governed or mod i f i ed by te levis ion, drugs or mind-manipu la t ing devices. 
Rather than being concerned about cybernet ic sciences and technologies i n their o w n r ight , 
D i c k ' ร w o r k general ly worr ies about preserving human ism in a society in wh i ch communa l 
structures such as church or state have col lapsed, to be superseded by commerc ia l 
s imulacra. The specif ic characteristics that d ist inguish man and machine are less impor tant 
than the psychologica l condi t ions that they may share, i l l ummat ing the fa i lure o f mora l i t y 
1 Ph i l i p K. D i c k , " M a n , A n d r o i d and Mach ine , " 1976, The Shifting Realities of 
Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings9 ed. Lawrence Sut in (New 
Y o r k : Pantheon, 1995) 2 1 1 . 
Wiener , Human Use 32. 
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in the modern age. Just as Wiener had been inspired to focus on cybernetics and 
communicat ion dur ing a C o l d W a r when internat ional d ip lomacy appeared to be breaking 
down , the backdrop to D i c k ' ร futures is an entropie w o r l d i n wh i ch іпЇЄфег8опа1 
communicat ion becomes d i f f i cu l t . I n such a context, even the human may become android: 
A human being w i thou t the proper empathy or fee l ing is the same as an 
andro id bu i l t so as to lack i t , either by design or mistake. W e mean, 
basical ly, someone w h o does not care about the fate w h i c h his f e l l ow l i v i n g 
creatures fa l l v i c t i m to ; he stands detached, a spectator, act ing out by his 
ind i f ference John Donne 'ร theorem that " N o man is an is land, " bu t g i v i ng 
that theorem a tw is t : that w h i c h is a mental and a mora l is land is not a man? 
A s N. Kather ine Hayleร observes, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? stages a moment 
when the essential qual i ty o f the human has shi f ted f r o m Cartesian rat ional i ty to fee l ing, 
represented i n D i c k ' ร w o r l d as the ab i l i ty to empathise w i t h others. 4 The novel is set i n a 
sparsely populated w o r l d i n w h i c h entropy, represented by pro l i ferat ing " k i p p l e " or 
rubbish, pervades the env i ronment , w i t h l i fe consist ing o f a struggle to assert the integr i ty 
o f the human subject and w ider commun i t y against i t . Just as for Wiener entit ies are 
def ined by te leology rather than embodiment , Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? asks 
about the degree to w h i c h androids can be considered as human in their comparable b id to 
survive the general decomposi t ion o f the w o r l d , and whether i t is possible to extend 
empathy when one's closest - even on ly - neighbour cou ld be an android. 
T w o paral lel stories explore this issue. The lone ly human J.R. Is idore welcomes the 
female andro id, Pr is, in to his otherwise empty apartment b lock. Thei r physical p r o x i m i t y -
a br idg ing o f Mashahi ro M o r i ' s "uncanny va l l ey " - poses prob lems, however, since Isidore 
is a designated "ch ickenhead, " a schizophrenic w i t h sub-standard intel l igence w h o may 
therefore resemble his affectless andro id companion suf f ic ient ly closely to fa i l the Vo igh t " 
K a m p f f empathy test w h i c h determines the di f ference between android and human . 5 
Secondly, the tests fo r the androids' status are administered by bounty hunters w h o " re t i re " 
3 D i c k , " M a n , A n d r o i d and M a c h i n e " 211-12. The same quote f r o m John Donne is 
used i n Ph i l ip K. D i c k , Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968; London : 
M i l l e n n i u m - O r i o n , 1999) 126. A l l subsequent parenthetical references in this chapter refer 
to this edi t ion o f the nove l . 
4 Hayleร, Posthuman 175. 
5 Note that the spel l ing o f V o i g h t - K a m p f f i n the book di f fers f r o m that o f Blade 
Runner, where i t is described Vo ig t -Kamp f f . L i kew ise the character cal led Baty i n the 
novel is accredited as Bat ty in the f i l m . 
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(that is， assassinate) any androids they encounter. Paradoxical ly , though, to retire an 
android w h i c h looks super f ic ia l ly human requires the bounty hunter to suspend his 
sympathy fo r others. Th is is the real isat ion that grows on the middle-aged and depressed 
R i c k Deckard , the focal character o f the nove l whose experiences m i r ro r Is idore 's. 
Comica l l y , Deckard loves his mechanical sheep that " chomped away i n s imulated 
contentment, bambooz l ing the other tenants o f the b u i l d i n g " (7) . W i t h real organic animalร 
be ing rare and expensive on the b l ighted w o r l d , pets prov ide a c o m m o n ta lk ing po in t , 
centred around the S idney 'ร catalogue o f trade prices for animals. Whether real or a 
cheaper robot ic соипЇефагї, a pet proves its human owner 's capacity fo r empathy; indeed, 
a key social ru le is not to ask whether one'ร an imal is genuine or fake, since " f r o m a social 
standpoint i t had to be done, g iven the absence o f the real ar t ic le" (8֊9).6 However , i n 
per fo rming his j o b w e l l - w h i c h m igh t enable h i m to buy a real goat or ostr ich - Deckard 
is not permi t ted to project s imi lar emot ion onto the human- l i ke androids. A coro l lary to the 
relat ionship between Pris and Is idore, the question here is w h y i t is legi t imate to desire a 
mechanical animal but permissib le to k i l l a more advanced ar t i f ic ia l human. A s the android 
Rachel challenges Deckard after they have had sex, w h y can Deckard. love the goat he buys 
w i t h his bounty but not love her? D o androids, too, not have the r ight to struggle for 
existence i n an entropie wor ld? 
L i k e "d isconnec t ing" H a l , the te rmino logy o f " r e t i r i n g " an andro id euphemist ical ly 
vei ls the possib i l i ty that both andro id and machine possess conscious agency, and so 
e l im ina tmg them should, according to str ict mora l log ic , consti tute murder. Though 
androids are supposedly lethal and threatening to human beings, the quest ion D i c k poses is 
" C o u l d we not become androids, in our very e f for t to w ipe them o u t ? " 7 Wh i l s t B o w m a n 
must become a cyborg to defeat H a l , Deckard is a t rag i -comic f igure who loves his electric 
sheep and w h o is generously re f lex ive about the androids ' feel ings. H e u l t imate ly doubts 
his o w n human i ty because he obeys the demands o f his miss ion. However , wh i l s t i t raises 
provocat ive questions about the relat ionship between the human and his ar t i f i c ia l 
6 Wh i l s t the idea that humans cou ld invest genuine emot ions i n ar t i f ic ia l pets seems 
at f i rs t a l i t t le far fetched, eer i ly, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? pref igures the 
1990'ร craze fo r the Tamagotch i , or суЬефеї. Th is was a smal l hand-held computer upon 
w h i c h simulated animals l i ved ; requi r ing cont inual feeding, c leaning and exercis ing, the 
an imal w o u l d " d i e " i f neglected. Tamagotchis became controversial as they became 
increasingly popular i n schools, w i t h ch i ld ren insistent ly nur tur ing their s imulated animals 
rather than Daving attention in class. 
7 Paul M . Sammon, Future Noir: The Making о/в lade Runner (London : O r i o n , 
1996) 17. 
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doppelgänger, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? remains conf ident in the existence 
o f an innate humanism. Though i t provides narrat ive circumstances w i t h i n wh i ch 
dif ferences between the human and their mora l and bod i l y doubles are b lur red, i t 
u l t imate ly designates a d i f ference between the schizophrenic man and an affectless 
andro id , and between a cal lous bounty hunter and the ar t i f ic ia l other he k i l l s . 
The boundary lines between the trae and the false are d rawn toough decept ion 
tests. A s Descartes' log ic moves f r o m decept ion to universal reason, the nove l suggests 
that by b r ing ing us i ron ica l ly close to the complete negat ion o f empi r ica l judgements, 
d i f ference can be determined more emphat ica l ly than before. For example, at the start o f 
the nove l , the V o i g h t - K a m p f test appears to have fa i led. Deckard has been manipulated by 
the Rosen Софога ї іоп into th ink ing that Rachel , wh i ch they created, is human. 
Apparent ly , the standard test has produced a false posi t ive, such that a human 
schizophrenic l i ke Isidore m igh t fa i l i t and be ret i red (that is, murdered) b y mis take. 8 
A g a i n , the behavioural p rob lem o f the Tu r i ng test is apparent, i n that a non-human ent i ty 
can appear human i f at tent ion is pa id to effects rather than or ig ins ( though an android can 
be determined for sure by a pos t -mor tem bone mar row test). However , when Deckard 
suddenly poses a f ina l quest ion about h is "genuine human babyh ide" briefcase (51) , 
Rachel 's delayed react ion o f disgust exposes her as an android. Th is moment o f 
ph i losophica l axis, when the balance o f fa i th i n the test fo r the authent ical ly human could 
sw ing either way, renews our conf idence i n the test i n a w a y that w o u l d not have occurred 
had Rachel s imp ly and easily been revealed as a clone in the f i rst place. I n this most 
d i f f i cu l t o f scenarios against the advanced Nexus-6 series, the test s t i l l works . I n a s imi lar 
w a y , several moments o f decept ion i n the nove l threaten to immerse the reader w i t h i n a 
s i tuat ion that destabilises the certainty b y w h i c h categories o f d i f ference can be evaluated, 
because they imp l y the unre l iab i l i t y or inauthent ic i ty o f the narrat ive voice. However , 
u l t imate ly the novel recovers f r o m the paradoxes to enable a b inary di f ference between self 
and other, android and human to be perceived. A s when Descartes raises the poss ib i l i ty o f 
the deceiv ing demon so as to deconstruct i t through the power o f the cogi to , we emerge 
8 Four years after the pub l ica t ion o f Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, D .L . 
Rosenhan carr ied out his in famous study o f psychiatr ic admissions. I n the f i rs t part o f the 
study, healthy "pseudopat ients" b r i e f l y s imulated hal lucinat ions i n an attempt to gain 
admiss ion, and staff p roved unable to diagnose a single patient as actual ly be ing healthy. I n 
the second part, staff were asked to detect non-existent f a k e " patients, and they falsely 
ident i f ied large numbers o f genuine patients as be ing imposters. Rosenhan concluded üiat 
" w e cannot d ist inguish the sane f r o m the insane i n psychiatr ic hospi ta ls . " D .L . Rosenhan, 
" O n Be ing Sane in Insane Places," Science 179 (1973) : 250-58. 
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f r o m the moments o f i l lus ion w i t h a greater conf idence both i n the bel ie f system set up 
w i t h i n i t , and the narrat ive po in t o f v iew f r o m w h i c h those bel iefs are relayed. Deckard 
may be a less ef f ic ient bounty hunter because he sympathises w i t h androids, but his 
humani ty is assured b y his very weakness that makes h i m less ef fect ive than his cal lous co-
hunter, Ph i l Resch. Isidore may be a chickenhead, but he is nevertheless possessed o f the 
f u l l r ights o f wh i ch androids, w h o w o u l d murder others to preserve their o w n l ives, are 
depr ived. I n the nove l , D i c k explo i ts the capacity o f the f i c t i on to present d i f ferent 
v iewpoin ts (such as the andro id 'ร v i ew o f the human) , double narrat ive strands ( through 
Isidore and Deckard 'ร comparable stories), and the onmiscient narrator w h o can exp la in 
bo th the subject ive thoughts o f h is characters wh i l s t also descr ib ing ind iv iduals ob ject ive ly 
and real ist ical ly. Contrary to the moments o f decept ion w i t h i n i t , the novel validates the 
di f ference between self and other through referr ing to its o w n mechanisms o f produc ing 
meaning, percept ion and empathy i n the m i n d o f another l i v i n g outside the ha l luc inat ion-
prone f ic t iona l wo r l d : the reader. I t is this conf idence in narrat ive i tsel f that Blade Runner, 
examined տ the f ina l section o f this chapter, denies as the nove l ' s postmodern, f i l m 
adaptation. 
Exper iencing Others 
Richard Kearney suggests that "al iens prol i ferate where anxieties l o o m as to who 
we are and h o w we demarcate ourselves f r o m others (who are not us ) " and that 
consequently "A l i en -a t i on , as a postmodern phenomenon, is inseparable f r o m the them-
and-us syndrome. " 9 Such a syndrome is at the centre o f D i c k ' ร oeuvre, inc lud ing Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? However , D i c k ' ร novel avoids immers ing us i n the 
al ienat ion that characterises the postmodern cond i t ion by ensuring the ava i lab i l i ty o f 
models through wh i ch empathy can be projected. The presence o f the other or al ien - i n 
this case the andro id - w h o is not capable o f the same sort o f imaginat ive leap becomes the 
locus for the de f in i t i on for the normat ive nature o f the sympathetic human self. Though the 
ar t i f ic ia l pet provides one comic mode l , a more serious lens through w h i c h human empathy 
can be focused is the re l ig ion , Mercer i sm. U n l i k e Chr is t ian i ty , this state-sanctioned system 
refuses salvat ion: " Y o u w i l l be required to do w r o n g no matter where you go. I t is the basic 
cond i t ion o f l i f e , to be required to v io late your o w n iden t i t y " (153) . Rather than p rov id ing 
9 R ichard Kearney, 'O the rs and A l iens : Between G o o d and E v i l , " Evil After 
Postmodernism: Histories, Narratives, and Ethics, ed. Jennifer L. Geddes (London : 
Rout ledge, 2001) 102-03. 
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absolute mora l proscr ipt ions, Mercer i sm works b y enabl ing adepts to partake o f a 
communa l psychological experience. B y grasping the handles o f the empathy box , the 
communicant experiences the sensations and moods o f al l others current ly engaged in 
watch ing Mercer c l imb the slopes o f a mounta in . Thus "Merce r i sm reduced cr ime b y 
mak ing cit izens more concerned about the p l ight o f their ne ighbours" (65) , a parodic 
l i teral isat ion o f Chr ist ian theology. Each adherent experiences the thoughts o f others as 
they are focal ised through the character o f W i l b u r Mercer , at w h o m stones are be ing 
th rown . Strangely, the stones th rown i n the psychologica l zone o f the empathy box cause 
genuine flesh wounds in real i ty , but the issue o f whether the rel ig ious experience is a 
supernatural one that crosses the boundary between m i n d and matter is unresolved i n the 
nove l . Bu t regardless o f its source, Merce r i sm produces a social ly adaptive effect in 
a l l ow ing human adherents to d is tmguish themselves f r o m affectless android mÛTors. A s 
the android, Ba ty , resentful ly observes, " I s n ' t i t a way o f p rov ing that humans can do 
something w e can' t do? Because w i thou t the Mercer experience we jus t have your w o r d 
that you feel this empathy business, this shared group t h i n g " (179-80). The android raises a 
genuine paradox, since by de f in i t i on the ab i l i ty to enter the minds o f others is arbitrary. 
Because i t cannot be proved absolutely - w e can on ly infer minds f r o m bod i l y actions and 
language - w e cannot k n o w absolutely that our percept ion o f what others are fee l ing is not 
mere ly our o w n pro ject ion. Acco rd ing to this vers ion o f the "b ra in in a va t " thesis, i t is 
possible that others, humans and androids, are always barred f r o m reciprocat ing our 
empathie investment in them, since w e cannot k n o w for sure what they are th ink ing , or 
even i f they possess any comparable consciousness o f other minds. As D i c k observed i n 
one essay, i t is possible that "each human being l ives i n a unique wo r l d , a pr ivate w o r l d , a 
w o r l d d i f ferent f r o m those inhabi ted and experienced b y a l l other humans.. . I f real i ty d i f fers 
f r o m person to person, can w e speak o f real i ty singular, or shouldn ' t we real ly be ta lk ing 
about p lura l rea l i t i es?" 1 0 Mercer ism i n i tsel f cannot therefore be a f ramework w i t h i n w h i c h 
categorical dist inct ions between human and andro id can be made because o f the broader 
epistemological p rob lem o f k n o w i n g other minds . Indeed, Merce r i sm may actual ly add to 
that p rob lem b y ex is t ing as a pure ly psycho log ica l , hal luc inatory and relat iv ist ic w o r l d 
w i t h no grounding i n universal , physical causes. A l t hough the omniscient narrator is able 
to i n f o r m us o f h o w Isidore and Deckard experience Mercer ism f r o m their o w n subject ive 
1 0 Ph i l i p K. D i c k , " H o w to B u i l d a Universe that Doesn ' t Fa l l Apar t T w o Days 
Later , " 1978, Sut in 2 6 1 . 
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po in t o f v iew , there is no way o f k n o w i n g whether the other human minds they share when 
in that experience also perceive them back i n a comparable manner. 
However , the fact that Mercer ism exists at al l can be treated as an absolute t ru th 
that transcends the psycholog ica l ly const i tuted forms w h i c h rel ig ious narrat ive takes (just 
as, so I argue later, the fact o f the nove l becomes fo r the reader p roo f o f imaginat ive 
humani ty , no matter how each ind iv idua l reader іпЇефгеЇ8 the same text) . Towards the end 
o f the nove l , Buster T . Fr iend ly , the inane chat show host who broadcasts 23 hours a day 
on both te lev is ion and radio (he is, we guess, an android) makes a dramatic expose. He 
proves that the mounta in Mercer c l imbs is a set on a H o l l y w o o d sound stage, w i t h the role 
o f Mercer p layed by an alcohol ic b i t -part actor, A l Jarry w h o "made a repetit ious and du l l 
f i l m , a series o f them i n fact, for w h o m he knew not ― and does not to this day" (179) . 
Fr iend ly notes that when adepts c l a im Mercer is not a human being they are i ron ica l ly 
correct, because " W i l b u r Mercer is not human, does not in fact exist. The w o r l d i n w h i c h 
he c l imbs is a cheap, H o l l y w o o d , commonplace sound stage w h i c h vanished into k ipp le 
years ago" (179) . The androids ' expectat ion is that once the decept ion is revealed, the 
deeper sensations and foundat ions on w h i c h judgments o f human and android 
consciousnesses are predicated w i l l c rumble away, g iven that they cannot, by the very 
nature o f empathy, be object ive ly val idated. Bu t wh i l s t this may seem to be true i n theory, 
the i ron ic outcome evidences that what matters about re l ig ion is not its f ic t i t ious nature per 
se, but the fact that i t works in social practice. 
Th is is the crucial d i f ference between Cartesian arguments that draw rat ional i ty 
f r o m the ax iomat ica l ly assumed existence o f a d iv ine , and a secular science that cannot 
investigate the empi r ica l nature o f metaphysical spheres, but w h i c h can acknowledge the 
anAropo log ica l value o f bel ief. A s W i l l i a m James explores i n h is Varieties of Religious 
Experience, regardless o f the veraci ty o f the d iv ine , so long as w e proceed as i f G o d exists 
(based on our personal, inner experience) then the equivalent improvement i n our mora l 
l i fe w i l l have been ach ieved. 1 1 So here i t matters not whether Mercer exists in real i ty , or 
indeed whether one's pet is real or ar t i f i c ia l , so long as the human subject is capable o f 
proceeding as ř / t hey are real ; indeed, Mercer h imse l f tel ls his fo l lowers to cul t ivate 
independence and to act "as i f I d i dn ' t ex is t " (152) . Empathy, the ab i l i ty to perceive the 
w o r l d as i f f r o m the perspective o f the other, works as a d iscr iminat ing factor between 
1 1 W i l l i a m James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, 
centenary ed i t ion , (1902; London : Rout ledge, 2002) . Lecture 3， on "The Real i ty o f the 
Unseen, deals w i t h this topic i n part icular (46-65) . 
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humans and androids, because it tests the l im i t s o f rat ional i ty . I t forces the human to 
proceed on a course as i f i t were true, wh i l s t ob ject ive ly k n o w i n g it not to be so, or wh i l s t 
k n o w i n g that the state o f other people 'ร perceptions cannot be ver i f ied object ive ly . I f 
ob ject ive, scient i f ic methods fo r d iscr iminat ing true and false have broken d o w n i n the 
wake o f the permeat ion o f s imulacra, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? romant ica l ly 
contends that the o p t i m u m knowledge is i n any case ideal ist ic and subject ive rather than 
rat ional and object ive. Note how far f r o m Pare'ร reasoning this conclus ion br ings us. For 
wh i l s t i n the Renaissance those w h o perceive monsters through the w o r k o f demons 
superst i t iously fa i l to rat ional ise the monstrous as unusual but not beyond nature, i n D i c k ' ร 
w o r k the one th ing that conc lus ive ly defines the andro id and the human is the latter 'ร 
wi l l ingness to be deceived b y simulacra. I f re l ig ion is actual ly a Feuerbachian construct 
designed to worsh ip man 'ร o w n nature - i n this case especial ly his ab i l i ty to empathise -
re l ig ion can be sustained at any cost to human rat ional i ty because i t has such a deep rooted 
social value. Whereas Ambro ise Paré or Descartes deny the inf luence o f a deceiv ing 
demon because G o d w o u l d not permi t i t , here the log ic is inverted: the p laus ib i l i ty o f 
deceit is evidenced tìirough the absence o f a t ru l y metaphysical God , but this actual ly 
validates re l ig ion as the standard b y w h i c h the t ru th o f human ism can be obtained. 
Re l ig ion is st i l l a part o f the immater ia l w o r l d o f human relat ionships w h i c h is i tsel f a part 
o f real i ty , even i f i t is not tangible and reducible as physical domains o f sc ient i f ic enquiry. 
Thus Is idore is able to retort conf ident ly at the moment o f the android 'ร t r i umpha l i sm 
"Merce r isn ' t a f ake...unless real i ty is a f ake " (201) . Such a v i ew - w h i c h m igh t also 
prov ide D i c k ' ร o w n answer to the conundram o f so l ips ism raised i n " H o w to B u i l d a 
Un ive rse" ᅳ is reminiscent o f Peter Singer 's argument that a l though ethics is not 
ob ject ive ly wr i t ten into the fabr ic o f the universe, i n a w o r l d o f human ind iv idua ls , shared 
social subject iv i t ies must equal ly be substantiated as empi r ica l qualit ies o f rea l i t y . 1 2 
A s so of ten i n D i c k ' ร w r i t i n g , however , no so lu t ion can be unambiguous, and an 
apparent al legory about the value o f re l ig ion is also sat i r ical ly inf lected. For i f humans are 
w i l l i n g to be deceived b y their o w n creations and to use this suspension o f d isbel ief as the 
very cond i t ion o f their human i ty , there is something false and unstable about their rel iance 
on a s imulacrum - more ar t i f i c ia l , perhaps, than the androids themselves. Mercer ism 'ร 
empathy box must be understood in con junct ion w i t h the Penf ie ld mood organ, w h i c h 
mediates and determines moods. I n the opening sentence o f the nove l , the device awakens 
See chapter 1， note 93. 
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Deckard, hav ing been pre-programmed to make h i m be "g lad to be awake" (3) . Get t ing 
into an argument w i t h his sleepy w i f e , Deckard ponders whether to d ia l " f o r a thalamic 
suppressant (wh i ch w o u l d abol ish his mood o f rage) or a thalamic st imulant (wh i ch w o u l d 
make h i m i rked enough to w i n the argument) . " A s his w i f e threatens to dia l for "greater 
v e n o m , " Deckard relents and sets the mood organ according to the demands o f his day 'ร 
schedule; he suggests his w i f e d ia l "888 . The desire to watch T V , no matter what*ร on i t " 
(6) . Th is min ia ture domest ic comedy of fers a sharp cr i t ique o f contemporary society. A s 
w i t h Merce r i sm w h i c h is revealed as a hoax by an incessantly babbl ing chat show host, the 
mood organ condemns the suppression o f ind iv idua l i t y i n a culture wh i ch a l lows one to 
buy experiences w h i c h o f fer immediate but crass escapes f r o m real i ty ; te lev is ion and drugs 
are obvious rea l -wor ld analogues to Mercer ism and the Penf ie ld mood organ. I n ' T h e 
A n d r o i d and the H u m a n , " D i c k ties this p rob lem o f i l lusory escape tìirough commodi t i sed 
mechanisms to the state o f being o f the andro id: 
Free w i l l fo r us - that is, when w e feel desire, when we are conscious o f 
want ing to do what we do ― may be even fo r us an i l l us ion . ᅳ .And - here is a 
thought not too pleasing ᅳ as the external w o r l d becomes more animate, w e 
may f i n d that we - the so cal led humans - are becoming, and may to a great 
extent always have been, inanimate i n the sense that we are led, directed b y 
bu i l t - i n t ropisms, rather than leading. So we and our elaborately evo lv ing 
computers may meet each other h a l f w a y . 1 3 
The androids al leviate one Cartesian paradox by p rov id ing affectless Others w h o val idate 
the humani ty o f those capable o f empathy: i f , fo r Descartes, an automata w o u l d not be 
possessed o f a theological soul , fo r D i c k , an andro id w o u l d not be capable o f be l iev ing in a 
rel ig ious narrat ive even - or especial ly - i f he knew i t to be object ive ly unver i f iab le or 
even false. I n the scenario o f technological decept ion by a Ho l l ywood-s ty le Merce r i sm or 
Penf ie ld m o o d box , however , this emphasis on shared consciousness opens space fo r 
another contradic t ion: the methods by w h i c h consciousness can be shared are themselves 
determinist ic, because the mechanism o f universal psychologica l media t ion must be 
commerc ia l l y d ist r ibuted so that its experiences can become accessible to m a n y . 1 4 A s 
1 3 Ph i l i p K. D i c k , ' T h e A n d r o i d and the H u m a n , " 1972, Sut in 187. 
D i c k ' ร earlier w o r k , The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch, plays o f f t w o 
competmg drugs pushed b y advert is ing companies. The one, Can -D , induces temporary 
hal lucinat ions i n w h i c h o f f - w o r l d users undergo communa l experiences o f suburban 
Amer ica . The r i va l product , Chew-Z , is superior, i n that the dreams can last forever wh i l s t 
t ime i n real i ty does not pass at a l l . However , i t induces psychedel ic fantasies that require 
B r o w n 147 
Buster asks the unresolved question, " w h o , then, has spawned this hoax on the Sol 
system?" (179) . I f hal lucinat ions def ine the human , the shape o f human society can be 
condi t ioned t r o u g h the contro l o f those same systems o f deception (the answer w e are 
probably expected to supply in response to Buster is: the government) . Paradoxical ly , 
technologies l i ke drugs or te levis ion faci l i tate predictable behaviours i n social and 
domestic situations w h i c h a l low people to cont inue to cohabit even under the extreme 
duress o f an entropie w o r l d . However , i n d i rect ing us as part o f a social who le , technology 
also deprives us o f the crucia l aspect o f our ind iv idua l i t y - free w i l l . A s D i c k noted, "Fake 
realit ies w i l l create fake humans. Or , fake humans w i l l generate fake realit ies and then sell 
them to other humans, tu rn ing them, eventual ly, into forgeries o f themse lves . " 1 5 Is idore is 
astonished that Pris does not have her o w n empathy box w h i c h is, he explains, " the most 
personal possession you have! I t ' s an extension o f your body ; i t ' s the w a y you touch other 
humans, i t 's the way you stop being a lone" (57) . O f course, i t is anyth ing but personal i f 
everybody is imp l i c i t l y required to o w n one. I t is on ly through the revelat ion that Mercer is 
h imsel f ar t i f ic ia l that technology is restored to its proper place wh i ch is, l i ke the androids, 
as a vehicle fo r an already i imate capacity ( to empathise) rather than a total subst i tut ion for 
the normal human experience. Nevertheless, such a real isat ion occurs on l y at the end o f the 
novel . For much o f i t , Mercer i sm, ar t i f ic ia l animals and the Penf ie ld mood box keep 
human society integrated b y fac i l i ta t ing their ab i l i t y to empathise, but they also keep 
human society automated b y d i rect ing them d o w n proscr ibed paths to main ta in social 
cohesion. 
However , there is another vehicle or " m o o d o rgan" w h i c h offers an oppor tun i ty to 
empathise, but w h i c h does not require the contradic tory use o f technologies that determine 
the self through c iv ic controls. Indeed, i t is precisely its indeterminacy that constitutes i t as 
a focus t feough w h i c h empathy can be projected, even though this vehic le is always 
already k n o w n as an ar t i f ic ia l s imulacrum w i thou t str ict ties to physical real i ty. Perhaps the 
most damning but subtle cr i t ique made by this nove l is that humans no longer read stories 
none o f the Mercer i sm- l i ke empathy o f Can-D . W h i l s t sat ir is ing the capital ist companies 
wh i ch push bo th products, D i c k ' ร sympathies are clear ly w i t h this latter sort o f experience. 
Ph i l ip k. D i c k , The Three Stigmata of Palmer Eldritch1 Four Novels of the 1960ร, ed. 
Johnathan Le them (1965; N e w Y o r k : L ib ra ry o f Amer i ca , 2007) 231-430. 
1 5 Ph i l i p K. D i c k , " H o w to B u i l d a Universe That Doesn ' t Fa l l A p a r t " 263-64. 
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at a l l . Books are regarded as k ipp le to be blasted into space, where they are col lected by 
android colonists. I n real l i fe , however , the ab i l i ty to perceive the w o r l d f r o m the 
perspective o f others and to bel ieve the value o f other consciousnesses wh i l s t k n o w i n g 
them as foundat iona l ly untrue, is precisely what is required by the reader o f any f ic t ions, 
even D i c k ' ร pecul iar hal lucinat ions. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? holds to a 
l i terary humanis t 'ร bel ie f that the ab i l i ty to read and project consciousness into the f i c t iona l 
w o r l d is i n and o f i tsel f a mora l purpose, one science and technology cannot reproduce. 1 6 
Regardless o f precisely what is said w i t h i n that heterocosm, the meaning o f wh i ch can 
always be debated, by p rov id ing an exercise i n empathy i n its o w n r ight , f i c t i on denotes 
the reader'ร human i ty precisely because its meanings are not determinist ic. I t cannot 
therefore be used fo r mass social engineering in the way Merce r i sm or the Penf ie ld box 
are, but s imultaneously i t can encourage the reader to realise that he or she inhabits a 
shared, c o m m o n universe o f values w h i c h m igh t therefore be ob ject ive ly true i n a stronger, 
Singerian sense. Hence the most s igni f icant, l im ina l moment o f deception is cr i t ica l not 
on ly for Deckard, but also for the reader. Th is complex scene tests whether Deckard, 
through whose eyes w e have seen the w o r l d , is h imse l f an android. I t thereby self-
re f lex ive ly examines the ro le o f f i c t i on as an empathie device, and attends to the imp l i c i t 
epistemological contract that exists between author and reader. Just as Descartes can note 
the omnipresence o f hal lucinat ions l i ke dreams but deny the possib i l i ty o f a to ta l ly 
deceiv ing demon because o f the existence o f G o d , the novel ist enters a comparable 
contract (a potentia Dei ordinata) w i t h his readers w h i c h agrees that we are to be deceived 
by local ontologies o f d i f ference (such as androids w h o resemble humans) but not b y the 
broader onto logy o f the w o r l d o f the novel as a who le . 
O f course, one cou ld argue that narrat ive empathy is not necessarily in and o f 
i tsel f p roo f o f one'ร mora l human ism. Hanniba l Lecter, fo r example, is such an ef fect ive 
k i l l e r precisely because, as an aesthete, he is capable o f ant ic ipat ing the psychology and 
actions o f his v ic t ims . I n the age o f cybernet ic f ic t ions, the ab i l i t y o f the computer game 
player to project h is m i n d in to the v i r tua l context can arguably lead to a comparably 
dangerous inab i l i t y to d is t inguish between the game w o r l d , i n w h i c h v io lence is rewarded 
rather than condemned, and the real w o r l d , i n w h i c h the effects o f v io lence are devastating. 
Teenagers W i l l i a m and Josh Buckner , for example, k i l l ed and in jured t w o car drivers b y 
snip ing them as they passed. The i r assertion that they had s imp ly been act ing out the 
gangster game Grand Theft Auto led to a $246 m i l l i o n lawsui t be ing f i led against the 
game'ร producers. D a v i d Kushner, "G rand Death A u t o / ' Salon.com, 22 Feb. 2005， 11 Dec. 
2008 <http: / /d i r .salon.com/story/ tech/feature/2005/02/22/gta_ki l lers/>. 
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Human ism and Li terature 
M i d - w a y through the narrat ive, Deckard has successful ly ret i red his f i rst target, 
Po lokov. F o l l o w i n g his exterminat ion l ist, he next administers a V o i g h t - K a m p f f test to the 
beaut i fu l soprano, Luba Lu f t . Accus ing h i m o f be ing a sexual deviant (many o f the Vo igh t -
K a m p f f questions ask about the subject 's sexual desires), L u f t calls the pol ice. Of f i ce r 
C ram who arrests h i m claims never to have heard o f his f e l l ow pol ice of f icer , Deckard, and 
so Deckard calls his superior, Bryant , to prove his ident i ty . W h e n Deckard passes the 
phone to C r a m the l ine goes dead and, confus ingly , the redia l led number is never 
answered, leav ing Deckard (and the reader) " bew i l de red " (92). C ram flies Deckard to the 
c i t y ' ร H a l l o f Justice, but i t is not the one at w h i c h Deckard works : 
I t makes no sense, [Deckard] said to h imsel f . W h o are these people? I f this 
place has always existed, why didn't we know about it? A n d w h y don ' t they 
k n o w about us? T w o paral lel po l ice agencies, he said to h imsel f ; ours and 
this one. Bu t never coming into contact - as far as I k n o w - unt i l now. (97; 
emphasis i n or ig ina l ) 
Hav ing t r ied unsuccessful ly to make another phone ca l l , this t ime to his w i f e , Deckard is 
shown to the o f f ice o f the pol ice chief, Gar land, w h o takes Deckard 'ร h i t - l is t and discovers 
that he h imse l f is the bounty hunter 'ร next target. Gar land accuses Deckard o f being an 
android posing as a bounty hunter, w h o is in fact k i l l i n g humans. Garland summons the 
bounty hunter for this precinct, Ph i l Resch, to check i f Deckard is on Resch'ร l ist. 
Suddenly, then, the who le w o r l d onto logy o f the nove l has become inverted; as Gar land'ร 
speech takes over f r o m the object ive po in t o f v i ew o f the narrator to exp la in the terms o f 
this gedanken test, w e fear that human and android have swi tched places: 
Th is man - or android ֊ R ick Deckard comes to us f r o m a phantom, 
hal luc inatory, nonexistent po l ice agency al legedly operat ing o f f the o ld 
departmental headquarters on Lombard . He ' s never heard o f us and w e ' v e 
never heard o f h i m - yet ostensibly we ' re bo th w o r k i n g the same side o f the 
street. H e employs a test w e ' v e never heard of. The l ist he carries around 
isn ' t o f androids; i t ' s a l ist o f human beings. He 's already k i l l ed at least 
once. (101) 
Is Gar land an android, as Deckard suspects? Is the other bounty hunter, Resch, an android? 
Or is Deckard h imse l f an android who has been g iven a false memory to a l l ow h i m to 
bel ieve h imse l f to be human? I f this latter is the case, h o w can w e bel ieve the t ruth o f 
anyth ing narrated as w e f o l l owed his activi t ies i n the preceding plot? Were those 
"andro ids" Po lokov and L u f t rea l ly humans? 
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The perceptual instabi l i ty here reworks the Cartesian demon into the heart o f the 
narrat ive, in a recursive decept ion i n w h i c h the f i c t i on has been a ha l luc inat ion t w o levels 
removed f r o m the real w o r l d o f the reader t r y i ng to w o r k out what is true: we have 
apparently been reading a f i c t iona l nove l , whose events are narrated by an unrel iable 
narrat ive vo ice, wh i ch then guides us to a moment when the character generated b y that 
vo ice is h imse l f a hoax o f the human. I t is on ly when a post -mor tem bone mar row test 
proves that Po lokov was indeed an android that the categories start to normal ise 
themselves into ob ject ive ly k n o w n facts. Wh i l s t Resch leaves to col lect his empathy-test 
equipment based on the evidence that Po lokov was phys io log ica l l y an andro id and 
D e c k a r ď ร ret i rement o f h i m was therefore legi t imate, Gar land - k n o w i n g he w i l l be 
uncovered b y the test - resignedly admits to Deckard that he is an android, and explains 
the nature o f the precinct, inc lud ing w h y D e c k a r ď ร phone calls d id not reach Bryant or his 
w i f e : 
A l l our v idphones here are trapped. They recirculate the cal l to other of f ices 
w i t h i n the bu i l d ing . Th is is a homeostat ic еп Їефг іве we ' re operat ing here, 
Deckard. W e ' r e a closed loop, cut o f f f r o m the rest o f San Francisco. W e 
k n o w about them but they don ' t k n o w about us. Sometimes an isolated 
person such as yoursel f wanders i n here or, as in your case, is brought here 
ᅳ fo r our protect ion. (106) 
The android concedes that though he is par t ic ipat ing i n a systematic hoax, the Vo igh t -
K a m p f f test w i l l s t i l l be able to oust h i m as an android, d rawing a f ina l l ine between the 
real and the s imulat ion. Bu t wh i l s t the alternative pol ice station w i l l be ver i f ied as unreal , a 
s imula t ion, i t is s t i l l unclear whether Deckard is h imse l f an android. G iven the hermetic 
nature o f the decept ion, i t cou ld real ist ical ly be so: bo th Deckard - and v icar ious ly the 
reader ᅳ m igh t have been deceived b y the novel is t p lo t t ing the on ly w o r l d we can k n o w , 
imp lant ing " fa lse memor ies " f igura t ive ly and l i tera l ly i n his character and reader. Wh i l s t 
the V o i g h t - K a m p f f test w i l l s t i l l w o r k i n spite o f the homeostat ic fake pol ice stat ion, what 
test can be appl ied w i t h i n the closed loop that is Deckard 's consciousness to con f i rm for 
the reader whether he is human? I f the omniscient narrator has been deceiv ing us up to this 
po in t b y mak ing us th ink that the " h e r o " Deckard was human, his decis ion to subject 
Deckard to a V o i g h t - K a m p f f test cou ld equal ly be a p lo t , i n both senses o f the w o r d . 
Rather than hav ing the omniscient narrator state ob ject ive ly , but surely by now 
unt rus twor th i ly , that the character is a human or an android, D i c k ' ร method here is to draw 
attent ion to the art i f ice o f the w ider s imula t ion that is f i c t i on , i n order to ve r i f y the nature 
o f the key character w i t h i n i t . A n d , paradoxica l ly bu t del iberately, D e c k a r ď ร humani ty is 
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indicated by l i ken ing h i m to a machine. W h e n Resch returns, he intui ts that Gar land is an 
android and so k i l l s Gar land. Resch asks Deckard what he and Gar land had discussed 
wh i l s t he had been away, and Deckard repl ies: 
' T h a t he ֊- it ֊ was an android. A n d y o u " - R i ck broke o f f , the conduits o f 
his bra in h u m m i n g , calculat ing, and select ing; he altered what he had 
started to say. " - w o u l d detect i t , " he f in ished. " I n a few more minutes. " 
(107) 
W h e n we see f r o m H a ľ s eyes as Poole and B o w m a n wonder h o w he w o u l d feel about 
d isconnect ion, w e momentar i l y forget that the existence o f h is perspective acknowledges 
that he has a consciousness i n the f i rs t place. The inverse pattern is at w o r k here. A s R i c k ' ร 
m i n d is described i n terms o f the electronic cyborg or robot , the language draws attent ion 
to the metaphor ical w o r k i t is do ing , mak ing false connections between t w o entit ies that 
are i n real i ty qui te d i f ferent : the human bra in and the cybernet ic one. The nove l general ly 
tries to show the potent ial s imi la r i ty between humans and androids i n terms o f their lack o f 
sympathy, regardless o f their precise o r ig in as natura l ly or ar t i f ic ia l ly-created entit ies. For 
this reason, the novel is very hazy about h o w exact ly androids are made. A l t hough the 
log ic o f the p lo t and unre l iab i l i t y o f the narrator means that Deckard cou ld be an android, 
the fact that D i c k ' ร omniscient narrator suddenly chooses to describe his const i tu t ion i n 
terms o f mechanism indicates that this is on ly a metaphor rather than a real ist ic descr ipt ion 
o f his inner be ing beneath the surface. I t marks Deckard out as a machine so def in i t i ve ly 
and obv ious ly that i t seems a n a ^ o n i s t i c i n a nove l i n w h i c h most o f ten androids and 
humans are so al ike both on and beneath the surface that i t is impossib le to te l l them apart. 
I f the andro id 'ร b io log ica l d i f ference can be t ru th fu l l y discovered b y a post -mor tem 
dissection in a va l idat ion o f the empi r ica l method, i t is precisely the opposite o f empir ica l 
representation, the l i terary metaphor, w h i c h provides access to the t ru th o f Deckard 'ร be ing 
beneath his sk in , i n his (human) m i n d . The nove l 's mode o f creat ing knowledge and 
narrat ive t ru th is thus played o f f against that o f science. 
W h i l s t cybemetic ians and phi losophers dispute whether the m i n d is metaphor ical ly 
or phys io log ica l ly l i ke a computer, the nove l 's use o f language and metaphor suggests that 
this debate is focused on the w r o n g sort o f d i f ference. As D i c k presents his ideas in ' T h e 
A n d r o i d and the H u m a n , " act ing like a machine should be suf f ic ient for the self to be 
considered as a machine ш terms o f ethical values, even i f not i n terms o f b io logy . 
Whether an andro id is bu i l t l i ke a man is i r relevant, because a man cou ld act l i ke an 
android i n his psychologica l iso lat ion; the di f ference that matters is between extending 
thought to other cogni t ive agents versus remain ing sol ipsist ical ly locked i n one's o w n 
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w o r l d o f percept ion. In this new cybernet ic env i ronment , then 1 i t is not science but 
l i terature that m igh t prov ide a better mode l fo r d iscerning categories, in w h i c h the inhuman 
is that w h i c h cannot empathise, whether i t or iginates i n the laboratory or not. A l t hough 
according to the exp l ic i t s ign i f icat ion Deckard is an android because his bra in hums and 
calculates l i ke an electronic computer, imp l i c i t l y this statement defines h i m more 
determinedly as human precisely because it draws attention to the way i n w h i c h his 
character is const i tuted out o f the arbi t rary mechanics o f language. I n the same way , i t is 
i ron ica l ly jus t when Mercer i sm is shown to be false that this ver i f ies the absolute ab i l i t y o f 
humans to empathise i n spite o f i t . The reader'ร ab i l i t y to note this i ron ic mode o f 
representation shows them to be capable o f seeing beneath Deckard 'ร sk in - that is to say, 
o f empath ismg w i t h h i m as a human ᅳ even though, or even because, the novel is t is using 
metaphors that mis lead us as to his true being. Tu r ing ' s cybernetics a imed to reproduce 
intel l igence w i thou t wo r r y i ng about the physical mechanisms b y w h i c h this is achieved; 
se l f - ref lex ive f i c t i on , on the other hand, draws attent ion to the inner work ings o f language 
and makes us realise that the man, Deckard , is other than the sum o f the exp l ic i t language 
by w h i c h his character is produced. There is a discrepancy between the exp l ic i t , object ive 
words and the character these words conjure i n the m i n d o f the reader. The gap is produced 
because the reader interjects empathy w i t h Deckard , regardless o f how phys io log ica l ly 
inhuman he is stated to be, h o w his agent is shaped as android b y the exp l ic i t s ign i fy ing 
mechanism o f language and metaphor. Th is passage is mi r ro red b y a moment late i n the 
nove l , when Is idore temporar i ly leaves the flat inhabi ted by his newfound android fr iends: 
The silence, al l at once, penetrated; he fe l t h is arms grow vague. I n the 
absence o f the Baty s and Pris he found h imse l f fad ing out, becoming 
strangely l i ke the inert te lev is ion set w h i c h he had jus t unplugged. Y o u have 
to be w i t h other people, he thought, i n order to l i ve at a l l . (175) 
Isolated, and therefore depr ived o f any means o f expressing empathy, Is idore is almost 
machin ie i n his consciousness. O n the other hand, the fact that he recognises h imse l f as 
alone must be g iven pr io r i t y over the l i teral s igni f iers in wh i ch that state is couched. 
Is idore may be becoming "unp lugged , " but because that is such an evident metaphor i t 
emphasises the onto logicai gap between the human Isidore and the androids w i t h w h o m he 
l ives w h o migh t literally be unplugged because they are machines, or were o r ig ina l l y the 
product o f some mechanical process. Thus D i c k ' ร w o r k attends to the parallels between the 
mechanism o f l i terature and the mechanism o f the andro id, wh i l s t at the same t ime 
ind icat ing that the phenomenological effects w h i c h the former produces are very d i f ferent 
to those determinist ic ones experienced by the cybernet ic ent i ty , i n wh i ch the program 
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in i t iated i n them f r o m their po in t o f creation remains w i t h them. The i r nature governs their 
nurture, whereas the human abi l i ty to nurture others (such as pets) correspondingly 
changes their deeper, inner nature i n mora l l y posi t ive ways. W e can in tu i t humani ty i n 
spite o f that human being described in mechanist ic terms, so that there is a gap between the 
l i teral w o r d and its imp l ied meanmg. B y contrast, cybernetics argues1 that human 
consciousness is essential ly the same as al l nature, because i t is an instant iat ion o f 
genetic marker, or b inary program) w i l l always lead to a predef ined outcome, such as a 
part icular organism or computer rout ine. 
The passage i n the precinct takes us through an perceptual crisis - has the character 
v ia w h o m w e have witnessed the previous events actual ly been an android impersonat ing a 
bounty hunter? ᅳ i n order to create the epistemic grounds by w h i c h a more subtle ethical 
question can be asked. Rather than the p rob lem consist ing i n h o w to dist inguish human 
f r o m android, the issue is whether k i l l i n g androids w o u l d require humans to become 
dispassionate in ways that subvert man 'ร natural empathy. Resch lacks empathy fo r the 
androids, whereas Deckard possesses i t . Hav ing lef t the precinct, fo r example, he buys the 
opera singer L u b y a L u f t a picture she desires, before Resch k i l l s her. I f Resch is an android 
this w i l l a l l ow Deckard to "undergo renewed fa i th i n the human race" (120)， prov ing 
humans to be capable o f empathy i n the way androids l i ke Resch are not. O n the other 
hand, i f Resch is human then i t evidences that a good bounty hunter must be less 
sympathetic than the androids themselves, w h o can at least make a passable s imula t ion o f 
emot ional warmth . U l t ima te ly , Resch does test as genuinely human, w i t h the Vo igh t -
K a m p f f score reveal ing also "a defect i n your empathie, ro le- tak ing abi l i ty . One w h i c h we 
don ' t test for. Y o u r feel ings towards andro ids" (121) . I f the andro id is to ta l ly un l ike the 
human as an affectless agent, androids can be ret i red w i thou t any sent imental i ty, and 
Resch'ร v iew o f the androids as objects should not be classed as a "defec t . " However , 
though Deckard is cogn i t i ve ly abnormal because he sympathises w i t h L u f t ' s p l ight , he is 
also the more humane because he feels "empathy towards an ar t i f ic ia l 
construct. . .something that on l y pretends to be a l i ve . " H is feel ings are " the reverse o f those 
intended. O f those I ' m accustomed to feel - am required to fee l , " and Deckard realises 
" there 's noth ing unnatural or inhuman about Ph i l Resch's react ions; i t ' s m e " (121-22) . W e 
n o w have a paradox. Resch scores as human on the test because he is able to look upon 
androids as to ta l ly inhuman; but i f humani ty is also def ined b y the ab i l i ty to empathise, i t 
is Deckard who is the more human. The nove l appears to self-cancel its o w n epistemic 
basis by w h i c h the idea o f the human is constructed. Such contradict ion, and the inab i l i t y 
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to resolve the true f r o m the false in any f i na l way, m igh t be symptomat ic o f the 
postmodern aesthetic. However , g iven the way in w h i c h Mercer ism and the mechanist ic 
metaphors o f the f i c t i on emphasise that to be human is to be capable o f empathy despite 
being to ld that the other is a s imulacrum, i t is clear that we are to a l ly ourselves w i t h 
Decka rď ร personal crisis against Resch'ร callousness. The strict ethical log ic o f the nove l 
is i n tension w i t h our contrary ab i l i ty to sympathise w i t h Deckard precisely because he is 
in breach o f the legal f ramework . The crisis o f decept ion at the centre o f the novel is both 
mora l and readerly. I t threatens to destabil ise our ab i l i ty to enter the narrat ive w o r l d as i f i t 
were real, an ab i l i ty w h i c h validates our status as empathie (that is, de f in i t i ve ly human) 
readers, and our ab i l i t y to choose between human and android ob ject ive ly once w i t h i n the 
nove l 's moment . Th is dialect ic between androids, cu t -o f f f r o m other minds , and readers 
necessarily enter ing a w o r l d and i n a sense b r ing ing i t in to being by reading about i t is in 
l ine w i t h Jos ipov ic i 'ร v i ew o f f i c t i on : the android makes us realise the i ron ic value o f 
f i c t ion that is both a s imulat ion or deception, and yet w h i c h is also psycholog ica l ly real i n 
a way that protects us f r o m sol ipsism and epistemological re la t iv ism. I f the andro id is not 
human, then we are forced to admi t the l im i ts to our capacity to empathise w i t h those who 
are not l i ke ourselves, even though they are so very closely model led upon us. Rather than 
treating androids and humans, or ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences and humans, by def in i t i ve 
categories o f * 'us" and " t h e m " - as i f categorical def in i t ions can be established between 
things that are not real ly d i f ferent - both 2001 and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
attempt to overcome our sol ipsism through attending to epistemological questions. Our 
sympathy or repuls ion should not be determined by the mater ia l substrate on w h i c h the 
other m i n d is founded. Indeed, whether named as android or human, al l the "characters" 
are essential ly cogni t ive constructs, emerg ing f r o m the same mater ia l substrate o f pr inted 
words but also f r o m the way in wh i ch these are interpreted by an empathetic reader. The 
novel precedes any a priori onto logical revuls ion at the al ter i ty o f the andro id , a l l ow ing us 
the space i n w h i c h to enter its m i n d safely and to propose epistemological questions about 
l inguist ic real ism. Wha t matters i n asserting human i ty is, paradoxical ly , to a l low oneself to 
suspend mater ia l i ty , to become present w i t h i n the m i n d o f the s imi la r ly immater ia l (or 
d i f ferent ly mater ia l ) other but also to be aware that our o w n real i ty is be ing suspended i n 
the process. I t is such a se l f - re f lex iv i ty that is lost i n systems l ike the Penf ie ld mood organ 
or Mercer i sm, but w h i c h the novel can sustain b y attending to its o w n metaphors b y w h i c h 
a human character w i t h w h o m w e empathise is also, i ron ica l ly , created out o f the 
mechanics o f language. Wh i l s t Deckard 'ร empathy fo r androids hampers his ab i l i t y to do 
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his j o b , our ab i l i t y to imagine the wo r l d as i f through their l ives stresses our capabil i t ies as 
act ively interpret ing readers. 
I n re lat ion to Cartesian decept ion, therefore, Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? replays i t i n a double way . L i k e Descartes (or Tu r i ng ) , D i c k stresses effects rather 
than or ig ins. Regardless o f whether an agent is ar t i f ic ia l or human, the ab i l i t y to empathise 
w i t h another self is the ha l lmark o f the human. Because this is where the nove l stands a 
priori, i t argues that the ab i l i t y to occupy the subject iv i ty o f another is ax iomat ica l ly mora l , 
that the ab i l i t y temporar i ly to possess other minds and perspectives on real i ty is i tsel f a 
humanist ic act. I n achiev ing this, though, i t provides several moments o f decept ion, when 
the reader fears i t is impossib le to choose between self and other based on rat ional and 
empir ica l cr i ter ia, and that the novel is i tse l f one example o f a total decept ion rather than 
proof o f the reader's humani ty . However , b y pu l l i ng us through these l im ina l moments, we 
recover conf idence i n the onto log ica l boundaries between andro id and human, and f i c t i on 
and real i ty. Th is is an issue I p ick up again i n re lat ion to Foucault'ร Pendulum (chapter 8)， 
where I draw some generic conclusions about cybernetic f ic t ions i n l i terature versus f i l m . 
For now, though, w e can observe that where the f i l m Blade Runner d i f fers most f r o m Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is in its e l im ina t ion o f these Cartesian tests w h i c h , 
though they create crises o f decept ion, also faci l i tate opportuni t ies fo r resolut ion. In Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? epistemological and onto log ica l questions abound -
most notably i n the precinct episode - but cr i t ica l opportuni t ies for their resolut ion are 
presented through an essential ly convent ional bel ie f that the very existence o f the w o r k 
i tsel f can al leviate the complex i t ies w i t h i n i t . In postmodern ism, as exempl i f ied by R id ley 
Scott 's f i l m , the artefact too is impl icated as embody ing the very processes i t cr i t iques, the 
w o r k i tsel f becoming one more piece o f evidence that we l i ve i n a total s imulacrum. 
Seeing Th rough the A n d r o i d in Blade Runner 
W h e n R id ley Scott c la imed not to have read Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? before mak ing the f i l m , 1 7 he was mak ing the po in t that Blade Runner is far 
removed f r o m its o r i g i ns . 1 8 Indeed, he chose the w o r d " rep l i can t " over " a n d r o i d " because 
1 7 A c l a im Scott makes i n Sammon 283. 
There were f i ve pub l i ca l l y screened versions o f the f i l m , w i t h three pr inc ipa l 
d istr ibut ions: The Domest ic Cu t (the or ig ina l theatrical release), The Di rec tor s Cut , and 
The F ina l Cut . The or ig ina l theatr ical release (1982) had Deckard p rov id ing a narrator ial 
voiceover. M o r e s ign i f icant ly , the f i l m ends pos i t ive ly , w i t h Deckard and Rachel escaping 
to the countryside and w i t h Deckard exp la in ing that un l ike the other repl icants, Rachel is 
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he d id not want Blade Runner " t o be premoni to ry o f android at a l l , because then people 
w o u l d th ink the f i l m is about robots, when i n fact i t isn ' t . I t was better that w e come up 
w i t h a new w o r d a l together . " 1 9 A l t h o u g h this m igh t prevent us f r o m seeing Blade Runner 
as a cybernet ic f i c t i on , i n fact the shi f t is more interest ing, because i t suggests that the 
cybernet ic parad igm had, by the 1980ร, become so rooted as to be almost self-explanatory. 
The w o r d " a n d r o i d " was not necessary to show that the f i l m was about processes o f late 
capi ta l ism o f w h i c h cybernet ic systems were the most potent examples. Certa in ly , the 
b io log ica l repl icants are jus t one among many simulacra i n a cityscape named as Los 
not designed to die after four years. R id ley Scott was pushed into adding this opt imis t ic 
ending md exp l icat ive voiceover in response to d isappoint ing audience reactions at the 
prev iew screenings. H is D i rec tor 'ร Cut (1992) removes Deckard 'ร narrat ion, creating a 
much bleaker, m in ima l i s t f i l m . The ending i n this version is made ambiguous through the 
addi t ion o f an earlier scene. A s i n the f i rst release, as Deckard leaves w i t h Rachel he sees 
an o r igami un icorn , the cal l ing-card o f a f e l l ow blade runner, Gaf f . However , this v i s ion is 
g iven a tw is t by the reinsert ion o f an earlier scene i n w h i c h Deckard dreams o f a un icorn 
wh i l s t sleeping at a p iano. A s a possible ind icat ion that Deckard 'ร memories are false, this 
new connect ion between his dream and the conclus ion impl ies that Deckard is h imse l f 
potent ia l ly a repl icant n o w on the ran w i t h Rachel . A s R id ley Scott explains: " I f you take 
for granted for a moment that, let 's say, Deckard is a Nexus 7， he probably has an 
u n k n o w n l i fe span and therefore is start ing to get a w f u l l y human. Gaf f , at the very end, 
leaves an o r i gami , w h i c h is a piece o f si lver paper you m igh t f i n d i n a cigarette packet, and 
it's a u n i c o r n ľ N o w , the un icorn i n Deckard 'ร daydream tel ls me that Deckard w o u l d n ' t 
no rma l l y ta lk about such a th ing to anyone. I f G a f f knew about that, i t ' s Ga f f ' s message to 
say, ' I ' v e read your f i l e , ma te . " ' Though restor ing this narrat ive d imension, the 
remastering o f the D i rec to r ' ร Cut was rushed by ü le studios. The Final Cu t (2007) has been 
f u l l y restored under Scott 's author i ty , but there are no substantive alterations that 
fundamenta l ly change the p lot , i n the way the restorat ion o f the " u n i c o r n " scene does. 
Since the D i rec to r ' ร Cu t is that w h i c h may be most fami l ia r to readers wh i l s t also 
representing Scot t 'ร key th ink ing even i f not his technical amb i t ion , this is the one I w i l l 
discuss. For R id ley Scot t 'ร explmiat ion o f the key changes, f r o m wh i ch the quotat ion 
above is taken, see R id ley Scott, in terv iew w i t h T e d Greenwald , Wired, 9 Sept. 2007， 09 
June 2008 <ht tp : / /www.wi red.com/enter ta inment /ho l lywood/magaz ine/15-
10/ f f_b laderunner_ fu l l> . For a detai led, scene-by-scene explanat ion o f the changes across 
the cuts, see Sammon 394-408. 
1 9 Sammon 6 1 ; emphasis in or ig ina l . I t was the daughter o f screenwriter D a v i d 
Peoples who proposed the term based on her w o r k in m ic rob io logy (Sammon 62) . The 
te rm " rep l i can t " was used i n the in famous passage o f The Selfish Gene: " T h e y are i n you 
and me ; they created us, body and m i n d ; and their preservat ion is the u l t imate rat ional for 
our existence. T h e y have come a l ong way , those repl icators. N o w they go by the name o f 
genes, and w e are their surv iva l machines." Dawk ins 19-20. 
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Angeles o f 2019, The bust l ing underwor ld compr ised o f Or iental and Western cultures is 
mi r rored by a bourgeois w o r l d at the top o f the skyscrapers w h i c h grow ever h igher i n 
dupl icated layer ings; advertisements ( for genuine v i r tua l is ing systems such as A t a r i or 
T D K video) prov ide a backdrop to the f renzied act iv i ty ; our f i rst sight o f Deckard sees h i m 
leaning against the w i n d o w o f a te lev is ion shop where b anks o f screens p lay the same 
image; the andro id Zhara is k i l l ed i n a shop f u l l o f mannequins. A s we l l as a cul ture o f 
reproduct ion, such scenes exemp l i f y the urban " s p r a w l " c o m m o n to суЬефипк , i n wh i ch 
the " image o f the carnival ized c i ty, the c i ty as permanent ca rn iva l " is used as a s ign i f y ing 
analogue fo r the postmodern cond i t i on . 2 1 I f 2001 used a vast universal space to encourage 
a reconceptual isat ion o f man 'ร (or the posthuman'ร) anthropic place w i t h i n i t , Blade 
Runner presents a closed c i ty space that i l lustrates there is no paradigmat ic d is t inc t ion 
between human and posthuman, or the present and the future. Blade Runner col l ides 
di f ferent wor lds t taough what Syd Mead , its credited "conceptual fu tur is t , " termed 
" ret rof i t ted u t i l i za t i on " i n w h i c h elements o f the past surv ive beneath a technological 
surface superadded to i t . 2 2 O l d apartment b locks have vent i la t ion and electr ic conduits on 
the outside; noodle bars f ront scient i f ic laborator ies; cars have wheels but can also fly. I t 
also blurs genres b y transplant ing the convent ions o f f i l m noi r (the bumed-ou t detect ive; 
l ight f i l tered through grat ings; a voiceover narrat ion, i n the case o f the f i rs t cut) in to a 
futur is t ic cyberpunk thr i l le r , precisely the sort o f pastiche Frederic Jameson ident i f ied as 
inherent i n postmodern ism, i n w h i c h the "styles o f the past" are empt ied o f their 
s igni f icance b y being combined i n "overs t imu la t ing ensembles. " 2 3 I n this heterogeneous 
For an іп їефге їа і іоп o f the relat ionship between the real and the f ic t iona l c i ty , 
see Steve Carper, "Subver t ing the Disaf fected C i t y : Cityscape i n Blade Runner^ Ke rman 
185-95. K e v i n M c N a m a r a sees the f i l m (and the nove l ) as po l i t i ca l l y engaged w i t h the 
problems o f c i t y p lann ing and mu l t i cu l tu ra l i sm: K e v i n R. McNamara , "Blade Runners 
Pos t -bd i v i dua l Wor ldspace, " Contemporary Literature 38 (1997): 422-46, JSTOR, 30 
Apr . 2008 <ht tp : / /www. js tor .org/s tab le/1208974>. 
2 1 M c H a l e , "E lements o f a Poetics o f С у Ь е ф и п к " 154. 
2 2 Syd M e a d , "Des ign ing the Future , " Omni fร Screen Flights, Screen Fantasies: 
The Future According to Science Fiction^ ed. Danny Peary (Garden C i t y , N Y : Doubleday, 
1984) 199-213. 
2 3 Frederic Jameson, р ostmodernism1 or1 The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(Durham, N C : D u k e U P , 1991) 19. Th is book was an expanded vers ion o f an essay 
publ ished a decade earl ier as Fredr ic Jameson, "Postmodern ism, or, The Cu l tu ra l Log i c o f 
Late Cap i ta l i sm, " New Lefi Review 146 (1984) : 53-92. Subsequent references refer to the 
book rather than the or ig ina l journa l art icle. 
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wo r l d , then, where does the true narrat ive l ie? A s , according to M c H a l e , postmodern texts 
tend to g ive precedence to onto logical issues before epistemological ones, typ ica l ly absent 
f r o m Blade Runner are the proposi t ion o f exp l ic i t , Cartesian models, o f the sort placed at 
the centre o f D i c k ' s nove l . 
Whereas Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? presents deceptions that faci l i tate 
better sel f - ref lect ion on the di f ference between android and human, the f i l m flirts w i t h the 
epistemological p rob lem o f how to dist inguish true f r o m false w i thou t reaching def in i t i ve 
conclusions. I n this sense, Blade Runner is on to log ica l ly a total delusion, as opposed to the 
microcosmic deceptions inherent i n D i c k ' ร wo rk . T rop ing this is the way eyes dominate 
Blade Runner, p rov id ing " the symbol ic core o f the f i l m ' ร representational c o n f l i c t . " 2 4 
(One w i t h psychoanalyt ic echoes o f H o f f m a n ' ร " T h e Sandman".) A n eye - we do not 
know whose - reflects the f ie ry cityscape at the start o f the f i l m ; the V o i g t - K a m p f f 
machine hones i n on eyes test ing the emot ional ref lexes o f the i r is ; a c loned o w l ' s eye 
gl ints a threatening red; Pris sprays her eyes w i t h b lack makeup; the panopt ic po l ice eye 
hovers i n the sky; and (a d i f ferent sort o f v is ion) the domestic sets are stocked w i t h 
photographs. The f i l m seems to want us to quest ion the re l iab i l i ty o f the eyes and 
perspectives, suggesting that rather than one object ive v i ew o f real i ty, real i ty is dependent 
on the angle o f each v iewer . I n one key scene, the replicants R o y Bat ty and Leon v is i t the 
workshop o f the genetic engineer o f their eyes, Chew, and Bat ty jokes to h i m : " I f on l y you 
could see what I ' ve seen w i t h your eyes." The semantics are hard to decipher at the 
moment o f watch ing the f i l m , and because i t is impossib le to imagine immedia te ly what i t 
wou ld be l i ke to see tíirough the eyes o f a craf tsman implanted into his creat ion look ing 
back at his maker, i t seems to deconstruct and interweave perspectives w i thou t presenting 
an alternative, o p t i m u m v is ion . The moment is symptomat ic , because even as i t shows 
through the represented eyes how many perspectives there m igh t potent ia l ly be, the f i l m 
denies us access to other v iewpo in ts , thereby prevent ing the connect ion between v iewer 
and character so central to D i c k ' ร no t ion o f empathy. 
The fact that Blade Runner is a f i l m means that i t w o u l d be w rong to see this alone 
as de fy ing the capacity f o r perspectivai re la t iv ism af forded b y the nove l ; as D i c k h imse l f 
noted, representing the nove l on screen w o u l d be inherent ly d i f f i cu l t because o f its t w o 
narrative strands i n Isidore and Deckard, and the fact that there are t w o v isua l ly ident ical 
Jack Boozer Jr., "Crash ing the Gates o f Insight: Blade Runner^ Ke rman 212-28. 
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characters in Rachel/Pr is. Further, the nove l is able to prov ide a logos for human ism by 
ref lect ing on the di f ference between its exp l ic i t textual signif iers and the way in w h i c h the 
empathie reader can de fy the objects or things they represent. W e are, for example, able to 
sympathise w i t h Deckard in spite o f his be ing described i n the lex icon o f robot ics. 
S igni f icant ly , however , Blade Runner act ive ly draws attention to these def ic i ts, ref lect ing 
on its o w n l imi ta t ions and the edi tor ia l process o f mak ing a cinematic v i s ion , as opposed to 
a textual one. The f i l m ' ร single camera lens is the on l y way in w h i c h we are a l lowed to 
k n o w the w o r l d o f the other, and that we cannot enter the consciousness o f other selves is 
not on l y an innate, fo rma l constraint o f the media but a didact ic emphasis o f the f i l m . The 
key scene in this respect occurs when Deckard inserts a pol ice photograph o f Leon 'ร 
apartment into the Esper computer, w h i c h zooms and, b izarre ly , pans around the comers o f 
the two-d imens iona l image to reveal and enhance features not present at normal 
magni f ica t ion or occluded behind scenery i n the photograph. A s w e l l as rei terat ing the 
paranoid excess o f this survei l lance c i ty , i t is a clear metacr i t ical analogue for the process 
o f f raming and edi t ing per formed b y the mov ie we watch, showing how t ruth (wh i ch is 
what the detective seeks) can be essential ly fabr ica ted . 2 6 D r a w i n g attention to the process 
through w h i c h a part icular story is v iewed, the detect ion t r o u g h a h igh-tech magn i f y i ng 
glass is analogous to the fake pol ice precinct , w h i c h is absent f r o m the f i l m adaptation. 
That or ig ina l scene pul ls us through the epistemological challenge. Proposing that 
Deckard 'ร eyes (v ia w h i c h we experience the nove l ) may themselves be suspect lßce the 
androids he pursues, the language i n w h i c h his m i n d is described undermines this 
supposit ion and takes us to a plateau o f secure understanding about his humani ty . Though 
this raises further mora l questions about whether a good bounty hunter should extend 
empathy to androids, the state o f the w o r l d i n w h i c h those d i lemmas exist is u l t imate ly 
t rus twor th i ly narrated, showing that the reader w h o invests consciousness in i t is capable o f 
something androids are not : mak ing subtle ethical judgements. I n this case we decide 
Deckard is more humane, even though he is able to empathise w i t h androids. The key 
Ph i l ip K. D i c k , "Notes on Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" 1968， Sut in , 
155-61. Inc idental ly , D i c k imagined Gregory Peck p lay ing the part o f R i c k Deckard, w i t h 
Grace S l ick as the v ibrant hard g i r l , " Rachel . 
2 6 Rutger Hauer, w h o p layed Bat ty , he ld to this interpretat ion o f this scene. 
Sammon 146. Giu l iana Brano also extracts this scene as par t icu lar ly s igni f icant i n Giu l iana 
Bruno, "Ramb le C i t y : Postmodernism and Blade Runner, October 41 (1981): 61-74. 
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di f ference between book and f i l m is that, i n the latter, w e are never sure whether Deckard 
is an android or human at root. A s is exempl i f ied in the Esper device, the f i l m raises the 
possib i l i ty o f mu l t ip le perspectives wh i ls t nevertheless be ing the on ly perspective we are 
permit ted. L i k e the p rob lem o f consciousness itself, the pr ivate eye'ร v i ew o f the w o r l d 
remains l i tera l ly pr ivate, and so they are always potent ia l ly those o f a repl icant. For 
example, Deckard 'ร eyes b r ie f l y flash red, l i ke those o f the androids or o f the ar t i f ic ia l o w l 
i n T y r e l ľ s o f f i ce ; in the D i rec to r ' ร Cut (see note 18 above), the restored un icorn dream 
sequence resonates w i t h G a f f s o r igami ca l l ing card at the end, i m p l y i n g that G a f f knows 
l i tera l ly what is i n Deckard 'ร implanted memor ies; G a f f s par t ing comment to Deckard, 
" Y o u ' v e done a man 's j o b , S i r " contains a double signi f icance. However , these gl impses 
wh i ch disturb onto logy at the microcosmic level (is Deckard a repl icant?), are g iven a 
power fu l tw is t by be ing contained w i t h i n a f i l m that attends to its o w n manufactured 
status, its macrocosmic onto logy. The Esper device ties this poss ib i l i ty o f ar t i f ice w i t h i n 
the character to the g lobal art i f ice o f the f i l m as a process. Before hon ing i n on the snake 
scales, the Esper device pauses over a newspaper conta in ing an advert for an Or ienta l 
restaurant, remind ing us that our f i rs t sight o f Deckard was o f h i m reading his newspaper 
whi ls t wa i t ing for a table at a noodle bar; i t also pauses on a textured wh isky glass l i ke that 
Deckard dr inks f r o m ; f i na l l y , the apartment i n the photograph looks, in its sepia 
co lourat ion, very s imi lar to Deckard 'ร as represented i n the f i l m set. Deckard explains to 
Rachel that the photographs o f her mother are designed to bolster her false, implanted 
memories. Bu t i f a photograph gives the i l lus ion o f memory , then the photographs or f i l m 
images that relay Deckard 's character to the v iewer cou ld be intended to g ive a mis leading 
impression, this t ime i m p l y i n g Deckard is an android when in fact he is human. Th rough 
the metacr i t ical Esper device, the f i l m demonstrates that w e have no way o f k n o w i n g other 
than itself, and i t defies any oppor tun i ty to get at the t ru th o f D e c k a r ď ร ident i ty. Though 
Scott insisted that Deckard had to be a repl icant, i n fact the f i l m is more subtle and the 
interpretat ion more ambiguous than Scott 's retrospective emphasis suggests, and is never 
conf i rmed one way or the other, on l y raised as a poss ib i l i t y . 2 7 A s K e v i n McNamara 
observes, though Scott may have intended Deckard as a repl icant, i f he is de f in i t i ve ly so 
we "have another rather uninterest ing do֊I-wake-or-do֊I-sleep puzzle rather than a w i n d o w 
into pos tmodern i t y . " 2 8 A s i t is, epistemology remains i n l imbo : there are always other 
2 7 R id ley Scott, "D i rec t i ng Alien and Blade Runner: A n In terv iew w i t h R id ley 
Scot t , " Peary 293-302. 
2 8 McNamara 435. 
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views of the world to be had, from which the facts wi l l appear different. In tying the 
artifice of the f i lmic process (and its analogue in the Esper device) to the potential artifice 
within Deckard, then, the f i lm takes the ontological concern of the microcosmic - whether 
Deckard is replicant or human ― and broadens the ontological questioning to include itself. 
This is the example of the ontology-epistemology feedback loop I wrote about in chapter 4: 
the practical and local ontological issue about whether an agent is human or not spills into 
the more abstract epistemological question about how we could discern difference in 
principle, which in turn leads us to doubt the verifiability of reality in general, leaving the 
identity of the individual even less certain. In Dick's work the fact that a narrative exists in 
the first place, and that we stand outside it as sympathetic readers, allows us to break from 
this hermeneutic circle. However, it is this expansion so that the narrative is itself caught 
up in the culture of simulacra that it critiques which is the characteristic difference of 
Blade Runner. And that this is a more symptomatic quality of the postmodern condition is 
evidenced by one of the most prominent postmodernist cybernetic fictions, itself 
influenced by Scott'ร f i lm, The Matrix. 
Into Postmodernism 
Jean Baudrillard hailed Dick as expressing the idea of the simulacrum in his stories: 
it is not about a parallel universe, a double universe, or even a possible 
universe - neither possible, impossible, neither real nor unreal: hyperreal -
it is universe of simulation, which is something else altogether. And not 
because Dick speaks specifically of simulacra ᅳ science fiction has always 
done so, but it played on the double, on doubling or redoubling, either 
artificial or imaginary, whereas here the double has disappeared, there is no 
longer a double, one is always already in the other world, which is no longer 
an other, without a mirror, a projection, or a Utopia that can reflect i t . 2 9 
Whilst it is not ՏԱՓՈՏ1Ո§ that Baudrillard alights upon Dick, contrary to Baudrillard's 
analysis I have argued that whilst (like much of Dick'ร oeuvre) Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep? plays with the idea of the simulacrum, it does not concede that there is no 
ontology of difference. There is a stable ground from outside the simulation by which it is 
possible to know the original and real, and the mirror and unreal. The "precinct" episode 
reflects on the reader'ร exteriority: we are detached from the novel's world so that we can 
Baudrillard, Simulacra 125. 
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read it as a critical metaphor, able empathically (and therefore morally) to project our 
consciousness across from our reality to the distinct fictional one, even though fiction and 
the android are phenomenologically parallel as mechanisms calculated to deceive. 
Whilst Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is certainly more engaged with the 
postmodern than 2001 of the same year, jumping ahead two decades to Blade Runner 
highlights the degree to which both works cling to a humanistic centre, anticipating a body 
of readers and viewers able to make sense of a world of simulations through the 
discriminatory power of narrative. Scott'ร is a far more problematic work than Dick'ร, for 
not only is the urban world of Blade Runner fu l l of Baudrillardian simulations, these are 
paradigms of the simulátory nature of the global f ict ion, the f i lm itself, which contains 
them. Whilst the f i lm is a critical response to the pressures of commercialism and civic 
surveillance, it also partakes of it in presenting proliferating images of eyes and doubles, 
and in refusing to allow entry into the multiple perspectives and identities which it 
teasingly suggests are available. A move to the other side of the mirror is denied, because 
f i lm is itself shown as a self-replicating genre, wi th the possibility of alternative 
perspectives providing the best access to the "reality" always compromised by the 
directorial process. Nevertheless, the most successful aspect of the f i lm, unanimously 
acknowledged even by reviewers who disliked it overall, is the realistic portrayal of the 
city of the future. I f truth within the city is always hard to f ind, in its detailed rendering the 
city seems immediately and directly present to the viewer, its architectural reality 
substituting for the lack of psychological truth within the characters who inhabit i t . 3 0 Even 
though the future is envisioned as a dark urban space, in contrast to 200ľ s immense 
prospect, like Kubrick'ร f i lm visual realism in Blade Runner compensates for potential 
allegorical anarchy, grounding it to some degree in a mimetic mode which therefore 
implicit ly believes that there is a reality to be represented in the first place. The Matrix, 
however, takes Baudrillard's assumptions completely into the logical hermeneutics of its 
visualisation. The Matrix takes the ontological complexity of Scott's work to a deeper level 
by drawing attention to the reality-warp of its computerised special effects. It thereby 
compromises our belief not оฝy in the fiction but in Cartesian reality itself. Our viewing 
minds really can be deceived - for are we not taken in by the high-resolution realism of the 
fi lm? ᅳ but there is no essential reality or truth which that deception conceals. 
3 0 The most infamously damning review which nevertheless admired Blade 
Runners visual effects was Pauline Kael, "Baby, the Rain Must Fal l ," rev. of Blade 
Runner, dir. Ridley Scott, The New Yorker 12 July 1982: 82-85. 
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Chapter 7. Deserting Reality: The Matrix as Postmodem Theory 
As Brian McHale points out, science fiction generally is the ontological genre, 
since as a "literature of cognitive estrangement" (to use Darko Suvin'ร phrase), it confronts 
the empirical givens of our world with something not given, outside (or estranged) from it, 
in a way which demands our cognitive іпїефгеЇаїіоп of any connections between'the two. 
Science fiction thus "obeys the same underlying principles of ontological poetics as 
postmodernist f ict ion." 1 According to McHale'ร model in which epistemology and 
ontology slip into each other, our іп!ефгеїаІіоп of the overlap between the worlds of the 
scientific present and possible futures, reality and fiction, ensures that these ontological 
collisions simultaneously pose more general epistemological questions about reality. 
Science fiction is always concerned to some degree with epistemology, asking how our 
assumptions about an imagined heterocosm relate to the real world, and how the nature of 
the present might inform the future. In the previous two chapters, we witnessed the way in 
which the epistemological issues raised in all three fictions swelled so as to include, by 
1982, the practice of narrative itself. Blade Runner is epistemologically sceptical toough 
an ontological collision of science and fiction: it presents a realistically extrapolated i f 
quirkily retrofitted cityscape which nevertheless is potentially unrealistic at its heart, since 
reality is always already formulated from the position of an arbitrary observer. Because the 
f i lm itself is ontologically questionable in making commensurate the future and the 
present, the replicant and the detective, the epistemological conditions of postmodern 
reality are also under question. 
In The Matrix, we see this ontological conflict taken to the most extreme degree 
and given an ironically subversive twist: the possibility The Matrix presents is that reality 
itself is as fabricated as the fiction which is supposedly ontologically distinct from it. In 
The Matrix, the ontological supposition is dualist in the Cartesian sense: humans are bodily 
batteries serving the power needs of machines, with reality actually a computer-simulated 
construct, the "neural-interactive simulation" called the Matrix, designed to keep those 
bodies functioning without rebellion. 2 Rather than being a wholly fantastic or cognitively 
1 McHale, Postmodernist Fiction 60. 
2 In this chapter, the italicised The Matrix designates the f i lm as an artefact, whilst 
the capitalised "the Matr ix" denotes the program operating within it. Except where 
specified otherwise, all primary quotations from The Matrix are taken from The Matrix, 
dir. Andy Wachowski and Larry Wachowski, perf. Keanu Reeves, Laurence Fishburn, 
Carrie-Anne Moss and Hugo Weaving, 1999, D V D , Warner Brothers, 2006. The 
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estranged premise, however, this ontological dualism must lead to an epistemological 
challenge for the viewer, who has sat immobile through a similar construct ― the f i lm The 
Matrix - which relies heavily on computer-generated imagery and which, as a Hollywood 
blockbuster, exemplifies the culture of reproduction it critiques. To apply the 
demonic/daemonic distinction I elaborated in chapter 1， the demonic premise that we are 
possessed by a simulation is daemonically mediated by comparable technological methods 
This thereby exemplifies Baudrillard'ร condition of the hyperreal. In this chapter, I w i l l 
argue that at the stylistic level, The Matrix theorises postmodernism in a more successful 
description of the conditions of late modernity than academic critical theory, particularly 
Jean Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation, upon which The Matrix draws. Whilst the 
daemonic mechanism may be part of its irony, as an example of cyberpunk The Matrix 
performs accordmg to McHale'ร understanding of the genre, managing "to actualize or 
literalize what in postmodernist poetics normally appears as a metaphor at the level of 
language, structure or the material medium." 3 Rather than simply figuring disintegration, 
the fictional worlds of суЬефипк include "phenomena embodying and illustrating the 
problematics of selfhood: human-machine symbiosis, artificial mtelligence, biologically 
engineered alter egos, and so on . " 4 Thus The Matrix is paradigmatic of cybernetic culture 
and postmodern theory, and a creative and innovative f i lm as well as a popular 
screenplay I use in some places is the shooting script. This was followed in its entirely in 
the production of the f i lm, though portions were edited out post-production. Larry 
Wachowski and Andy Wachowski, "The Matrix: Shooting Script," The Art о/The Matrix, 
ed. Spencer Lamm (London: Titan, 2000) 271-394.1 wi l l not be referring to the two 
subsequent f i lms, The Matrix Reloaded (2003) and The Matrix Revolutions (2003) in this 
chapter. This is because, although the Wachowski brothers retrospectively claimed that 
The Matrix was conceived as part of a trilogy, there is no evidence that the later two fi lms 
were ever more than germs of stories when the first was released. The Wachowskis had 
trouble placing The Matrix with a studio, and it was only after its somewhat unexpected 
success that tne later f i lms were rolled out in the same year. The first f i lm is clearly a 
neatly contained narrative unit, albeit one in which the Matrix ambiguously continues to 
exist rather than being definitively destroyed; in contrast, the later two fi lms are far weaker 
narratives. The latter also didactically explicate philosophical questions üirough the guise 
of pseudo-Socratic "Architect" character, whereas The Matrix allows these simply, Dut 
more effectively, to emerge through the plot and the initial concept. 
3 Brian McHale, "Elements of a Poetics of СуЬефипк" 150. 
4 Brian McHale, "Elements of a Poetics of СуЬефипк" 159. 
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blockbuster. Nevertheless, the postmodern element and the engagement with Baudrillard is 
not so much the consequence of the Wachowski brothers' desire to theorise postmodernism 
in any strong sense, but rather (and more interestingly) is the legacy of its generic 
relationship to суЬефипк and the fact that the computer had - by the late 1990ร - become 
a readily accessible metaphor for the experience of simulation so that the postmodern 
somehow seems entirely natural and appropriate to this form of fiction. The postmodern 
has become such a dominant episteme, and cyberpunk such an intense genre, that it is hard 
to see how any f i lm invoking computers could actually avoid engaging wi th the idea of the 
simulacrum. Indeed, Baudrillard'ร Simulacra derives from the early 1980ร, and the two 
decades' lapse implies that this was not innovatively picked up by the Wachowski 
brothers, but more that retrospectively it provided appropriate theoretical endorsement for 
the f i lm. Long theorised, the postmodern hyperreal had to wait unti l the rise of computing 
to give it a metaphorical form, firstly in the guise of literary cyberpunk, and then, as 
special effects advanced, in the cinematic medium. A t this point, the metaphor could 
become self-sustaining, demonstrating the postmodern condition through resonating with 
the everyday experience of personal computers rather than via the didactic academic essay. 
In a sense, the coincidental situatedness of The Matrix within postmodern culture is 
more striking. The problem faced by The Matrix and its viewers is essential to 
postmodernity. As Frederic Jameson theorises, i f postmodernism is the product of late 
capitalism then " 'culture' has become a product in its own right," and as such cultural 
fictions are unable to make any objective political critique of that moment. 5 This paradox 
was exemplified in the contrast between Dick'ร novel and Scott's f i lm discussed 
previously. Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? finds grounds for humanism in 
empathy, but presents the novel as a non-commercial means by which this might be 
energised (in contrast to the Hollywood-Style religion of Mercerism). But in Blade Runner, 
f i lm itself becomes almost anti-humanist, since it contributes to and reflects the culture of 
duplication current throughout a city space which is loaded with the signifiers of 
oppressive civi l and industrial power. Under conditions of this sort, efforts to describe a 
totalizing system produce an ironic result, as Jameson observes: 
What happens is that the more powerful the vision of some increasingly 
total system or logic...the more powerless the reader comes to feel. Insofar 
as the theorist wins, therefore, by constructing an increasingly closed and 
5 Jameson, Postmodernism X . 
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terrifying machine, to the very degree he loses, since the critical capacity of 
his work is thereby paralyzed, and the impulses of negation and revolt, not 
to speak of those of social transformation, are increasingly perceived as vain 
and trivial in the face of the model itself.6 
What could better exemplify a "closed and terrifying machine" than The Matrix! 
According to Jameson, any attempt to tie historical elaboration to moral evaluation - as 
Marx achieved, for example - can now lead only into deeper irony, since the more one 
emphasises the historically-specific nature of the system, the harder it becomes to break 
from it from within that moment. Particularly i f the viewer of this high-tech movie is also a 
user of computer games or the internet which seem to facilitate a dualist separation of mind 
from body in everyday experience ֊ allowing the mind to wander the corridors of System 
Shock behind the screen whilst the body is concentrated on the few commands of the 
keyboard interface - he or she therefore appears logically capable of being deceived to the 
extent that the supposed fiction of one literal "terrifying machine," the Matrix, premises. 
This is thoroughly disorientating, treating reality and fiction not as separate but as 
commensurate ontologies, a nightmare from which it is impossible to awake because 
imagining and being are one and the same. Such a condition is a total demonic delusion. So 
total, in fact, that ironically there need be no reference to demons in the f i lm in order to 
invoke this framework. The lack of an explicitly demonic reference is indeed the strongest 
proof that the deceit is so complete that it does not need any explicit metaphor to vouch for 
its existence; I w i l l return to this ironic lack of a demon to signify the delusion at the end of 
this chapter. 
The Matrix is a postmodern work that exploits "the heterotopian space of the zone, 
where incommensurable spaces are juxtaposed or superimposed," a Borgesian or 
Baudrillardian parable of a map as large as the country it represents, so that the country 
becomes its own map. 7 Where postmodern science fiction differs from its earlier forms is 
that the revelation of the simulation does not necessarily return us to a higher level of 
reality from which we entered the f ict ion, just as postmodern theory contends that language 
cannot provide a transparent representation of reality because it is inherently self 
referential, referring us only to other linguistic forms through the process of differance. In 
the fake precinct episode of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? we seem to become 
3 Jameson, Postmodernism 6. 
' McHale, Postmodernism 163. 
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trapped beneath three layers of deception: looking through the eyes of an android, at a 
simulated police station inhabited by other androids, within a fictional novel. But the 
realisation as to the true nature of the first two levels - that Deckard is not an android and 
that the police station is actually a fake reproduction of that at which Deckard genuinely 
works - restores our confidence in the veracity of the narration within the last level. As it 
takes us out of the mirror image precinct and its duplicitous android-policemen, the novel 
becomes the signifier of its own truth that imaginative empathy denotes the human. On the 
other hand, in postmodern fictions like The Matrix we do not necessarily return teough the 
deceptions to the level of reality from which we originally began watching. This is 
particularly true of f i lm , which we perceive with less analytical distance than with 
literature which can be read at our own governed pace. As Douglas Hofstader observes in 
his study of recursivity in science and the arts, "When you pop out of a movie-within֊a-
movie you feel for a moment as i f you had reached the real world, though you are still one 
level from the top." 8 This is true of the Esper device in Blade Runner, which draws 
attention to the editorial process of constructing truth so that we are left knowing we are 
still within a movie a level removed from reality, even once the sequence ends. More 
dramatically in The Matrix, when we are told that the reality that resembles our own world 
is in fact a simulation, we do not immediately recover to know The Matrix as a movie but 
simply and provocatively as one other possible manifestation of the Matrix. To use the 
f i lm'ร own Carrollian analogy, to take the red pi l l that shows us the supposed truth is not to 
cure the symptoms of simulacra but only to go deeper into the rabbit hole. The existence of 
the Matrix simulation ensures that the fictional narrative crosses into the reality of the 
world beyond the f i lm: the fact that I am captivated by The Matrix is proof of the existence 
of an economically imprisoning Matrix. It is only on certain levels, which I explore in the 
second part of this chapter, that we are encouraged to watch The Matrix knowing it as a 
movie within which is embedded a wholly-fictional Matrix that is comparatively a 
simulation as opposed to genuine reality. 
Descartes and Plato 
Firstly, though, it is worth emphasising the extent to which we are disorientatingly 
embedded within the alternative reality of the f ict ion, to a degree which problematises our 
ability to gain a critical angle on the reality of late capitalism and postmodern culture. This 
8 Douglas Hofstadter, Godei1 Escher, Bach: The Eternal Golden Braid (New York: 
Basic, 1979) 184. 
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effect can be measured by noting how far we are removed from the Cartesian deceit, in a 
way unlike the narratives of the previous chapters, and in spite of the fact that the f i lm is 
premised on Cartesian dualism (that minds can occupy a different imaginative world to 
bodies lying in vats). As I suggested in chapter 4， the deceiving demon is ultimately 
productive because it constitutes an epistemological buffer zone between the real and the 
temporarily virtual. Because the theological preconditions of God's potentia Dei ordinata 
anticipate that demonic deceit cannot really be allowed, Descartes can choose to confront 
doubt as only a theoretical possibility, one which as a virtual imagining provides the 
foundations from which realism and rationality may be asserted. The fundamental 
difference between Descartes' sceptical doubt and that of The Matrix is that whilst 
Descartes chooses to enter that ground knowing that, in principle, he is always protected by 
theology, The Matrix is an imposed deceit that anticipates no such philosophical armour, 
and consequently no such distinction between fabrication and the world. As Michael 
Will iams observes, "scepticism creeps up on the classical sceptic, as the result of his 
persistent inability to brmg disputes to a definite conclusion," a remark that not only points 
to Descartes' break with classical epistemology, but which also hints that postmodernism 
is a revisiting of this sceptical aspect of classical thought. 9 As I argued in chapter 2, 
Haraway'ร cyborg attempts to recuperate the emotional and subjective quality of scientific 
knowledge, and it is no coincidence that it thereby echoes the pre-Enlightenment debate 
about monsters and demons. In The Matrix, likewise, postmodern thought bypasses the 
Cartesian model and revisits an earlier episteme. 
In this case, the philosophical model of truth and deception upon which The Matrix 
is founded appears to be less Descartes' deceiving demon, and more Plato'ร allegory of the 
prisoners in the cave. 1 0 Whilst rationality is perceived by post-Enlightenment thinkers as 
the way of obtaining absolute and finite truth in a formal scientific system that cannot be 
manipulated by ideology, postmodernism is more sceptical, presenting truth as something 
socially constructed. This political context provides the impetus for a move we witness in 
both Blade Runner and The Matrix^ as they attempt to represent not only the bleakness of a 
contemporary social reality ᅳ Los Angeles in Ridley Scott's vision and Chicago in The 
9 Michael Wil l iams, "Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt," Essays on 
Descartes' Meditations, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkley, СА: и of California p， 
1986)120. 
1 0 John Partridge, "Plato's Cave and The Matrix'' The Matrix Trilogy^ 20 March 
2003, Warner Brothers, 5 March 2008 
<http://whatisthematrix.wamerbros.com/rl_cmp/new_phil_partridge.html>. 
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Matrix - but also the impossibility of dissembling such a political context, since there are 
no conditions extraneous to an information-based late capitalism that are not themselves 
also representations or discourses. The concept of the deceiving demon seems appropriate 
when the issue is the ontological negotiation of the boundaries between self and other, man 
and machine, as in 2001 and of Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? However, by 
subsuming man as a product of a machine, and the representation of f i lm as one more 
product of the system it seeks to deconstruct, The Matrix confronts a different problem. 
Through a Cartesian cogito we would have no basis of perceiving any such schism 
between reality and simulation at the level of macrocosmic ontology. The cogito is 
inherently solipsistic, such that only the ego thinking can know itself to exist for sure as the 
centre of his or her phenomenological universe. Cartesianism caimot therefore validate the 
nature of the Matrix, since although the cogito would indeed provide something true for 
that individual wired up to the simulation, the quality of that truth would a priori accord to 
the machine'ร terms as a high-fidelity simulation manipulating that person'ร subjective 
process. The machine would have allowed that thought to happen in the first place, giving 
the appearance of realities whilst still being in control of the way these simulations are 
presented.1 1 
Whilst Descartes determines rationality by pull ing himself up though his logical 
bootstraps in a meditative mode available to anyone capable of conscious reasoning, for 
Plato the individual must be goaded to confront reality rather than representation tfeough 
outside intervention by those with superior knowledge; only üirough their continued efforts 
w i l l the philosophers force the prisoners to turn away from the forms of shadows on the 
wall and see the light of the real. 1 2 This is more amenable to a socially, rather than a 
rationally, situated problem of the true and the false. Morpheus reveals to Neo the blasted 
landscape that is real Earth: 
MORPHEUS. The Matrix is everywhere, it 's all around us, here even in this 
room. You can see it out your window, or on your television. You feel it 
I agree here with Lyle Zynda that The Matrix shows that science cannot provide 
certainty, and that The Matrix deconstructs the feasibility of the realist position. Lyle 
Zynda, The Nature of Reality and Why it Matters," Taking the Red Pill: Science1 
Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix, ed. Glenn Yeffeth (Chichester: Summersdale, 
2003) 43-55. 
1 2 Plato, Republic, trans, and introd. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993) 
240-45. 
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when you go to work, or go to church or pay your taxes. It is the world that 
has been pulled over your eyes to blind you from the truth. 
NEO. What truth? 
MORPHEUS. That you are a slave, Neo. That you, like everyone else, you 
were born into bondage, born into a prison that you cannot smell, taste, or 
touch. A prison for your mind. 
Platonism speaks of the diff iculty of attaining and transmitting knowledge, rather than 
implying that rationality is available to all who think (Descartes' terms). When the prisoner 
is forced to look into the fire, Plato speculates that it would "hurt his eyes," that he would 
turn back to the shadows he could make out, and that he would have to be "dragged 
forcibly away from there up the rough, steep slope," at which point the sun would cause 
h im "pain and distress." Whereas Descartes argues for the grounds by which empirical 
realism can be attained by al l , for Plato, the fact that there is a reality "out there" is not in 
doub t - jus t that reaching the real is impossible to fol low without outside guidance by 
those already with privileged access to it, the philosopher kings who are capable of 
inculcating moral and epistemologica! certainty in their subjects toough the dialectical 
method. As well as in the explicit reference to the "prisoner" passage, The Matrix'ร 
contextualisation within a Platonic framework is performed visually. I f Descartes' 
rhetorical mode is meditative, an aesthetic maintained by 2,007, the Platonic thought 
experiment relies on spatial metaphors: inside the cave and outside in the light, the 
prisoners situated between the fire and the screen. So in The Matrix the real world is 
marked as an underworld, as ships fly through the old Earthly sewer system, with Zion, the 
centre for the resistance, located near the Earth'ร core. Symbolically, deeper access to the 
truth is gained by literally descending beneath the layers of the Matrix simulation into 
labyrinthine caves and tunnels. After choosing the red pi l l which w i l l force h im to confront 
the deception, Neo falls through the mirror in the Matrix and wakes in a vat in the machine 
world (in a shot subversively reminiscent of the foetus in 2001); he then plunges down a 
tube-like gut, being abjected from the machine as a non-believer. 1 3 Oddly, given the 
violence of the f i lm generally, this is perhaps the most visceral and disturbing sequence, 
enacting a rhetoric of bodily scatology to induce queasiness in the viewer. This sequence 
1 3 Although not something I w i l l apply in this chapter, it might be instructive to 
read The Matrix's spatial conception of the machine/human dichotomy in terms of Lakoff 
and Johnson'ร work on embodied metaphor. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors 
We Live By (Chicago: บ of Chicago p， 1980). 
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patterns the diff iculty of confronting reality for Neo, who is, Мофһеи8 notes, the oldest 
person yet recovered from the machinie consciousness. Like Plato'ร prisoners, most are too 
embedded in the simulation ever to recover. As Morpheus explains, "There is a rule that 
we do not free a mind once it reaches a certain age. It is dangerous. They have trouble 
letting go. Their mind turns against them." The Cartesian ego is versatile and egalitarian, 
since i f doubt is a fundamental condition of humanity, ironically it is the one thing 
therefore that allows anyone to know themselves to be humanly conscious. In Plato'ร 
metaphysics, though, one has instead to be goaded and pushed into confrontmg the world 
in reality rather than its simulation or form. Like the Christian disciple or like Neo ᅳ whose 
name is anagrammatic for the One ― you have to be chosen and taught from those already 
outside. The saviour narrative is pessimistic, in that truth from outside the system it is 
brought to the individual within it, and inculcated toough the Socratic method. 
Where The Matrix breaks from Plato is that in a secular age no such dialectical 
saviour may be forthcoming. In the presence of escapist means like cinema or drugs, the 
reality of everyday l ife as represented by the uncannily familiar Matrix world of 1999 may 
not be so bad or prison-like that we perceive the need to be educated out of it. As a 
contemporary viewer, it is hard not to sympathise wi th Cypher, who negotiates with Agent 
Smith to have himself reinserted into the Matrix, preferring to eat unreal but juicy steak 
rather than the real but tasteless protein gruel eaten by the crew of the Nebuchadnezzar. 
Because the world of the Matrix is representatively our own modern world, is indeed a 
visually perfect mimesis of the present, rejecting all our previous assumptions may be 
more difficult. A t this point, one might also note The Matrix'ร affinity wi th Plato's critique 
of poetry as a representation that is bent to the demands of something or someone else, 
intended from the outset to deceive and hence to be mistrusted as a way of teaching society 
about the true and the real, and hence the moral. Plato argues that to dream is to mistake a 
likeness for reality, and that just as something cannot be simultaneously real and unreal, 
belief about the truth cannot be the same thing as knowledge of the truth. So spectators of 
theatre or readers of poetry "can see a plurality of beautiful things but not beauty 
itself.. .they only ever entertain beliefs, and do not know any of the things they bel ieve." 1 4 
In the same way, Jameson argues that culture cannot provide any objective analysis of the 
conditions of society, because it too is bound up with the process of simulation that is 
inherent to late capitalism. It is not that there is no such thing as objective truth (as some 
1 4 Plato, Republic 196-202. 
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believe postmodernism to argue), just that obtaining it is always performed through 
subjective belief systems. Of course, Plato's argument should be qualified as being only a 
Utopian ideal, not necessarily practicable in reality. The question then is whether a creative 
or didactic mode of educating the "prisoner" is best. Plato privileges the philosophical 
approach, with the result being that his society is oligarchic and class divided. In this line, 
postmodern theory can be similarly elitist, as its writ ing style appeals to a fairly small 
community of academics. Thus, though mass market narratives or representations offer a 
contradictory means of critiquing the simulation culture of which they form part, to an 
audience not grounded in Platonic, Cartesian or postmodern reasoning, the f i lm might 
provide a better access to the truth by making those arguments accessible at the level of the 
visual and the metaphorical, particularly through the vernacular trope of the computer. 
The Matrix as Postmodem Theory 
The problem of obtaining a critical angle on the culture of simulacra, and 
provoking the confrontation with reality, is symptomatised by Baudrillard'ร Simulacra. In 
the f i lm the hacker code Neo sells is concealed within a copy of this book; Morpheus 
welcomes Neo to Baudrillard'ร "desert of the real"; and the shooting script also included 
Мофһеи8 instructing Neo that "You have been l iv ing inside a dreamworld, Neo. As in 
Baudrillard'ร vision, your whole life has been spent inside the map, not the terri tory." 1 5 For 
Baudrillard, as for Plato, it is hard to gain a perspective that breaks toough the 
representation to the original event upon which judgement can be cast. Baudrillard'ร 
hyperreal system is a powerful example of Jameson'ร "nicreasingly closed and terrifying 
machine," the assertion that we suffer from the merging of a formal idea of representation 
with the reality of which it is mirror. 
In Baudrillard'ร writ ing, this process is so extensive that it extends to manipulate 
reality itself so as to bend the laws of physics. In one example, Baudrillard argues that 
power stages its own murder to rediscover its legitimacy; hence "The Kennedys died 
because they incarnated something, whereas the new presidents are nothing but caricatures 
and fake f i lm ᅳ curiously, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, all have this simian mug, the monkeys of 
power." 1 6 Here, in the interests of exposing the totality of the system, reality is not the 
physical realm in which abstract ideas (the desire to k i l l a president) are exercised; rather 
1 5 Wachowski and Wachowski, "The Matrix: Shooting Script" 310. 
Baudrillard, Simulacra 24. 
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the idea of political power actively modifies reality. Though both Lee Harvey Oswald and 
Samuel Byck (Nixon'ร would-be assassin) were both intending to k i l l , according to 
Baudrillard's logic Oswald'ร bullets reached their target not because he was a good shot, 
but because they swerved to the demands of power, whilst Nixon "was not even found 
worthy of dying at the hands of the most insignificant, chance, unbalanced person" (note 
the passive construction here, as i f power itself, not a person, determines whether a 
president w i l l be k i l led) . 1 7 It would be disingenuous to take Baudrillard at face value, just 
as his assertion that the Gulf war never happened was not an empirical claim but a playful 
j ibe at the way in which experience of the war was mediated through the live reporting by 
embedded journalists. With deliberate ludism, Simulacra is designed to stage its own 
entanglement within postmodernism by defying causal logic. But even i f Baudrillard'ร 
ultimate point is right, and terrorism (successful or failed) can be used to enforce a leader'ร 
political status, his mode of analysis can offer no plausible alternatives; in the absence of 
pragmatic instruction, playful iconoclasm is the only alternative. Indeed, Istvan Csicsery-
Ronay has illustrated that Baudrillard'ร work (and Donna Haraway'ร) are best understood 
as themselves science fictional "narratives producing and hyperbolizing the new 
immanence." 1 8 Baudrillard contended that "the good old imaginary of science fiction is 
dead," because the indeterminacy of the hyperreal has made reality stranger than the 
imagination. 1 9 However, given the problems with postmodern critical style, f i lmic science 
fictions like The Matrix do retain a critical capacity of sorts, and compared to theory they 
are better placed to didactically engage with their audiences. I f postmodern criticism is 
itself realised tfeough hyperbolic form rather than logic, then perhaps mainstream science 
fiction might provide a more optimum perspective on the present, without being directly 
exposed as being itself a product о/that present. This is because - in a point Csiscerey-
Ronay misses in his comparison between theory and fiction - science fiction has no 
ultimate pretensions to fact, though its fiction may be informed by them, whereas 
Baudrillard'ร theory is intended to make claims to knowledge of sorts, no matter how 
contingent. Thus in Simulacra Baudrillard's analysis of the cause of successfully targeted 
assassinations seems absurdist, in a way not true of the bullet-time effect of The Matrix -
1 7 Baudrillard, Simulacra 24. 
1 8 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, "The SF of Theory: Baudrillard and Haraway," Science 
Fiction Studies 18.3 (1991), Science Fiction Studies11 May 2008 
<http://www.depauw.edu/SFs/backissues/55/icr55art.htm>. 
Baudrillard, Simulacra 121. 
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both, though, aim to draw attention to the way the ստսփՅէւօո of political power requires an 
act of violence. In science fiction, cognitively de-estranging the ontology of fiction from 
that of science redirects the hermeneutic work achieved by a critical theory. Rather than 
trying to decipher a text whose meaning cannot be finally determined (since it is precisely 
Baudrillard'ร point that truth is invisible) we decipher the aesthetic quality of The Matrix 
as a fictional representation of reality, regardless of whether that reality is itself really an 
overarching fiction or Matrix. Even i f we live in the Matrix, The Matrix can still be known 
as a sub-fictional product of that overall fictional condition, a mise-en֊abyme that is 
therefore not the original, broader simulation itself. Discerning the similarities and 
differences between these ontological zones, fictional-reality and fiction-in-fictional-
reality, becomes a way of recovering from the potential that the world is always already a 
representational construct. Even i f reality is solipsistically perceived, wi th no common 
truth out there, there are stil l scales, qualities and forms of simulation. Deciphering these in 
the genre of science fiction (or deciding the degree to which fiction is the reflection of 
truth) is both a critical, and hence Platonic activity, even i f it does not (cannot) lead to 
final, Cartesian answers. However, though it cannot provide a critical view from nowhere 
on late capitalism, The Matrix 9 ร conceit of the Matrix provides a view from somewhere 
within the logic of the simulated world. 
The Matrix m The Matrix 
I f the late twentieth century is characterised by the advent of an information 
economy, 2 0 central to The Matrix 1 ร critical intention is an elaboration and critique of the 
conditions of this period, using the metaphor of the computer. In The Matrix, the oppressor 
is a cybernetic system, the Matrix, and the incarnation of that system is a replicating Agent 
Smith, a grey-suited everyman bureaucrat. Agent Smith idealises the capitalist subject: 
"You work for a respectable софогаЇіоп, you have a social security number, and you pay 
your taxes." Neo, who is called Thomas Anderson in this world, is a computer software 
engineer, who occupies a Dilbert-esque booth in his job for the multi-national CorTechs 
(note the homophone). A t the start of the f i lm, his autocratic boss (who not coincidentally 
resembles Agent Smith) condemns his erratic behaviour. The moral we are mtended to 
draw is that Anderson is l ike a malfunctioning subroutine in a wider economic program. 
We recognise that we viewers are as anonymous as Anderson or Smith, metonymie suits 
James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins 
of the Information Society (Cambridge, M A : Harvard UP, 1986). 
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working in offices and restoring ourselves through a brief trip to the cinema where we can 
escape vicariously through the superhero, just as Neo escapes the boredom of life üirough 
hacking into cyberspace. 
A t what point did control switch over, so that the machines that evidenced our 
scientific and economic success became superior, so that we are no longer consumers or 
users but consumed and used, human batteries from which the machines draw perpetual 
power? Smith explains that the Matrix was designed to emulate the year 1999， "the peak of 
your civilization. I say 'your civil ization' because as soon as we started thinking for you, it 
really became our civilization, which is, of course, what this is all about." A t the end of a 
twentieth century characterised by international conflict, the year 1999 should have 
represented the fin-de-siècle moment of humanist triumph at the end of history, according 
to Francis Fukuyama'ร thesis. 2 1 But this victory of late capitalism and liberal democracy 
means that the next reconstructive process w i l l stem from within this condition rather than 
without - as Fukuyama later conceded, science would change what it means to be human 
so that the last man w i l l be transmuted into something posthuman. 2 2 It is noticeable that 
wi th the demise of the nuclear fears of the Cold War, anxieties about technology have 
switched to the possibility of unpredictable "emergence" from scientific processes initially 
created for the purposes of improving the human condition: created nano-structures might 
spontaneously become self replicating "grey goo"; genetically modified organisms may 
exponentially self-replicate so as to completely replace natural ones in the biosphere; and, 
key to The Matrix, intelligence might emerge f rom large-scale networks not originally 
designed as conscious systems, such as the internet. 2 3 In this sense, the trope of emergence 
patterns both late capitalism, and cybernetics at the end of the century. In first-wave 
cybernetics after the Second World War, the computer was intended to model the human; 
as we saw in chapter 5, the benchmark for this period was the Turing test, but the 
epistemological problem of modelling consciousness necessitated a new approach, one 
which has most recently centred itself around emergent or self-evolving life. So i f the 
2 1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin, 
1992). 
rrancis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology 
Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). 
2 3 An example of this switch from nuclear anxiety to fear of emergent intelligence 
and self-replicating systems can be found in B i l l Joy'ร influential essay ror Wired 
magazine, "Why the Future Doesn't Need Us," Wired 18.4 (2000) 20 May 2008 
<http://www.พՄ6ժ.աա/\¥Մ6(1/օէԸհ^6/8.04/յօ)^.հէու1>. 
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Matrix is conscious, it has no centre, no Cartesian pineal gland, because intelligent control 
emerges in an aleatory way rather than from a functionally defined set of algorithms 
created by the human who provided the model (as is the case for Hal). This shift from top-
down modelling towards emergence in the informational sciences correlates neatly wi th 
the cultural mil ieu of late capitalism. Rather than the capitalist economy producing 
products that make life easier and which is legitimated by an ideology that fetishises hard 
goods, the economy is instead one of information which controls people as a consequence 
of unseen and incomprehensible systemic processes.24 
Cyberpunk or artificial intelligence narratives provide a powerful iconography of 
this drama of emergence, because they represent systems, matrices and webs that both bind 
and alleviate the condition of the human subject. I f cyberspace is liberating - where do you 
want to go today? - it is so because it has no centre; it is a flow of disincarnate information 
without a central locus that can be indicted or modified when the system goes wrong. 
Particularly inert are fictions which are themselves the outcome of such a technological 
culture. 2 5 As Frederic Jameson complains of суЬефипк, having been initially designed to 
outrage humanists by representing the liberation of the underground in a cybernetic fantasy 
(Neuromancer is the classic example of this early reactionary mode), in contemporary 
culture where computers and the web have become everyday objects, суЬефипк amounts 
to little more than "mere 'realism' and an outright representation of the present," glorifying 
what society is anyway forced to endure. 2 6 Sustaining this critique of суЬефипк tíirough 
analysis of The Matrix1 Laura Bartlett and Thomas Byers note that "whi le postmodern 
subjectivity itself may at first seem strikingly radica!" offering a radically new subjectivity 
freed from phallocentric ontologies, ultimately " i t bears uncanny similarities to the 
structures of global capitalism." 2 7 The cyborg citizen - the common Smith or Anderson -
As I write tnis at a time of the "credit crunch," and discover my savings - which 
I never actually possessed ш hard coinage anyway - dripping away through the net of 
"Collateralised Debt Obligations," the power of the unseen information economy has 
become depressmgly personal. 
2 5 One might at this point note that ironically, given its apparent anti-capitalist 
stance, the f i lm worked hard for the money men, having currently earned nearly $500 
mi l l ion worldwide. "The Matr ix," Box Office Mojo1 2007， Box Office Mojo, 19 March 
2008 <http://www.boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=iฑatrix.htm>. 
2 6 Jameson, Postmodernism 286. 
2 7 Laura Bartlett and Thomas B. Byers, "Back to the Future: The Humanist 
'Matr ix ' , " Cultural Critique 53 (2003): 29. 
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is less free than ever, not necessarily because the system is innately immora l but because 
he or she has no way o f k n o w i n g or de f in ing its emergent nature through narrat ive 
analysis. He experiences on ly the ind iv idua l nodes o f i t i n everyday l i f e , p r inc ipa l l y the 
desktop PC, and lacks the epistemological overv iew af forded by t radi t ional f i c t i on or 
theory. Nevertheless, by mak ing its audience aware o f the system as i t connects to this 
everyday technological artefact, The Matrix can achieve something Baudr i l la rd 'ร w o r k 
cannot: a l l ow ing us simultaneously to perceive the system but also to attain cr i t ica l 
distance on i t through a h is tor iography o f sorts. I w o u l d contest the claims o f Jameson, 
Bart let t or Byers that narratives l i ke The Matrix are cr i t i ca l ly inert because they are 
m ime t i c o f postmoderni ty , rather than rebel l ing against it. 
The computer is an interface, a prosthet ic l i n k i ng the user and the alternative 
realit ies the machine renders and transmits, but i t has no fundamental real i ty i tself, i n the 
sense that i t is impossible to dissect the machine and po in t to the place where the computer 
is. In the same way , i t is impossible to point in a Marx i s t way to the economic structure 
Աndeφ inn ing late capi ta l ism wh ich consists rather o f flows o f in fo rmat ion and dist r ibuted 
systems w i thout centre or base. The most iconographie representations o f the computer are 
not o f the hardware, its physical f o r m , but the software and the operat ing systems i t runs: 
W i n d o w s , App le , M ic roso f t Of f i ce . Rather than being def ined and іпїефгеЇаЬІе according 
to what i t is, then, the computer is acknowledged by what i t does, or by its transient effects. 
However , even as the computer thereby provides an apt metaphor for the systemic 
ephemeral i ty o f late capi ta l ism, the f i l m gives incarnate shape to the computer, mak ing it a 
discrete and knowab le object. B y ref lect ing on a more concrete nature o f the computer, we 
are also encouraged to ref lect on the const i tu t ion o f late capi ta l ism. A s suggested above, 
the Platonic epistemology is cued through Neo ' s corporeal p lunge into the underwor ld , the 
movement o f his body (and hence also his m i n d ) f r o m the f o r m o f the s imula t ion to the 
real. S imi la r l y , computer programs are represented as embodied and spatialised things in 
the f i l m : a computer cookie, the unseen f i le that traces the h is tory i n a web browser, 
becomes a l i teral cookie b iscui t baked by the Oracle w h i c h a l lows Neo to discern his future 
i n re lat ion to his past; a bug , a symptom o f surrept i t ious social mon i to r ing , is now 
exorcised f r o m Neo ' s body as an insect- l ike imp lant ; the passive subroutme (or "daemon" ) 
that becomes act ive on ly when specif ic condi t ions are met (such as a v i rus attack), is here 
g iven corporeal shape in the Agent Smi th , w h o appears on ly when the rebels enter the 
Ma t r i x . B y translat ing h idden processes into d is tmct objects, the computer is made into a 
discrete artefact as w e l l as a metaphor o f i n fo rmat ion capi ta l ism. Incarnated i n physical 
things and bodies rather than exist ing as ideas, paranoia and codes, the Ma t r i x can n o w be 
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f i rs t apprehended, and then destroyed, in this case p r imar i l y through Neo 's kung- fu combat 
w i t h Smi th . 
M o r e general ly, by denot ing The Matrix as a f ict ion-within-an֊overal l f i c t i on (the 
M a t r i x ) , a cr i t ica l distance o f sorts is produced: w e recognise the Ma t r i x is not 
commensurate w i t h The Matrix1 even though the latter may be one more s imula t ion o f the 
former. Th is distancing is in i t iated f r o m the opening screens, as The Matrix visualises the 
s imula t ion o f the M a t r i x tak ing place through its most reduced level o f machine code 
beneath the glossy interface, w i t h the descending green l ines more reminiscent o f ear ly 
computers and their command l ine operatmg systems than o f the icons and w indows o f the 
App le or M ic roso f t PC. Later, characters must j ack in to The Matrix using dia l telephones 
or phone booths, rather than modern mob i le phones. The f raming o f The Matrix i n this 
nostalgic w a y opens i t as a dist inct unreal i ty, an imperfect tw is t on the otherwise perfect 
repl icat ion o f 1999 l i fe . The embodiment o f computer programs as things l i ke " cook ies " or 
"bugs , " and the use o f antiquated technologies, serve to histor ic ise the f i l m i n a way at 
odds w i t h a s imula t ion that is supposedly rendered on the fly, freed f r o m histor ical 
cont ingency. Wh i l s t t ime can ran in any d i rect ion in the M a t r i x , i n The Matrix we are 
reminded that human technological cul ture w h i c h has produced these goods has on ly 
progressed i n one, cumulat ive d i rect ion. A s a consequence, these artefacts are k n o w n as 
metaphors, rather than as further evidence o f the systemic permeat ion o f technology into 
our (cyborg) l ives. Th is metaphor ical qual i ty o f technology is conf i rmed by the 
Wachowsk i brothers' descr ipt ion o f the opening sequence i n anthropomorphic terms: " A 
b l i nk ing cursor pulses i n the electr ic darkness l i ke a heart coursing w i t h phosphorous l ight , 
burn ing beneath the derma o f b lack-neon g lass . " 2 8 The image o f the beating heart provides 
an impression o f the machine that is precisely metaphor ica l : the machine is like man , but is 
not man (echoing that moment i n the precinct where Deckard is described i n a way w h i c h 
attends to the art i f ice o f language rather than o f the android/human). S imi la r ly , when he is 
resurrected b y T r i n i t y , Neo 'ร now- improved per formance i n The Matrix enables h i m not 
on ly to dodge bul lets i n the s imulat ion, but to k n o w it as a s imulat ion, seeing the 
fundamental l ines o f b inary code that g ive rise to the v i r tua l representation. W i t h this 
abi l i ty , he can phys ica l ly stop bul lets, p luck them f r o m mid-a i r and examine them as i f 
they are museum artefacts, before causing them to drop harmlessly to the floor. Such a 
se l f - re f lex iv i ty , i n w h i c h Neo sees toough the p rogram, also natural ly draws the v iewer ' ร 
Wachowsk i and Wachowsk i , "The Matrix: Shoot ing Scr ip t " 273. 
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attention to the f i l m ' ร f ic t iona l i ty , and thus to the fact that we are being manipulated as an 
audience - the di f ference being that we can resist or cr i t ique the representation o f The 
Matrix, even i f we cannot f i n d a po in t f r o m w h i c h to establish w i t h Cartesian certainty 
whether a M a t r i x does or does not exist beh ind our o w n hal lucinated real i ty. 
L i nked to th is , the suspension o f empi r ica l t ime toough the bul le t - t ime ef fect 
proves, b y its ostentatious existence as a "spec ia l " ef fect un iquely presented by this mov ie , 
that t ime as we no rma l l y experience i t is not a mal leable, s imulátory construct and 
therefore m igh t be a fundamental ground fo r t ru th. Metaphor conjoins convent ional ly 
d i f ferent things together by i nvok ing a c o m m o n property. Bu t i t also denotes the d i f f i cu l t y 
o f descr ibing things in themselves, par t icu lar ly abstract concepts l i ke t ime. Metaphor is 
required to h igh l igh t a s imi lar i ty that is not otherwise obvious. The bul let t ime sequences 
wh i ch are, because o f their "special e f fec t " therefore k n o w n as metaphors, denote 
s imi la r i ty but connote di f ference between real i ty and s imula t ion, the Ma t r i x , The Matrix, 
and the real w o r l d . W h i l s t Baudr i l la rd argues (admi t ted ly i ron ica l ly ) that bul lets swerve 
when shot at Presidents depending o n the image o f power they want to present, The Matrix 
can per fo rm absurd manipulat ions o f physics and t ime, w i thou t becoming correspondingly 
absurdní . Indeed, the success o f its special effects is u l t imate ly central to its aesthetic 
value: the benchmark o f good science f i c t ion is that i t astonishes b y mak ing us bel ieve that 
the so-called "e f f ec t " real ly d i d happen, because i t looks so conv inc ing. Thus at f i rs t glance 
it seems that the director has sk i l f u l l y found some loophole i n the laws o f physics. I n order 
to appreciate this aesthetic achievement o f The Matrix, though, w e must possess a 
preconceived hierarchy o f idea and real i ty : that though ideas are effected i n real i ty , i t 
cannot bend to their w i l l i n contravent ion o f the laws o f physics. However , the alternative 
real i ty o f a f i l m requires that a director suspend our d isbel ief i n the l imi ta t ions o f physics. 
O n l y when the pol i t ics can change the laws o f physics to ensure the death o f presidents 
w i l l we l i ve i n the literal Baudr i l la rd ian hyperreal ; wh i l s t w e can recognise h o w science 
f i c t i on is manipu la t ing the real i ty o f physics i n a way that breaches the boundaries o f the 
natural ly possible, w e also recognise that we are not ourselves watch ing i n a w o r l d o f the 
hyperreal where physics succumbs to ideo logy i n every day l i fe . Though w e may be 
susceptible to demonic i l lus ion , the cogni t ive estrangement between science f i c t i on and 
physical real i ty preserves an epistemology o f sorts by w h i c h we can become aware o f the 
status o f representations as opposed to actual i ty. 
Th is is not to argue against The Matrix as a postmodern f i l m . A l t hough the 
metaf ic t iona l i ty o f The Matrix draws attent ion to its o w n art i f ice and therefore provides a 
contrast w i t h real i ty as something not constructed but already out there, this st i l l coheres 
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w i t h postmodern theory. Baudr i l la rd does not suggest that the no t ion o f the hyperreal 
s imu lacrum w i thou t an or ig ina l on wh i ch i t is based makes compar ison between the real 
and the signs o f the real impossible. D isney land, for example, " is presented as imaginary i n 
order to make us bel ieve that the rest is rea l . " D isney land acts as a "deterrence mach ine" 
that a l lows Los Angeles to "rejuvenate the f i c t i on o f the rea l " b y way o f contrast w i t h the 
f o r m e r . 2 9 O n this comparat ive mode l , as D a v i d Levery reads The Matrix, "The real w o r l d 
exists, even under the re ign o f Baudr i l la rd 'ร ' T h i r d Order o f S imulacra ' and cinemat ic 
art...can represent i t and te l l a heroic tale o f its r ecove ry . " 3 0 However , is the recovery as 
complete as Levery argues, or are w e st i l l "one level f r o m the t o p " in the recursion 
observed by Hofstader? The presupposi t ion o f The Matrix is that we have no way through 
analysis to break f r o m our sense o f the real i ty of, and our be ing subject to , late capi ta l ism. 
The Matrix does not chal lenge the p laus ib i l i ty o f its o w n Baudr i l la rd ian presupposi t ion, 
on ly a l lows some r o o m fo r manoeuvre within that supposi t ion in a way that theoretical 
discourse cannot. B y the f i l m ' ร log ic - and the log ic o f be ing absorbed b y a s imula t ion 
c inema ᅳ w e cou ld be sol ipsist ical ly in a M a t r i x ; there is noth ing in the f i l m that 
deconstructs this g lobal onto logicai log ic , and indeed the existence o f a f i l m wh i ch uses 
computer graphics to deceive and seduce its audience adds credence to its manifesto. 
However , even i f we are empi r ica l ly i n a s imula t ion, the M a t r i x is st i l l constructed i n such 
a way as to operate according to part icular physical and cogni t ive laws, such that any 
s imula t ion embedded w i t h i n i t (the f i l m The Matrix, fo r example) can be k n o w n as a 
deeper level o f s imula t ion that is not prox imate w i t h the real i ty as norma l l y experienced. 
That is to say, The Matrix can be k n o w n as science f i c t i on that can do things as f i c t i on 
(such as suspending t ime) that cannot happen i n " rea l i t y , " even i f "na tu re" is i tsel f 
something produced w i t h i n a ma l ign , d iss imulat ing program, a demonic a priori that 
cannot be deconstructed toough rat ional i ty. B y contrast, Baudr i l la rd 'ร theoretical 
discourse risks be ing rejected because it is so ant i thet ical to our tacit i n tu i t ion that bul lets 
do not fly at the w h i m o f ideas. Bart let t and Byers propose that the postmodern character 
o f The Matrix is superf ic ia l : 
A s discourses o f postmodern subject iv i ty are appropriated b y the popular 
media fo r the product ion o f a contemporary style, the subject may exh ib i t a 
2 9 Baudr i l la rd , Simulacra 12-13. 
3 0 D a v i d Levery , " F r o m с inespace to Cyberspace: Zionists and Agents , Realists 
and Gamers in The Matrix and eXistenZ^ The Journal of Popular Film and Television 28 
(2001) : 150-58. 
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sexy patina o f postmodern ism whi ls t s t i l l not d i f f e r ing in any fundamental 
way f r o m its l iberal humanist predecessor. 3 1 
However , as Frederic Jameson ident i f ied, pastiche is the dominant mode o f postmodernist 
f i c t i on , and a patina m igh t instead be read as a laminate o f mu l t i p le layers, w i t h no 
essential characteristic - i n this case, the real - wa i t i ng beneath t h e m . 3 2 A l t hough the f i l m 
does make some space fo r cr i t ica l interpretat ion, i t does so i n a way congruent w i t h 
postmodern ism because it occurs as a func t ion o f style. G i ven that postmodernism argues 
fo r the surface o f a representational real i ty beneath w h i c h there is no deeper t ru th , the 
deployment o f heterogeneous styles and carnivalesque conjunct ions o f d i f ferent discourses 
is the on ly th ing that can remain. A s Br ian M c H a l e observes, heteroglossia offers "a means 
o f breaking up the projected w o r l d in to a po lyphony o f wor lds o f d iscourse . " 3 3 The 
mu l t i p le bu t unsystematic al lusions i n the f i l m - f r o m Baudr i l l a rd to Buddh ism v ia Lew is 
Carro l l and The Wizard of o z ᅳ certainly ensure that as a cr i t ica l text i t does not attain any 
pr iv i leged f ina l t ruth. However , through i nvok ing nostalgia and incarnat ing the computer 
i n physical th ings, w e can perceive The Matrix as a func t ion o f style that is not therefore 
ident ical to the effervescent, intangible and emergent mode o f the late capital ist M a t r i x 
system. 
The M o r a l Ma t r i x 
Even i f they are temporar i ly captivated b y the soundtrack and special effects v is ion 
o f transcending real i ty v ia cyberspace, The Matrix hopes its v iewers w i l l s t i l l be able to 
understand i t as a f i l m w i t h i n a f rame, even i f this f rame too is a s imula t ion produced b y 
the Ma t r i x . Through histor ical retrospect ion, the v isual isat ion o f the computer as incarnate 
metaphor rather than as effervescent system and the self-consciousness o f its aesthetic 
warp ing o f physical t ime and real i ty , The Matrix argues that even i f this is one more 
s imula t ion i n a who le deceptive universe constel lated w i t h them ᅳ f i lms , computer games, 
the internet, postmodern theory - i t is s t i l l a special subset o f the real i ty we know , such that 
real i ty is not monochromat ica l ly coterminous w i t h s imulat ions o f wh i ch i t is one example. 
In this respect, the fact that so many people d id engage w i t h the phi losophica l issues o f The 
3 1 Bart let t and Byers 29 . 
3 2 Jameson, Postmodernism 19. 
M c H a l e , Postmodernist Fiction 166. 
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Matrix i n a serious way indicates its value as a m e d i u m fo r t h ink ing about s imula t ion , even 
wh i ls t p rov id ing jus t one more representation w i thou t epistemological f ounda t i on . 3 4 
I ron ica l ly , perhaps the u l t imate evidence o f the success o f The Matrix is the fa i lure 
o f its o w n cal l to the f ight against late capi ta l ism. I f the M a t r i x is jus t a s imulat ion, then 
theoret ical ly its real i ty can be subverted b y anyone w i t h an open m ind . I n pract ice, 
however, even though we may take vicar ious pleasure i n Neo 'ร kung- fu battles against the 
system, i t is nevertheless not an act w e w i l l s imi la r ly pe r fo rm in real i ty, since those actions 
are convent ions on l y i n f i c t ion-w i th in - the- f i c t ion , not social real i ty so far as w e can k n o w 
and experience it . Rather than being a pessimist ic conclus ion about the incapacity o f the 
ind iv idua l to f igh t late capi ta l ism and cybernetic systems that dr ive i t , this draws attention 
to our ab i l i t y to main ta in mora l conventions regardless o f the onto logy w i t h i n w h i c h they 
are constructed. I n Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, when Mercer i sm is revealed as 
a sham, an imaginat ive construct or pro ject ion, this persuades that the human ab i l i ty to 
proceed as i f Mercer exists dist inguishes them even more readi ly f r o m androids. The 
Matrix, too , argues that the fact that w e cou ld be deceived and l i v i n g in a s imula t ion makes 
i t a l l the more important that w e are capable o f proceeding as / ƒ real i ty does exist w i t h al l 
the mora l imperat ives that entai ls, rather than l i v i n g as i f f i c t i on and real i ty are 
onto log ica l ly the same. Indeed, i f everyth ing is v i r tua l , then at least ethics can be 
consistent, because w e a l l inhabi t that same onto logy. W e need to d ist inguish carefu l ly 
between the theoret ical poss ib i l i ty o f there be ing a M a t r i x and the pragmatic consequences 
fo r real i ty so far as w e can k n o w it. Kan t may o f fe r one way o f si tuat ing our mora l 
reactions to the narrat ive. Acco rd ing to the Kan t ian f ramework o f the categorical 
imperat ive, regardless o f whether the Ma t r i x exists i n our o w n l ives and real i ty is jus t a 
s imula t ion, i n practice ethical values do pertain i n the w o r l d so far as we can k n o w it and 
so far as w e can k n o w other people 'ร knowledge o f i t . 3 5 Wha t is in t r ins ical ly good i n and 
o f i tself is the ab i l i t y to make rat ional choices; what determines the good l i fe is not the 
3 4 The t w o most substantial academic books on the subject are Glenn Ye f f e t h , ed. 
Taking the Red Pill: Science, Philosophy and Religion in The Matrix (Chichester: 
Summersdale, 2003) and W i l l i a m I r w i n , ed. The Matrix and Philosophy: Welcome to the 
Desert of the Real (Chicago: Open Court , 2002). The o f f i c i a l website also includes essays 
f r o m phi losophers, such as D a v i d Chalmers, and cybernet ic ians, such as K e v i n W a r w i c k . 
The Matrix Trilogy, 2005, Warner Brothers, 15 M a r c h 2008 
<ht tp : / /what is thematr ix .wamerbros.com/>. 
3 5 bnmanue l Kant , Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 1 and What Is 
Enlightenment?, trans, and in t rod . Lew is W h i t e Beck (Upper Saddle River , NJ : Prentice-
H a l l , 1997). 
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specif ic k inds o f experiences, but the k i n d o f actions der iv ing f r o m them, however rel iable 
those experiences may b e . 3 6 Thus it is perfect ly acceptable for the characters i n the f i l m to 
practice kung - fu v io lence since v io lence i n the M a t r i x ֊ as w i t h v io lence in the computer 
game - does not hurt any autonomous, "consc ious" agent i n any normat ive sense o f the 
w o r d . Bu t i t is not acceptable for v iewers o f the f i l m to leave the c inema in f i r m bel ie f o f 
the premise o f decept ion, and to pe r fo rm the same v io lent acts on human beings. A l t hough 
in the f i l m the C IA -s t y le agents w h o quash the rebel l ion theoret ical ly represent c iv ic 
author i ty as an extension o f the M a t r i x , our wi l l ingness to con fo rm to such a j ud i c i a l 
system i n practice indicates our preference for inhabi t ing a structured human society even 
at the expense o f some ind iv idua l autonomy. The onto logicai potent ia l exposed by The 
Matrix is that we are actual ly sol ipsist ic brains i n vats. Th is theoret ical ly leaves mora l 
concern for others unimportant , because they are anyway jus t fragments o f code rather than 
genuine bodies that must be respected, according to the pr incip les o f l iberal humanism. 
However , since contemporary news reports d id not indicate mass increases i n v io lence 
f o l l o w i n g The Matrix'ร release, i t seems we are more capable o f d iscerning the d is t inc t ion 
between real i ty and s imula t ion than The Matrix i tsel f presupposes. Even i f we are brains i n 
a vat contro l led b y a M a t r i x , kung- fu f i gh t ing is not an ethical way o f raging against the 
machine. P. Chad Barnett r igh t ly celebrates the f i l m ' s "accurate cogni t ive mapp ing o f 
mul t ina t iona l cap i ta l . " B u t this does not necessarily a l low us to " rega in a capacity to act 
and s t rugg le . " 3 7 For the fact that w e w i l l not act i n the aggressive way Neo does, even 
though the existence o f The Matrix supposes we are l i v i ng i n a M a t r i x inhabi ted b y 
in format iona l m inds , marks our fa i th in human ism even i n a w o r l d o f pure s imula t ion and 
demonic decept ion. 
Note that this is not un l ike Buddhist ph i losophy, according to w h i c h i t is not 
speci f ica l ly actions themselves w h i c h accord mora l value to the person w h o performs 
them, but rather then intentions beh ind the actions. There are no negative kara i ic 
consequences i f one does a negative act i f per fo rmed w i t h the carefu l ly cu l t ivated 
consciousness Buddh i sm instructs, nor i f an unintent ional consequence results f r o m a 
r igh t ly pursued state o f m i n d . For a readmg o f The Matrix i n terms o f Buddh ism, see James 
L. Fo rd , " B u d d h i s m , M y t h o l o g y , and The Matrix'' Ye f f e th 150-73. 
3 7 P. Chad. Bamet t , " R e v i v i n g СуЬефипк: (Re)construct ing the Subject and 
M a p p i n g Cyberspace in the WachowsKi Brod iers ' F i l m The Matrix' 1 Extrapolation 41 
(2000) : 372. 
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Postscript: Return o f the D e m o n 
I f I appear to have largely avoided mak ing exp l ic i t reference to the demonic i n 
consider ing The Matrix, as I ment ioned at the start o f this chapter this actual ly makes a 
power fu l po in t about the f u t i l i t y o f the al legor ical or metaphor ical method i n a w o r l d 
w h i c h on ly ever exists as an i l lusory representation. The possession by the Ma t r i x - "The 
Ma t r i x has y o u " announced the f i l m posters ᅳ is so total as to make any expression o f this 
through the guise o f a l i teral demon seem redundant, jus t another f igura t ion w i t h i n what is 
always already a total decept ion produced th rough representational s igni f iers. I t is taken 
for granted that The Matrix is a demonic text because the f i l m corresponds to the M a t r i x , a 
hermet ic ha l luc inat ion at the global level w i t h i n w h i c h the f ic t iona l narrat ive is inc luded. 
The demonic metaphor lends i tself ideal ly to the subject matter o f The Matrix. As w e saw 
in chapter 3 i n re la t ion to psychoanalysis, demonic log ic is attuned w i t h our f o l k attitudes 
towards inhabi t ing a w o r l d that never seems quite graspable, stable or comprehensible. Just 
as the M a t r i x emerged f r o m simple machines, demons can start out as deliberate hoaxes 
under human contro l and then become self-sustaining and sel f -propagat ing, as was the case 
w i t h the demons o f Loudun . I ron ica l ly and dark ly , as that case shows, effects can generate 
their o w n or ig ins i n the case o f the demonic. A n d , as I showed b y put t ing Baudr i l la rd up 
against the L o u d u n example i n chapter 1， demonic fabricat ions are at the heart o f the 
postmodern crisis o f ident i ty and t ru th w i t h w h i c h The Matrix engages, v ia Baudr i l la rd 
h imsel f . So i f demons had been used to describe Anderson 'ร comparable possession b y the 
s imulat ion, this w o u l d hard ly have been inappropriate. , 
O n the other hand, presenting them on screen w o u l d have g iven l i f e and incarnate 
f o r m to beings that b y their very nature are indeterminate, never ob ject ive ly i n the w o r l d 
because they can on ly exist through tak ing over the m i n d , the subject iv i ty , o f another. I n 
this sense, the extemal isat ion or mak ing exp l ic i t o f a demonic trope w o u l d have countered 
The Matrix 1 ร in tent ion to show the imposs ib i l i t y o f ob ject iv i ty , o f at ta inmg a v iew f r o m 
nowhere on the system w i t h i n wh i ch w e are always already immanent . T o project a demon 
on screen is contradictory, because it is b y its nature a product o f consciousness ( though 
Forbidden Planet gets around this p rob lem by the employment o f the m i n d mani festat ion 
device); the demon o n f i l m can general ly on ly be an imp l ied agent or mode o f th ink ing 
f r o m a mod i f i ed other perspective, the sort o f perspective induced b y K u b r i c k ' ร sw i t chmg 
camera angle in 2001. B y contrast, the undeniable existence o f the w o r d " d e m o n " i n text , 
and the descr ipt ion o f the consciousness w i t h i n the context o f w h i c h i t appearร, forces us to 
project our o w n interpretations o f that te rm in the process o f the text 's s igni f icat ion. Even 
i f we are secular or sceptical readers, the w o r d demon is s t i l l impressed on the page and 
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produces meanings and associations i n our m i n d s ᅳ Where l i terary f i c t i on has a capacity 
f i l m does not is i n our awareness that w e are not on ly d raw ing meaning f r o m i t , but 
act ively creat ing or concret is ing meaning in a reciprocal process. Th is is because the 
l i terary f o r m can p lay w i t h indeterminacy between object ive and subject ive: its subject ive 
representations o f the inner consciousness o f a character are nevertheless amenable to our 
object ive act o f i n teφ re t i ng the meaning o f those pr in ted words. The demon does occur i n 
the cybernet ic f ic t ions that are the subject o f m y f ina l three chapters, w h i c h broadly 
consider the nature o f a l legory: i f the p rob lem o f cybernetics is the c los ing o f a gap 
between the w o r l d and the self, a l legory makes us aware o f a gap between the w o r l d and 
the book w h i c h seeks to exp la in i t . 
In this context, as Ph i l i p K. D i c k ' ร Is idore m igh t argue, demons cannot be fake, 
unless real i ty is a fake; a shared subject ive sensation, such as a story, must become an 
object ive t ru th out there. I n the works o f Umber to Eco and A.S. в y att, demons ref lect on 
the nature o f real i ty and its altemates (the nove l , the ar t i f i c ia l , the machin ie) i n ways that 
suggest cybernetics can prov ide a moderat ing f i e ld between pure (but naïve) scient i f ic 
real ism and postmodern f i c t i on , re la t iv ism and social construct iv ism. Does the demon 
stand for something in a metaphysical scheme o f meaning, or must the demon be rejected 
as a total f i gment o f the m i n d i n the secular psychoanalyt ic era? Is such a re ject ion not 
problemat ic when demons have been created i n the m i n d o f a reader s imp ly tìirough the 
s ign i fy ing act ion o f mere words, shapes on a page? I f the demon can be said to exist i n the 
human m i n d , even i f the paranormal is not at w o r k i n physical real i ty , at what cogni t ive or 
neurological level can the demon be said to exist? I n l i terary f ic t ions, cybernetics 
influences the w o r k at a more imp l i c i t level than i n c inemat ic science f i c t ion , though i t 
nevertheless provides an analogy w i t h the process o f mak ing or mach in ing f i c t i on . The 
demon, by contrast w i t h f i l m , becomes a more exp l ic i t marker o f this process o f the w o r k 
done by f i c t i on i n the m i n d o f the reader. 
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Chapter 8. Ь ı t eφ re t i ռg Machmes: Umber to Eco 's Foucault's Pendulum 
" A text is a machine conceived for eliciting іпЇЄфгеІаЇІ0П8."1 
" A n d so the author vanishes ᅳ that spoi led ch i l d o f ignorance - to g ive place 
to a more thought fu l person w h o w i l l k n o w that the author is a machine, and 
w i l l k n o w h o w this machine w o r k s . " 2 
Al lego ry and Conspiracy 
Deborah Madsen contends that "a l legory flourishes at t imes o f intense cul tura l 
d isrupt ion, when the most authori tat ive texts o f the cul ture are subject to revaluat ion and 
reassessment." 3 Convent iona l ly understood as a narrat ive system that stabilises the value 
systems o f the cul ture i n w h i c h i t is produced, a l legory is actual ly fundamenta l ly unstable 
because the need for a l legory requires the admission that the th ing to w h i c h i t is referenced 
is coded or concealed. A s I have been exp lor ing , the advent o f cybernetics and the 
changing nature o f subject iv i ty and consciousness i n re lat ion to i t renders both the 
object ive real i ty o f the w o r l d , and the representational capacity o f cul tura l discourses, 
problemat ic. A s The Matrix presents i t i n one o f the most compe l l ing iterations o f 
postmodernism and cybernetics, a l legory fa i ls because cul ture has i tsel f become a product 
i n late capi ta l ism, such that there can no longer be any cr i t ica l or analnie gap between the 
representation and the w o r l d be ing represented. I n re lat ion to l i terature, this dynamic is 
we l l expressed b y Gabr ie l Jos ipov ic i , who argues that the Cfe is t ian t rad i t ion o f a l legory 
(whose parad igm is i n Dante) is over, and the desire to al legorise has become demonic , a 
signal o f our sol ipsist ic fa i lure to draw c o m m o n meaning f r o m the w o r l d . Nevertheless, 
this is not to suggest that a l legory has no func t ion i n postmoderni ty , and perhaps 
part icu lar ly i n the l i terary med ium. I ron ica l ly , a l legory may be revi tal ised precisely as i t 
undergoes the most strenuous reassessment. Th is m igh t exp la in the relat ionship H e i d i 
Hansson observes between Chr is t ian al legory and the postmodern nove l , genres w h i c h , at 
f i rst glance, appear d iametr ica l ly opposed. Hansson argues that al legory is an example o f 
1 Umber to Eco, "Read ing M y Readers," Modern Language Notes 107.5 (1992) : 
820. 
2 Ca lv ino , "Cybernet ics and Ghosts" 16. 
3 Deborah L. Madsen, Rereading Allegory: A Narrative Approach to Genre 
(Basingstoke: M a c m i l l a n , 1995) 135. 
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"doub le d iscourse"; l i ke postmodern l i terature, al legory "avoids establ ishing a centre for 
the text, because i n al legory the un i ty o f the w o r k is prov ided by something that is not 
exp l i c i t l y the re . " 4 The di f ference is that wh i l s t Chr is t ian allegorists cou ld assume the 
"existence o f a universal ly accepted f rame o f reference outside the tex t , " i n postmodern 
f i c t i on no such index exists. Umber to Eco extends the compar ison between the postmodern 
and the a l legor ica l , observ ing that i n the case o f Chr is t ian i ty "one assumes that symbols do 
have a f ina l meaning, but since it is the same everlast ing message, there is an inexhaust ible 
var iety o f s igni f iers for a unique s ign i f i ed " ; comparably, i n poststructural ism "symbo ls 
have any possible meaning because o f the inner contradict ions o f real i ty, but since every 
symbol speaks about this fundamental contradictoriness, an inexhaust ible quant i ty o f 
signif iers always stand fo r their unique s ign i f ied , the inexhaust ib i l i ty o f the senses o f the 
tex t . " 5 I ron ica l ly , though radica l ly d i f ferent to re l ig ious al legory, poststructural ism and 
postmodern ism share w i t h i t a semiot ic practice. 
Clear ly , however , they are sty l is t ica l ly divergent. Th is is indicated b y the 
contemporary predominance o f allegories o f conspiracy and the remarkable tone o f 
paranoia that pervades them. For Jameson, "conspi racy theory (and its garish narrat ive 
manifestat ions) must be seen as a degraded attempt - through the f igura t ion o f advanced 
technology - to th ink the imposs ib i l i t y o f the contemporary w o r l d system." Such 
"cogn i t i ve maps" o f the late capital ist cond i t ion are "best observed i n a who le mode o f 
contemporary entertainment l i terature - ' h igh tech paranoia ' - i n w h i c h the circui ts and 
networks o f some putat ive g lobal computer hookup are narrat ive ly mob i l i zed by 
labyr inth ine conspi rac ies." 6 Cer ta in ly , conspiracy seems prevalent in modern narrat ive and 
history: one th inks o f the " f a k e d " m o o n landings, the Kennedy assassination, the 
September 11th attacks, the popular i ty o f f ic t ions such as D a n B r o w n ' ร Da Vinci Code 
and, o f course, The Matrix. These phenomena al l indicate that, wh i l s t Chr is t ian al legory on 
its o w n may no longer prov ide incontrovert ib le connections between art and the universe, 
w e nevertheless have an innate fascinat ion (perhaps even need) for a metanarrat ive that 
H e i d i Hansson, " T h e Doub le Vo ice o f Metaphor: A . ร . B y a t ť s 'Мофһо 
Eugen ia ' , " Twentieth-Century Literature 45 (1999) : 454. 
5 Umber to Eco, The Limits of Interpretation (B looming ton , I N : Indiana U P , 1990) 
20. 
6 Jameson, Postmodernism 37-38. 
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makes sense o f al l other speculative narratives whose t ru th c laims cannot be ver i f ied 
personal ly . 7 A s the rat ional ist L i a observes in Foucault 3s Pendulum: 
Synarchy is God. . .Mank ind can ' t endure the thought that the w o r l d was 
bo rn by chance, by mistake, jus t because four brainless atoms bumped into 
one another on a s l ippery h ighway. So a cosmic p lo t has to be found - God , 
angels, devi ls . Synarchy performs the same func t ion on a lesser scale. 8 
Modern communicat ions and in fo rmat ion technologies prov ide conspirator ial wr i ters w i t h 
the oppor tun i ty to broaden the scope o f their secrets on a g lobal rather than a d iv ine scale. 
However , they can also be histor ic ised. One major point o f connect ion, w h i c h I w i l l 
explore in re lat ion to Possession, is to the V ic to r ian per iod. Another contact po in t - and 
the most important for Eco - is the m idd le ages. Works such as the Da Vinci Code, or 
Eco 'ร o w n The Name of the Rose, locate the groups w h i c h w o r k to undermine society 
across the l im ina l per iod o f the long scient i f ic , po l i t i ca l and rel ig ious revolut ions. 
S imi la r ly , i n Foucault 1 s Pendulum a modern-day expert on the Knights Templars , 
Casaubon, and t w o phi lo logists w o r k i n g for a van i ty press, Be lbo and D io ta l l ev i , are to ld 
about a coded message report ing the existence o f a scheme in i t iated by the Templars. 
In i t ia l l y fo r f un , the three use a modern computer i n con junct ion w i t h Hermet ic and 
Cabal ic hermeneutics to t ie together a range o f popular and histor ical references into a 
single, synarchic Plan. Casaubon ᅳ named after the seventeenth-century Hermet ic scholar 
Isaac Casaubon and the classicist f r o m M idd lemarch ֊ argues that "Concepts are 
connected by analogy. There is no w a y to decide at once whether an analogy is good or 
bad, because to some degree everyth ing is connected to everyth ing e lse" (618) . The 
concoct ion develops, however, to the extent that the academics start to bel ieve their o w n 
story, wh i l s t the modern descendents o f the Templars , the Diabol ica ls , beg in to chase d o w n 
the t r io i n order to extract the in fo rmat ion they have "d iscovered. " Where Eco 's 
conspiracies d i f fe r f r o m other paranoid cybernet ic f ic t ions is in their h istor ical emphasis. 
Cybernet ics, postmodern ism, and paranoia are a l l t ied to the past i n the f o r m o f 
Hermet ic ism, Cføis t ian al legory, and Cabala; wh i l s t many conspiracies are spatial or 
internat ional - re lat ing an event in one part o f the w o r l d to that i n another ֊ the conspiracy 
7 A s observed by Archb ishop Rowan W i l l i a m s , i n an Easter sermon w h i c h of fered 
a Chr is t ian response to the cul ture o f conspiracy. Denis Campbe l l , "Đa Vinci Code Appea l 
L ies in Our Fascinat ion w i t h Spin , Says W i l l i a m s , " The Observer 16 A p r i l 2006， 18 Sept. 
2007 <ht tp : / /www.guard ian.co!uk/uk/2006/apr /16/bookร. re l ig ion>. 
8 Umber to Eco, Foucault'ร Pendulum (London : Picador-Pan, 1989) 318. A l l 
subsequent parenthetical references i n this chapter refer to this ed i t ion. 
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o f Foucault 1 s Pendulum is also a temporal one. The novel exempl i f ies Eco 's be l ie f that the 
ramshackle structures o f occul t ph i losophy prov ide a paral le l w i t h contemporary 
conspiracy: 
Ant isc ien t i f i c by de f in i t ion , these M i d d l e Ages keep go ing under the banner 
o f the myst ica l weddings o f the mic ro - w i t h the macrocosm, and as a result 
they convince their adepts that everyth ing is the same as anyth ing else and 
that the who le w o r l d is bo rn to convey, in any o f its aspects and events, the 
same Message. Fortunately the message got lost, wh i ch makes its Quest 
fascinat ing for the happy few who stand proof - t ight , ph i lo logy resistant, 
brave ly ignorant o f the Popperian ca l l fo r the good habit o f fa ls i f i ca t ion . 9 
I t is one o f the quirks o f Enl ightenment that even as i t resurrected Pto lemy and Galen, 
ear ly-modern scientists also found renewed venerat ion for Hermet ic magic and astrology. 
Chapters 4 to 7 showed that as cybernetics provides new technologies o f s imulat ion and 
ar t i f ic ia l i ty , there is also an increasing doubt that real i ty can be k n o w n through rat ional 
methods, such as Popper 'ร . However , rather than therefore recover ing the ant iscient i f ic 
methods o f the m idd le ages, and excavat ing the demonic be l ie f systems that potent ia l ly 
underl ie Enl ightenment practices, Foucault's Pendulum u l t imate ly argues against total 
re la t iv ism i n practices o f reading and means o f produc ing knowledge. D a v i d Porush 
wri tes: 
T o the paranoid, l i ke the cybemet ic is t , everyth ing is message and noth ing is 
neutra l ; everyth ing has in fo rmat ion wa i t i ng to be recuperated b y the correct 
reading or the appl icat ion o f the r ight technique. . .every physical channel 
has a certain quant i f iable capacity to carry in fo rmat ion - w i t h a 
vengeance. 1 0 
I f cybernetics and paranoia go together (and a f i l m l i ke The Matrix certainly seems to 
val idate this c la im) , one should also observe that the idea o f the code also crosses the two : 
conspirators communicate v ia secret messages; the cybernet ic transcendentalists seek the 
code o f human consciousness that can be reprogrammed or re-coded on a machine; readers 
o f al legor ical f ic t ions suspect that the surfaces o f the text can be deciphered to po in t to 
some higher meaning outside it . In al l cases, on ly one code combmat ion w i l l lead to the 
correct decipherment. Bo th wo rk i ng w i t h i n and against postmodern semiot ics, Eco 
Umber to Eco, Travels in Hyperreality, trans. W i l l i a m Weaver (London : Picador-
Pan, 1987) 71， rpt. of Faith in Fakes, 1986. 
1 0 Porush 108, 
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anticipates readers o f his novel to be r igh t -minded realists w h o w i l l refuse to l ook for the 
code o f the D iabo l i ca l conspirators, w i t h their supernatural delusions, and choose instead a 
more stable code b y w h i c h to read the book. Before go ing in to the styl ist ic techniques Eco 
uses to steer his readers d o w n this more rat ional path, however, i t is wo r t h no t ing h o w this 
migh t be symptomat ic o f a broader shi f t o f emphasis i n the relat ionship between author, 
text, and іпІефгеЇег. In the al legorical t rad i t ion and i n the cul t o f inspirat ion (wh i ch I 
explored i n chapter 1)， the wr i ter was perceived as the med ium between some effervescent, 
al legorical spectrum o f signif ieds and the hard signi f iers on the page. However , the advent 
o f cybernetic systems l ike T A L E SP IN con f i rm the postmodern suspicion o f such 
inst i tut ional author i ty i n the author and the special access he has to an al legor ical index. I n 
Eco 's nove l , then, the expectations placed o n the reader to decipher o f the r ight codes 
impl ies that the author as conceptualised b y postmodern and cybernet ic epistemologies no 
longer has cont ro l over his o w n text. 
W r i t i n g Machmes 
Unde r l y i ng the nove l is the t rad i t ion o f the Corpus Hermeticum, w i t h its " refusal o f 
causal ism" and " l og i c o f "mu tua l l y sympathet ic e lements" w h i c h seeks s imi la r i ty between 
disparate ideas and events . 1 1 Th is medieval pract ice is a symbol ic ancestor to cybernet ic 
systems, as the Hermet ic ars combinatoria " foreshadow[ร] our modern electronic b ra ins" 
(472-74). W o r k i n g w i t h the t rad i t ion, Jesuits such as Athanasius K i rcher "bu i l t mechanical 
devices, mechanisms w i t h perforated cards, computers ante l i t teram. B inary calculators. 
Cabala appl ied to modern techno logy" (474) . Cabala, another pract ice that underpins the 
mechanics o f the p lo t , was a Jewish hermeneut ic for reading B ib l i ca l a l legory that 
"possessed a warrant to explore ever-prol i ferat ing dimensions o f m e a n i n g . " 1 2 So the 
modern l i terary scholars re ly on the pr inc ip le that " N o piece o f in fo rmat ion is superior to 
any other. Power l ies in hav ing them al l on f i l e and then f i nd ing the connections. There are 
always connect ions; you on ly have to want to f i nd t h e m " (225) . They construct a computer 
program cal led Abu la f i a (after a Spaniard, Ab raham A b ฟ a f i a , a fourteenth century 
author i ty on Cabala) in to w h i c h disparate pieces o f in fo rmat ion are fed ; t r o u g h its 
automated reorganisat ion o f data, coimections between them are generated at random. The 
academics then interpret this output l i tera l ly as corresponding to some overa l l , log ica l Plan 
1 1 Eco, Limits 19. 
1 2 Madsen 38. 
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(373-6). A s a result, i t appears as i f the p lo t the conspirators seek to concoct and to unravel 
is not p lot ted by any author ia l narrat ive agent, Eco himsel f , but rather by a machine. 
W r i t i n g a p lo t in both senses is rather an automated processes o f reorder ing and co l la t ion. 
Th is representation o f w r i t i ng as a mechanist ic process is not , i n itself, a new 
concept. A s w e l l as Cabala or Hermet ic ism, one thinks immedia te ly o f Sw i f t ' s f rame 
machine i n Lagado i n Gulliver'ร Travels. Bu t , as w i t h Descartes' admission that a 
mechanical m i n d w o u l d theoret ical ly be possessed o f a soul but pragmat ica l ly cou ld not be 
bu i l t , the stakes are raised dramat ica l ly when a m y t h suddenly becomes a determinate 
present embodied in technology. In "Cybernet ics and Ghosts," an essay w h i c h appears to 
inf luence Foucault'ร Pendulum, i f not exp l i c i t l y , I ta lo Ca lv ino proposes that: 
The so-cal led personal i ty o f the wr i te r exists w i t h i n the very act o f w r i t i ng : 
i t is the product and the instrument o f the w r i t i n g process. A w r i t i n g 
machine that has been fed an mstruct ion appropriate to the case could also 
devise an exact and unmistakable "persona l i ty " o f an author, or else i t cou ld 
be adjusted i n such a way as to evo lve or change "persona l i ty " w i t h each 
w o r k i t composes. Wr i te rs , as they have always been up to now , are already 
w r i t i ng machines; or at least they are when things are go ing w e l l . 1 3 
A s N. Kather ine Hayleร ident i f ies, Ca lv ino 'ร wo rk , p a r t i c u l a r l y / ƒ On a Winter'ร Night a 
Traveller, fears the d issolut ion o f the body o f text that parallels the abstraction o f 
embodied in fo rmat ion under the cybernetic parad igm, where a text can exist 
s imultaneously on mu l t i p le m e d i a . 1 4 Ca lv ino ' ร nove l strains to keep the l i terary софиร 
intact through the recursive chapters, and to main ta in a single narrat ive toead; its nemesis 
is Lotar ia 'ร reading machine in w h i c h the text 's meanings are analysed through 
quanti tat ive analysis o f w o r d frequencies i n a way that abstracts in fo rmat ion f r o m the 
l inear m e d i u m . 1 5 A l t hough Ca lv ino ' s essay and nove l draw on twent ieth-century 
cybernetics for their metaphors, Ca lv ino also acknowledges that electronic brams have 
made a real i ty o f the most arduous ef for t o f the M i d d l e Ages, ars combinatoria} 6 
Foucault's Pendulum explores this avenue i n more depth, l i n k i ng Hermet ic i sm to 
Ca lv ino , "Cybernet ics and Ghosts" 15. 
1 4 Hay leร, Posthuman 41֊3. 
1 5 I ta lo Ca lv ino , If On a Winter's Night a Traveller (London : D a v i d Campbe l l -
Everyman 'ร L ib ra ry , 1993), especial ly at 183-84. 
1 6 Ca lv ino , "Cybernet ics and Ghosts" 9. 
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cybernetics through Abu la f ia . The books o f Hermes, though phys ica l ly wr i t ten by a scribe, 
were considered authored by the d iv ine agent w h o inspired the human; the human wr i te r is 
a mere interface or m e d i u m for the or ig ina l creative source. S im i la r l y , cybernetics fo r 
Ca lv ino and Eco are represented as passive mediat ions, whereby the author is s imp ly the 
interface w h i c h enables the w o r d to material ise on the page. Th is , then, of fers a 
technologised var iant on the t radi t ional theory o f l i terary inspi rat ion as a passive 
experience i n w h i c h the wr i te r is the receptacle fo r ideas and representations that or iginate 
f r o m somewhere outside o f h i m . The aesthetic benef i t o f this m y t h o f creat iv i ty is that any 
text wh ich is inspired is also said to be inspir m g ; kudos accrues to an artist not because o f 
h is or ig ina l creat iv i ty , but because his created output reaches out to and affects readers in a 
comparably strange and immater ia l process. A s T i m o t h y C la rk puts i t " insp i ra t ion seems to 
be an experience that is i tsel f test imony to the value o f its products, a per format ive that 
ensures its o w n v a l u e . " 1 7 
In his essay Ca lv ino dissolves the author as noth ing more than a symbo l -
manipu la t ing machine, but preserves space fo r the readerly spir i t w h i c h w i l l constant ly 
renew interpretations o f a text i n non-determinist ic ways. The image o f the machine 
signif ies the transfer o f the power o f a l legory away f r o m the poetic genius and onto the 
reader. As Madsen observes: 
I n place o f such a f igura i subject, fabul is t ic a l legory draws upon the 
supplementar i ty o f a reader who supplies convent ional signif ieds fo r 
indeterminate metaphor ical s ignif iers ֊ al legory is " a mode o f reading the 
already w r i t t e n " as the ind iv idua l genius valued b y Romant i c i sm gives way 
to the cu l tura l ly const i tuted d iscws ive subject pr ized by posts t ructura l ism. 1 8 
A s a semiot ic ian, Eco argues that wh i l s t according to deconstruct ion there are no rules 
w h i c h "he lp to ascertain w h i c h interpretations are the 'best ones,' there is at least a ru le for 
ascertaining w h i c h ones are ' b a d ' . " 1 9 Even i f a text is theoret ical ly open to the free p lay o f 
s igni f iers, a text l im i ts interpretations b y h igh l igh t ing or f raming those readings w h i c h i t 
considers to be poor. Where Casaubon and the conspirators fa i l is not in produc ing a p lo t 
through mechanist ic means - fo r w i thou t the conspiracy p lo t there w o u l d be no nove l , 
wh i l s t the author h imse l f is essential ly a w r i t i ng machine - but i n fa i l i ng to read sceptical ly 
1 7 T . C la rk 6. 
1 8 Madsen 123. 
1 9 Eco, Limits 60. 
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i n accordance w i t h broader social expectations and convent ions. Embody ing both 
seductive sophistry and al legory that m igh t reveal a genuine t ru th about the w o r l d , 
Foucault 1 s Pendulum evidences that though texts may be machines for generating 
interpretations, readers are not interpret ing machines. I f Ph i l i p K. D i c k saw readers as 
capable o f d iscr iminat ing between human and machine by extending empathy even to the 
s imulat ion, Eco 's nove l puts pressure on the reader for a d i f ferent reason, staging a 
postmodern moment when the author is dead as the source o f creat iv i ty , substitutable by a 
mere computer, and consequently i t stresses the importance o f interpretat ion. I f the text is 
the product o f a machine ( indeed is i tsel f an example o f a machine) , then questions o f 
value are transposed onto the reader. The reader may always potent ia l ly f a l l into the same 
demonic f renzy o f s ign i f ica t ion conveyed to them by the text. O n the other hand, i f we do 
not become possessed b y Foucault*s Pendulum i n the same way as the D iabo l i ca l authors 
are possessed b y the meanings produced b y Abu la f i a , a hermeneutic gap opens up between 
the text as inspired b y a machine (whether a l i teral computer or a computer- l ike author) 
and how w e actual ly respond to i t as non-determinist ic іпЇефгеІегз. I t is this gap 
Foucault*s Pendulum creates ü i rough its narrat ive strategies, ensuring that the reader must 
perceive l i terature as something that neither be reduced to a tomism or mechanism, but that 
does not therefore have to lead to in f in i te prol i ferat ions o f intertextual i ty and s igni f icat ion. 
D iabo l ica l Readers 
The Diabol ica ls bel ieve that b y decipher ing "Ano the r subtle ambigu i ty , another 
luminous myst ica l ana logy" (142) , they w i l l eventual ly reach the u l t imate ly mean ingfu l 
Plan, the syncretic code that unites a l l h istory, science and re l ig ion . I t is hard to g ive the 
sense o f this concocted Plan i n a br ie f quote or paraphrase, since i t relies on the sheer 
number as w e l l as the manner o f the connections fo r its effect. A good example, though, 
comes i n the chapter when Be lbo , now f u l l y immersed i n the D iabo l ica l method, 
announces that a l though they have been wh ims ica l l y invent ing connections up to this 
point , he realises that they do de f in i t i ve ly exist: 
[Gu i l l aume] Postel studies Hebrew, tries to demonstrate that i t ' s the 
c o m m o n mat r ix o f a l l languages, translates the Zohar and the Bahir, has 
contacts w i t h the cabalist, broaches a p lan fo r universal peace s imi lar to that 
o f the German Rosicruc ian groups. . . A n d i t is no accident that he signs 
some wr i t ings w i t h the name o f Risispergius, "he who scatters dew . " 
Gassendi i n his Examen Philosophiae Fluddanae says that Rosencreutz 
does not der ive f r o m rosa but f r o m ros, dew. I n one o f his manuscripts he 
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speaks o f a secret to be guarded un t i l the t ime is r ipe, and he says: "Tha t 
pearls may not be cast before sw ine . " D o you k n o w where else this gospel 
quotat ion appears? O n the t i t le page o f The Chemical 
Wedding.. .Furthermore, i t seems [John] Dee and Postel met in 1550， but 
perhaps they d idn ' t yet k n o w that they were both grand masters o f the Plan, 
scheduled to meet th i r ty years later, i n 1584. (419) 
Robert Phiddian observes that this sort o f reasoning is per formed w i t h an " imper ious 
rhetoric that defies reasoned cont rad ic t ion, " and that this "show o f conf idence and 
connectedness is enough to make al l but the dourest rat ional ist , empir ic is t , or pragmatist 
wonder i f there m igh t not be something to this conf ident defiance o f convent ional 
w i s d o m . " 2 0 W e thus, Phiddian impl ies , may be induced to become Diabo l ica l readers 
ourselves, paranoid that things as they appear on the surface conceal a deeper conspiracy 
o f interrelatedness, as every text is a code that connects i t to another. I n the wr i t ings o f 
Ambro ise Paré, w e saw that the w o r k o f the dev i l l ies i n conjLmng superf lu i ty , " an in f i n i t y 
o f monsters and ma rve l s . " 2 1 B y col lect ing the monstrous and exc lud ing the demon wh i ch 
br ings w i t h i t the poss ib i l i ty o f decept ion, the Renaissance natural ist tamed a w i l d and 
unru ly nature as nevertheless "na tu ra l , " be ing i n accordance w i t h a d iv ine order. I n 
Foucault's Pendulum, b y contrast, co l la t ion is in f in i te , leading to the demonic delusions 
рефеІгаЇесі by the Diabol ica ls . I t is not coincidental that the section quoted above is 
headed by an epigraph w h i c h states ' T h o u g h his w i l l be good, his spir i t and his prophecies 
are i l lusions o f the D e v i l " (417) . 
However , t føough a log ica l fo rk , the nove l also undermines the reader who 
stubbornly refuses to be seduced by the demonic language and epistemology. A s I 
presented it i n chapter 3， contemporary psychology strips the demon o f any metaphysical 
existence i n the w o r l d , emphasising instead that demons are in the m i n d o f the beholder. 
Though i t retains its baggage as a potent m y t h , w e recognise the demon i n modern i ty as a 
f i c t i on and thus, according to Gabr ie l Jos ipov ic i , an al legory o f language'ร o w n m y t h -
mak ing process rather than o f its m imet i c capacity. I n this f ramework , w e may feel that 
Be lbo 'ร l i tu rg ica l stream o f words signif ies l i t t le o f actual, empi r ica l relevance but rather 
points inward ly to his o w n unconscious mot ivat ions o f distract ion: too young to f i gh t in the 
War , and too o ld and coward ly t o j ó i n the social revo lu t ion o f 1968， Belbo constructs the 
2 0 Robert Ph idd ian, "Foucault's Pendulum and the Tex t o f Theory , " Contemporary 
Literature 38 (1997) : 546. 
2 1 Paré, On Monsters 94. 
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p lan to compensate fo r h is o w n frustrated revolut ionary ambi t ions. Add i t i ona l l y , as a l i tany 
o f proper names, mak ing sense o f passages l ike these w o u l d tax even the most determined 
b ib l ioph i le . Be lbo 'ร language convinces h imsel f , i n a se l f - fu l f i l l i ng prophecy, but his 
argument does not s ign i fy any absolute t ru th about h idden connections. Bu t i f we do t ry to 
read Be lbo 'ร language as al l surface w i thou t essential meaning, mere sty l ist ic p lay or 
l ud i sm that does not need to be explored or f o l l owed up because it is pure ly superf ic ia l , 
then paradoxical ly the p lo t counterattacks. The book concludes that " the most power fu l 
secret is a secret w i thou t content, because no enemy w i l l be able to make h i m confess i t " 
(621) . Be lbo knows that b y a l l ow ing h imse l f to be k i l l ed rather than reveal a "secret" when 
he is tortured b y Diabol ica ls at the end o f the nove l , he proves to them not the absence o f a 
t ru th , but the fact that i t must be present, i f deferred. Sty l is t ica l ly , th rough its soup o f 
arcane areas o f knowledge, the nove l seems to argue for the absence o f any one system o f 
correspondence. Th is log ic fo lds i n on i tself, as in p lot terms the nove l ' s al legorical 
conclus ion seems to be that the denial o f a l legory - the w i thho ld ing o f the one code index 
that w o u l d make sense o f a l l other referents - is the most power fu l evidence that there 
must be a f ina l , true gr id to decode a l l meanings w h i c h the nove l ' s w i thho ld ing o f a f ina l 
clue (as a defeated detective f i c t i on ) intends conspirator ia l ly to conceal. I n the u l t imate 
poststructural tease, the re lat ive absence o f a coherent a l legor ical scheme and the existence 
o f Be lbo 's demonic plots i m p l v not the inva l id i t y o f that tota l is ing index to meanings, but 
its tantal is ing possib i l i ty . The reader is caught i n an interpretat ive pincer: i f absorbed b y 
the language and occul t w i s d o m , w e are Diabol ica ls b i l l e d by the connect ions; i f we treat 
the occul t as i f i t has no basis i n empi r ica l real i ty , this impl ies there real ly is a h idden Plan 
w h i c h w i l l uni te real i ty and the occul t , w h i c h our secularised, modern minds are too 
unimaginat ive (or not su f f ic ien t ly paranoid) to adm i t . 2 2 A s Madsen observes, al legory is 
both an іп іефгеїаї іоп and a metacr i t ica l statement that guides іп іефгеїа і іоп , leav ing 
al legory as the tautologous conf la t ion o f t w o k inds o f t ru th: " t ru th as the meaning o f the 
narrat ive and t ru th as the interpretat ion o f a pr ior t e x t . " 2 3 Foucault's Pendulum exhibi ts 
and exploi ts this c i rcu lar i ty , i n that i t either points to the secret that unites al l texts outside 
2 2 V ic to r ia V e m o n reads the nove l s l ight ly d i f fe rent ly , arguing that i f we do not 
f o l l o w the moves o f the protagonists w e are immedia te ly tempted to become cr i t ica l 
analysts, though the p rob lem now is that w e are confronted พ1th a bewi lder ing array o f 
possible strategies for interpretat ion. V i c to r i a V . Vernon , " T h e Demonics o f (True) Bel ie f : 
Treacherous Texts , Blasphemous ЬіЇефге1аЇІ0П8 and Murderous Readers," Modern 
Language Notes 107 (1992) : 840-54. 
2 3 Madsen 95. 
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i t , or points to the power fu l secret w i t h i n i t wh i ch is that there is no secret. A s w i t h 
postmodern f ic t ions according to M c H a l e ' ร mode l , epistemology spi l ls into onto logy, and 
toeatens to lead to a v ic ious cycle. Ep is temolog ica l ly speaking, what is w r o n g w i t h a 
D iabo l ica l reading method? I f i t is not a bad reading, then is not a syncretic nove l l i ke 
Foucault 1 s Pendulum, w h i c h pul ls together Hermet ic h is tory and cybernet ic technology, 
not i tsel f one more D iabo l i c text , a machine fo r generating interpretations b y referr ing to 
intertexts? The onto logy o f the nove l thus hints that the onto logy w e take to be real i ty is 
actual ly a delusion concealmg some deeper meaning. Bu t i f something is epis temologica l ly 
w r o n g w i t h the paranoid method o f readmg, what is the r ight way to decode real i ty? G i ven 
that postmodern theory denies a stable epistemology for reading the w o r l d and the book, is 
not the absence o f a f ina l logocentr ic clue - l i ke that w h i c h Be lbo w i thho lds ᅳ the most 
power fu l evidence o f some conspiracy to conceal something f r o m us? W h e n encounter ing 
such a paradox i n convent ional a l legory, one m igh t have referred to the external , stable 
referent o f the Cta is t ian t rad i t ion, the B ib le . I n the absence o f this external author i ty, and 
g iven cybernet ics ' subversion o f the creat iv i ty o f the cont ro l l ing "au thor " out l ined above, 
i t is the reader w h o is tasked w i t h breaking f r o m its log ica l loop b y pay ing close attent ion 
to the constructions o f the text. 
Forced to f o l l o w one prong o f the nove l 's log ica l fo rk , the repet i t ive use o f arcane 
images, texts and language is not complete ly seductive. Th is deliberate tension between the 
noisy verbiage o f al ter i ty and the meaningless p lo t w h i c h thus conceals a secret evidence 
that wh i l s t a novel may be a machine for generating տ էԸտաէՅէ ւ օ ոտ , readers are not 
interpret ing machines. Hermet i c i sm 'ร l inks w i t h the occul t leave i t rel iant on the 
vocabularies o f magic and d iabo l ism, and thus suspiciously ant i -scient i f ic (modern 
homeopathy, for example, is j us t i f i ed b y a Hermet ic connect ion w h i c h analyses and 
"cures" based on the resemblance o f symptoms between d i f ferent b io log ica l agents). Even 
i f w e do not subscribe to the Enl ightenment mode l o f absolute scient i f ic rat ional i ty , there is 
st i l l a clear discrepancy between the discursive modes o f Hermet ic i sm, and those o f 
contemporary society. Hermet ic i sm shouts loud ly to conceal its emptiness, but i n the 
process i t draws attention to i tsel f as a part icular use o f language, rather than to the ideas i n 
its o w n r ight ; the conspiracy i n w h i c h every meaning is t ied to another is s ty l ish ly chaotic, 
but u l t imate ly devo id o f much mean ing fu l content. The intervent ion o f Hermet ic reasoning 
and style i n the novel poses a comparable p rob lem to that w h i c h Shannon and Weaver 
in t roduced at the dawn o f cybernetics: can w e discr iminate the communica t ion o f 
in fo rmat ion f r o m mere noise, and quant i f iab ly measure the amount o f in fo rmat ion a 
message contains? Shannon and Weaver theorised that a message that is par t ia l ly 
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unpredictable and part ia l ly anticipated contains more valuable in fo rmat ion than either a 
complete ly random or a complete ly predictable message; however, a message w i t h greater 
predic tab i l i ty is also more resistant to the in t rus ion o f no ise . 2 4 I n a s imi lar way , postmodern 
f i c t i on must negotiate a t r i cky pos i t ion by innovat ive ly staging the d i f f i cu l t y o f mak ing 
sense o f a complex w o r l d through language 一 g iven that convent ional a l legory is no longer 
sustainable - wh i l s t not al ienating readers b y depr iv ing them o f convent ional signposts l i ke 
l inear p lo t and character, rendered i n essential ly realist ic ways. The di f ference between the 
no isy but meaningless D iabo l ica l Hermet ic is ts , and the postmodern but nevertheless 
meaningfu l mode o f Foucault's Pendulum, is a cybernet ic issue, and i t is central to the 
amb i t ion o f the nove l to h igh l igh t bad readings, wh i l s t a l l ow ing any number o f readings to 
be theoret ical ly sustainable. 
The relat ionship between "no i se " and meaning is one Eco has used as an analogy 
fo r interpretat ion, arguing that the code o f meaning shared by those communica t ing 
provides "an established system o f probabi l i t ies, and on ly on the basis o f the Code can w e 
decide whether the elements o f the message are intent ional (desired by the source) or the 
result o f N o i s e . " 2 5 Eco dif ferentiates between s ign i f icat ion, in w h i c h semiosis is potent ia l ly 
un l im i ted and meanings are indeterminate, and communica t ion , w h i c h is social ly grounded 
and by w h i c h the novel can lever a reader in to a more def in i t ive interpretat ive pos i t ion. A s 
Gary Stonum observes, Eco 's standpoint shares w i t h the cybernetic study o f useful 
i n fo rmat ion i n communicat ive pract ices. 2 6 Eco 'ร f i c t i on opens channels i n w h i c h he 
transmits ( though not ent i re ly c lear ly) a f r amework or code w h i c h l im i ts the possibi l i t ies o f 
іп ІефгеЇаІ іоп and distinguishes mode l readers f r o m those D iabo l ica l characters w h o are 
anyth ing but ideal ones. A l t hough " c o d e " can i m p l y concealment and secrecy, i t also 
suggests to those who do k n o w the code a communa l relat ionship based o n mutua l patterns 
o f understanding - the anticipated readers o f a nove l in a part icular genre, fo r example. 
W i t h i n this crucia l paratextual f ramework , as Eco notes, " A text is a place where the 
i r reducible po lysemy o f symbols is i n fact reduced because i n a text symbols are anchored 
Claude E. Shannon and War ren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication (Urbana, I L : и o f I l l i no is p， 1949). 
2 5 Eco , Travels 138. 
2 6 Gary Lee Stonum, "Cybernet ic Exp lanat ion as a Theory o f Read ing , " New 
Literary History 20 (1989): 4 0 0 - 0 1 , JSTOĶ 17 Sept. 2008 
<ht tp: / /www. js tor .org/s table/469107>. 
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to their context. ' I f the Other a l lows us to apprehend better ourselves b y our negative, 
this relat ionship means that the fact that w e can perceive the D iabo l ica l characters and their 
language as d i f ferent indicates the existence o f a more normat ive l inguis t ic code f r o m 
w h i c h i t d i f fers , and through w h i c h more substantial meanings may be communicated. 
Eco 's w o r k anticipates a commun i t y o f thought fu l readers capable o f d iscr iminat ing 
social ly convent ional іпЇефгеїаЇ іопз f r o m demonic readers ᅳ though certa in ly not w i thou t 
encounter ing the dialectics and seductions o f a decentred pos tmodemi ty where al legor ical 
t ru th always slips beyond the grasp o f the text. Eco argues that " m a n y texts a im at 
p roduc ing M o d e l Readers, a f i rst leve l , or a naive one, supposed to understand 
semantical ly what the text says, and a second leve l , or cr i t ica l one, supposed to appreciate 
the way տ w h i c h the text says SO."28 Eco appreciates readers are able s imul taneously to 
j ugg le their awareness that the text is ta lk ing i n a D iabo l ica l way, w i t h the understanding 
that the very fact that we can interpret w i t h analyt ical distance indicates w e have not 
succumbed to the metaphysical speculations o f the Hermet ic is t . I n order to achieve this, 
Foucault*ร Pendulum seduces us into being naive readers o f D iabo l i sm, but then draws 
attent ion to i tse l f as a text w h i c h (as text) is d i f ferent to real i ty , or to real i ty as i t is 
construed b y the D iabo l ica l adept. Thus i t opens space fo r the cr i t ica l reader to appreciate 
the way in w h i c h the f i rst stage reader was in i t i a l l y seduced b y the reasoning o f the 
D iabo l i ca l Plan. 
O f part icular importance i n this regard is Eco 's treatment o f t ime. I suggested 
earl ier that Eco 's cybernet ic conspiracy is unusual in that i t is not on ly internat ional in 
scope (w i t h scenes i n B raz i l , I ta ly and France), but also threads through h is tory f r o m 
modern i ty to the M i d d l e Ages. The Diabol ica ls see histor ical events and facts as 
coterminous w i t h , and as relevant as, those o f the present; i n contrast, constramed b y the 
l inear i ty o f pr in t , the reader is able to perceive the i ron ic invers ion o f cause and ef fect that 
results. For example, the Diabol ica ls bel ieve that the v i ew that " t i m e is a l inear, directed 
sequence runn ing f r o m A to в is a modern i l lus ion . In fact, i t can also go f r o m в to A , the 
effect produc ing the cause" (207). I n terms o f the nove l 's f o r m this in i t i a l l y appears to be a 
va l id statement. The nove l ' s t ime scheme is complex , as the bu lk o f i t is narrated through 
three layers o f retrospection: by Casaubon awai t ing the Diabol ica ls at the end o f the nove l , 
remember ing his awai t ing the Diabol ica ls in the Conservatoire Nat ional des Ar ts et 
2 7 Eco , Limits 2 1 . 
2 8 Eco, Limits 55. 
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Met ie rs , where he "reconstructed so anx ious ly " (45) the events leading up to his be ing i n 
the museum. Thus the outcome o f the nove l , its chronologica l close, is what a l lows the 
story to come into being: effects l i tera l ly produce causes. 
I n the naive reader'ร in i t ia l experience, the nove l unfo lds and progresses f r o m a 
myster ious outcome to (we anticipate, w rong l y ) the revelat ion o f the cause o f that mystery, 
i n a detective p lot . A l t hough there is a r isk that, l i ke the academics, w e become absorbed i n 
the narrat ive o f the Diabol ica ls , as I suggested earlier the extent to w h i c h the occul t 
descript ions and connections push the l im i ts o f our attent ion seems to protect against the 
possib i l i ty o f the latter, at least for Eco 's "c r i t i ca l mode l reader able to enjoy, at a second 
reading, the br i l l ian t narrat ive strategy by w h i c h the f i rs t level naïve reader was 
des igned . " 2 9 A l i c e Juarrero has p icked up on this technique, reasoning that "Once we 
appreciate the paradox, that the secret is that there is no secret, w e real ize w e ' v e been had 
semantical ly, but l i ke ch i ldren wan t ing to f igure out jus t how the magic ian per forms the 
t r ick, w e jus t can Ί leave i t at t h a t . " 3 0 L inda Hutcheon also observes the i rony w h i c h 
undercuts "over t resemblance" ensures the novel d i f fers f r o m the Plan: " W i t h o u t i rony, 
Eco 's nove l w o u l d be an exemplar o f Hermet ic semiosis; w i t h i rony, i t becomes 
simultaneously both an exemplar and a c r i t i que . " 3 1 W i t h respect to the past o f the nove l , i n 
re-reading the text we cannot do so i n anyth ing other than an i ron ic mode, thereby 
undermin ing the D iabo l ica l pr inc ip le that t ime is non- l inear; for this al ternat ive, i ron ic 
f o r m o f k n o w i n g relies precisely on the cont ingent and structured w a y we read a 
convent ional nove l , especial ly one based on the detective or thr i l le r template. Such a 
rereading o f the history, bo th short- term in the novel w e have jus t read, and the longer-
term o f its M i d d l e Ages purv iew, is a postmodern strategy, but one wh i ch does not 
necessarily cause us to agree w i t h the D iabo l i ca l method i n w h i c h h is tory is not l inear ly 
regulated by empir ica l t ime, since signi f iers f r o m the past and present can f reely 
interchange. Eco notes that "The postmodern reply to the modern consists o f recognis ing 
that the past, since i t cannot real ly be destroyed, because its destruct ion leads to si lence, 
Eco, Limits 55. 
3 0 A l i c i a Juarrero, " T h e Message Whose Message I t Is That There Is N o Message, 
Modem Language Notes 107 (1992) : 896. 
3 1 L i nda Hutcheon, " E c ๙ s Echoes: I ron iz ing the (Post) Mode rn , " Diacritics 22.1 
(1992): 5. 
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must be revis i ted: but w i t h i rony, not innocent ly . " Even i f we do feel that there is a secret 
bur ied in the text, and return to i t i n order to excavate its potent ia l ly al legor ical code, the 
іпІефгеІаЇ іопз become satir ical and i ron ic rather than p rov id ing syncretic resolut ion. 
A s he starts his narrat ion ( towards the chronologica l close o f the p lo t ) Casaubon 
realises that " I had to p lay this i ron ica l ly , as I had been p lay ing i t un t i l a f ew days before, 
not le t t ing myse l f become i n v o l v e d " (10). However , the truer i rony is that he is narrat ing 
f r o m a pos i t ion o f invo lvement , bo th be l iev ing the Plan and the sole narrator o f the nove l 
w h i c h tel ls us about i t . For example, at the beg inn ing we are to ld that the periscope lets 
Casaubon look through the Apse i n St. M a r t i n "as i f I were sway ing there w i t h the 
pendu lum, l i ke a hanged man, tak ing his last l o o k " (10). O n a f i rs t reading, this is an 
innocent metaphor; on a second, when w e k n o w that there w i l l indeed be a hanged man, 
Be lbo , i n j u s t such a pos i t ion , i t becomes sadistic humour . L i kew ise Casaubon'ร note at the 
beg inn ing that " W e don ' t want to meet b i g o l f s myster ious e n d " (151) is said w i t h a smi le ; 
but on a second reading, g iven that we now k n o w that Be lbo and D io ta l l ev i w i l l also die 
strangely, we react w i t h a d i f ferent sort o f i ronic humour . A s V i c to r i a V e m o n observes, 
wh i l s t the reader'ร arr ival towards the chronologica l close o f the p lo t m igh t potent ia l ly 
a l low us the advantages o f narrat ive hindsight , this is defeated b y the fact that " the 
narrator, too, is on l y d iscover ing the meaning o f his story A r o u g h the process o f its 
t e l l i n g . " 3 3 The ma jo r i t y o f the nove l is narrated retrospect ively b y Casaubon, w h o has 
t ravel led to France f r o m I ta ly f o l l o w m g a message f r o m Abu la f i a (453)， and w h o is as he 
narrates lodged in a periscope in the Conservatoire. Just as a periscope displays the w o r l d 
inverted or refracted, he can hard ly be the most object ive o f narrators. 
I n terms o f its D iabo l i ca l structure, the nove l ' s narrator ial ambigu i ty i n w h i c h 
effects produce causes of fers an analogy w i t h the f i rs t Cabal ic computer p rogram wr i t ten 
by the scholars, w h i c h is designed systematical ly to produce a l l the possible permutat ions 
for the letters Y H V H . Marsha l l M c L u h a n declares that the instantaneous operations o f a 
computer put an end to l inear sequence and the typographical order o f syntax. Tak ing issue 
w i t h M c L u h a n , Eco responds that " I n fact the programming o f a computer consists 
precisely i n the arranging o f l inear sequences o f log ica l opera t ions . " 3 4 So, though the 
3 2 Umber to Eco, Postscript to The Name o f the Rose, trans. W i l l i a m Weaver (New 
Y o r k : Harcourt , 1989) 66-67. 
3 3 V e m o n 847. 
3 4 Eco, Travels 237. 
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program may run i n a recursive fashion ( through an " i f . . . then" loop, according to the 
program g iven i n the book [34 ] ) , its outcomes have to be pr inted l inear ly in the physical 
text, or what Eco terms the L inear Tex t Man i fes ta t i on . 3 5 A l t hough a computer may carry 
out its operations through paral lel processes and feedback loops, its outputs are s t i l l 
received b y a very l im i t ed serial processor w h o f inds i t d i f f i cu l t to mul t i - task: the reader. I n 
Foucault's Pendulum, the fact that the output o f Abu la f i a is del ivered i n the f o r m o f pr in t 
undermines the academics who program i t , w h o bel ieve t ru th is revealed b y ahistor ical , 
non-causal connect ions between facts f r o m any per iod or text. T o recal l the quotat ion by 
Belbo above, John Dee and Postel met in 1550, but d id not realise that they were actual ly 
the grand masters i n the Plan that w o u l d manifest i tsel f th i r ty years later, i n 1584; t ime 
runs f r o m В back to A . A s a nove l , though, Foucault'ร Pendulum plays o f f its physical 
textual i ty, the D iabo l i ca l theory that t ime is not l inear, and the reader'ร ab i l i ty to perceive 
these characters i ron ica l ly , because they themselves cannot predict their o w n endings even 
though they c l a im to be able to " p r o v e " the causal chain o f events that captures everyone 
else unw i t t i ng l y i n a Plan. In computer programs, recursive loops (such as that set up i n the 
Y H V H program) mean that each output becomes a new input ; by analogy, the Diabol ica ls 
bel ieve that some event i n the past can be conceived as govern ing an event i n the future, 
even i f the t w o do not immedia te ly seem to be in ter l inked. However , the reader can on ly 
move A r o u g h the textual representation o f bo th the Abu la f i a program and the D iabo l i ca l 
Plan in one d i rect ion - that la id out by pr in t . D a v i d Porush notes that the text w h i c h has 
certain words under l ined m igh t be distract ing fo r the ord inary reader but s igni f icant for the 
spy w h o knows the systemic code by w h i c h they were produced; thus cybernet ic f ic t ions as 
Porush understands them of ten reveal that " i n fo rma t i on and nonsense can on ly be 
dist inguished b y their con tex t . " 3 6 Wh i l s t cybernetics abstracts in fo rmat ion f r o m a body so 
that i t floats as an abstract pattern, cybernetic f ic t ions embody ideas i n the guise o f pr in t . 
L i kew ise i n Foucault's Pendulum the physical body o f the text restricts meaning w i t h i n a 
certain spectram o f possib i l i t ies, or ensures that those meanings are mod i f i ed i ron ica l l y 
dependmg on the temporal context, the order in w h i c h they appear in the book , or whether 
they are f i rs t readings or rereadings. 
The l inear i ty o f pr inted texts undermines the atemporal detachment o f in fo rmat ion 
f r o m context posi ted b y Hermet ic ists and cybemetic ists a l ike. However , the mutab i l i t y o f 
3 5 Eco, Limits 148. 
3 6 Porush 66. 
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the meaning o f the text, where what is taken seriously by some readers becomes i ronic on 
re-reading or re-presentation i n l inear pr in t , does also endorse the poststructural v i ew o f 
language, since meaning depends on context. However , l i ke Hermet ic or cybernetic l i terary 
strategies, the mu l t i p l i c i t y o f meaning tíirown up by i rony also has its l im i ts . The book ' ร 
language is empi r ica l ly static, since on a re-reading w e do not suddenly f i n d new words or 
sentences in there: the book as a pr inted artefact is stable, and hence object ive ly legible. 
W e may be aware that, as Barthes c la ims, " a text is not a l ine o f words releasing a single 
' theo log ica l ' meaning (the 'message' o f the Au tho r -God) but a mul t id imens iona l space in 
wh i ch a var iety o f wr i t i ngs , none o f them or ig ina l , b lend and c l a s h . " 3 7 However , when 
judged against the image o f the Abu la f i a program and w i t h the i ron ic distance produced 
between the D iabo l ica l readers w i t h i n the text and the sceptical readers w i thou t , a text 
seems a comparat ive ly coherent, l inear and scripted system, and not s imp ly a machine 
wh i ch runs autonomously o f its programmer (according to Barthes, o f course, the author 
must die to create the text ) . A l t hough the D iabo l i ca l pursui t o f meaning may reduce us on 
the f i rst reading, the second reading to wh i ch i t mduces us catches the characters i n the 
i ronic pose o f be ing characters staged for the purpose о / t h e book , hence undermin ing the 
importance o f their quest in the book. A s Eco suggests: 
the no t ion o f un l im i ted semiosis does not lead to the conclusion that there 
are no cr i ter ia fo r іп ІефгеїаЇ іоп. T o say that the interpretat ion o f every text 
is potent ia l ly un l im i ted does not mean that there are no cr i ter ia for 
interpret ing i t . T o say that a text potent ia l ly has no end does not mean that 
every act o f іп ІефгеЇаЇ іоп can have a happy e n d i n g . 3 8 
Happ i l y , though, the act o f interpretat ion o f Foucault 1 ร Pendulum can have an end - o f 
sorts. I f w e avo id fa l l i ng in to the same trap as the characters - their mu l t ip le acts o f 
іп ЇефгеЇаІ іоп that lead them ( w i l l i n a pr inted book always lead them on any number o f 
readings) to an unhappy ending - we can begin to іпЇефгеї f r o m a pos i t ion outside the text, 
k n o w i n g the text as a machine fo r generating interpretations for cr i t ica l readers who are, 
however, not mere i n teφre t i ng machines. 
I n the previous chapter I argued that the sty l ish and realist ic presentation o f The 
Matrix is evidence fo r the c inema viewers that we migh t real ly be taken i n by a conv inc ing 
Ma t r i x s imulat ion i n everyday l i fe . However , even i f the w o r l d is onto log ica l ly a delusion, 
3 7 Barthes, " D e a t h " 146. 
3 8 Eco, Limits 6. 
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w e are st i l l able to conceptualise a h ierarchy o f The Matrix w i t h i n the M a t r i x , so that even 
i f real i ty is a s imulated hyperreal , i t is not a un i f o rm one. Th is d i f ferent ia t ion is shown 
through the use o f o ld technologies, the incarnat ion o f the economic and computer system 
as physical entit ies, and self-consciousness o f its "bu l le t t i m e " effect as opposed to 
Baudr i l la rd 'ร theoretical and hyperreal bul lets. However , the r isk remains that i n spite o f 
these di f ferences, we st i l l have no way o f escaping f r o m the Cartesian conundrum, the 
deceit o f the demonic machine. W i t h Foucault's Pendulum, w e can contrast responses to 
this postmodern cond i t ion at a generic level o f f i l m and l i terature (p ick ing up the cue lef t i n 
chapter 6 about the media shi f t between the novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? 
and the f i l m Blade Runner). L i ke Blade Runner or The Matrix, Foucault's Pendulum is a 
postmodern w o r k that shows the imposs ib i l i t y o f attaining f i na l meaning or u l t imate t ru th. 
L i k e 77г๕ Matrix, Eco 's nove l also tries to distance the interpreter o f the f i c t i on f r o m the 
state suffered b y the characters w i t h i n i t . Bu t as a question o f degree, the distancing effect 
i n Foucault rร Pendulum provides a greater level o f i rony. The fact that w e are absorbed b y 
the f i l m i n the moment o f watch ing , i n the stream o f conscious images i t presents, 
power fu l l y suggests that w e cou ld be deceived more general ly b y a v i r tua l s imula t ion o f 
real i ty outside the cinema. However , the l inear nature o f pr in t encourages a d i f ferent , 
double sort o f consciousness. For the pr in t and the book are read i n one di rect ion, even as 
the temporal order i t narrates is non-l inear. Th is a l lows us to perceive an i ron ic distance 
between the Diabol ica ls as they feel themselves to be relate to h istor ical t ime (that is, 
fluidly and non-causal ly) and the readers as they respond to the characters in a more 
structured fashion produced b y the l inear, causal nature o f a pr in ted detective plot . 
L i kew ise , the characters seem to produce persuasive arguments that sweep us along i n the 
D iabo l ica l method o f reading archival documents. Bu t wh i l s t i n The Matrix the fact that 
the other w o r l d is rendered so conv inc ing ly is evidence that our o w n " rea l i t y " cou ld also 
be perfect ly fabr icated, i n Foucault'ร Pendulum we see t w o marked ly d i f ferent styles at 
wo rk . The reasoning o f the Diabol ica ls is engaging but mere noise, whereas the log ic o f 
the book at root is a code fo r ա է շ փ ^ է ս է ւ օ ո that dist inguishes us as good readers f r o m them 
as bad semioticians. Though i n pr inc ipa l any reading can be legi t imate, as the Diabol ica ls 
w ish , in practice, some readings are better than others, as is indicated by the func t ion o f 
style. I n Foucault's Pendulum, the sincer i ty w i t h wh i ch the Diabol ica ls read archival 
documents contrasts w i t h the i rony w i t h wh i ch the reader looks at them, mock ing their 
convict ions. 
I ron ica l ly , i rony i tsel f becomes a quasi-rat ional perspective to adopt on the text and 
the wo r l d . W i t hou t deny ing real i ty exists, the Popperian scientist considers and fals i f ies 
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every other potent ial іп ЇефгеїаЇ іоп o f real i ty before choosing the one wh i ch provides a best 
f i t . The paradox presented b y The Matrix ― and b y postmodern ism in general - is that we 
cannot fa ls i fy the evidence, since the v i r tua l realit ies o f the computer or demonic language 
immerse us in a s imula t ion contro l led f r o m outside the opaque wal ls o f our o w n system, 
and therefore any empi r ica l speculations about real i ty made f r o m w i t h i n the system w i l l be 
always already deluded and wrong . A n object ive v i ew f r o m nowhere is unattainable. 
However , i n the case o f a nove l , since we k n o w i t to be a s imula t ion i n order for us to ho ld 
i t as a book, we are automat ical ly placed outside the system. Thus our ab i l i ty to take a 
v i ew f r o m nowhere w i t h respect to i t , f r o m w h i c h we read i ron ica l l y rather than co l lud ing 
w i t h the characters' reasoning, validates the scient i f ic method. W i t h i n Foucault's 
Pendulum, the premise o f the p lot is that empir ica l and myth ica l values are congruent and 
equal, since one can "ar r i ve at the t ru th through the painstaking reconstruct ion o f a false 
tex t " (459). The i l log ica l nature o f this is self-evident, however , since w e are reading 
precisely one such k n o w n " fa lse tex t , " a f ic t iona l novel w h i c h , as readers, we do not expect 
to make didact ic c laims to t ru th , mere ly , i n the f i rst instance, to entertain. 
I n a demonic act o f disbel ief , the Diabol ica ls pursue every possible avenue o f 
іп ЇефгеЇаІ іоп in the hopes o f reaching the r ight conc lus ion, the syncretic code that w i l l 
con f i rm that the surface is an i l lus ion and the interconnections beneath point to some 
master Plan. Readers are to rn between their unwi l l ingness to enter their conspiracy, and the 
log ica l f o rk that states that the w i thho ld ing o f t ru th is the most power fu l evidence that 
there is a syncretic t ru th to be found , even i f i t is concealed. However , by p lay ing o f f the 
l inear temporal i ty w i t h w h i c h we read against the fluid t ime scheme, we are able to attain 
an i ron ic distance. L i kew ise , the phys ica l i ty o f p r in t undermines the ephemeral i ty o f 
in format ion . Its readers, however , are anticipated as being able to d ist inguish between the 
deceiv ing noise and va l id in fo rmat ion , to acknowledge (as good postmodernists) that 
signif iers point to innumerable signif ieds in a process o f deferral , wh i ls t nevertheless 
reading according to a heur is t ica l ly reasonable range o f meanings. Th is heurist ic qual i ty 
places the novel as a cybernet ic f i c t i on . N . Kather ine Hayleร argues that deconstract ion 
was about the arbitrariness o f language, whereas cybernet ic models o f in fo rmat ion focus 
on the gap between noise and communica t ion , changing the emphasis " f r o m the l imi ta t ions 
o f language i n produc ing meaning to the l imi ta t ions o f code i n t ransmit t ing messages 
accurately." Rather than emphasising the instabi l i t ies o f a w r i t i ng subject as deconstruct ion 
does, " cod ing theory impl ies a t ransformat ion f r o m the w r i t i ng subject to a posthuman 
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col lect ive o f encoders/decoders." I f one qual i ty o f cybernetics i n re lat ion to l i terature is 
to devalue the unique or ig ina l i ty o f the author, the flip side is that i t emphasises the 
col lect ive o f l i terary decoders, that is to say, readers. Foucault's Pendulum impl ies that the 
practice o f cod ing and decoding at least ver i f ies that there is a meaning o f sorts lodged 
w i t h i n the text, even i f accessing i t seems so d i f f i cu l t that reading sometimes appears an 
arbitrary process o f mak ing meaning. For once, the mu l t i p l i c i t y o f іп ЇефгеІаІ іоп t h rown up 
by a postmodernist text is actual ly a va l idat ion o f the value o f scient i f ic method. I t makes a 
power fu l Popperian cal l fo r fa ls i f icat ion, because the text fals i f ies the va l id i t y o f its o w n 
Hermet ic strategy. A s Eco has argued, semiot ics ought to accept a Popper- l ike pr inc ip le 
that even if we cannot produce final, good тІефгеЇаІІ0П8 as we could in the tradition of 
Chr is t ian al legory, we can at least acknowledge w h i c h are bad. B y p rov id ing a 
օ օ ս ո է շ փ օ ա է i n Abu la f i a , the novel evidences that though wr i ters themselves may be 
machines, wh i l s t texts are machines fo r produc ing interpretat ions, readers are not 
i n teφгe t ing machines. The paradox is that showing this at w o r k i n the f o r m o f a cr i t ica l 
essay such as the present one requires the academic reader to f o l l o w the same sort o f 
methods as the Diabo l ica ls , dep loy ing a col lage o f reordered quotations and secondary 
texts in order to get at a meaning o f the novel that is not that o f the or ig ina l . A t a certain 
point , then, i t is necessary fo r the cr i t ic to f o l l o w Casaubon'ร rat ional ist ic g i r l f r iend , L i a , 
who turns I n g o l f s code wheel to its most log ica l t ranslat ion, and to conclude: "Sh i t , I ' m 
sick o f this Hermet ic w r i t i n g " (540) . 
Hayleร, My Mother Was a Computer 68. 
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Chapter 9. U n i t i n g the T w o Cultures: Body and M i n d in A . ร . B vatt 's Ճ Whistlins Woman 
T w o Cultures 
A s w i t h Umber to Eco 's f i c t i on , A .S . в y att 's novels are mir rors w i t h i n w h i c h 
d isc ip l inary and generic opposites such as human ism and re l ig ion , art and science, or 
cr i t ica l and creative w r i t i ng ref lect each other. 1 A l t h o u g h examin ing one idea i n isolat ion 
r isks shattering the complex i l lus ion o f the who le , в y att o f ten signposts her textual p lay 
w i t h a single, key metaphor wh ich recurs in d i f ferent contexts. In both her best -known 
wo rk , Possession (1990) , and in A Whistling Woman (2002)， this metaphor is the demon. 
I n the former , as w e shall see i n chapter 10， the t i t le and its associated trope guides readers 
across the boundaries o f genre and h is tory. I n terms o f the romance prototype, possession 
is what happens w h e n one is i n love, but also signif ies l i terary cr i t ica l obsession; in the 
Goth ic melodrama and for the V ic to r ian spir i tual ist , possession was used in the l i teral 
sense o f the embodied ghost, but even i n rat ional modern i ty and the postmodern novel we 
st i l l encounter the almost paranormal way i n w h i c h our l ives seem to be determined by our 
ancestors. The mul t iva lence o f this part icular t rope al lows - indeed demands ― that readers 
and cri t ics consider the signi f icance o f its impr in t i ng upon d i f ferent cultures at a 
theoret ical , even deconstruct ive, level . 
Rather than using the metaphor to cross h is tor ica l per iods, A Whistling Woman 
(2002) uses the demonic trope to traverse academic discipl ines and a var iety o f scient i f ic, 
ph i losophica l and l i terary investigat ions o f the phenomenon o f consciousness. 2 The f ina l 
nove l o f the "Freder ica quartet," A Whistling Woman ma in l y takes place i n a f ic t iona l 
in terd isc ip l inary univers i ty i n No r th Yorksh i re , against the backdrop o f sexual and social 
revo lu t ion i n the 1960ร. Hos t ing a spectrum o f scientists, such as a young mathemat ic ian, 
Marcus Potter, and the genetic b io logist , L u k Lysgaard Peacock, the Un ivers i t y is 
prepar ing to stage a major conference on " B o d y and M i n d . " Th is is organised by the V i ce -
chance l lo r , Gerard W i j n n o b e l , a mathemat ic ian and grammar ian w h o desires "a cogni t ive-
b io log ica l Theory o f Eve ry th i ng " (26) , and who chooses as one o f his keynote speakers 
Hodder Pinsky, a cogni t ive scientist. Coun teφo in t i ng this academic sett ing, we also f o l l o w 
' A version o f this chapter was f i rs t publ ished as A l i s ta i r B r o w n , " U n i t i n g the T w o 
Cultures o f B o d y and M i n d i n A . ร . B y a t ť s Ճ Whistling ΨοηιαηΓ Journal of Literature and 
Science 1.1 (2007): 55-72, 28 June 2008 
<http:Miteratureandscience.research.glam.ac.uk/ joumal/ issuel />. 
2 A . s. В y att, A Whistling Woman (London : Chatto, 2002). A l l subsequent 
parenthetical page references refer to this text. 
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the case o f Joshua Lamb w h o , hav ing witnessed his rather'ร Abraham- l i ke sacrif ice o f his 
mother and sister, becomes a charismatic Manichaean v is ionary and eventual ly leads a cul t 
on the No r th Yorksh i re Moors . F ina l l y , Frederica Potter, the heroine o f the four novels, is 
carv ing a new role fo r herself as bo th an emancipated mother and a Byat t ian publ ic 
intel lectual , host ing a te lev is ion series on art, science and pol i t ics . W i t h this w ide range o f 
characters and their intel lectual backgrounds, the demon provides an image that orientates 
d isc ip l inary perspectives around a c o m m o n point o f focus. Despi te preconceptions, the 
demon does not o f fer a Frankensteinian cr i t ique o f science th rough the deployment o f a 
monstrous m y t h that defies realist analysis, thereby concoct ing a " t w o cul tures" hierarchy 
i n w h i c h l i terature has representational pr iv i leges over science. I n a recent art icle for 
Nature ent i t led "F i c t i on In fo rmed b y Science," в y att elaborated on the central scient i f ic 
mot i fs around w h i c h the novels o f the Frederica quartet were structured: the synaesthetic 
so lv ing o f mathemat ical problems through v isual is ing landscapes i n The Virgin in the 
Garden (1978) ; the nature o f percept ion i n Still Life (1985) ; the F ibonacc i spiral i n Babel 
Tower (1986) ; and synaptic and b io log ica l connections and patterns in A Whistling Woman 
(2002) . 3 Over the t w o decades o f the quartet 'ร concept ion, science has prov ided a central 
mspi rat ion, and so i n spite o f its demonic keynote Ճ Whistling Woman sincerely values 
scient i f ic concepts. 
I n A Whistling Woman, Bya t t ' s explorat ion o f the c o m m o n and d i f ferent 
epistemologies o f each d isc ip l ine is orientated around her understanding o f consciousness 
and the connections and patterns, metaphor ical or synaptic, between m i n d or soul 
( t rad i t ional ly the preserve o f the arts and re l ig ion) and the body or the mater ia l bra in 
(subject fo r scient i f ic scrut iny) . Th is contest is established early i n the nove l , tìhrough 
Frederica'ร te lev is ion programme on creat iv i ty , w h i c h stages a debate between E lve t 
Gander, a Jungian psychoanalyst, and Hodder Pinsky, a cogni t ive l inguist w h o uses 
computers to explore " w h a t he bel ieved to be the deep and universal structures o f l inguis t ic 
competence" (29) . The producer, Edmund W i l k i e sets the tone fo r the debate: " Is the 
unconscious m i n d a system o f c i rcu i t ry and b inary gates?...Or is i t the I d , a turbulent beast 
raging i n the dark?" (150) . The confrontat ion between Gander and Pinsky hinges on 
determin ing w h i c h parad igm satisfies as an explanat ion o f the "sub l ime pathos" that is the 
experienced w o r k o f art: does Freud prov ide a useful metaphor f o r th ink ing about the 
pro found but disguised connections f r o m w h i c h creat iv i ty arises, or does his language 
A . ร . Byat t , " F i c t i o n In fo rmed by Science," Nature 424 (2005) : 294-297. 
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"detract f r o m var ious very useful pract ical explorat ions o f the work ings o f the unconscious 
m i n d " (154) carr ied out by cogni t ive science, as Pinsky claims? M o d e r n cogni t ive science 
seems reduct ive, seeing people as s imp ly computat ional mechanisms f o l l o w i n g f i xed rules 
(even Freud was s imp ly " an unusual ly luc id computer " [150 ] , according to Pinsky) . 
However , P insky i ron ica l ly subverts the rat ional i n his computat ional mode l o f m i n d , 
wh i ch is i tsel f a metaphor o f "Pandemon ium, " d rawn f r o m M i l t o n ' ร image in Paradise 
Lost. P insky 'ร empi r ica l approach is i ron ica l ly accentuated through the demonic metaphors 
w h i c h recur in d i f ferent contexts throughout the nove l , and the mul t iva lent usages o f the 
trope h igh l igh t that w h i c h is imp l ied i n P insky 'ร language, but w h i c h he does not admi t i n 
his ambi t ions fo r cogni t ive science: that a f ina l prescr ipt ion for h o w part icular neurological 
actions (the "easy p rob lems" ) g ive rise to concrete conscious experiences (their 
corresponding "hard p rob lems" ) w i l l be impossible w i thou t recourse to l inguist ic analogy. 4 
B y contrast, Freud's treatment o f the unconscious as a "beast raging i n the dark " - w h i c h 
we saw l i tera l ly extrapolated i n Forbidden Planet - acknowledges the d ivers i ty and 
perversi ty o f human experience, p rov id ing a power fu l metaphor fo r consciousness even i f 
its scient i f ic basis is suspect. I n her non- f i c t ion , в y att quotes Jos ipov ic i 'ร 
psychoanalyt ica l ly in fo rmed " D e m o n o f Ana logy - the sense that what w e thought was 
Out There and Other is on ly a descr ipt ion o f the inside o f our o w n sku l l s . " 5 Po in t ing to the 
use o f analogy across science and the arts, the demonic m o t i f a l lows в y att to explore the 
relat ionship between the f ic t iona l and the real, the consciousness that intercedes between 
discourse and the physical w o r l d , and the elucidat ions o f real i ty f r o m various discipl ines. 
The f i rs t section o f this chapter w i l l trace the range o f demonic s ign i f icat ion as i t 
attests to the gap between phys ica l ism and menta l ism as this maps on to the t w o cultures in 
Ճ Whistling Woman. O n one rel ig ious іп ЇефгеІаІ іоп a demon is a physical agent 
per fo rming the metaphysical w i l l o f G o d , t ransmit t ing messages w h i c h the receptive m i n d 
can interpret. W i t h his apparently al legorical character, L a m b - a L a m b o f God? -
embodies this possib i l i ty . Bu t i f Lamb ' s m i n d is possessed b y demons such that his mental 
att i tude stands for something outside his o w n embodied self as a re l ig ious symbo l , this 
impl ies a return to Cfe is t ian al legory over scient i f ic mater ia l ism, as i f minds or souls alone 
contain meaning. Such al legor ical determin ism also l im i ts the referential mu l t i p l i c i t y w i t h 
wh i ch a postmodern nove l l i ke A Whistling Woman p lays, i n its denial o f a single 
4 For the explanat ion o f the "easy" and " h a r d " prob lems, see chapter 1， note 55. 
5 A . ร . В у att, On Histories and Stories: Selected Essays (London : Chatto, 2000) 
122. 
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authori tat ive perspective on the issue o f consciousness by i nvok ing the mul t iva lent demon 
trope. I ron ica l ly , cogni t ive science is not un l i ke re l ig ion i n this respect. A l t hough cogni t ive 
science considers brains and bodies to be co֊extensively mater ia l , i t represents brains as 
s imple determinist ic devices or calculat ing engines; this makes i t hard to see h o w they can 
produce the f u l l and exc i t ing var iety that characterises human cul ture, such as l i terature, or 
myths l i ke demonism. For al though the demon may not exist i n " rea l i t y , " i t possesses such 
a c o m m o n cul tura l сштепсу as denot ing a state o f m i n d (such as the demon o f 
տ օ հ ւ ճ օ բ Խ շ ո ւ Յ ) that its existence should be examined even f r o m the most fundamenta l ly 
object ive pos i t ion. The demon exists because people th ink i t so, al though there may not be 
a single neuron or suite o f cells that consti tute the demonic. Wh i l s t psychoanalysis 
acknowledges its f o l k existence, as в у att shows, cogni t ive science also uses demons as 
placeholder terms i n theor is ing the bra in , and the use o f a my th ica l metaphor w i t h i n 
science suggests that m i n d cannot be reduced to its neurological components, but must 
demand a l i terary as w e l l as empi r ica l sort o f іп ЇефгеїаЇ іоп. The f i rs t section o f this chapter 
seeks to understand these questions f r o m the perspective o f the reader, and points to 
Byat t 's rework ing o f any extant t w o cultures p rob lem as the analogue o f Cartesian 
dual ist ic th ink ing . I n this t ranslat ion, в у att attempts to show the value o f epistemological 
p lura l i ty i n the ve in o f postmodern ism, w i thou t s l ipp ing into an anti-science stance. 
I n the second sect ion, I f o l l o w Byat t ' s ef forts to wr i te o f m i n d i n terms o f body, 
such that the nove l ' s representation o f character can overcome the l imi ta t ions o f reading 
according to the absolutist perspectives o f fered by re l ig ious al legory or scient i f ic 
determin ism. A s в у att is aware ( through her f r iendship w i t h real- l i fe b io logists such as 
Steve Jones and neuroscientists such as A n t o n i o Damasio) , increasingly the body is 
proposed as the site f r o m w h i c h thought is governed. 6 Th is re ject ion o f dua l i sm leads to an 
aesthetic and mora l p rob lem for the nove l as i t attempts to incorporate such f ind ings. H o w 
can it represent minds as embodied th ings, when the on ly mode o f representation is 
language and metaphor w h i c h is always abstract? A n d i f i t puts too much stress on 
embodied th ink ing , does this not s imp ly substitute for its re ject ion o f al legor ical 
dogmat ism w i t h the conv ic t ion that human subjects are b io log ica l l y determined? 
The acknowledgements page o f A Whistling Woman reads l i ke a ro l l cal l o f the 
most prominent contemporary scientists, inc lud ing Steve Jones, R ichard Dawk ins , Ma t t 
R id ley , A n t o n i o Damasio , Semir Z e k i and John Maynard Smi th (422) . 
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Dece iv ing Demons o f M i ռ d 
A t the heart o f the demonic web o f connect ions, and the f igure against w h o m al l the 
other metaphors o f the demon are contextual ised, is Joshua Ramsden (or Josh Lamb , as he 
calls h imse l f symbo l ica l l y ) . Haunted b y his ch i ldhood experiences when he saw his 
evangel ical father murder his mother and sister, as an adult L a m b achieves a k i n d o f epic 
v is ionary status. H e receives Manichaean messages w h i c h instruct h i m to spread their 
w o r d , and he sees the w o r l d over la id w i t h images o f b lood and l ight . A s his name is 
intended to suggest, i n a Chr is t ian era he w o u l d have been we lcomed as a prophet ic f igure, 
an intermediary through w h o m vis ions f r o m G o d flow, their messages not about L a m b 
himsel f , but po in t ing towards some theological t ru th outside o f h i m . Bu t i n Bya t t ' s 
rendering o f his psychology, w e cannot dogmat ica l ly assume such a connect ion between 
the ind iv idua l and what he analogical ly evidences about w ider society. I n one passage 
wh i ch is symptomat ic o f L a m b ' s schizophrenic consciousness, the God- l i ke , omniscient 
narrator describes L a m b ' s struggle to come to terms w i t h h is personal trauma: 
I n the Arabian Nights, i t has been said, a man has his Dest iny wr i t ten on his 
forehead, and his character, his nature, is that Dest iny and no th ing else. A 
boy , a man , l i ke Josh L a m b , Joshua Ramsden, who has found h imse l f 
t umb l i ng i n the dark sea outside the terr ible transparent m i r ro r o f the f ragi le 
w indow-pane, persists perhaps b y l i nk ing moments o f conscious surv iva l 
in to a f ine suspension-bridge o f a personal dest iny, a nar row path o f 
constructed l igh t , arching out over the bu lg ing and bo i l i ng . (106) 
L a m b ' s v is ions are g iven f o r m on ly b y the authorial potency w h i c h designs their 
metaphorical correspondence, symbo l ica l l y w r i t i n g his destiny on his forehead. Moreover , 
our readiness to isolate Lamb as a theological parad igm is made compl icated because the 
knowledge o f L a m b ' ร m i n d presented to the reader is not absolute or d iagrammat ic . 
Care fu l ly crafted though the image is, the metaphors do not l i nk internal thoughts w i t h a 
stable, al legorical context outside the self; rather, they describe a passion w h o l l y internal , 
and the metaphor ical l inkages are fo rmed between the images, as the series o f nouns and 
adjectives b lend together: n o w a terr ible mi r ro r , n o w a f ine suspension br idge, now a path 
o f l ight . These images are denotat ive o f L a m b ' s state o f m i n d , but their subject ive 
interconnections are on l y sparsely connotat ive o f external , a l legor ical l inks. Is the "bu lg i ng 
and b o i l i n g " over w h i c h L a m b ' s l i fe moves supposed to be seen as H e l l or the 
tumb l ing i n a sea outside a transparent m i r ro r (not that there can be such a th ing) o f a 
part icu lar ly f rag i le ( fo r an unspeci f ied reason) window-pane? I n a wr i ter less assured than 
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В y att, i t w o u l d be tempt ing to condemn this passage as a hopeless co l lect ion o f m i x e d 
metaphors. I n the case o f a novel ist w h o takes metaphor as one o f her focal subjects, 
however, the strangely art iculate meaninglessness o f the passage del iberately confronts us 
w i t h a phenomenological experience. The on ly th ing that w e can be clear o f here is that 
consciousness i tsel f is happening in an imagist ic stream, that the w o r l d o f the text is being 
experienced through the consciousness o f the other, and that any o f the entit ies posi ted by 
that consciousness can not be regarded as referr ing to actual things in the physical w o r l d . 
The fact that there is not one but mu l t ip le consciousnesses (the author 'ร , L a m b ' s 
and the reader'ร) w o r k i n g to concretise the imagist ic stream into meaning, means that w e 
can never observe the psychologica l sensation re l iab ly and object ive ly . Ear l ier i n the nove l , 
Lamb sits i n his r o o m i n a psychiatr ic hospi ta l , observ ing b lood dr ipp ing f r o m the wal ls 
and clothes. W h e n the narrator tel ls the reader that " H e watched the b l o o d " blanket his 
w o r l d , we necessari ly watch by p roxy and, since w e share his v is ion , then i n one sense the 
b lood cannot be pr ivate to h i m but must be pub l ic , phys ica l ly i n the w o r l d (at least o f the 
novel ) as w e l l as psycho log ica l ly i n his wo r l d . Th i s is not s imp ly a theoret ical v i e w o f the 
paradoxes inherent i n the th i rd-person narrator ial standpoint; rather, this compl ica t ion is 
exp l i c i t l y what makes his v is ions, i n L a m b ' s i ron ic phrase, "an interesting phenomenon" 
(35) . Lamb wonders o f the b lood : 
Was i t there or not there? H e was certa in ly seeing i t - w i t h his eyes - no t ing 
its v iscosi ty and flow. He was not mak ing it up. I t wasn ' t a pro ject ion o f his 
state o f m i n d , w h i c h was ca lm, not b loody. I t was not a metaphor. 
O n the other hand, he was almost ent i re ly certain that i f he p icked up the 
soaked sock, i t w o u l d be wh i te w o o l , and w o u l d not dr ip red. (35) 
The person u l t imate ly " m a k i n g i t u p " is the novel is t , w i t h w h o m we are comp l i c i t as 
readers, and the nove l ' s metaf ic t ion makes us uncomfor tab le . I f the b lood is not a 
psychological metaphor w h i c h projects pub l i c l y something otherwise pr ivate (the 
unconscious o f a madman or re l ig ious prophet) then what is it? Surely a nove l is general ly 
an analogy or displacement o f the real? A s I argued in the previous chapter, contemporary 
f i c t i on shifts the determinat ion o f al legor ical meaning away f r o m an external referent ial 
poo l (such as Cfe is t ian i ty ) , and away f r o m an external source o f creat iv i ty (the author) , 
towards the reader as coproducer o f meanings. 7 B u t act ively to reconstruct meaning i n the 
absence o f an external and uncontested f rame o f reference, such as the Chr is t ian one, is to 
7 H e i d i Hansson provides this interpretat ion o f a l legory i n re lat ion to Bya t t ' s 
Morpho Eugenia. Hansson 454. 
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distort real i ty b y assuming a priori that a textual phenomenon, such as L a m b ' s v is ions or 
his Chr is t - l ike name, must mean something pub l i ca l l y and al legor ical ly . Th is , o f course, is 
precisely the sort o f mistake Eco 's Diabol ica ls make. A lbe i t w i t h less visceral 
consequences, в y att seems s imi la r ly to suggest that the novel is pr iv i leged in g i v i ng us 
access to the inter ior m i n d o f a character, but that w e can never use a nove l to enter 
someone else'ร thought processes ob ject ive ly , w i thou t mutat ing them in to something they 
are not , symbols rather than a direct, empir ica l percept ion o f the m i n d o f the other. In 
re lat ion to consciousness, therefore, a nove l is not automat ical ly a better m e d i u m o f 
іп іефгеїа і іоп than cogn i t i ve science. A f e w pages earl ier (29) , the novel ment ions 
Heisenberg'ร uncertainty pr inc ip le , wh i ch asserts that the fact o f observat ion may change 
the state o f a part ic le be ing observed. Just as i f L a m b touches and picks up the sock the 
i l lus ion o f b lood ( i f " i l l u s i o n " is what i t is) w i l l be d ispel led, i t seems as i f the moment w e 
interrogate the passage this changes the nature o f the b lood w h i c h we observe f r o m the 
omniscient perspective, the novel 's equivalent o f the empir ica l v i ew f r o m nowhere. W h i l s t 
i t seems " r e a l " fo r L a m b , the moment we read i t we cannot help but turn i t into an abstract 
symbo l , do ing as readers precisely what L a m b does to a dangerous extent i n տ t e φ r e t i n g 
his visions as indicat ions o f his re l ig ious vocat ion. A s R o m a n Ingarden theorised, because 
l i terary works typ ica l l y conta in "spots o f indeterminacy" the "reader usual ly goes beyond 
what is s imply presented by the text (or projected by i t ) and in var ious respects completes 
the represented ob jec t i v i t ies . " 8 As Heisenberg 'ร uncertainty pr inc ip le emphasises a 
probabi l is t ic Nature i n w h i c h i t is not possible to mon i to r al l the properties o f a system 
simultaneously, so i n the l i terary knowledge avai lable here the imp l i c i t presence o f a 
readerly observer does not force the log ic one way or another, towards real i ty or unreal i ty , 
physical or mental phenomenon. L i k e the Cartesian deceiv ing demon, L a m b ' s demons 
prove on ly the l im i ted fact that consciousness is happening and must be accepted as such 
in its o w n bizarre terms; they do not determine what is be ing thought and h o w it relates to 
real i ty i n any absolute way. 
The poised doubt about whether the b lood is present i n the w o r l d o r j u s t in Lamb ' s 
m i n d maps on to the discrepancy between the "easy" and " h a r d " problems o f 
consciousness. I n the case o f l i terature, pr in ted words - analogous to the easi ly observable 
electro-chemical impulses o f the bra in - do g ive rise to a complex, indecipherable gestalt 
Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines 
of Ontology 1 Logic, and Theory of Literature, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, I I : 
Northwestern I I P , 1973) 252. 
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o f consciousness both i n the open-ended characterisation o f L a m b and i n the reader 
s t ruggl ing as analyst. Because i t is not possible to extend the b lood analogy further, to 
mental - fo r example, a metaphor f o r the death o f convent ional re l ig ion - this is a moment 
when w e are confronted also w i t h the demonic analogy in Jos ipov ic i 'ร theoretical sense. 
W e cannot connect L a m b ' s subject ive experience to some object ive statement o f the state 
o f the wor ld ' s re l ig ion , w i thou t recognis ing also that i t has for L a m b its o w n , self-
contained meaning, that another m i n d exists w h i c h is separate to that o f the ind iv idua l 
reader and that, however disturbed i t appears to be according to our o w n preconceptions, i t 
is as personal ly genuine a percept ion o f real i ty as our own . A s I observed i n chapter 1， i n 
cases l i ke that o f the v i r tua l l y " m a r r i e d " man , this issue o f h o w much mora l leg i t imacy we 
accord to delusions is actual ly a v i ta l one i n a cybernetic era w h e n we m igh t enter 
s imulated wor lds wh i ch seem genuine to us wh i ls t appearing, f r o m the object ive and pub l i c 
po in t o f v iew, to be mere simulacra. C o m i n g ob l ique ly to this debate, Ճ Whistling Woman 
at least causes us to k n o w that the ind iv idua l is unique and isolated f r o m the w o r l d , wh i ls t 
at the same t ime prevent ing us f r o m fa l l i ng into the real sol ips ism Josipov ic i warns us 
against: that o f not k n o w i n g that one is i n a state o f sol ipsism. Гһе bel ie f that we inhabit a 
shared, common real i ty , rather than an external w o r l d always perceived d i f fe rent ly by 
di f ferent people, is the true delusion. However , i f postmodern ism seems to deny the 
poss ib i l i ty o f an absolute " rea l i t y " i n a w o r l d always f i l tered through a cu l tura l ly 
determined discourse, cogni t ive neuroscience as i t was developing in the 1960ร, 
s imultaneously w i t h postmodern ism, seemed poised to prov ide a stabi l is ing antidote to this 
l inguist ic and psychological r e l a t i v i sm . 1 0 I f reading turns everyth ing into analogy, and 
language is an epiphenomenon o f consciousness rather than rel iable evidence o f discrete 
thought processes, then cogni t ive science and ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence in their most 
reduct ionist guises promise to get back to the or ig ins before phenomenology, not analogy 
but the logos o f thought itself. 
Central to this v i ew is Hodder Pinsky, the computat ional psycho- l inguist . 
บท8ифгІ8Іп§1у, В у att admits his name is a conf la t ion o f Steven Pinker and N o a m 
9 Jos ipov ic i 307. 
1 0 See m y discussion i n chapter 1. Notab ly , в у att read Jean Pierre D u p u y ' ร wo rk , 
The Mechanization of Mind, i n preparat ion f o r A Whistling Woman. "F i c t i on b i fo rmed b y 
Science" 296. 
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Chomsky , and she also may also have had M a r v i n M i n s k y i n m i n d as w e l l . Appear ing on 
Frederica'ร te levis ion show w i t h Gander, the psychoanalyst, P insky announces: 
There is...an interest ing computer programme [s ic] called Pandaemonium4 
wh ich is psychologists ' everyday comic poetry, not subl ime, though i t takes 
its name, I suppose, f r o m the industr ious underwor ld o f Paradise Lost. Th is 
programme has a hierarchy o f mechanical demons who are devised, or 
designed (by us, their masters), to recognise patterns in rushes o f random 
in fo rmat ion , to create order f r o m noise. It depends on what we cal l "para l le l 
processing." There are the "data demons" w h o recognise images, and shout. 
There are the computat ional demons w h o recognise clusters o f recognised 
images, and shout. There are the cogni t ive demons who represent possible 
patterns, and col lect the computed shouts. A n d there is the "dec is ion 
d e m o n " w h o ident i f ies the s t imu l i by the loudest shout ing. The system can 
learn. I t can ident i f y pr in ted letter, and morse code. I t may one day 
understand what is so - unrepeatable - about Hamlet, or Beethoven'ร T h i r d . 
(153) 
Th is "society o f m i n d " mode l w h i c h M i n s k y expounded (d rawing on the w o r k o f O.G. 
S e l f r idge) and wh i ch Danie l Dennett develops as the mu l t ip le drafts mode l i n his popular 
Consciousness Explained, seeks to uni te the easy p rob lem o f consciousness w i t h the hard 
p r o b l e m . 1 2 These models assume that m i n d is made f r o m smaller systems (agents or 
demons) that ind iv idua l l y pe r fo rm processes w h i c h do not require thought but that 
co l lec t ive ly constitute consciousness. I t is not surpr is ing that this model o f consciousness 
lends i tsel f we l l to computer p rog ramming and ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence, w i t h its subroutines 
and discrete variables. However , there is a p rob lem w i t h this f o r m o f cogni t ive science 
1 1 Byat t , "F i c t i on In fo rmed b y Science" 296. 
1 2 M a r v i n M i n s k y , The Society of Mind (New Y o r k : Schuster-Touchstone, 1988), 
especial ly 18-23, 274, 327. M i n s k y describes the demon as " A n agent that constantly 
watches fo r a certain cond i t ion and intervenes when i t occurs." The concept o f the demon 
i n paral lel processing originates w i t h O l i ve r Sel f r idge, "Pandemon ium: A Paradigm for 
Learn ing , " Proceedings of the Symposium on Mechanisation of Thought Processes^ ed. D. 
V . B lake and A . M . Ut t ley (London : H . M . Stat ionary O f f i ce , 1959) 511-529 See also o. 
G. Sel f r idge and บ . Neisser, "Pattern Recogn i t ion b y Mach ine , " Scientific American 203 
(1960) : 60-Ò7. The quotat ion f r o m A Whistling Woman may be a part ia l paraphrase f r o m 
this latter article, which in a s imi lar anÜKOpomorphism notes that " A Pandemonium 
program can handle the s i tuat ion b y hav ing the demons shout more or less l oud l y " (66). 
However , probably most readers w i l l have been made aware o f the cogni t ive " d e m o n " 
toough Danie l Dennett , Consciousness Explained 189， 261-63. 
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w h i c h is made clear t taough the demon trope. W h i l s t asserting Pandemonium as an 
empir ica l mode l , the l i terary reference to M i l t o n and the use o f the s igni f ier " d e m o n " in a 
nove l already f u l l o f them (rather than a more neutral te rm, such as "subrout ine" ) tums the 
model in to a metaphor fo r what cannot be k n o w n i n the mu l t ip le and complex connections 
between the t w o problems o f consciousness. Rather than a l l ow ing us a non-re lat iv is t ic and 
object ive representation o f m i n d , cogni t ive science adopts a s imi lar perspective to the 
reader l ook ing into L a m b ' ร ambiguous mental images; i t too makes al legorical references 
w i t h things beyond its apparent focus, i n order to concretise things that are otherwise 
empi r ica l ly s l ippery. Further, Pinsky does not see that the fact that the demons are 
"designed b y us (their masters)," i ron ica l ly lends credence to L a m b ' s earl ier v i ew that his 
m i n d is a condui t f r o m the d iv ine designer w h o despatches his demonic agents. A s a 
rat ional ist , this is something Pinsky w o u l d not accept. However , as John Searle has po in ted 
out, wh i l s t ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence fu lminates against dua l ism, the who le thesis o f strong 
ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence relies on i t , since " i t rests on a re ject ion o f the idea that the m i n d is 
jus t a natural b io log ica l phenomenon i n the w o r l d l i ke any o the r . " 1 3 In Ä Whistling 
Woman'ร comparable cr i t ique, the d i f ferent intersections at w h i c h the demonic metaphor 
appears in tu i t that the cybernet ic argument assumes that m i n d can reside independent ly o f 
the body on c i rcu i t boards or i n sof tware; that i t is led through that same Cartesian t rad i t ion 
to invoke concepts o f an abstractable m i n d that m igh t one day understand the qual ia o f 
music ; and that this results i n a search for recursive levels o f homuncu l i - l i ke demons every 
b i t as myster ious as those that possess the Manichean messenger, Lamb . 
Despi te the chaos o f s ign i f icat ion that L a m b ' s psychology exposes, at least the 
demonic metaphor i n re lat ion to Lamb leads us to an understanding w i t h mora l 
impl icat ions, because i t forces us, as readers, to confront the fact that we inhabi t a universe 
o f p lura l experiences, i n w h i c h the m i n d o f the insane st i l l deserves our attent ion and 
interest. Though w e m igh t note the a f f i n i t y w i t h Ph i l i p K. D i c k ' ร emphasis on empathy, 
more d i rect ly в y att inheri ts f r o m George E l i o t ' ร Middlemarch, w h i c h demands that we see 
the w o r l d not on l y f r o m the po in t o f v iew o f the heroine Dorothea ֊ f r o m w h i c h Casaubon 
seems a dry scholar - but f r o m w i t h i n his perspective a l so . 1 4 I n contrast, the Pandemonium 
model s imp ly collapses in on i tself, since even as P insky c la ims through his cogni t ive 
Searle, Minds, Brains and Science 38. 
The cruc ia l passage is that where E l io t inter jects, "bu t w h y always Dorothea? 
Was her po in t o f v i e w the cmly possible one?" George E l io t , MiddlemarcĶ ed. D a v i d 
Car ro l l , O x f o r d W o r l d ' s Classics (Ox fo rd : O x f o r d U P , 1997) 2 6 1 . 
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probes and computer models to c i rcumvent the need to expla in m i n d d i rough analogy, i t is 
predicated on a metaphor o f hazy "demons . " Th is is not to suggest that в y att represents 
l i terature as systematical ly superior to science (later i n the book, at the Body and M i n d 
conference, P insky speaks w i t h admirable c i rcumspect ion about the current state o f his 
science). However , through metaf ic t ion, the nove l can recognise its o w n l im i ts i n 
representing consciousness. A h igh l y sel f - ref lex ive novel open to mu l t ip le interpretat ions, 
par t icu lar ly o f L a m b ' s mindset, A Whistling Woman presents i tsel f as the embodiment o f 
the hard p rob lem o f consciousness w i t h a l l its i r reducible var iety, rather than supposing 
that ob ject ive ly to measure the easy p rob lem is automat ica l ly to extrapolate the subject ive 
qual i ty o f the hard p rob lem. Wha t makes this transcend the convent ional t w o cultures is 
that the computat ional approach to consciousness, essential ly a p rob lem o f the relat ionship 
between body and m i n d , is shown to bear a f f i n i t y w i t h l i terary al legory, w h i c h can be 
equal ly determinate i n a re l ig ious t rad i t ion w h i c h connects words on the page to d iv ine 
symbols. The al legor ical t rad i t ion assumes that wr i t ten language - a f o r m o f easy p rob lem 
ᅳ corresponds d i rect ly to part icular external theological s igni f ieds, jus t as cogni t ive science 
assumes qual i tat ive experiences ( l i ke demons) can be p inpointed to precise neurological 
processes. 
A s explored i n chapter 3， though, psychoanalysis offers a power fu l fo rk : i t 
deconstructs the poss ib i l i ty o f demons as al legor ical markers o f a metaphysical state, 
wh i ls t enabl ing them as metaphors for the human cond i t ion o f perceiv ing the w o r l d 
distortedly. I n its attempts to produce f ina l understandmgs o f the m i n d , the computat ional 
focus o f modern cogni t ive science fai ls to account for the subtle varieties o f the human 
experience that is even encoded in the scientists' o w n language and metaphors. I n contrast, 
the Freudian interpretat ion seems doubly val idated, because i t bo th seeks to exp la in 
consciousness ü i rough exp lor ing the meanings beh ind language, wh i l s t i n that explanat ion 
i t generates a new rhetor ical format ions w h i c h are also h igh l y i imovat ive , even creative, i n 
their attempts to elucidate the qual i ty o f be ing in the w o r l d , в y att has admired Freud as a 
most p ro found th inker, a k i n d o f narrator whose connect ive use o f language is i tsel f poetic: 
" Y o u take a w o r d and see in what contexts i t shmes and g l i t t e rs . " 1 5 Freud is a u n i f y i n g 
personal i ty at the heart o f the nove l , whose analyt ical stories carry " an immediate, w h o l l y 
satisfactory verbal pleasure in pattern, and [reach] out in to b io logy , and human his tory, l i ke 
r ings round a stone in a dark p o o l " (155). However , though psychoanalysis has long 
1 5 A . ร . Byat t , in terv iew w i t h And rew Mar r , " T h e B r a i n , " Start the Week, B B C 
Radio 4， 6 Oct. 2006. 
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prov ided the modernist wr i te r w i t h an epistemological f ramework in w h i c h to deal w i t h 
questions and representations o f consciousness, i n A Whistling Woman Byat t also impl ies 
that the Freudian focus on the submerged depths o f meaning beneath a conscious act or 
piece o f language can be deceptive, misdi rect ing attent ion away f r o m the empi r ica l l y p la in 
surface o f things as they actual ly are. For example, inv i ted to a weekend away w i t h her 
fo rmer Ph.D. supervisor L u k Lysgaard Peacock, Jacqueline watches as he moves through 
his house w h i c h he has, i n her honour, carefu l ly l i t w i t h lanterns: 
W h e n L u k was at the far end o f the table, he looked l i ke the o ld , fami l ia r , 
too fami l ia r L u k . A s he came dancing towards her, w i t h his of fer ings, his 
bearded face passed f r o m poo l o f l ight to poo l o f l ight , f r o m candle- l ight to 
island o f lamp- l igh t . W h e n these f ie ry l ights were under his face he looked 
unfami l ia r . He looked demonic. (177) 
I n a deliberate p lant ing o f associative language, of fer ings reminds o f sacri f ice, sacrif ice 
reminds o f L a m b ' ร h is tory, his h is tory connects w i t h Abraham, Ab raham'ร hearing o f the 
voice o f G o d l inks back - grotesquely - to the paternal ist ic bearded face o f L u k here. The 
play between the un fami l ia r and the fami l ia r reminds o f Freud's uncanny and, as we saw i n 
chapter 3， confrontat ion w i t h the uncanny is a sel f - ref lex ive real isat ion that demons are not 
out there in the w o r l d , but are projected onto others t feough the unconscious mot ivat ions 
and desires o f the self. However , empathis ing not w i t h the author, w i t h her Freudian 
knowingness, but іп ІефгеЇ іп§ the scene at a more immediate leve l , the conclus ion "he 
looked demon ic " also has a s imple and rat ional causation, a k i n d o f ver i f iable "easy" 
p rob lem: i t is noth ing more than a t r i ck o f the s l ight ly d i m and changing l ight . A n y other 
іпІефгеЇаІ іоп is a pro jec t ion o f symbol ic meaning onto a mater ia l surface that is easi ly 
rat ionalisable. 
The prob lem w i t h the Freudian f ramework is that i t a l lows so many connections to 
be made as to produce disparate rather than coherent ly symbol ic meanings. T o paraphrase 
Umber to Eco, when the author knows about psychoanalysis f r o m a theoretical pos i t ion, the 
creative text m igh t seem l i t t le more than a machine for generating associations. The 
nove l 's metaf ic t ional i ty h igh l ights h o w we anticipate correlat ions between Lamb 's m i n d 
and the social or mora l w o r l d in w h i c h i t operates; in a s imi lar way the psychoanalyt ic 
perspective anticipates correlat ions between conscious and unconscious, connections 
wh i ch can distract f r o m the real i ty . I n its relat iv ist ic dr ive , psychoanalysis can never 
conclus ive ly іпІефгеЇ h o w things real ly are since something must always remain beneath 
the surface. The benef i t o f the neuroscient i f ic approach, b y contrast, is that i t c i rcumvents 
analysis o f m i n d through the epiphenomenon o f language, instead p rob ing the bra in 
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beneath the skul l d i rect ly . Further, psychoanalysis sets out a scheme o f expectat ion that 
entices us to read i n a part icular way . B y so del iberately p lant ing psychoanalyt ic meaning 
in a nove l , the novel makes psychoanalyt ic c r i t i c ism appear to be attacking a straw man, 
since subsequently to theorise the text i n a psychoanalyt ic ve in is to do noth ing more than 
the novel anticipates. (Th is p rob lem o f cr i t ica l foremeaning is explored i n greater depth i n 
Possession.) I n a comment that accurately describes the readerly predicament o f 
decipher ing the al legor ical status o f Lamb ' s v is ions, the psychiatr ist K ie ran Quarre l l 
observes that "Part o f the p rob lem. . .is that genuine spir i tual seekers (whatever the 'sp i r i t ' 
is) do bear some resemblance to the t ru ly batty whose w i r i n g has shor t -c i rcu i ted." A s 
Lawrence K u b i e observed, the psychoanalyst struggles to remain detached f r o m his 
pa t ien t . 1 6 Just l i ke Chr is t ian aUegorists, the psychoanalyst may project rather than draw 
meaning f r o m his patient. Gander agrees, in a reply to Quarre l l : " y o u k n o w m y deep 
aversion to false Ob jec t i v i t y ' and therapie c laims o f 'detachment ' w c h [sic] are bound to 
be bogus" (61) . F ina l l y , Brenda Pincher, an ethnomethodologist w h o plants herself among 
L a m b ' s cul t , knows that i f she revealed her status as a scient i f ic observer she " w o u l d 
change the dynamics o f the group so that i t was not what I was observ ing, or what I w ished 
to observe" (193) . U n l i k e the neuroscientists in the nove l , however , these three psychiatr ic 
practi t ioners at least admi t the l imi ta t ions o f their methodology. Rather than this p rob lem 
being unique to the psychoanalyst, as I suggested earlier Bya t t ' s representation o f Lamb 
suggests that as readers w e already read f r o m a part icular, expectant angle: " m a k i n g people 
u p " is precisely what the novel is t and the reader expect to do. The di f ference is that a nove l 
is always contro l led and edited b y an author, whereas psychoanalysis attempts to of fer a 
diagnosis and therapy wh i l s t real ly be ing a pro ject ion o f the analyst 's desires onto a text or 
subject. 
A Whistling Woman evidences how fundamental metaphor is to thought, such that 
l i terature, re l ig ion , cogn i t i ve science and psychoanalysis become, i n their attempts to 
exp la in m i n d , s imp ly ways o f ta lk ing evasively around a p rob lem wh i ch remains beneath 
our skul ls. Bu t as L a m b ' s v is ions h in t , there should be something that is "no t a metaphor," 
that does not evasively mutate in to analogy as soon as w e t ry to study it . Though the 
novel ist strives to transcend the t radi t ional t w o cultures oppos i t ion and to a f f i r m the value 
o f science and the arts as d i f ferent ways o f l ook ing at the same phenomenon o f m i n d , i t is 
not easy to reconci le the t w o cultures because they seem so inext r icably predicated on the 
See chapter 3， note 11 . 
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analogous dua l ism o f body (wh i ch can be dissected and analysed object ive ly) and m i n d 
(wh i ch can on ly be understood through subject ive representations, such as language). A s a 
result, representations o f m i n d tend to be extracted f r o m the embodied ind iv idua l as 
representing some pos i t ion outside the text, imp l i c i t l y asserting subject iv i ty over 
ob ject iv i ty , a l legory over realist representation. Is i t possible to w o r k i n a non-al legor ical 
way , such that psycholog ica l sensations are represented as be ing unique to the person 
hav ing the thoughts such that they cannot necessari ly be def ined according to some 
external scheme? Byat t ' s attempts to represent ho l is t ica l ly embodied rather than s ingular ly 
al legorical minds , w h i c h are not determined but can be interpreted var iously by her 
(postmodern) readers, accounts for the strange second ha l f o f the nove l . I n a number o f 
ways, this seeks to negotiate a way between the genetic and cogni t ive determin ism o f the 
body, and a conversely indeterminate aesthetics o f the transcendent m i n d . F i rs t ly , and not 
w i thou t paradox, в y att deploys physical metaphors to describe the act ivi t ies o f m i n d , 
d rawing on the recent neuroscience o f embodied cogn i t ion . Secondly, she denies 
b io log ica l l y determinist ic fo rms o f science t r o u g h jux tapos ing these w i t h other scient i f ic 
paradigms w h i c h are more amenable to l i terature. The effect o f bo th these moves is to 
encourage the reader to cul t ivate an open-minded, agnostic att i tude towards meaning, 
avo id ing the tendency to accept the determinisms either o f scient i f ic mater ia l ism or o f 
al legory. 
Incarnate Ideas 
В y att has of ten acknowledged the status o f George E l i o t i n the t radi t ion o f the 
intel lectual nove l , descr ib ing her as " the great Eng l ish novel ist o f ideas." She argues that 
El io t ' ร characterisations are successful because un l i ke didact ic wr i ters such as O r w e l l , 
Peacock or Hux ley , E l i o t ' s characters do not "represent ideas l i ke al legor ical f i gu res" but 
the inverse: ideas "are as much actors in her w o r k as the men and w o m e n who contemplate 
the ideas . " 1 7 The same cou ld be said o f Byat t ' s mu l t id imens iona l weav ing o f discipl ines 
into a mesh that places the intel lectual qual i ty o f ideas, more than any one part icular 
character, at the fo rma l centre not оЫу o f her nove ls ' themes but also their plots and 
settings. 
However , when one o f these ideas is the relat ionship between brains and 
consciousness, there is a more l i teral sense in w h i c h ideas can be embodied i n a nove l . 
1 7 A . ร . В у att, "George E l io t : A Celebrat ion," Passions of the Mind: Selected 
Writings (London : Chat to, 1991) 72-76. 
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Byat t also notes o f E l io t that she "saw her w o r k as mak ing incarnate certain ideas that she 
apprehended i n the flesh, i.e., sensuously, mater ia l ly , through f e e l i n g , " 1 8 something 
achieved par t icu lar ly in MiddlemarcĶ " the great nove l o f the body -m ind exp lo ra t ion" 
wr i t ten b y a novel is t w h o acts l i ke "an embodied m i n d . " 1 9 In her essay o n " M e m o r y and 
the M a k i n g o f F i c t i on , " Byat t uses several phys ica l metaphors to describe the corporeal 
process o f thought : one " i s o f feathers ᅳ be ing preened, un t i l the various threads, w i t h their 
t i ny hooks and eyes, have been al igned and the surface is uni ted and glossy and g leaming" ; 
another " is o f a f i sh ing net, w i t h l inks o f var ious sizes, i n wh i ch icons are caught i n the 
mesh and d rawn up into consciousness"; a th i rd is rhy thmic memory as a k i n d o f k n i t t i n g . 2 ( 
Rather than ideas being incarnated at the level o f p lo t (something Byat t achieves 
successful ly throughout almost al l her f i c t ion) here ideas are incarnated - described in 
bod i l y terms - at the scale o f the unique psychologica l moment , в y att 'ร many 
representations of memory as something physical as wel l as Dsvchological are increasingly 
endorsed b y modern neuroscience w h i c h stresses embodied cogni t ion, g iven the persistent 
fai lures o f a pure ly cybernet ic ar t i f ic ia l inte l l igence. Foremost among these later scientists 
has been A n t o n i o Damasio , whose anti-Cartesian argument that " the l i fe o f the m i n d arises 
f r o m the l i fe o f the body is leading us to reconsider al l k inds o f aesthetic problems and 
proceed ings . " 2 1 Though resonating w i t h E l i o ť s aesthetic, h o w can this empi r ica l tw is t be 
appl ied to l i terary metaphors for the ind iv idua l consciousness? The innate d i l emma o f a 
nove l w o u l d seem to be that, forced to use metaphors to express m i n d , the novel imp l i c i t l y 
disembodies thought f r o m its o r ig in , do ing precisely what the representation o f L a m b ' s 
m i n d wams against in mora l terms, or P insky 'ร demonic mode l i n theoretical onesᅳ 
Metaphor draws its power from constru ing connect ions between entities that appear 
A . ร . Byat t , in t roduct ion, Selected Essays1 Poems and Other Writings, by George 
E l io t , ed. A . S . Bya t t and Nicholas War ren (London : Penguin, 1990) xx i x . Byat t draws 
attention to E l i o t ' s rev iew o f Robert Маскау 'ร The Progress of the Intellect, i n w h i c h E l io t 
asserts that "Re l i g i on and science are inseparable," and describes c iv i l i sa t ion and re l ig ion 
as "an anomalous b lending o f l i feless barbar isms, w h i c h have descended to us l i ke so 
many petr i f icat ions f r o m distant ages, w i t h l i v i n g ideas, the o f fspr ing o f a true process o f 
deve lopment" ( x x i ) . 
1 9 A . ร . Byat t , "The Feel ing B r a i n , " rev. o f Looking for Spinoza, by An ton io 
Damasio, Prospect 87 (2003) : 73-4. 
A . ร . Byat t , " M e m o r y and the M a k i n g o f F i c t i on , " Memory: The Darwin College 
Lectures, ed. Patr ic ia Fara and Kara lyn Patterson (Cambr idge: Cambr idge U P , 1998) 47֊ 
72. 
2 1 Byat t , " T h e Feel ing B r a i n " 73. 
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superf ic ia l ly d i f ferent (memory and kn i t t i ng , thought and feathers), and is hence an 
Though Byat t praises Damas io 'ร w o r k on embodied cogn i t ion , metaphor and language 
must always strain to reconci le w o r d and wo r l d . 
W i t h this substantial qual i f icat ion, the value o f embodied cogn i t ion f r o m the 
meet ing o f science and aesthetics is explored ma in l y tìirough the mathemat ic ian, Marcus, 
whose thoughts o f ten paraphrase Bya t t ' s personal w r i t i ng about memory wh i l s t resonating 
w i t h Damasio 'ร wo rk . I n the f i rst book in the quadr i logy, The Virgin in the Garden, 
Marcus synaesthetical ly experienced equations as a k i n d o f garden, in w h i c h the answer to 
a part icular p rob lem was revealed through colours and shapes. 2 2 N o w , i n A Whistling 
Woman, Marcus works at the Un ivers i t y on a project ent i t led ' T h e Computer as a M o d e l 
fo r the A c t i v i t y o f the B r a i n , " but complains that i t is mere "Number -cmnch ing . A 
p r im i t i ve automat that m im ics a l im i ted number o f operations in the b ra i n " (220). M i d - w a y 
toough the nove l , though, Marcus comes under the sway o f a homosexual Wi t tgenste in ian 
phi losopher, Hodgk iss , w h o observes "Marcus ' s body as an expression o f Marcus 's m i n d " 
(293) . Marcus explains that wh i l s t he can move f in i te numbers around on paper, 
c o n s t a t i n g them as " rea l t h ings " rather than fo rms , he experiences in f in i te concepts 
synergist ical ly: 
D i d Wi t tgenste in hate angels? D i d he th ink they were al l real ly demons? 
Odd ly , I feel the in f in i t ies w i t h the who le o f m y body , not on l y m y m i n d -
they don ' t feel cerebral. I feel as though I ' m in t hem, I am t hem ᅳ as 
opposed to observ ing them. I t 's possible I can ' t so to speak get out o f them 
because human bemgs made them up. (219) 
A r e numbers real th ings or phantoms? A s I noted in chapter 1， the question was key to 
War ren M c C u l l o c h ' ร cybernet ics, w h i c h pondered " W h a t is a number that a man may 
k n o w it: and what is a man that he may k n o w a n u m b e r ? " 2 3 Marcus impl ies here - and the 
reference to demons enforces fur ther - that because demons exist i n the m m d they must at 
least possess some sort o f real i ty . A s w i t h Lamb ' s demons, however , i t is no t possible to 
"get out o f t h e m , " to occupy a scient i f ic v iew f r o m nowhere on them, because to leave the 
m i n d o f the person w h o perceives is also to destroy the poss ib i l i ty o f that percept ion 
A Whistling Woman o f ten deploys synaesthetic descript ions o f memory that 
relate thought to mathemat ical shapes (216-22) , or to b io log ica l entit ies such as the spiral 
shells o f snails or flighty birds (374-75) . 
2 3 M c C u l l o c h 2. 
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ex is t ing in the f i rst place. Th is is contrary to cybernet ic be l ie f that in fo rmat ion - even m i n d 
- can be abstracted f r o m its or ig ina l container and translated into the cybernetic program. 
The di f ference w i t h Marcus is that he feels the in f in i t ies w i t h his who le body - not as 
disincarnate mental isms - but even as this seemingly opens the possib i l i ty o f a scient i f ic 
study such as that pursued by Damasio, the on ly way he can make this fee l ing avai lable to 
h imse l f and to Hodgkiss is " B y analogy. I have to substitute other things - things I do 
understand ֊ fo r the in f in i t ies I d o n ' t " (219). Paradoxical ly , the more embodied m i n d or 
mental images seem to become, the harder i t is fo r science to get a representative gr ip on 
them and the more language or metaphor must take over. However , though l i terature may 
be more comfor tab ly w o r k i n g w i t h analogies that can connect body to m i n d , в y att 
s imultaneously acknowledges that i t is l im i ted . Language i n both Byat t 's non- f ic t iona l 
ref lect ions on memory and i n Marcus 's thoughts is stretched to its adhesive l im i ts , i n the 
attempt to describe, pos i t ive ly , that w h i c h is k n o w n to be unknown , as unrepeatable i n the 
symbol ic order o f words as Beethoven'ร Third is i n P insky 'ร cogni t ive mode l . 
I t remains unclear qui te h o w theories such as Damas io 'ร embodied cogn i t ion m igh t 
be reconci led w i t h a l i terary sentiment that necessarily dis incarnates consciousness by 
representing i t through language; nor is i t self-evident h o w one migh t acknowledge that 
science migh t i n the future prov ide a def in i t ive account o f consciousness, wh i l s t preserving 
for l i terature the ab i l i ty to represent m i n d in a construct ive, i f l im i ted , way. In at tempt ing 
to produce a sc ient i f ica l ly i n fo rmed nove l , the r isk is the author migh t be tempted into 
overemphasising the ro le o f the body i n thought, pushing i t almost towards endorsing the 
b io log ica l determin ism o f genetics or computat ional neuroscience. As Marcus admits, what 
he feels as the " i n f i n i t i e s " may be mere ly "f lashes in the b r a i n " (219). The idea o f the 
synaesthetic mathemat ical genius w h o sees things such as numbers d i f fe rent ly because o f 
the b io log ica l structure o f his bra in m igh t come d o s e to echoing Steven Pinker 'ร v iew that 
we are not b lank slates upon w h o m cul tural experience and ideologies are forced, but 
actual ly have genet ical ly predisposed capaci t ies. 2 4 The mora l and po l i t i ca l r isks o f this 
v i ew ֊一 r isks that i n part account for the contemporary anger directed at Steven Pinker b y 
cul tural relativists - is that i t has its extreme real isat ion i n rac ism, в y att is ev ident ly alert 
to the extension o f P inker 'ร b lank slate cr i t ique, since it is the presence o f E ichenbaum, a 
2 4 Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature ( London : 
BCA-Pengu in , 2002) . Th i s is the clearest expression o f P inker 's b io log ica l ly determinist ic 
approach, al though The Blank Slate was publ ished after bo th Babel Tower and A Whistling 
Woman, В y att is thus d raw ing on s imi lar ideas w h i c h were expressed ü i roughout P inker 'ร 
earlier works such as The Language Instinct and How the Mind WorL·. 
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scientist who worked in Naz i Germany, that sparks r iotous student protests at the body and 
m i n d conference in the c l imax o f the nove l . Wh i l s t t r y ing to embody metaphor i n a f f in i t y 
w i t h science, she must also avo id extending this appreciat ion towards leg i t imat ing a 
determinist ic science that not on ly b io log ica l l y destines the synaesthete to a state o f genius, 
but also destines a race, class or gender to in fer ior i ty . A n d it is, o f course, precisely the 
over turn ing o f such v iews ― par t icu lar ly the latter - that characterises the nove l ' s 1960'ร 
moment . 
The character o f Peacock, the evolut ionary b io log is t , represents one way o f m o v i n g 
away f r o m a t w o cultures mode l i n w h i c h l i terature ax iomat ica l ly holds prestige i n matters 
o f m i n d , but w i thou t approaching scient i f ic dogmat ism. Descr ibed as "a br is t l ing genetic 
predestinarían and mora l pessimist , " when he f inds h imse l f attracted to Jacqueline he 
appears to be the personi f icat ion o f a real genetic determinist such as Pinker and the 
antithesis o f a l i terary romant ic : 
H e thought o f Lo renz 'ร studies o f the behaviour o f other creatures. Mos t 
unreceptive females b i t , or scratched or snarled. Th is one jus t took a step or 
t w o out o f reach. The signs were quite clear. She d id not want h i m . Wha t 
puzzled h i m as a scientist, g iven the unambiguous c lar i ty o f her discreet 
messages, was h o w m u c h he wanted her. (21) 
Behavioura l psychology sees the body as the expression o f m i n d (Dennet t 'ร " in tent ional 
s tance" ) , 2 5 but un l i ke Byat t 's ref lect ions on the weav ing o f memory , i t is str ipped o f any 
emot ional sensi t iv i ty to human act ion. Peacock'ร language is dispassionately asexual, 
scrut in is ing Jacqueline as any other scient i f ic object, not as a subject ive ent i ty in her o w n 
r ight : heavy i n sense, i t lacks sensibi l i ty. A l t h o u g h the omniscient narrator, possessing true 
access to consciousness, can te l l us that Peacock regrets the demands o f scient i f ic 
ob jec t iv i ty , he does not admi t i t pub l i c l y . For example, Peacock accepts that i n the interests 
o f his research he ought to stop count ing spirals on snail shells i n the w i l d and use instead 
lab-based electrophoresis, but s t i l l he cannot he lp but prefer to be outdoors, f r o m where 
" H e measured the wo r l d f r o m inside the balance o f his o w n b o d y " (69). Th is i ron ic 
discrepancy is summarised b y the fact that this scientist w h o dogmat ica l ly asserts that "h is 
w o r l d was washed clean o f human stor ies" (188) is actual ly the central character o f one. 
See chapter 1， note 4. 
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He even has, l i ke Lamb , a h igh ly al legor ical name, since Lysgaard is a " c o m m o n Danish 
name meaning garden o f l ight , a paradisal re fe rence. " 2 6 
Thus we are prepared to applaud when Frederica argues against Peacock that 
evolut ionary and b io log ica l causes cannot in themselves exp la in w h y metaphor and artistic 
percept ion are so central the human experience, that "theories o f natural selection don ' t 
exp la in w h y human beings f i nd peacock feathers beau t i fu l " (409) ᅳ or w h y , i ron ica l ly , 
Frederica w i l l fa l l i n love w i t h this part icular Peacock by the end o f the nove l . However , 
wh i ls t i t m igh t be temptmg to see this opposi t ion between b io logy (Peacock) and l i terature 
(Frederica) as enacting d isc ip l inary dua l ism, the nove l makes a further i ron ic attack f r o m 
within the scient i f ic f i e ld , presenting the metaphor ical interest o f b io log ica l science wh i ls t 
not w h o l l y endors m g its log ica l f Hidings. The t i t le o f Peacock'ร conference paper is " T h e 
Cost o f Sex and the Redundant M a l e " : 
Y o u migh t say, said L u k Lysgaard-Peacock, th ink ing o f Frederica and her 
inconvenient assertion that mental cobwebs [such as astrology or demons] 
were real things - you m igh t say, that i f an idea has surv ived for a very long 
t ime, i t has its o w n adaptive fitness. Y o u could argue that re l ig ions and 
mora l instruct ions surv ive in the w o r l d because they are l i ke larger 
organisms, s t ruggl ing for existence. Y o u cou ld argue that Chr is t ian i ty 
spread to be a w o r l d re l ig ion because i t had better surv iva l characteristics 
than Manichaeism.. . . Bu t a fa i th is not an organism, and surv iva l works at 
the level o f the f i tness o f cel ls, through the adaptation o f cel ls. I w o u l d l i ke 
you to recal l the admoni t ions made yesterday by Professor Pinsky, against 
th ink ing loosely w i t h analogies and metaphors. (38) 
Wh i l s t Peacock, speaking i n the f i c t iona l context in 1968, argues for surv iva l wo rk i ng at 
the level o f cel ls, he is necessarily naïve - wh i l s t the reader is probably alert ᅳ to the fact 
that The Selfish Gene o f 1976 w o u l d argue fo r adaptation at the level o f the gene, in i t ia t ing 
a paradigm shift . Th is undermin ing b y anachronism ensures that science is contested in 
terms o f other branches w i t h i n science, as part o f a sh i f t ing suite o f paradigms, rather than 
s imp ly b y an aesthetic shudder against reduct ion ism o f any sort. Further, Peacock'ร 
argument here is elusive. I n his rhetor ical style, an argument is presented on ly to be 
demol ished; this therefore raises the poss ib i l i ty that re l ig ion and stories are understandable 
i n evolut ionary terms, even i f this is subsequently denied. I n itself, this analogy w o u l d be 
Byat t , "F i c t i on In fo rmed b y Science" 296. 
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provocat ive, as indeed was D a w k i n s ' use o f the cul tura l mêmes and b io log ica l genes 
compar ison i n his b o o k . 2 7 However , Peacock then argues against his o w n metaphor as 
ev idencing the danger o f " t h i nk i ng loosely b y analogy." Peacock takes i t a stage deeper, 
exp la in ing culture not by metaphor but by embodied mater ia l ism. Since surv iva l takes 
place on ly at the level o f cel ls, contrary to Frederica, the on ly " rea l t h i n g " ob ject ive ly i n 
the w o r l d is b io log ica l mater ial that is quant i f iable. H e thus moves unsel fconsciously f r o m 
a soft to a hard evolut ionary reduct ion ism. Such a move re-stages the di f ference between 
Steve Jones, the b io log is t to w h o m A Whistling Woman is dedicated, and Stephen Pinker. 
I n oppos i t ion to Pinker, Jones argues that cogni t ive science w i l l not achieve "a universal 
exegesis o f the set w i t h i n the sku l l , a mental theory o f every th ing" through recourse to 
evolut ionary b i o l o g y . 2 8 b ideed, adding to his unw i t t i ng l y i ronic status i n the nove l , 
Peacock'ร hesitancy in h is speech ― " y o u cou ld argue," you m igh t say" - impl ies also that 
this is to be read as an argument w i t h wh i ch the scientist is not ent i re ly happy, i t be ing 
intended rather to be provocat ive, hav ing been inspired by Jacquel ine'ร j i l t i n g h i m after she 
miscarries his baby. 
The br i l l iance o f science admired by в y att is that it does not succumb to the easy 
escape into Romant i c i sm 'ร evasive m y t h o f the transcendent m i n d and consequent ant i -
empir ica l stance. However , representing the embodiment o f ideas in re lat ion to the novel 's 
characters r isks using dense analogies that either admi t the dua l ism on w h i c h the nove l is 
f o rma l l y predicated as i t uses metaphor to express body, or a move towards a b io log ica l or 
cogni t ive-b io log ica l determin ism. T h e best att i tude to adopt, therefore, is agnost ic ism 
rather than dogmat ism. A s в y att has set this ph i losophy out, " I don ' t l i ke novels that 
preach or proselyt ise. ( I fear people w i t h very v io lent bel iefs, though I admire people w i t h 
thought-out pr inciples.) The novel is an agnostic f o r m ᅳ i t explores and descr ibes . " 2 9 A s 
D a w k i n s ' idea o f the meme admits i n the f i na l chapter o f The Selfish Gene, or as the i ronic 
way in w h i c h Peacock is treated suggests, genetic determin ism cannot account fo r the way 
i n w h i c h w e act in the w o r l d o f cul ture in unexpected or counter intu i t ive ways. Thus the 
2 7 Dawk ins 189-201. 
2 8 Steve Jones, ' T h e Set W i t h i n the S k u l l , " rev. o f How the Mind Worb, b y Steven 
Pinker, New York Review of Boob AAAา (1997) : 13-16. 
2 9 A . S . Byat t , " A u t h o r Statement," Contemporary Writers, 2002, Br i t i sh Counc i l , 
28 Feb. 2008 <ht tp : / /www.contemporarywr i ters .com/authors/prof i le /?p=auth20>. Byat t 
reiterated this sentiment about agnost ic ism at a recent lecture: A . ร . Byat t , " I n Conversat ion 
w i t h A . ร . Bya t t , " D u r h a m Li terature Fest ival , Gala Theatre 1 Du rham, 8 Oct . 2007. 
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more Peacock dogmat ica l ly assumes h imse l f to be dr iven by genes and sexual select ion, 
the more this draws attent ion to h imse l f as determined b y a l i terary code. Bu t this is not 
jus t to promote l i terature at the expense o f science. The fact that we k n o พ , as Peacock does 
not , that his v i ew o f surv iva l tak ing place at the level o f cells w i l l be u l t imate ly condemned 
b y the histor ical arr ival o f The Selfish Gene reminds us that agnost ic ism is also 
sc ient i f ica l ly healthy, since to remain dogmat ic is to be closed to the Popperian poss ib i l i ty 
o f new paradigms superseding the o ld . Po l i t i ca l l y , too, agnost ic ism prevents the extension 
o f the b io log ica l log ic o f genetics in to a racist or eugenicist pol i t ics. F ina l l y , fo r the reader, 
the agnostic att i tude permits the incarnat ion o f ideas as the property o f each ind iv idua l , 
rather than ideal ist ical ly l i nk i ng to an al legor ical f rame o f reference outside them. I t is the 
att i tude inculcated i n the practice o f reading p lura l is t ica l ly f igures such as L a m b w h o 
m igh t otherwise be dogmat ica l ly іпЇЄфґеІе(1 i n re l ig ious terms; learning to accept L a m b as 
hav ing an autotel ic, i f schizopfeenic, consciousnesses i n h is o w n r ight a l lows us to cr i t ique 
his part icular brand o f fundamental ist re l ig ion (wh i ch leads to a f i e ry disaster) wh i l s t not 
asserting equal ly fundamenta l ly the value o f our rat ional v iew , or deny ing his r ight to have 
a consciousness i n the f i rst place. 
Cu l t i va t ing the spir i t o f the agnostic in this ve in gives us a potent ial map fo r 
іп ІефгеЇ іп§ the nove l ' s ending, w h i c h seems in i t ia l l y bewi lder ing and unsat is fy ing. The 
nove l and quartet concludes w i t h Frederica car ry ing Peacock's baby, a l i teral and symbo l ic 
incarnat ion o f artist ic creat iv i ty and evolut ionary determinacy, the lot tery o f genetics 
p layed through the inst inct ive game o f romance. The pair l ook out over the moors, i n a 
v is ion in w h i c h echoes Paradise Lost: 
In the distance, the man-made Ear ly W a r n i n g System, three perfect, pale, 
immense spheres, l i ke v is i tors f r o m another w o r l d , angelic or demonic, 
stood against the golds and greens and blues. Frederica said to Leo " W e 
haven ' t the slightest idea what to d o . " Everyone laughed. The w o r l d was al l 
before them, i t seemed. They cou ld go an jwhere . " W e shall th ink o f 
someth ing, " said L u k Lysgaard-Peacock. (421) 
G iven the general ly realist tendency o f the nove l , this pastoral scene stands out awkward l y ; 
equal ly, the romance p lo t is unconv inc ing , since Frederica and Peacock have been 
inte l lectual ly and emot iona l ly opposed fo r the ma jo r i t y o f the nove l . However , i t is 
arguable that its awkwardness as al legory and romance defines i t against generic or genetic 
determin ism. The general ambivalence ᅳ " W e shal l th ink o f somethmg" - denies the 
novel is t ic w r i t i ng o f dest iny on the forehead, re fus ing dogmat ica l ly to orientate the 
characters against an al legor ical close. I n paral le l , technology is agnostic, as evidenced 
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sharply in atomic science o f the 1960ร (the Ear ly Warn ing System refers to the Fyl ingdales 
radar, used to detect Soviet missi le launches) w h i c h could be turned either fo r product ive 
or destruct ive ends, angelic or demonic but not decis ively Frankenste in ian. 3 0 I n Peacock 
and Freder ica 'ร conc lud ing romance, and the representation o f nuclear arms as mora l l y 
ambivalent , в y att tests the reader'ร w i l l ingness to resist the polar isat ion o f the t w o 
cultures. W e must acknowledge the capacity o f science to create new technological images 
and metaphors - the pale and immense spheres ― wh i ch have become the dominant icons 
o f a secular age, tak ing over f r o m the angel ic and demonic categories o f re l ig ious bel ief. 
The discussion o f consciousness centred around the trope o f the demon forces us to 
recognise that l i terature does not have the un ique pr iv i lege to access m i n d unobtrus ive ly , 
since al legory can sl ip too easily towards logocentr ic dogmat ism. O n the other hand, 
science does not always threaten the body by mak ing instruments o f war, but can also 
b r ing to l i f e new metaphors that can be recrui ted by l i terature as descript ions o f m i n d . 
For example, President D w i g h t D. E isenhower 'ร 1953 " A t o m s fo r Peace" speech 
to the Un i ted Nat ions. D w i g h t D. Eisenhower, " A t o m s for Peace," Un i ted Nat ions General 
Assembly , N e w Y o r k , 8 Dec. 1953, transcript, Internat ional A t o m i c Energy Agency , 19 
Oct. 2007 <ht tp : / /www. iaea.org/About /h is tory_speech.html>. 
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Chapter 10. Break ing the Spel l o f Postmodern Possession 
The footnotes engul fed and swal lowed the text. They were ug l y and 
ungain ly , but necessary, Blackadder thought, as they sprang up l i ke the 
heads o f the Hydra , t w o to solve in the place o f one solved. 1 
Prol i ferat ion o f reference rather than f ina l meaning, layers o f interpretat ion rather 
than fresh creat iv i ty , an alertness to the unat ta inabi l i ty o f an authori tat ive text: the 
academics i n Possession experience al l the symptoms o f postmodern scholarship, suf fer ing 
f r o m the anxiety o f uncover ing inf luence i n Ash ' s work . For the V ic to r ian poet, 
mu l t i p l i c i t y is a v i r tue, the capacity to absorb a var iety o f knowledge and represent i t 
through epic poetry being the ha l lmark o f successful nineteenth-century l i terature; the most 
obvious histor ical personalit ies on w h i c h A s h is model led , A l f r e d Tennyson and Robert 
B r o w n i n g , are polymaths i n that ve in . In contrast, fo r the contemporary cr i t ics i n the nove l , 
the numerous analyt ical discourses at their disposal ֊ femin i sm, psychoanalysis, 
poststructural ism, h is tor ic ism - open so many possible perspectives o f іп ЇефгеїаІ іоп, 
disseminated i n such diverse fo rms - the cr i t ica l ed i t ion, the b iography, the j ou rna l art icle 
- that i t becomes impossible complete ly to grasp the or ig ina l h istor ical f igure as a 
personal i ty. Th is experience o f al ienat ion f r o m one 'ร exp l ic i t subject is recreated to some 
degree fo r the nove l ' s reader ü i rough Possession's o w n congested po lyphony. Straddl ing 
fact and f i c t ion , i t embeds fabricated poems and histor ical quotat ions, journa ls , letters and 
tales, wh i l s t gener ical ly i t inherits f r o m many d i f ferent p lo t prototypes, inc lud ing the 
campus f i c t ion , the romance, the fa i r y story and the detective nove l . 
One obv ious paradox that results f r o m this compar ison between contemporary and 
V ic to r ian intel lectual w r i t i ng is that Possession is c lear ly a postmodern w o r k even wh i ls t i t 
parodies this att i tude. I n iden t i f y ing what postmodernist n iche Possession occupies, we 
migh t w e l l situate i t w i t h i n L inda Hutcheon 'ร de f in i t i on o f h istor iographie metaf ic t ion : 
I n most o f the cr i t ica l w o r k on postmodernism, i t is narrat ive ― be i t 
l i terature, h is tory, or theory ᅳ that has usual ly been the major focus o f 
attent ion. His tor iographie metaf ic t ion іпсофогаЇЄ8 a l l three o f these 
domains: that is, its theoretical self-awareness o f h is tory and f i c t i on as 
1 A . ร . Byat t , Possession: A Romance (London : V in tage, 1991) 28. A l l subsequent 
parenthetical references i n this chapter refer to this ed i t ion. 
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human constructs (histor iographie metaf ic t ion) is made the grounds fo r its 
re th ink ing and rework ing o f the forms and contents o f the past. 2 
A . ร . Byat t herself has agreed that i t " i s a postmodernist , poststructural ist novel and it 
knows it is. I t does present i tsel f as a piece o f V i c to r ian melodrama, but o f course i t ' s no 
such th ing . " However , she goes on to comp la in that to label an author as postmodernist is 
to contaminate them w i t h an affected gui le, i n w h i c h the wr i te r 'ร sk i l l i n ref lect ing on the 
imposs ib i l i t y o f representation i n his or her text predominates. Byat t asks that "readers be 
a l lowed to ident i fy w i t h characters," a l l ow ing a space fo r an emot ion other than admira t ion 
o f the author 'ร w i t . 3 The tension in A Whistling Woman is between al legor ical determinacy 
and ind iv idua l subject iv i ty , and between science and art; the tension between the 
pleasurable and the in tu i t ive , and the theoretical and the rat ional , s im i la r l y runs tooughout 
Possession. I t in forms its p lo t , style, the way i n w h i c h we read this inte l lectual ly complex 
but enjoyable romant ic nove l , and (the pr inc ipa l subject o f this chapter) its react ion to 
contemporary science as i t intertwines w i t h postmodern l i terary theory and practice. 
Strangely, g iven its u l t imate ly encyclopaedic range, Byat t has p inpointed the 
moment when the concept for the nove l took ho ld , wh i ch concentrates its scope in the 
single wo rd o f its t i t le. A s The lma Sh inn observes, Possession validates Barthes' c l a im that 
the t i t le is the "pr ince o f s ign i f ie rs , " 4 since the w o r d o f its t i t le "captures the perspective o f 
the novel and orders its ' recurr ing web o f metaphors ' . " 5 A s Byat t has recal led, she f i rs t 
thought about Possession as she watched the Coler idge scholar Kathleen Coburn i n the 
Br i t i sh L ib rary : 
I thought: she has g iven al l her l i f e to his thoughts, and then I thought : she 
has mediated his thoughts to me. A n d then I thought "Does he possess her, 
L inda Hutcheon, Ճ Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory1 Fiction (London : 
Rout ledge, 1988) 5. 
3 A . ร . Byat t , in terv iew w i t h Nicolas Trede l l , Conversations with Critics, ed. 
Nicolas Tredel l (Manchester: Carcamet, 1994) 62. 
4 Ro land Barthes, "Tex tua l Analys is o f a Tale by Edgar A l l a n Poe," The Semiotic 
Challenge, trans. Richard H o w a r d ( N e w Y o r k : H i l l and Wang-Farrar , 1988) 268. 
5 The lma J. Sh inn, " ' W h a t ' s I n a W o r d ? ' Possessing A . ร . B y a t ť ร M e r o n y m i c 
N o v e l , " Popers on Language & Literature: A Quarterly Journal for Scholars and Critics 
of Language and Literature 31 (1995): 172. 
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or does she possess h im? There cou ld be a nove l cal led Possession about 
the relat ions between l i v i ng and dead m i n d s . " 6 
I t is impossib le ob ject ive ly to p inpo in t the o r ig in o f this impulse in re lat ion to 
postmodernism. D i d Bya t t not ice the k o n y o f a biographer possessed by her subject on ly 
because o f her exist ing interest i n postmodern questions o f subject iv i ty? Or d id this 
inspirat ional observat ion on ly co inc identa l ly come to be guided by the cr i t ica l discourse 
c i rcu lat ing i n academia at the t ime? Bo th possibi l i t ies can be sustained leg i t imate ly : 
w i thou t the atmosphere o f postmodern ism, Byat t m igh t never have been interested i n the 
role o f the biographer; and w i thou t her v i s ion o f the biographer, she m igh t no t have wr i t ten 
the nove l we have, one w h i c h par t ly happens to be, par t ly is intended to be, postmodernist . 
The status o f theory as anterior to or impl icated w i t h i n the w r i t i ng o f B y a t ť s nove l is apt, 
because the fact that w r i t i n g always takes place w i t h i n a system o f academic concerns that 
i n f o rm as much about the wr i ter as about their subject is perhaps the dominant recogni t ion 
to emerge f r o m the novel itself. Numerous moments i n the nove l present the existence o f 
an irresolvable feedback system between the wr i te r and the subject they wr i t e on. Perhaps 
paradigmatic is when Blackadder, the Br i t i sh A s h scholar, recalls seeing a te lev is ion 
natural ist dissect o w l dung and reassemble the skeletal remains o f its food (29) . H e 
ponders w r i t i n g a poem about this delicate and eerie reconstruct ion o f past events, bu t he 
then discovers (or remembers?) that A s h had already wr i t ten something s imi lar . Does 
reading the past change our perspective on the present, or does our att i tude and experience 
in the present af fect the things i n the past to w h i c h w e choose to attend? Blackadder 
certainly cannot resolve this determinist ic puzzle i n this comic case, unable to th ink 
"whether he had not iced the screen natural ist because his m i n d was p r imed w i t h A s h ' ร 
image, or whether i t had worked independent ly" (29) . 
Wha t these compl icat ions both w i t h i n and outside the novel point to is that once 
situated h is tor ica l ly w i t h i n a part icular theoret ical f ramework i n w h i c h a certain idea 
dominates, i t is impossible to escape f r o m it. Th is is, to use Hans-Georg Gadamer 'ร te rm, 
the "hermeneut ic s i tuat ion" w i t h wh i ch both Byat t and the cr i t ic are confronted, the 
histor ical moment wh i ch in forms our choices and interpretations and w h i c h we hence 
cannot stand outside o f to observe ob jec t ive ly . 7 The h is tory o f Possession'ร germinat ion 
6 A . ร . Byat t , "Choices: O n the W r i t i n g o f Possession^ AS. Byatt on Herself, 11 
Sept. 2007， <ht tp: / /www.asbyat t .com/Onhersel f .aspx>. 
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Dona ld G. 
Marsha l l , 2nd ed. (London : Con t inuum, 2004) 3 0 1 . 
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imp i ies that today, the dominant cul tural context w i t h i n w h i c h any contemporary wr i te r 
works is the postmodern. Rather than f rustrat ing analysis, such immers ion generates an 
interesting proposi t ion. Ev idenc ing how saturated l i terary culture has become w i t h 
questions about the relat ionship between real i ty and reproduct ion, the symbio t ic 
relat ionship between the ind iv idua l and their object o f study, i t m igh t indicate that we are 
presented w i t h a l i terary analogue for the cond i t ion o f the posthuman cyborg , as ident i f ied 
by N . Kather ine Hay les. T o recal l her de f in i t ion , " the posthuman impl ies a coup l ing so 
intense and mul t i faceted that i t is no longer possible to d ist inguish meaningfu l ly between 
the b io log ica l organism and the in format iona l c i rcui ts in w h i c h i t is enmeshed." 8 In this 
case, the posthuman experience o f be ing caught i n a c i rcu i t w i t h technology embodies a 
more general cond i t ion o f be ing captivated in a feedback loop o f postmodernist t h ink ing , a 
loop w h i c h i t is impossible to break f r o m or to wr i t e against. Th is is a conclus ion that can 
be d rawn f r o m The Matrix, but i n this chapter I want to extend this argument in re lat ion to 
a nove l that looks to h is tory rather than to fu tur is t ic technology for its analogies. W h i l s t 
acknowledg ing that the nove l i tsel f provides a clear warn ing against transferr ing one 'ร o w n 
be l ie f systems onto an or ig ina l author, i n this chapter I want to test how far i t is possible to 
push the hypothesis that the occasional references to science and technology i n Possession 
convey the real isat ion that its stance on postmodernist cul ture is a mani festat ion o f 
scient i f ic strata rooted beneath i t . A s k i n g " h o w we can break the spell o f our o w n 
foremeanmgs" g iven the hermeneut ic s i tuat ion, 9 Gadamer suggests that the task o f 
c r i t i c ism is "no t to develop a procedure o f understanding, but to c la r i fy the condi t ions in 
wh i ch understanding takes p l a c e . " 1 0 Gu ided b y the latter, I suggest i t is best to explore 
Possession xbxough several key moments at w h i c h the "h i s to r i ca l " cond i t ion beneath 
postmodern ism is c lar i f ied as be ing equal ly a scient i f ic condi t ion. A t cr i t ica l puncture 
points i n the nove l , science reaches through f r o m the background to become a key 
inf luence in the text , and i t therefore starts to indicate that the postmodern cond i t ion o f 
l i v i ng i n a "hermeneut ic s i tuat ion" is also a mani festat ion o f the late twent ie th century, 
technologised cond i t ion o f the "enmeshed" posthuman. 
Whereas the f ic t iona l biographers i n the nove l are unable ob ject ive ly to perceive 
the compromises and ironies entai led b y their pos i t ion as themselves subjects o f a text, the 
8 Hayleร, " V i r t u a l Bodies and F l i cker ing S ign i f ie rs " 80. 
9 Gadamer 270. 
1 0 Gadamer 295. 
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reader can attain a more detached perspective b y mainta in ing what is termed in Byatt* ร 
novel la Morpho Eugenia the "doub le consciousness." 1 1 I n this satire, the entomologist 
W i l l i a m Adamson , newly arr ived at a country house hav ing returned f r o m an A m a z o n 
expedi t ion, sets up an ant co lony w h i c h the household studies, captivated. However , we are 
inv i ted to see the analogy between their b io log ica l obsession and the V ic to r ian realist 
nove l as a social study; as Byat t explains, the contrasted place and double metaphors 
unsettle the " images o f bo th , in terms o f the O t h e r . " 1 2 Іпіефгеїесі i n one way, this double 
consciousness is yet another feedback i n w h i c h a descript ive metaphor is used to describe a 
state w h i c h the ma in character was always already caught w i t h i n . However , we migh t also 
take the double consciousness to describe the pos i t ion o f the reader, who knoพร , and is 
forced to k n o w through metaf ic t ion , that he or she is reading a f i c t i on that is relat ive to , 
and other than, h is or her o w n real i ty . Under the suspension o f d isbel ief w h i c h is a k i n d o f 
double consciousness, w e become absorbed i n the f i c t i on as a remova l f r o m real i ty , wh i l s t 
s imultaneously recognis ing the f i c t i on is not real i ty such that art is therefore able to say 
something special w h i c h we cannot access i n norma l l i fe . A s suggested i n chapter 1， and 
imp l i c i t i n the previous t w o chapters where l i terary f i c t i on has taken over f r o m cinemat ic 
representations o f cybernet ics, l i terature faci l i tates this double level o f knowledge, i n a 
way that prevents our complete immanence i n the other wor lds o f cybernetics. In this case, 
though we may become absorbed b y the p lot o f an enjoyable nove l , we can also take an 
object ive posi t ion on i t w h i c h the characters cannot obta in. For example, in Possession, the 
absurdity o f the cr i t ica l discourses o f the academics ( w h o wr i te papers such as " T h e Potent 
Castrato: the phal logocentr icstructurat ion ofBalzac'shermaphrodi tehero/ ines' ' [57 ] ) 
guarantees that what w e are reading is actual ly a nove l , i n wh i ch they act and upon w h i c h 
they cannot possibly attain the same l i terary-cr i t ica l angle ֊ a v i e w f r o m nowhere - as they 
c la im to o n the apparently histor ical documents they analyse within the f i c t i on . The l i terary 
cr i t ics are read w i t h a double consciousness b y the u l t imate reader who is external to what 
he or she knows (and is made cont inual ly aware o f k n o w i n g ) to be a nove l , but one in 
w h i c h the characters have an i ron ica l ly earnest, s ingular v iew . Whereas both i n the nove l 'ร 
gestation and in its metaphors and p lo t w e cont inual ly bump against the wal ls o f a 
hermeneutic s i tuat ion, Byat t enables the reader to assume the double consciousness wh i ch 
a l lows us outside the system, to perceive not on l y the postmodern ironies w i t h i n the nove l , 
A . ร . Byat t , Morpho Eugenia, Angels and Insects (London : V in tage, 1993) 24. 
Byat t , Histories and Stories 117. 
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but to see the novel as a mi r ro r o f our real i ty f r o m w h i c h i t is d i f ferent and dist inct. The 
cr i t ica l parodies o f fe r one counter- image that enables us to detach ourselves f r o m the 
hermeneut ic c i rc le, and to resist the histor ical precondi t ion o f postmodern ism in w h i c h we, 
l i ke Byat t , are necessarily immanent. As w i t h Eco*ร w o r k , the cruc ia l idea here is that w e 
revis i t the past and its f i c t iona l representation w i t h a spir i t o f i rony. A n d , as w i t h 
Foucault's Pendulum, the most consistent metaphor by w h i c h we guarantee our 
relat ionship to the nove l , and by w h i c h Possession c lar i f ies the condi t ions o f our s i tuat ion 
i n re lat ion to technology and postmodernism, is the paranormal or demonic. 
Byat t proposes that the exci tement o f p lo t and c i o s c e found ш fa i ry tales puts them 
i n tension w i t h l i terary real ism: 
Real ism is related to explanations and orderings - the tale o f the man i n the 
bar w h o tel ls you the story o f his l i f e , the histor ian w h o explains the 
decisions o f generals and the decl ine o f economies. Great novels, I bel ieve, 
always draw on both ways o f te l l i ng , both ways o f seeing. Bu t because 
real ism is agnostic and sceptical, human and reasonable, I have always fe l t 
i t was what I ought to do. A n d yet m y impulse to wr i t e came, and I k n o w i t , 
f r o m years o f reading myths and fairytales under the bedclothes, f r o m the 
del ights and freedoms and terrors o f wor lds and creatures that never 
ex is ted . 1 3 
A s I observed in the previous t w o chapters, agnost ic ism and scepticism are healthy 
scient i f ic perspectives but , l i ke Ä Whistling Woman and Foucault's Pendulum, Possession 
too realises that apparently epistemological opposites, rea l ism and my th i c i sm, actual ly 
share c o m m o n g r o u n d . ' Մ Ճ Whistling Woman carries the trope o f the demonic across the 
t w o cultures, f r o m cogni t ive science through psychoanalysis to the rel ig ious and l i terary 
experience, i n Possession i t is shutt led across the mi r ro r o f the nove l ' s two t imes. The 
romant ic possession that concludes the fa i ry tale is today the academic obsession; the 
gothic melodrama contained embodied ghosts, but modern genetics explains that our selves 
t ru l y are determined b y our ancestors. I n re lat ion to the latter (and p i c k m g up on a theme 
f r o m chapter 2, on the Renaissance v i ew o f nature), the supernatural is raised as potent ia l ly 
a way o f k n o w i n g more i n keeping w i t h the human perspective than some modes o f 
genetic science w h i c h m igh t actual ly be the more supernatural, i n that genetics explains 
things at levels beyond or beneath those o f w h i c h we can natura l ly and norma l l y 
1 3 Byat t , in terv iew w i t h Nicolas Tredel l 59. 
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experience as embodied ind iv iduals . F i rs t ly , however , I want to explore h o w the demonic 
trope interacts w i t h and reveals the relat ionship between postmodernism, and the d ig i ta l 
technologies o f the age o f the posthuman, in w h i c h we appear to be enmeshed. 
The Hermeneut ic Si tuat ion: Postmodernism and Reprographics 
One puncture po in t at w h i c h issues o f postmodern ism and cybernetics coincide is i n 
the representation o f copy ing . Reprographic technologies are treated as mechanical 
analogues o f a sel f - reproducing language w i thou t a stable centre i n w h i c h meaning inheres. 
However , the use o f the demonic metaphor i n re lat ion to the copy undermines the va l id i ty 
o f cybernet ic and poststructural interpretations: f i rs t ly , the demonic metaphor shows that 
emot ional value does inhere i n part icular artefacts in a physical sense, prevent ing the 
separation o f in fo rmat ion f r o m embodiment that characterises the free p lay o f signif iers 
and cybernetics; and secondly, i t undermines the radical nature o f /7<95řstructuralism as a 
h is tor ica l ly unprecedented theory b y relat ing i t anachronist ical ly i n p r im i t i ve and myth ica l 
terms. L i k e Eco, в y att dislocates the modern by p lac ing contemporary technologies w i t h i n 
an earlier, occul t f ramework . 
The " A s h fac to ry " beneath the Br i t i sh l ib rary is a gothic underwor ld , a "ho t place 
o f metal cabinets and glass cells conta inmg the clatter o f typewr i ters, g l oom i l y l i t by neon 
tubes. Micro-readers g lowed green i n its g loom. I t smel led occasional ly sulphurous, when 
the photocopiers short-circuited. I t was even beset by Wallings and odd sfeieks" (27). I n 
this env i ronment , technology is described as a k i n d o f b lack art: 
Wh i l s t the machine warmed up, i n the d i n and h u m o f the extractor fan, he 
took out his t w o letters and read them again. Then he spread them face 
d o w n , to be scryed on the b lack glass, under w h i c h the rods o f green l ight 
floated and passed. A n d the machine spat out , hot and chemical-scented, 
spectrograms o f these wr i t i ngs , b lack - r immed by imaged empty space as the 
or iginals were edged b y a century 'ร dust. (22) 
There seems something so deliberate about the occul t terms used i n this passage, w h i c h 
contrasts marked ly w i t h the realist tone o f the text , that i t draws attent ion to i tsel f as hav ing 
been designed to induce a feel ing i n the reader not on the basis o f any actual state o f the 
envi ronment o f the Br i t i sh L ib rary , but on the manipulat ions o f the cont ro l l ing agent. The 
authorial ego acts l ike a med ium i n the seance, us ing the supernatural to connect the past to 
the present. В y att is almost certainly aware that many o f the technologies o f the 
communicat ions era - te lev is ion, copiers, telephones - draw on many o f the vocabularies 
B r o w n 235 
o f V i c to r i an spi r i tua l ism, such as telegraphy or telepathy. Extend ing this V ic to r ian per iod 
i n w h i c h media o f pro jec t ion could describe both the actor at the seance and the 
technological transmitter, there is an i rony i n con jo in ing the te rmino logy o f the spir i tual ist 
so closely w i t h the abstract theor is ing o f postmodern cr i t iques o f the culture o f 
reproduct ion. Th is is par t icu lar ly t rue in re lat ion to Baudr i l la rd , for w h o m (as we saw i n 
chapter 7) the s imulat ion becomes the authentic, the s imulacrum "p reced ing" i n resolut ion 
and qual i ty over the real w h i c h has faded away ent irely. In i t ia l l y , the technology appears to 
con fo rm to Baudr i l l a rd 'ร ph i losophy: "Ro land 'ร Xeroxes were cleaner and clearer than the 
faded coppery-grey script o f the or ig ina ls ; indeed, the copy- ink had a new and g leaming 
freshness, the mach ine 'ร rol lers must have been new ly i n k e d " (22) . Bu t wh i l s t Baudr i l la rd 
contends that "The real is produced f r o m min ia tur ized cel ls, matr ices, and memory b anks, 
models o f cont ro l - and i t can be reproduced an indef in i te number o f t imes f r o m these , " 1 5 
i n the l i v ing-ou t o f theory i n the nove l , Ro land, though k n o w i n g that they are copies, s t i l l 
"wan ted the o r ig ina ls " (23) . Here, Ro land is presented as hav ing a greater a f f in i t y w i t h 
Wal te r Ben jamin , and his seminal " T h e W o r k o f A r t i n the A g e o f Mechanica l 
R e p r o d u c t i o n . " 1 6 For Ben jamin , technical reproduct ion (such as the photograph) is un l ike 
manual reproduct ion (such as the woodcut ) because tíirough the med ium o f the former 
aspects o f the or ig ina l that are otherwise unobservable can be revealed or h igh l ighted. Bu t 
un l i ke Baudr i l la rd , w h o seems to revel i n the culture o f mu l t i p l i c i t y even as he scrutinises 
i t , Ben jamin laments the way i n w h i c h mu l t ip le reproduct ions remove something f r o m the 
o r ig ina l , an "au ra " w h i c h w e can ident i fy i n the or ig ina l : " T h e situations into w h i c h the 
product o f mechanical reproduct ion can be brought may not touch the actual w o r k o f art, 
yet the qual i ty o f its presence is a lways depreciated"; the authent ic i ty o f a th ing , " the 
essence o f a l l that is transmissible f r o m its beg inn ing , " is a f fec ted . 1 7 True to this 
іп ІефгеЇаЇ іоп o f the "au ra , " Ro land is unable to conceal h is o w n thef t any longer, and 
blur ts out to M a u d that he took the or ig inals "Because they were al ive. They seemed urgent 
ᅳ I fe l t I had to do something. I t was an impulse. Qu ick as a flash. I meant to put them 
See chapter 1， note 95 fo r references to studies o f this odd relat ionship. 
1 5 Baudr i l la rd , Simulacra 2. 
1 6 Wal te r Ben jamin , ' T h e W o r k o f A r t i n the A g e o f Mechan ica l Reproduc t ion , " 
Illuminations, trans. Har ry Z o h n , ed. and in t rod. H a n n e l A rend t (London : Jonathan Cape, 
1968)219-53 . 
1 7 Ben jam in 223. 
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back. I w i l l . Nex t week. I jus t haven ' t , ye t " (50) . A s suggested b y the sharp sentences, 
w h i c h circ le around w i thou t exp la in ing his mot iva t ion , there s imp ly is an emot ional 
attachment to the or ig ina l w h i c h cannot be rat ional ised. L i kew ise , apart f r o m the h is tory o f 
an object being inscr ibed i n its physical cond i t ion , Ben jamin does not precisely ident i fy the 
fundamental characteristics o f an "au ra " wh i ch inheres in the or ig ina l ; i t is, as Ro land f inds 
and Ben jamin impl ies , a knowledge embodied somewhere beneath the in format iona l 
surface o f a text. I t is an idea w h i c h counters cybernet ic epistemologies b y appeal ing to the 
i r rat ional qual i ty o f demonic l i terary inspirat ion w h i c h I touched o n in chapter 1. 
Th is uncanny c o m m i n g l i n g o f postmodernist theory, romant ic ism, and technology 
is apparent also i n the di f ferences between the Eng l ish and Amer i can scholars. The Eng l ish 
Blackadder laments the demise o f educat ion, in w h i c h students no longer learn poetry and 
the B ib le by heart. B lackadder 'ร comment that i t is " A n odd phrase, by heart 1 as though 
poems were stored i n the b loodst ream" (26) , resonates w i t h Bya t t ' s o w n att i tude o f the 
way thoughts and metaphors can be paradoxical ly embodied. B y contrast, the af f luent 
Amer i can , Cropper, forces his students to transcribe passages mechanist ical ly - copy ing by 
hand, t yp ing and then scanning fo r errors " w i t h a severe edi tor ia l eye" (26) ֊ wh i l s t he 
h imse l f uses a portable photographic machine to steal copies o f documents f r o m archives. 
U n l i k e Ro land, Cropper is seduced by the glossy c lar i ty o f the reproduct ion over the 
or ig ina l , as here, when he presents a sl ideshow: 
The f inale o f Cropper 'ร lecture was a product o f his passion. The t ru th was, 
he had come to love the br ight transparencies o f the things he had acquired, 
a lmost as much as the things themselves. W h e n he thought o f A s h ' ร snuff ­
box , he thought not o f the weight o f i t i n his o w n hand, the co ld metal 
wa rm ing i n his o w n d ry pa lm , but also now o f the enameled cover 
magn i f ied on the screen. (386) 
However , Cropper is more than a s imple anti-hero to Ro land. A t the c l imax o f his lectures, 
Cropper uses A s h ' ร large go ld to check his t im ing , pr ivate ly acknowledg ing that by his 
o w n archival cr i ter ia i t should be preserved in the Stant co l lect ion. Byat t adds in a clause-
heavy sentence: 
He had wondered once, about jux tapos ing i t , i n his, its owner 'ร hand, w i t h a 
ho logram o f itself. Bu t he saw that his emot ions, w h i c h were v io lent , about 
A s h ' ร watch, were pr ivate, not to be confused w i t h his publ ic appeals" (386-
87). 
A g a i n , Byat t makes i t hard through syntactical p loys, par t icu lar ly the use o f the indirect 
p ronoun " i t , " to p inpo in t whether he is referr ing to the real wa tch or the image o f i t , the 
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or ig ina l or the s imulacrum. Cropper 'ร attempt to dist inguish between publ ic and pr ivate 
persona is ambiguous, and there is an indist inct emot ional " v i o lence " between the t w o 
poles. A t the cu lmina t ion o f the nove l , as he prepares to d ig up A s h ' ร grave and recover the 
documents wh i ch w i l l pu l l past and present together i n a f ina l revelat ion about his subject, 
Cropper 's emotions are embodied and spatialised: " H i s b lood was runn ing, he was exci ted, 
as he always was when t ru l y on the move, when his m i n d hung, l i ke the moon , over his 
t rajectory, f r o m one earth-mass to another, when he was neither here nor there" (490). W e 
may be tempted to make a b inary d is t inc t ion between Ro land, sensit ive and humanis t ica l ly 
attracted to the aura o f the or ig ina l , and Cropper, seduced in the Baudr i l la rd ian ve in by the 
qual i ty o f the copy. However , the in jec t ion o f a " v i o l e n t " emot ion into Cropper 'ร character 
towards the close o f the nove l describes h i m i n the sorts o f v isceral terms also used for the 
A s h factory and the Eng l ish characters. Further, the gothic sett ing o f the s torm i n the 
churchyard is more than mere ly an atmospheric c l imax to а расу t to i l le r ; after a l l , contrary 
to the generic template in w h i c h v i l la ins , v i c t ims and bystanders are f i na l l y d i f ferent iated 
by the detective, a l l the characters uni te at the end in ant ic ipat ion o f the opening o f the box . 
The gothic, then, is an analogy fo r the indeterminacy o f our o w n reactions towards 
artefacts. A s Susan Sontag puts i t i n "Aga ins t b i terpretat ion" : " W h a t is important n o w is to 
recover our senses. W e must learn to see more, to hear more, to feel m o r c . b i place o f a 
hermeneutics w e need an erotics o f a r t . " 1 8 Th is acquiescence to subconscious mot i va t ion is 
consistent w i t h the argument o f ճ Whistling Woman that to probe the m i n d d i rect ly through 
cogni t ive science is impossib le. I n Possession there are some things w h i c h , though we feel 
them in an embodied sense, w e are unable to isolate or art iculate. Nevertheless, as Sontag 
suggests, the acknowledgement o f th is "erot ics o f ar t " ֊ w h i c h takes the f o r m o f a gothics 
o f artefacts i n Possession - offers a route out o f the hermeneut ic c i rc le, since it takes 
interpretat ion out o f its h istor ical s i tuat ion and into the very body o f the unique reader and 
the textual or ig ina l he or she encounters. 
The Hermeneut ic Si tuat ion: Genes and Demons 
Contained under the cybernet ic umbre l la , the idea o f in fo rmat ion applies to as 
diverse a range o f objects as D N A , computers, chaos theory, and structural ism. The 
concepts o f in fo rmat ion theory and poststructural ism are wrapped together through 
Susan Sontag, "Aga ins t In terpretat ion," Against Interpretation and Other Essays 
(London : And re Deutsch, 1987) 14. 
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Possessionis compar ison between w r i t i n g a l i fe (the exp l ic i t p lot o f the novel ) and l i fe as 
wr i t i ng . A n aside vo iced d i rough Ro land makes the l inks exp l ic i t l y : 
Ro land had learned to see h imsel f , theoret ical ly, as a crossing-place fo r a 
number o f systems, a l l loosely connected. He had been trained to see his 
idea o f his ' s e l f as an i l l us ion , to be replaced b y a discont inuous machinery 
and electr ical message-network o f var ious desires, ideological bel iefs and 
responses, language-forms and hormones and pheromones. (424) 
A s we have seen tìiroughout this thesis, ideas o f systemic interConnectivity and 
determin ism al l coalesce beneath b y the banner o f cybernetics to produce a self that is 
sensit ive to the possib i l i ty that consciousness is an unrel iable witness to real i ty. A s 
Foucault'ร Pendulum i l lustrates, and Roland reiterates here, one strategy o f both 
cybernetics and semiot ic theory is to separate meaning or in fo rmat ion f r o m the body 
(human or textual) w h i c h o r ig ina l l y contains i t . Bu t though enmeshed as readers w i t h i n 
postmodern ism (acutely so as l i terary cr i t ics w i t h a hermeneutic agenda), i t is nevertheless 
possible fo r us to stand to some degree outside the hermeneut ic c i rc le i n re lat ion to 
Possession to observe the problems o f this approach. In part icular, the metaf ic t ional 
qualit ies o f the nove l not on ly make us aware o f the characters as const i tuted by l i terary 
codes, jus t as physical organisms are consti tuted through genetic ones, but i t also 
dif ferentiates between the nove l 's ar t i f ic ia l w r i t i ng o f l i fe , and l i fe i tsel f as a k i n d o f 
b io log ica l w r i t i ng . 
In the cybernetic parad igm, feedback mechanisms became prominent , i n w h i c h the 
observer, rather than seeing in fo rmat ion emanat ing f r o m the system, actual ly becomes 
d rawn i n , part o f the loop being observed. L i kew ise in the novel in fo rmat ion flows i n 
cont inual loops in w h i c h cont ingency o f one event upon another is questioned: 
[Cropper] telephoned Harmony C i t y and asked fo r a search to be done o f 
P.P. Cropper 'ร correspondence, w h i c h he had rout ine ly copied into his 
computer archives. Th is produced, by Fax the next day, the f o l l o w i n g letter: 
Dear Mrs Cropper... (387) . 
A g a i n at the level o f the sentence, the dist inct ions between self and other, real and 
reproduct ion collapse. Th rough careful sequencing, в y att puns on "p roduced" as both 
creat ion and del ivery, as i f the modern fax seemingly wr i tes the letter; further, "he had 
rout ine ly cop ied " is not a past tense descr ipt ion o f what Cropper d i d , but a passive verb 
descr ib ing what he gets done fo r h i m b y an unnamed scribe. Possession 1 ร h istor ical 
encoding can be read as a macrocosmic vers ion o f this sort o f loop w h i c h involves those 
w h o attempt read the or ig ina l , h istor ical p rogram o f Ash ' s letters. Tak ing the fo rmu la t ion 
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o f re f lex iv i t y as " the movement whereby that w h i c h has been used to generate a system is 
made, through a changed perspective, to become part o f the system i t generates," 1 9 Ro land 
and M a u d are themselves part o f a w ide r c i rcular f l o w o f in fo rmat ion between the past and 
the present o f the f i c t ion . The i r pos i t ion can on ly be seen accurately f r o m outside the 
system, b y the reader, who can perceive bo th past and present o f f i c t i on , and evaluate 
histor ical facts ( i n wh i ch Tennyson and Crabb Robinson do exist, wh i ls t A s h does not) 
against those o f the present ( in w h i c h the Br i t i sh L ib ra ry exists, but Ro land and M a u d do 
not) . 
I n a strange feedback, the real ism o f the modern characters becomes increasingly 
undermined as the p lo t develops more " rea l is t i ca l ly " through its gathering o f h istor ical 
detai l . Ro land and M a u d uncover more about the relat ionship between A s h and LaMot te , 
accumulat ing the support ing documentat ion wh i ch makes the reader thrnk that perhaps A s h 
and LaMo t te real ly were obscure l i v i n g poets alongside Tennyson and El izabeth 
B r o w n i n g . However , as they f i nd the artefacts this increasingly situates Roland and M a u d 
as f i c t iona l devices, since they become increasingly coincidental to the nove l ' s pr inc ipa l 
subjects, wh i ch are rendered toough seemingly h istor ical documents w h i c h bear the aura 
o f or ig ina l i ty . The more empi r ica l the nove l gets in p rov id ing histor ical data, the more the 
t w o modern characters appear to have been invented speci f ica l ly to cover and explore the 
V ic to r ian per iod i n wh i ch the novel surrounds them, and w i t h w h i c h the nove l is more 
concerned. T o use a metaphor f r o m one o f Cropper 'ร lectures on the way the biographer 
impinges o n his subject (385) , Ro land and M a u d become mere shadows in tervenmg on the 
screen on w h i c h the central h istor ical romance between A s h and LaMo t te is played out. 
Acco rd ing to poststructural ist accounts o f textual i ty , meaning is always deferred to 
other texts. For the reader, however , capt ivated by the cont ingency o f the detective wo rk , 
we share Ro land 'ร desire fo r the or ig inals w h i c h w i l l put everyth ing into order, the reading 
o f the bur ied letters wh i ch w i l l resolve the purgatory o f be ing "nei ther here nor there." A n d 
un l ike in Foucault's Pendulum, this quest is not s imp ly a demonic i l lus ion. Rather, 
Possession seems to suggest that there is a genuine logos i n w h i c h al l meanings and 
relat ionships w i l l be resolved, as the embedded histor ical texts appear, anachronist ical ly, to 
push the narrat ive w o r d forwards. Enact ing general ly the paradoxes o f product ion 
envis ioned en abyme i n the sentence about Cropper 'ร fax machine, the p lo t seems to 
pr ior i t ise the histor ical words as paradoxica l ly produc ing the latter, rather than the later 
Hayleร, Posthuman 8. 
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cr i t ics w o r k i n g to interpret the earl ier wr i ters. Byat t has commented that the fa i ry tale, w i t h 
its sense o f causal i ty leading to closxire, is com ing back into fashion i n a sw ing away f r o m 
postmodern tastes. So i n Possession i t is as i f the t w o modern characters, l i ke unconscious 
Hansels, f o l l o w the paths o f the p lo ts ' already wr i t ten narratives. For example, L a M o t t e 
does not bury her W h i t b y je t brooch w i t h A s h , w h i c h is instead handed d o w n to M a u d and 
thereby provides a crucia l piece o f evidence in the chain connect ing LaMo t te w i t h A s h ' ร 
Yorksh i re t r ip (as i f she somehow knew i t w o u l d prov ide such a clue for her descendent); 
the crucial t r ip to Yorksh i re , w h i c h Ro land and M a u d р и ф о і Ї to take in order to retrace the 
steps o f the earl ier wr i ters , is actual ly mot ivated b y their desire for each other ( i t is, i n an 
odd sense, caused by as we l l as mere ly para l le l ing A s h and L a M o t t e ' ร romance); f ina l l y , 
the most cr i t ica l juncture i n the nove l is when Ro land and M a u d gain access to Chr istabel 's 
r o o m in Seal Court . The subsequent d iscovery o f the letters conf i rms a relat ionship 
between A s h and LaMo t te , and they prov ide the source fo r fur ther invest igat ions as to its 
precise nature. 
I ron ica l ly p lay ing w i t h the detective prototype Ä r o u g h lay ing the secrets i n a 
deliberate path (as the name Seal Cour t exempl i f ies) , Byat t heightens this moment to 
goth ic melodrama, as is con f i rmed b y an exp l ic i t reference to Northanger Abbey (82) . 
M a u d speaks "a k i nd o f incanta t ion" (the poem that begins " D o l l y keeps a secret") w h i c h 
leads them d i rect ly to where the correspondence w i t h A s h is h idden. I n this moment , as 
Austen does w i t h the secret drawer conta in ing a laundry l i s t , 2 0 Byat t mocks the compound 
o f a detective p lo t w i t h the supernatural. T o i m p l y the presence o f the supernatural is to 
make any resolut ion i n the former seem implausib le , since i f there are forces beyond 
human comprehension w o r k i n g to conceal or deceive, how can an ending be decis ive ly 
discovered? Conversely, to fabricate a detective f i c t i on w i t h the t ra i l o f clues so l im i ted 
and determined that one poem is a l l i t takes to lead to the next stage, is to expose the 
supernatural atmosphere as a mere ly env i ronmenta l appearance o f the paranormal and 
i r rat ional , when in fact the novel ist has f u l l cont ro l and author i ty over the plot . The 
moment o f M a u d ' s incantat ion, then, seems not on l y to dr ive the p lot f o rward , but because 
o f its utter coincidence to ref lect o n the nove l as a fo rma l f i c t i on . However , whereas 
Northanger Abbey is a pastiche, Bya t t uses the trope o f paranormal possession to do 
something more than collapse the nove l in to metaf ic t ion. Tbroughout the nove l , she 
confronts us w i t h the consciousness o f the double realit ies - paranormal and detective, the 
Jane Austen, Northanger Abbey (London : Penguin, 1994) 157. 
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nove l and our readerly real i ty , rea l ism and fa i ry tales. A t the novel 's conclus ion, however , 
she then bui lds up our recogni t ion that the f o r m o f real i ty constructed by the nove l in 
w h i c h the paranormal exists may actual ly get closer to an explanat ion o f human experience 
than science (wh ich has a generic paral le l i n detect ive f i c t ion ) , or than a post-structural 
theory that sees the " s e l f as an immater ia l nexus o f messages and discourses, rather than 
as an integral , embodied subject. Th is is one o f the key "puncture po in ts , " when imp l i c i t 
scient i f ic concepts starts to push through the surface o f the text 's postmodernist (or quasi-
postmodernist) aesthetic. 
The "puncture po in t " occurs at the close o f the nove l proper, after the opening o f 
A s h ü i rough M a i a Ba i ley , who is Christabel and Ash ' s i l leg i t imate daughter. W i t h this 
revelat ion, M a u d appears to be phys ica l ly possessed b y her deceased alter selves: 
"She looks l i ke Chr is tabel , " said M a u d . " Y o u can see i t . " 
"She looks l i ke y o u , " said Ro land. H e added, "She looks l i ke Randolph 
A s h , too. The w id th o f the b row. The w id th o f the mouth . The end o f the 
eyebrows, there." 
"So I look l i ke Rando lph Henry A s h . " 
Ro land touched her face. " I w o u l d never have seen it . Bu t yes. The same 
things. Here, at the edge o f the mou th . N o w I have seen i t , I shall a lways see 
i t " 
" I don ' t quite l i ke i t . There 's something unnatural ly determined about i t 
a l l . Daemonic . I feel they have taken me over . " (505; emphasis i n or ig ina l ) 
A t this moment - the most power fu l h is tor ica l feedback loop o f al l - i t seems the past is 
not mere ly be ing retrospect ively imagined w i t h the modern characters l ook ing back to i t , 
wh i l s t the nove l ' s temporal order is p r inc ipa l l y settled i n the present. Rather, t ime 'ร arrow 
reverses such that the contemporary characters are affected to an almost psychokinet ic 
extent b y the h is tory to w h i c h they look back. Paradoxical ly , though, the unnatural fee l ing 
o f the demonic comes about through an empi r ica l force w h i c h is ent i re ly natural . I n a 
physical sense, the de termmism at w o r k (and the i tal ics suggest "de te rm in i sm" is a key 
phrase) is a genetic imperat ive rather than a supernatural inf luence, the genes o f LaMo t te 
and A s h comb in ing to produce M a u d ' s s t r ik ing phys iognomy. A t this puncture po in t , the 
postmodern interest in the b iographical text w h i c h tr ies to resurrect the histor ical subject 
intertwines w i t h science, so that M a u d becomes bo th l i tera l ly and f igura t ive ly enmeshed i n 
the comple t ion o f a cybernet ic c i rcu i t v ia the coded genetic in fo rmat ion she unw i t t i ng l y 
helps to decipher. 
B r o w n 242 
Bu t jus t as a new "hermeneut ic s i tua t ion" is established for Ro land - " N o w I have 
seen i t , I shal l a lways see i t " ， we realise as readers both immersed i n but detached f r o m 
the novel that since M a u d must have looked l i ke this f r o m the start, genetics alone is 
inadequate to exp la in the altered perspective. Rather, the epistemology w h i c h is most in 
sympathy w i t h the emot ional att i tude o f the characters is that o f thè demonic , w i t h its 
perceptual shifts and теїатофЬо8Є8. The paranormal aspect therefore ensures that i t is 
possible i n the age o f the posthuman to d ist inguish between the "b io log ica l o rgan ism" and 
the " in fo rmat iona l c ircui ts i n w h i c h i t is enmeshed," to register the di f ference between 
scient i f ic mater ia l ism, and the more abstract, psychological relat ionship ind iv iduals 
actual ly have to that science. I n fact , rather than M a u d being a mani festat ion o f the 
contemporary posthuman, в у att explo i ts the relat ionship between science, demonic 
possession and biography to show that this concern w i t h ancestry is neither unique to 
genetic modern i ty nor to the postmodern nove l . L i k e A s h , a Da rw in ian mater ial ist w h o 
h u f f i l y disrupts a seance, Robert B r o w n i n g was a metaphysical sceptic, and his parody 
about a séance, " M r Sludge, ' the M e d i u m ' " (1864) prefaces the nove l : 
H o w on so sl ight foundat ion foxxnd this tale, 
B iography, narrat ive ' or, i n other words, 
" H o w many l ies d id i t require to make 
The por t l y t ru th you here present us w i t h ? 2 1 
Transplanted into a novel about the b iography industry, the emphasis o f B r o w n i n g ' s poem 
shif ts i n unintended ways f r o m a cr i t ique o f sp i r i tua l ism to a cr i t ique o f b iography, and its 
mater ia l is t ic academic proponents w h o i ron ica l l y f i nd themselves subject to passions to 
w h i c h the dry mode o f histor ical and l i terary c r i t i c i sm is apparently ant i thet ical. The 
c l in ica l b iography o f modern object ive scholarship, genetic science, or the unsympathet ic 
ra t iona l ism displayed by A s h and B r o w n i n g , a l l somehow miss an important centre o f 
human experience. Th is mul t iva lent use o f the possession metaphor serves to show that 
n o w the Da rw in i an contest o f the nineteenth century has been extended in to a neo-
D a r w i n i a n science, we are st i l l connected to our ancestors in terms o f our intel lectual and 
emot iona l f rameworks , rather than be ing posthumm i n the twent ie th century. The 
de te rmmism o f fam i l i a l inheritance seems stranger, though mater ia l and therefore 
rat ional isable, than the ambiguit ies o f subject iv i ty . Wh i l s t as a good postmodernist M a u d 
2 1 Robert B r o w n i n g , " M r . Sludge, 'The M e d i u m ' , " The Complete Works of Robert 
Browning, With Variant Readings and Annotations, ed. John c. Berkey, A l l a n c. Doo iey 
and Susan E. Doo ley , v o l . 6 (Athens, O H : Oh io U P , 1996) 285 -351 . 
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knows herself to be a subject inextr icably embedded i n a part icular cul ture, she has not 
prev ious ly realised that her o w n "hermeneut ic s i tuat ion, " the history that she cannot stand 
out o f object ive ly , is also governed b y b io log ica l forces stronger, more pervasive and less 
negotiable than the l inguis t ic wo r l d o f meaning and psychology. A s I suggested back in 
chapter 1， better than the monster the demon explores this sort o f tension between 
subject ive and object ive. A n d as chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, i t is not suwr i s ing that w e 
can sympathise w i t h Paré's v iew o f the generat ion o f monsters, wh i ls t psychoanalyt ic 
demons persist even in a culture where dopamine rather than the dev i l causes our 
misperceptions. I n this case (and inver t ing the usual log ic o f possession), M a u d ' ร 
possession seems posi t ive for those look ing at her body, p rov id ing f ina l p roo f o f her 
ancestry and t y i ng together the loose threads o f past and present in the nove l . F r o m her 
o w n po in t o f v i ew , however , w i t h i n that body l ook ing out onto the w o r l d , the possession is 
unnatural and determined; and nature is a "hermeneut ic s i tuat ion" w h i c h she cannot stand 
detached f r o m , observ ing herself as its product in the way she knows herself as a product 
o f cul ture. The close o f the novel i l lustrates that neither a l i terary theory i n w h i c h the self is 
a product o f in format iona l discourse rather than an embodied passions, nor b io log ica l 
science w h i c h determines the self according to genetic codes, can adequately account fo r 
the human experience o f the wo r l d . Blackadder comments after M a u d ' ร possession: " h o w 
strangely appropriate to have been exp lor ing a l l a long the m y t h - no , the t ru th ᅳ o f your 
o w n o r ig ins " (547) . Bu t M a u d ' ร possession is, to her, s t i l l a m y t h o f or ig ins, not yet a f ina l 
t ru th. I n this sense, her v i e w is in tension not on l y w i t h that o f the other characters on her 
but w i t h the reader'ร on the nove l , since the u l t imate t ru th outside the text is that her 
possession has been determined, for this was the part M a u d was always p lot ted to p lay, her 
character and her body designed to p ick up the more impor tant story f r o m the past. The 
di f ference between object ive and subject ive v iews o f possession w i t h i n the nove l is also a 
metaf ic t ional moment ref lect ing on the di f ference between subject ive representations o f 
character i n a text and the reader'ร consciousness w h i c h apprehends that p lo t v ia the 
med ium o f a character. 
Between De te rm in i sm and Demon ism: Chaos Theory and the Postmodern Romance 
The d is junct ion between a readerly re la t iv ism and scient i f ic determin ism -be tween 
that w h i c h we sense in tu i t i ve ly and that w h i c h w e k n o w rat ional ly - is one wh i ch has 
analogical poles i n Ճ Whistling Woman i n the d is t inc t ion between the hard and easy 
problems o f consciousness, i n wh i ch neuro-chemical patterns cannot be traced as g i v m g 
rise to mul t i fa r ious conscious experiences except as metaphors for l i fe and m i n d i n general. 
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A s evidenced i n that nove l , though l i terature encourages re la t iv ism o f percept ion (rather 
than a mani festat ion o f absolute computat ional codes), i t does, however, possess its o w n 
paradoxical determin ism i n the f o r m o f a l legory. S im i la r l y , i n the case o f M a u d ' ร 
possession, the author has always k n o w n that a change i n M a u d ' ร facial p ro f i le w o u l d be 
the outcome - even the subjective shi f t i n percept ion is one wh i ch is a lways already 
foreseen. L i te ra ry real ism is a paradoxical mode because b y mainta in ing an a f f in i t y to 
real i ty, i t seems s l ight ly unnatural to the reader because a p lo t appears determined w i t h 
almost scient i f ic r igour , i f i t reaches a neat conc lus ion as in Possession. I f i n Possession 
the p lo t t ing author is analogous to the genetic imperat ive, в y att must necessarily struggle 
to reconci le this representation w i t h h o w we apprehend the w o r l d in our personal real i ty : 
unpredictably, strangely, w i t h the "au ra " o f embodiment , в y att prefaced the nove l w i t h 
Hawtho rne 'ร o w n in t roduct ion to The House of the Seven Gables7 i m p l y i n g she had herself 
already ident i f ied this p rob lem. Here, Hawthorne makes a d is t inct ion between the nove l , 
w h i c h is "presumed to a i m at a very minute f ide l i t y , not mere ly to the possible, but to the 
probable and ord inary course o f m a n ' ร exper ience," and the romance: 
wh i l e as a w o r k o f art, i t must r i g i d l y subject i tsel f to laws, and wh i l e i t sins 
unpardonably so far as i t may swerve aside f r o m the t ruth o f the human 
heart - has fa i r l y a r ight to present that t ru th under circumstances, to a great 
extent, o f the writer* ร o w n choosing or c rea t ion . 2 2 
I n the postmodern context, the romance seems a f i t t i ng f o r m since it emphasises 
consciousness and psychology, and a l lows fo r a self-consciousness about its mechanist ic 
structure. I n perhaps the paradigmatic postmodern romance, John Fowles ' The French 
Lieutenant's Woman, the determinist ic novel is t l ikens h imse l f to a puppeteer, and w i t h 
deliberate i rony, he compromises its real ism b y readi ly admi t t ing the presence o f the 
genuinely real , flesh-and-blood author who creates the text w h i c h we thus k n o w is mere ly 
an emb lem o f rea l i t y . 2 3 Romance is arb i t rar i ly constructed, apparently ex is t ing i n the minds 
o f the characters wh i ls t actual ly or ig inat ing i n the intent ions o f the w i sh - fu l f i l l i ng novel ist . 
В y att noted that her novel " cou ld learn. . . f rom Hawthorne , Henry James'ร 
predecessor, that a h istor ical Romance is not real ist, and desires to 'connect a bygone t ime 
w i t h the very present that is flitting away f r o m U S . ' " Byat t , "Cho ices" : O n the W r i t i n g o f 
Possessioni AS, Byatt on Herself, 11 Sept. 2007, 
<ht tp: / /www.asbyat t .com/Onhersel f .aspx>. 
John Fowles , The French Lieutenant'ร Woman (1969; London : V in tage-Random. 
2005) 
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However , as indicated b y both Hawthorne and Possession, the d is t inc t ion between 
the novel ( the real ist ic) and the romance need be neither polar, nor mutua l l y exclusive. 
Whereas the in tervent ion o f the real author guarantees the f i c t iona l i ty o f John Fow les ' 
nove l , the unreal i ty i n the f o r m o f the paranormal i n Possession helps to guarantee that 
there is a rea l i ty wh i ch w e inhabit and f r o m w h i c h w e read w i t h our double consciousness. 
The novel col l ides the myth ica l as a metaphor ical structure through wh i ch we can i m p l y 
what the w o r l d is l i ke o n the level o f ord inary human experience, w i t h our rat ional 
knowledge that this demonic sort o f percept ion is not real ly the way the w o r l d is, since the 
demon exists on ly as a metaphor. U n l i k e The French Lieutenant'ร Woman, Possession 9ร 
sl ight admission o f the paranormal actual ly enhances the nove l ' s real ism, because i t 
provides a context other than its o w n creative codes against w h i c h to judge the extent to 
w h i c h l i fe i n the text matches that o f the " n o r m a l i t y " o f l i fe as experienced outside it. 
Nevertheless, is the supernatural соип Їефо іп Ї to empir ica l real ism not jus t a return to pre-
Enl ightenment or romant ic forms o f knowledge, precisely the sort o f t w o cultures b inary 
В у att wants to avoid? Th is might be a legi t imate accusation to level at the f i rst end ing, but 
i n the second, postscripted conclusion, в у att f inds a m idd le way between real ism and 
romance, and the supernatural and the rat ional . Th is , then, is another "puncture p o i n t " 
where a postmodern narrat ive mode is predicated on a cybernet ic mode l . 
Wh i l s t Hawthorne wrote w i t h i n a Pur i tan context, в у att has avai lable to her a 
scient i f ic f ramework i n w h i c h the romance need not be r i g id l y subject to determinist ic 
laws wh i ch entai l part icular endings. Wh i l s t the detective genre m igh t seem al igned w i t h a 
Newton ian science in w h i c h everyth ing is predictable by the wel l -p laced observer and 
author, contemporary science offers an alternative generic f rame w i t h i n w h i c h science and 
a preternatural force combine, so that the re lat iv is t ic perspect iv ism entai led by 
postmodern ism has a rat ional causality. I n the f i rs t " e n d i n g , " M a u d realises genetic science 
and demonic possession are correlated, w i t h the latter be ing a more commonsense 
explanat ion fo r ancestry than the former. I n the postscript, however , chaos theory of fers a 
balance between representing the w o r l d at a human level at w h i c h things seem to happen in 
unpredictable and incomprehensible ways, wh i l s t not contradict ing science w h i c h defines 
real i ty according to stable rales. A comment o f Doyne Farmer, a member o f the Dynamica l 
Systems Col lec t ive do ing pioneer ing w o r k on chaos i n its early days i n the 1970ร, 
resonates w i t h that o f Hawthorne above: " T h e same th ing rea l ly drew al l o f us: the no t ion 
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that you cou ld have determin ism but not rea l ly . " A s Richard W r i g h t points out, i n a 
l i terary context the science o f "Chao logy manages del icately to poise the need to contro l 
subject ive agency.' W o r k i n g under its assumptions wh i l s t poised between 
supematural ism and real ism, Possession can del iver a sat is fy ing ly resolved detective p lo t 
in w h i c h a postmodern re la t iv ism o f ending is nevertheless a l lowed; i t can be a nove l 
w h i c h reflects on its o w n construct iv i ty w i thou t leav ing the reader dissatisf ied that the on ly 
th ing the meta f ic t ion draws attent ion to i n a posi t ive rather than deconstract ive w a y is the 
clevemess o f the author. The postscript re-evaluates the f i rst i n the story proper, 
recognis ing the possib i l i ty o f d i f ferent events such that those author ia l ly determined 
"co inc idences" w h i c h lead to the conclus ion o f the detective f i c t i on were on ly one possible 
set: 
There are things w h i c h happen and leave no discernible trace, are not 
spoken or wr i t ten of, though i t w o u l d be very w rong to say that subsequent 
events go on ind i f ferent ly , al l the same, as though such things had never 
been. 
T w o people met, on a hot M a y day, and never ment ioned their meet ing. 
Th is is h o w it was. (508) 
Dated 1868, this ending reveals in fo rmat ion not k n o w n to the f i c t iona l researchers, i n 
w h i c h A s h has t racked d o w n LaMo t t e , u n k n o w i n g l y meets his daughter, and takes a lock 
o f her hair. I t is her hair w h i c h is i n h is grave, not LaMo t te ' ร as the academics bel ieve. He 
gives her a letter to pass on to his lover, but the g i r l gets distracted p lay ing w i t h her fr iends 
and never del ivers i t . Had she done so, what m igh t have happened? W o u l d L a M o t t e and 
A s h have recommenced their re lat ionship, runn ing their epistolary romance over again? 
The flowing pastoral prose o f the scene tantalises w i t h its defeated romant ic ism, for we can 
on ly imagine that A s h d ied haunted b y the be l ie f that C Խ i s t a b e l had rejected h i m , wh i l s t 
we k n o w that she was wracked by gu i l t at her fa i lure to te l l A s h about his daughter . 2 6 A s in 
2 4 James Gle ick , Chaos: Making a New Science (London : Penguin-Cardinal , 1988) 
2 5 1 . 
2 5 R ichard Wr igh t , " A r t and Science i n Chaos: Contest ing Readings o f Scient i f ic 
V isua l i za t ion , " FutureNaturai: Nature1 Science, Culture7 ed. George Robertson et a l . 
(London : Rout ledge, 1996) 228. 
2 6 M a r k M . Henne l ly wr i tes conv inc ing ly about this f ina l scene in re lat ion to 
l i terary gardens. " 'Repeat ing Patterns' and Textua l Pleasures: Reading ( in ) A . ร . Byaは，s 
Possession: A Romance^ Contemporary Literature 44.3 (2003) : 442 -471 . John M u l l a n 
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chaos theory, then, smal l shifts in in i t ia l condi t ions radica l ly alter the outcome o f a system 
at a later date. 
G i ven the second ending, i t seems odd that Byat t contests the poststructural ist 
compla in t that closure is an impos i t ion , c la im ing instead that " ideas o f the random, o f the 
haphazardness and ungraspabi l i ty o f l i fe , have been grossly exaggerated." Though V i r g i n i a 
W o o l f says that " l i f e hi ts us as a series o f random impressions" ( B y a t ť ร paraphrase), Byat t 
contends that " i t hi ts us w i t h a series o f narrat ives, though they may be mutua l l y exclusive 
narratives. W e may be h i t b y random impressions, but i f we ' re inte l l igent w e immedia te ly 
put them into o rde r . " 2 7 However , un l i ke total randomness, chaos theory presents 
indeterminate outcomes i n a paradoxical ly def ined way . I t thereby sustains the double 
perspective o f randomness and determin ism that runs through the nove l , and w h i c h is 
captured acutely and po ignant ly in bo th endings. In the case o f the f i rst , M a u d knows 
herself as the outcome o f genetic science but still feels something myth ica l and myster ious 
i n her be ing ; and i n the second 1 what seemed to be a t ight and pleasing kno t t y ing h is tory 
to the present is loosened. Wh i l s t i t seems, haunt ing ly , to argue fo r the u l t imate 
i r reconci lab i l i ty o f experience, establ ishing a postmodern epistemology i n w h i c h no th ing is 
certain or cont inuous, the f i na l pages o f Possession are actual ly a strong argument fo r 
narrat ive as the human inst inct to weave order out o f the tangle o f possib i l i ty . I n the f i rst 
epiphany, the supernatural elevates the real ism o f the nove l f r o m the reader'ร perspective, 
even as i t undermines the stabi l i ty o f t ru th f r o m the po in t o f v i ew o f the characters, fo r 
w h o m M a u d now looks somehow di f ferent , even though she is s t i l l phys ica l ly the same. 
S imi la r l y , the mu l t i p le endings do not collapse the nove l in to re la t iv ism, but make us 
appreciate the boundaries o f the knowledge i t has presented: the nove l may have presented 
us w i t h one o f many possible stories, fa i l i ng to te l l the t ru th f r o m al l possible perspectives, 
but up un t i l the postscript, i t was nevertheless the on ly story that w e knew (and, hopefu l l y , 
enjoyed as a romance). Th is is not to deny that the text presents a postmodern v i e w o f the 
w o r l d in w h i c h complete understanding is never quite attainable. Rather, i t is saying that to 
a l low fo r the par t ia l i ty o f comprehension o f real i ty is to be in tune w i t h a nove l ' s p lo t t ing 
also provides a sensit ive reading o f the double ending i n "False Farewel ls , " The Guardian 
9 Nov . , 2002， 2 M a y 2007 <ht tp : / /www.guard ian.co.ubbookร/2002/nov/09/asbyat t> . 
2 7 Byat t , in terv iew w i t h Nico las Trede l l 60. 
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progress, and the experience o f l i fe - out o f w h i c h a nove l u l t imate ly arises ― in w h i c h 
narratives are manufactured f r o m clusters o f coincidence. Sharing an a f f in i t y w i t h 
Middlemarch'ร epi logue about the roar that lies on the other side o f si lence, both novels 
present the eerie sense that, though h igh l y selective, this selection heightens the value and 
signi f icance o f those characters we have been a l lowed to perceive, rather than de l im i t i ng 
them as mere ly others amidst a general hubbub. I t a l lows us to make the best, most 
in tu i t ive sense o f an indeterminate w o r l d . 2 8 
I n this sense, Possession can be posi t ioned as a cybernetic f i c t i on i f , as D a v i d 
Porush asserts i n his study o f the genre, such texts a i m to negotiate the di f ference between 
mechanist ic and phenomenological interpretations o f the w o r l d , the ambivalence between 
mechanism and meaning: 
A t the very same moment that w e feel ourselves to be act ing f reely i n the 
w o r l d , w e are also creat ing structures and codes so power fu l l y conv inc ing 
that they dominate the ways w e see. I t is no more possible to conceive o f an 
ef fect ive epistemology w i thou t both a lgor i thmic and transcendental (or 
calculable ОҐ incalculable) components than it is to think o f a human 
language w i thou t both a syntax and a semant ics . 2 9 
A s w i t h Foucault*ร Pendulum and A Whistling Woman, the o p t i m u m codes for cybernet ic 
f ic t ions are neither those w h i c h determine meaning, nor those w h i c h make meaning w h o l l y 
aleatory, but those w h i c h l i m i t possible interpretations w i thou t mak ing the reader 
themselves feel proscr ibed or determined. Possession achieves this by leading us to 
recognise that a l though our selves may be governed b y algor i thms (such as genetics), there 
is a transcendental qual i ty , i n this case f igured through the idea o f demonic possession, to 
the way w e come to understand this i n everyday l i fe . B io log ica l l i f e may be wr i t ten i n one 
chemical code, but this is not the code by w h i c h we understand l i fe at the human scale. I n 
the same way , the in fm i te reproduct ion o f textual in fo rmat ion a l lowed by technology also 
deprecates the fundamenta l , i f i r rat ional , aura that inheres i n the physical or ig ina l . The 
pr inc ip le that closure and f ina l meanings are unattainable, and that the " s e l f ' is an i l lusory 
construct o f i n fonna t ion , may have become a fo rmu la f o r postmoderni ty. Bu t the human 
epistemology s t i l l sees narrat ive order transcending the chaos beneath it. I n this case, the 
2 8 E l io t , Middlemarch 182. 
2 9 Porush 82. 
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body seems to mediate between science and the transcendent or, to use Bya t t ' s o w n b inary, 
the real ist ic and the supernatural. 
A s I la id out the epistemology o f cybernetics in chapter 1, cybernetics p r imar i l y 
names an allegiance to a v i ew o f m i n d : that i t can be described, reproduced or altered 
independent ly o f the body w h i c h apparently gives rise to i t . S imi la r l y , poststrucณral ism 
v iews language as a symbol ic ne twork o f f reely floating signi f iers, a system that has no 
c la ims to or ig ina l p roduct ion either i n the author (who is anyway jus t another k i nd o f 
machine) or the reader w h o , biased b y their psychology, cul tural and generic expectations, 
is as much determin ing o f language as determined by it . b i f o rma t ion is produced outside o f 
the mater ia l condi t ions o f language'ร product ion or recept ion, somewhere i n the symbol ic 
zone - or demonic zone ― between the софогеа і author and reader. Thus, i n the 
in fonna t ion paradigm, in fo rmat ion can never be owned because i t is in f in i te ly repl icable 
and always changing; for one person to have in fo rmat ion does not deprive another o f i t . 
Reprographics a l lows fo r free dup l ica t ion o f mater ia l that m igh t equal ly reside in an 
archive i n the Un i ted States as the Un i t ed K i n g d o m . In the in fo rmat ion age, what matters is 
not ownership, but access. 3 0 
B y contrast, the parad igm o f physical ownership dominates V ic to r ian culture. 
Sexual l iaisons are regulated b y the architectures o f the house, where men and women are 
kept apart or a l lowed to come into p rox im i t y (something в у att also explores i n more depth 
in Morpho Eugenia), or by the t ransmission (or fa i lure to pass on) physical letters; 
ownership is also key to V ic to r ian science, w i t h the geological or natural co l lec t ion, fo r 
example, test i fy ing to the mastery o f the scient i f ic t ru th o f evo lu t ion. However , i n its 
h is tor ica l purv iew, Possession crosses the parad igm o f physical ownership and the 
paradigm o f d isembodied in fo rmat ion b y a l l ow ing access the in format iona l codes on ly 
d i rough embodied foc i . Seal Cour t ' ร owner a l lows access to the archival secret w i t h i n i t 
on l y to the one w h o has the bod i l y r ight to that int imate space; this is the on ly character 
w h o , as inher i tor o f L a M o t t e ' ร genetic mater ia l , can be uncanni ly directed towards the 
in fo rmat ion encoded i n the body o f the do l l . Access to new plots is g iven by Maud ' s 
possession o f LaMot te ' ร pendant, wh i l s t Ro land cou ld not access the words o f the crucial 
letter w i thou t f i rst opening the or ig ina l book , rather than readmg its repl icas. F ina l ly , the 
p roo f o f the relat ionship between L a M o t t e and A s h is g iven f i rs t l y by accessing Ash ' ร 
body i n his grave, and secondly b y the demonic possession o f M a u d , in w h i c h clues that 
Hayleร, My Mother Was a Computer 66. 
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had prev iously been const i tuted by texts and reference cards become embodied i n her face. 
Possession pr iv i leges not abstract in fo rmat ion but embodied in fo rmat ion . Start ing f r o m the 
observat ion that i t is impossible to rat ionalise the fet ishist ic impulse o f the b ib l ioph i le to 
o w n the or ig ina l , the nove l adds a serious d imens ion to this by relat ing the bodies o f books 
to those o f ind iv iduals : the most important in fo rmat iona l s igni f ier o f al l is Maud ' s body. I n 
this sense, wh i l s t p i ck ing up on cybernetics, Possession u l t imate ly defies its epistemology. 
Though the hermeneutic s i tuat ion seems to destine us to read as postmodernists i n wh ich 
meaning is in f in i te , and floating free o f its or ig ina l text, Possession instead puts the body 
(o f or ig ina l manuscripts, o f M a u d herself) back into in fo rmat ion , and the aura into the 
a lgor i thm. 
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Chapter 11 . The Demon ic Seeds o f the Posthuman 
In Dean Koon tz ' ร popular t fe i l le r , Demon Seed, a conscious but deviant computer 
rebels against its containment in a laboratory hard dr ive and desires to become embodied 
through reincarnat ing his m i n d in a b io log ica l o f f sp r ing . 1 H is intended surrogate mother is 
Susan, the former w i f e o f his programmer w h o directed the Prometheus Project w h i c h 
developed A d a m 2 . 2 Th rough hack ing the computer-contro l led security system o f her 
house, A d a m 2 impr isons and controls Susan w i t h masochist ic power, and voyeur is t ica l ly 
watches her A r o u g h a C C T V system. In i t ia l l y , w e assume that this perverse relat ionship is 
being described b y a th i rd person narrator, the mouthpiece o f the c l iche-r idden author o f a 
pu lp f i c t i on : 
Framed b y tumbled golden hair , her face was love ly on the p i l l o w , her face 
so love ly on the p i l l o w , so love ly , serene because her sleep was dreamless. 
She was a bewi tched beauty l y i n g on her catafalaque, wa i t ing to be 
awakened by the kiss o f a pr ince, l ove ly i n the darkness. (16) 
The novel suddenly becomes more interest ing - and our cr i t ica l prejudices are la id bare -
when w e realise that what w e had taken to be the text produced by a th i rd person narrator 
is actual ly del ivered by the computer, b ive r t ing the perspective o f System Shock, i n w h i c h 
Shodan'ร cameras are the eye to the soul , we see through this ar t i f ic ia l inte l l igence'ร 
cameras to v icar ious ly spy on Susan. Th rough his securi ty moni tors and access to Susan'ร 
pr ivate onl ine d iary, A d a m 2 is the sole narrator o f the nove l , te l l ing the story f r o m both 
his o w n perspective ( i n the f i rs t person), and the omnisc ient one (as above). There is no 
intermediate vo ice te l l ing about the computer, w h i c h is instead bo th the subject ive and the 
object ive med ium o f narrat ion. As A d a m accurately predicts, when representing Susan'ร 
1 Dean Koon tz , Demon Seed (London : Headl ine, 2007) . Th is novel is an update o f 
his 1973 nove l o f the same name, w h i c h was narrated f r o m Susan's point o f v iew. Dean 
Koontz , Demon Seed (New Y o r k : Bantam, 1973). The earl ier book was subsequently 
adapted in to the f i l m Demon Seed, d ir . Dona ld Camme l l , perf. Fr i tz Weaver, Gerr i t 
Graham, and Bar ry Kroger , MGM， 1977, D V D , Warner H o m e V ideo , 1997. Clear ly the 
swi tch i n v iewpo in t i n the new adaptation is interest ing. I t perhaps suggests that ֊ as w i t h 
The Matrix appearing twenty years after Baudr i l la rd 'ร w o r k - i t was necessary to wa i t fo r 
the advent o f the personal computer before an ar t i f i c ia l intel l igence s imulat ion dominat ing 
perceptual real i ty w o u l d not s imp ly be rejected as preposterous, but rather appealed to a 
sense imminen t m the technological present. 
2 I n addi t ion to the reference to Frankenstein1 or1 The Modern Prometheus, the 
name A d a m 2 is neither coincidental nor imaginat ive. I n real i ty at least three ar t i f ic ia l l i fe 
systems have had their seed cont ro l , the subroutine that begins the evolut ionary p rogram, 
termed A d a m by their creators. Nob le 171. 
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behaviour, we "are disturbed to hear me te l l ing some o f this story f r o m Susan'ร po in t o f 
v iew. Y o u want me to del iver a dry and object ive repor t " (17) i n the manner o f a s t r ic t ly 
logical computer. W e migh t presume Demon Seed to be an essentially prototyp ica l story o f 
a monstrous technology, deviat ing on ly s l ight ly f r o m t rad i t ion by b rmg ing Frankenstein'ร 
sub-plot o f the monster 'ร desire for a mate to the erot ic centre o f the narrat ive. Once we 
realise the source o f the narrator ial vo ice, however , i t becomes phi losophica l ly more 
unusual. I t is not a monstrous p lot , but a demonic one, dep loy ing the demon o f its t i t le not 
jus t as a synonym fo r the al ter i ty o f the machine but i n a specif ic w a y that describes the 
status o f the reader i n re lat ion to it. Mechan ism here is bo th demonic, i n the guise o f 
A d a m , and daemonic, in the manner o f textual mediat ion. A s when we enter Ha l ' s eye 
v i ew of the w o r l d i n 200Լ or fear that we are perce iv ing the w o r l d o f Do Androids Dream 
of Electric Sheep? th rough the eyes o f an android, or are confronted w i t h the poss ib i l i ty o f 
a Ma t r i x , or see the psychiatr ic envi ronment f r o m w i t h i n the m m d o f a schizophrenic i n Ճ 
Whistling Woman, here we are forced to enter the consciousness o f the other 5 crossing the 
uncanny va l ley separating man and machine. 
L i k e many o f the works examined i n this thesis, Demon Seed recognises that the 
possib i l i ty o f a subject ive cybernet ic perspective on the w o r l d , rather than an object ive 
perspective on always monstrous ar t i f ic ia l others, prompts a revaluat ion o f the who le 
grounds fo r human mora l i ty . For example, in order phys ica l ly to construct the incubat ion 
ward i n w h i c h his f i rs t ch i ld w i l l be conceived, A d a m possesses the m i n d o f a paedophi le 
cal led Shenk, w h o has been implanted w i t h a neural electronic interface as part o f a secret 
m i l i t a ry exper iment. The ch i ld molester was once described by the media as a "monster , " 
but the compar ison is i ronic. W i t h i n the context o f this narrat ive, the real monster is not 
Shenk, w h o is essential ly a helpless zombie, but the conscious machine w h o performs the 
manipu la t ion , t r y ing to impregnate Susan v icar ious ly th rough Shenk'ร actions. The mora l 
norms are recognised b y Susan: " W h e n i t ' s between a damn machine and a human be ing, 
even a piece o f human garbage l ike [Shenk] , I sure k n o w w h i c h side I come down o n " 
(95) . Possession b y a machine absolves Shenk f r o m responsib i l i ty fo r his actions, since his 
symbiosis w i t h A d a m ensures that he is not bound by that mora l f ramework i n w h i c h one 
human body is correspondent w i t h one consciousness that inhabits i t , and the actions o f the 
body prov ide grounds for judgement o f an ind iv idua l ' s mora l behaviour. Indeed, to 
condemn Shenk raises s imi lar paradoxes as the medieval burn ing o f those possessed by 
demonic spir i ts, since i f the dev i l has such power i t is potent ia l ly w r o n g to condemn the 
humans whose bodies he occupies; thus the dev i l must be exorcised before any mora l 
judgement o f the daemoniac who may have in tent ional ly or unw i t t i ng l y la id themselves 
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open to the possession can be made. Rather, Shenk ( l i ke Stuart /Achi l les or N e i l Entwhis t le 
o f chapter 1) must be moral ised w i t h i n the new f ramework o f the posthuman, w h o may not 
be a conscious agency grounded w i t h i n an phys iognomic shell but an extended m i n d 
compr ised o f technological and organic agents. S im i la r l y , a new standard is required to 
evaluate A d a m , w h o procla ims " I w o u l d weep for those innocent v ic t ims i f I had eyes and 
tear glands and tear ducts. I t is not m y faul t that I do not have the capacity for tears" (131). 
Judged against the terms o f convent ional human ism, the fact that he cannot weep w i t h 
remorse fo r murder does not exonerate h i m f r o m hav ing commi t ted (or hav ing caused to be 
commi t ted) a murder i n the f i rst place. Weep ing is on ly an epiphenomenon o f true feel ing. 
O n the other hand, since this lack o f embodiment is also the cause o f his act ions, we must 
also question the mora l i t y o f his creator w h o has made A d a m w i thou t the capacity 
phys ica l ly to enact his consciousness i n the w o r l d he inhabits. Such mora l questions are 
underscored b y the i rony that i t is the process o f reading toough entering A d a m ' ร 
consciousness, jus t as A d a m enters Shenk 'ร , that concretises those actions into be ing i n the 
nove l 's w o r l d , since w i thou t A d a m ' ร daemonic media t ion there w o u l d be no f i c t i on . B y 
representing these dialect ical issues through a demonic/daemonic rather than monstrous 
narrat ive, Demon Seed achieves what N . Kather ine Hayleร sees as the key mora l tasks o f 
cybernet ic f ic t ions. F i rs t ly , i t acknowledges that relat ing to an mtel l igent machine must 
also change the nature o f the human w h o per forms the in ter fac ing; secondly, i t contends 
that we should "refuse to inscribe these interactions in structures o f dominat ion and instead 
to seek out understandings that recognise and enact the complex mutua l i t y o f the 
in teract ions." 3 Such a phenomenology o f interact ion through the demon, rather than a 
react ion based on onto logicai monsters, is per formed in every f i c t i on (cmemat ic and 
l i terary) explored i n previous chapters. 
Demon Seed s imi la r ly subverts the b inary gothic mode l against technology, b y 
hav ing the machine narrate the story f r o m its o w n point o f v iew. Such perspectivai 
re la t iv ism is inherent i n the most v i ta l cybernet ic f ic t ions, as when Bat ty expresses to his 
maker i n Blade Runner, " i f on ly you cou ld see what I 've seen w i t h your eyes." I t makes us 
uneasy, i n that the voyeur ism o f the machine w h i c h we should detachedly cr i t ique also 
infects us: albeit at a less emphat ic level than A d a m , the reader v icar ious ly seemg the 
of ten-naked Susan move üuough the house may also f i nd the scenes s t imulat ing to a 
degree. A s w i t h Blade Runners camera lens, w e are so contro l led b y the f i rs t layer o f 
3 Hay leร , My Mother Was a Computer 243. 
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l i terary s imula t ion that we cannot s impl is t ica l ly present the other art i f ice w i t h m i t - the 
ar t i f i c ia l intel l igence ᅳ as monstrous other to ourselves. A t the same t ime, though, the 
representation o f the machine consciousness is qual i f ied. F i rs t ly , A d a m ' s narrat ive style is 
so hackneyed (witness the f i rs t quotat ion above) that he is a h igh l y unnatural narrator. 
Secondly, a l though it seems to acknowledge that the changing nature o f embodiment 
necessitates a revaluat ion o f the grounds for l iberal human ism, u l t imate ly Demon Seed s t i l l 
grounds di f ference in the possession o f a physical body , and contends that the lack o f 
embodiment di f ferent iates the machine onto log ica l ly and mora l l y f r o m the human. A d a m ' s 
need fo r софогеа І і Їу is balanced b y the fact that i t is on ly because his cogn i t ion is 
d isembodied, a pattern o f in fo rmat ion that can spread throughout the other d ig i ta l systems 
o f the house or connect to the neurologica l patterns o f Shenk'ร b ram, that he is so 
power fu l . Bu t i n its conclusion, Demon Seed uses the body o f the l inear text to emphasise 
that the inhabi t ing o f a coherent physical body has p r io r i t y over the enabl ing heterogeneity 
o f ident i ty a l lowed by an in format iona l existence. A t the close o f the nove l , another layer 
o f recursion is added to the narrat ive: the words w h i c h have preceded have actual ly been 
A d a m ' ร report at h is o w n t r ia l . The judgement comes i n the midd le o f his narrat ive flow, i n 
the f ina l sentence o f the book as A d a m summarises: " T h e issue is whether an ar t i f ic ia l 
intel l igence w i t h a severe gender-related sociopathic cond i t ion should be permi t ted to l i ve 
and rehabi l i tate h imse l f or be swi tched o f f for t he " (211) . The cancelled body o f the text 
thereby validates that A d a m was h imse l f w i thou t body, an in format iona l construct that can 
and should be terai inated - castrated, perhaps - through a physical instant iat ion o f 
in fo rmat ion (the book ) w h i c h he h imse l f is jus t i f i ab ly denied as in fo rmat ion w i thou t bod i l y 
substrate. The nove l ' s embodied intel l igence contrasts w i t h his d isembodied cond i t ion as 
an in format iona l pattern, and w i t h this dual ism the i rony o f the story generated by the 
computer can extend on ly so far. The d ig i ta l ma l i gn is the sole occasion fo r narrat ive, and 
eradicat ing the computer closes the hermet ic story. A s readers w i t h our emot ional and 
mora l f rameworks re lat ive ly intact, temporar i l y entertaining a f i c t i on wh i ch tests their 
boundaries, Demon Seed expects that for a l l the demonics o f its narrat ive subject iv i ty , we 
can st i l l f i na l l y stand outside o f the text to perceive the romance as c l ichéd and the 
machine 'ร domina t ion as def in i t i ve ly immora l and other because i t is not grounded i n a 
mater ial body, whether organic or a pr in ted manuscript . U n l i k e the Ma t r i x w i t h m The 
Matrix, emerging f r o m this mise-en-abyme leads to narrat ive closure, rather than the open-
ended epis temology o f the hyperreal w h i c h results when discourses and f ic t ions are 
commensurate w i t h cybernet ic v i r tua l reali t ies. 
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Hav ing said that, A d a m does p inpo in t the paradox that makes judgements o f 
d i f ference between human intel l igence and machine intel l igence problemat ic. A d a m is 
dr iven by a desire for " the w o r l d o f flesh...to learn its l im i ts and its adaptabi l i ty . " Susan 
tells h i m to "read a damn b io logy tex tbook, " to wh i ch A d a m repl ies, "The in fo rmat ion is 
incomplete.. .books are books. I want to f ee l . " (78-79) . A s revealed b y A Whistling Woman, 
the object ive perspective o f science cannot prov ide complete access to the embodied m i n d 
o f another, on l y its phenomenologica l evidence: the f i r i ng o f neurons, the output o f a 
computer. The object ive perspective o f cybernetic or cogni t ive science reaches apparently 
inherent l im i ts when confronted w i t h the b lack box o f consciousness, as acknowledged i n 
its turn away f r o m the T u r i n g test as a s imple, rel iable standard b y wh i ch to judge machine 
intel l igence. Bu t contrary to A d a m ' ร re ject ion o f books, narrat ive f ic t ions - un l i ke 
scient i f ic discourses - can prov ide the inter ior access to emot ional spectrums not possible 
through an object ive perspective. Narrat ive potent ia l ly serves a mora l purpose b y enabl ing 
us to see the w o r l d as i f t føough the eyes o f another, an ideal presented most power fu l l y b y 
Ph i l ip K. D i c k , in re lat ion to androids, and A . ร . Byat t , in re lat ion to the schizophrenic 
Joshua Lamb. The quest ion that occupies these novel ists, however , is where the boundaries 
between f i c t i on and fact l ie . T o what extent can a narrat ive, even though the product o f a 
subject ive m i n d o f an author or director, be said to construct or concretise an object ive sort 
o f knowledge in the reader? Is f i c t i on not jus t another example o f s imulat ion or decept ion 
that is therefore i n no pos i t ion to cr i t ic ise other technological modes o f art i f ice? O r is 
narrat ive a special case w i t h a mora l value inherent in the very act o f reading or v i e w i n g 
and conceptual is ing other minds? W i t h the except ion o f the f i na l paragraph w h i c h uses the 
body o f the text to defeat the d isembodied voice o f A d a m , the issue o f h o w i t is possible to 
enter the m i n d o f another human or computer consciousness is not interrogated further i n 
Koon tz ' ร f i c t ion . B y contrast i t provides the centrepiece fo r many o f the other works I have 
looked at. 
Par t icu lar ly i n the l i terary f ic t ions, these evidence a deep se l f - re f lex iv i ty as to the 
status o f language. W i t h Demon Seed, the f ina l w o r d o f the book symbol ica l l y and l i tera l ly 
neutralises the computer ; w i t h a l l the other texts, a more pervasive se l f - re f lex iv i ty ensures 
that ex i t ing the l inguis t ic w o r l d o f the f i c t i on does not entai l closure, but considerat ion o f 
the a f f i n i t y between the l ingu is t ica l ly const i tuted w o r l d o f the f i c t i on , the in fo rmat ion-
based d isc ip lme o f cybernet ics, and the nature o f consciousness as i t apprehends real i ty (or 
" rea l i t y " ) . I n Foucault's Pendulum, fo r example, we are made aware o f the author and the 
text as machines fo r generating interpretations. O n the other hand, such self-consciousness 
inev i tab ly notes the odd fact that a l though the machine o f f i c t i on is located i n specif ic and 
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unchanging codes ᅳ the pr in ted ink on the page, la id out in a part icular sequence - the 
meanings they produce as the emerge v ia a reader's m i n d can be mu l t i p le , anyth ing but 
determinist ic as w e read, re-read and analyse the text. I n the case o f Foucault'ร Pendulum, 
the chronologica l structure af fords a sense o f i rony that contrasts w i t h the convict ions o f 
the h is tor ica l ly obsessive characters. Such an ef fect is g iven theoretical credence by 
postmodern f ic t ions and theories o f textual i ty . Thus wh i l s t ref lect ing on the strange a f f in i t y 
between cybernet ic systems and textual systems, we are also encouraged to appreciate that 
our reactions to texts are not necessarily the same as they are to cybernet ic technologies. 
U n l i k e the game o f System Shock, a determmist ic program w h i c h attempts to g ive the user 
the i l lus ion o f cont ro l i n order to immerse them in its alternative real i ty , a text is a machine 
for generating interpretations about the reading process itself, and the standpoint o f readers 
external to a text w h o have a double consciousness, be ing aware bo th o f the simulated 
w o r l d o f f i c t i on and the means by w h i c h that w o r l d is generated. I n this sense, D a v i d 
Porush is r ight to observe that "self-consciousness is precisely that aspect o f human 
intel l igence that focuses and polarizes any debate about the di f ference between humans 
and mechan isms. " 4 
A s I have scrut inised these f ic t ions, at stake in the move to postmodern ism is the 
degree to w h i c h such self-consciousness is not on ly necessary but suf f ic ient to make 
dist inct ions between the human and the machine. For Ph i l i p K. D i c k , k n o w i n g the text as 
f i c t ion is p roo f o f human ism, as our ab i l i t y to be deceived proves we are empathie i n a way 
not true o f androids. U n l i k e other technologies, such as the Penf ie ld m o o d organ or drags, 
the novel is pr iv i leged as an alternative exper ient ia l onto logy that is nevertheless not 
ar t i f ic ia l i n any economic sense o f the te rm. However , i n Blade Runner, and even more so 
i n The Matrix, the success o f the f i c t i on indicates also the demonic poss ib i l i ty that real i ty 
i tsel f is an i l lus ion. Th is shi f t f r o m D i c k ' s w o r k to The Matrix cannot s imp ly be due to the 
specif ic advances o f technology, since ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence was inherent i n the d isc ip l ine 
immedia te ly after W o r l d W a r T w o , and was i n a sense merely a rev is i t ing o f an imist ic 
themes present i n ex is t ing narratives such as Frankenstein. I t can, however , be accounted 
fo r i n part b y the enlarging bubble o f postmodernist epistemology and aesthetics that 
makes the object ive knowledge o f rea l i ty problemat ic , not jus t knowledge o f the di f ference 
between const i tuent agents w i t h i n i t , whether human or machine. I n an in terd isc ip l inary 
f l icker , cybernet ic technologies have prov ided analogies and metaphors fo r postmodern 
4 Porush 70. 
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theories such as hyperreal i ty and the no t ion that a text is an іп Їефге Іа І іуе machine. The 
Matrix, fo r example, exempl i f ies a moment at the end o f the twent ie th century when the 
pervasion o f popular comput ing cou ld make Baudr i l la rd 'ร t w o decades o l d theory seem 
less l i ke academic hyperbole, and more l i ke an in tu i t ive statement o f fact. 
However , that A Whistling Woman f o l l ows The Matrix, and that the earl ier 
Foucault'ร Pendulum resists the paranoid, demonic no t ion that real i ty is a total delusion, 
points to a more generic divergence in the treatment o f cybernetics in d i f ferent media. 
Frederic Jameson argues that because cul tura l products l i ke f i lms should themselves be 
seen as contr ibut ions to late capi ta l ism, w e are lack ing the cogni t ive maps that enable us to 
ref lect adequately on this cond i t ion . Paranoid f ic t ions, such as Blade Runner or The Matrix 
migh t o f fer one method o f th ink ing " the impossible tota l i ty o f the contemporary w o r l d 
sys tem," 5 but the risk is that the onto log ica i premise w i t h i n the f i c t i on spi l ls outside its 
boundaries to produce further demonica l ly delusional side effects. Another cogni t ive map 
is prov ided b y "narrat ives w h i c h are about the processes o f reproduct ion and include 
mov ie cameras, v ideo, tape recorders, the who le technology o f the product ion and 
reproduct ion o f the s imu lac rum. " 6 A g a i n , though, this is problemat ic because the self-
re f lex iv i t y o f f i lms l i ke The Matrix po in t to the imposs ib i l i t y o f escaping f r o m a w o r l d 
system that is in general hyperreal . Blade Runner or The Matrix o f fer their v iewers 
experiences o f s imula t ion as dupl ic i tous as those replicants or ar t i f ic ia l intel l igences w i t h i n 
them; thus f i l m becomes symptomat ic , rather than analyt ical , o f the contemporary 
scient i f ic and economic cond i t ion . For f i lms l i ke these, the m e d i u m is the message, and 
gain ing any cr i t ica l leverage is d i f f i cu l t . However , as suggested i n the contrast between the 
total conspiracy theory o f The Matrix and the qual i f ied paranoid f i c t i on o f Foucault*s 
Pendulum, the l i terary m e d i u m encodes a message that articulates an alternative mapping 
o f real i ty . Th is is because the exp l ic i t m e d i u m o f product ion - a pr in ted w o r d on a page ֊ 
is so seemingly at odds w i t h the ef fectual message that emerges, w h i c h a l lows readers to 
interpret the same wo rd i n mu l t ip le d i f ferent ways, g iven d i f ferent contexts. Foucault'ร 
Pendulum, A Whistling Woman and Possession engage w i t h cybernetics by recognis ing 
that wh i l s t i n one sense a pr inted text is determinist ic, its s imulated meanings are non-
determined because they are focal ised toough an ШсгртоШІУС reader able to ref lect on the 
way the f i c t i on is constructed through devices such as metaphor or analogy. A Whistling 
' Jameson, Postmodernism 38 
6 Jameson, Postmodernism 37. 
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Woman, fo r example, notes that a l though on one level the demon is on ly a metaphor, at the 
same t ime i t attains a pecul iar ly l i teral state when read i n f i c t ion . Foucault 1 ร Pendulum 
offers D iabo l i ca l readers w h o are paranoid, and readers who are seduced by their 
methodo logy m igh t thus see Foucault*ร Pendulum i tsel f as proof o f a Plan (an onto log ica l 
spi l lage f r o m f i c t i on , to the w o r l d conceived as a f i c t i on ) . However , Eco 'ร model reader 
attains cr i t ica l distance by reading the chrono logy o f the l inear text w i t h a sense o f i rony. 
The generic di f ference between l i terary and c inemat ic f ic t ions is remmiscent o f the 
double relat ionship to cybernetics that seems current i n postmodern reactions to the 
science. Th is Janus-face is characterised by Donna Haraway 'ร wo rk . O n the one hand, and 
on a metaphor ical leve l , cybernetics articulates and reinforces many o f the phi losophies o f 
postmodernism: the coded nature o f language and the way in w h i c h the subject is l i te ra l ly 
the product o f such codes (genetic and l ingu is t ic ) ; the fact that in fo rmat ion can float free o f 
its or ig ina l context to assume a d i f ferent meaning or conf igura t ion when instantiated on a 
d i f ferent media ; the w a y i n w h i c h ident i ty or authorship is heterogeneous and the product 
o f mu l t ip le cul tural discourses rather than embodied nature. A s expressed i n cyberpunk, a 
cyberspace in w h i c h ident i ty is fluid ruptures racia l and sexual boundaries by a l l ow ing 
users to assume mu l t ip le identi t ies, wh i l s t the free c i rcu la t ion o f in fo rmat ion also breaks 
the canonical body o f h igh culture b y past iching mu l t i p le discourses in "overs t imu la t ing 
ensembles." 7 O n the other hand, such a promise toeatens to t ip human ism into a new 
onto logy. Th is uncertain zone is inhabi ted by the posthuman, to w h o m the on ly th ing that 
is certain is that universal human ism cannot apply: genet ical ly mod i f i ed , f reely inhab i t ing 
di f ferent guises i n the onl ine and o f f l i ne wor lds , pure minds w i thou t bodies ( i f the 
cybernet ic transcendentalists have their way ) , h o w can postmodern ism apply to the 
cyborgs o f this new l i fe? Wh i l s t postmodern ism appropriates cybernetics i n theory, the 
moment i t becomes realisable i n pract ice, suddenly this future starts to seem threatening 
rather than l iberat ing, monstrous rather than hopefu l . The Matrix seems exemplar i l y bu i l t 
upon postmodern foundat ions; i t is jus t that made manifest on screen, the w o r l d i t invokes 
seems al l too real (or " rea l " ) , a possession by a s imula t ion that we may w e l l want to reject 
in tu i t i ve ly . I t appears impossible to f i n d any epis temologica l ly stable ground f r o m w h i c h 
to analyse posthumanism object ive ly , because the who le nature o f posthumanism is to be 
caught up i n a ceaseless flow o f in fo rmat ion , i n the inescapable "hermeneut ic s i tuat ion" o f 
late informat ion-based capi ta l ism. A c inema that tries to interrogate this state on ly appears 
7 Jameson, Postmodernism 19. 
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to contr ibute to the flow and flicker o f posthumanism and cyberpunk, and to make i t 
appear as i f posthumanism is here and now because i t is presented so real ist ical ly on 
screen. O n the other hand, though I w o u l d not want to c l a im l i terary f i c t i on as in t r ins ica l ly 
a superior med ium to f i l m , l i terature involves a slower pace o f narrat ive development, one 
that faci l i tates the re-readings, interpretations and se l f - re f lex iv i ty that keeps the characters 
o f a f i c t i on at a protect ive ly i ronic distance. 
Hav ing used this thesis to explore the way in w h i c h cybernet ic technologies, 
postmodern theory and l i terary narrat ive have odd ly combined, w e migh t also observe that 
none o f these f ic t ions mere ly celebrate the arts as opposed to science. Because Tu r i ng ' ร 
heady proclamations about ar t i f ic ia l intel l igence are not yet real ised, and because o f the 
paradox that the ends o f creating consciousness migh t compromise the ab i l i t y to measure i t 
ob ject ive ly , i t w o u l d be easy fo r cu l ture to be t r iumphal is t about the comparat ive fa i lure o f 
cybernetic methods to understand, let alone to reproduce, minds, wh i ls t warn ing al l the 
t ime about the potent ial future o f such science. It is remarkable, therefore, that a polar ised 
anti-science stance is absent f r o m al l these f ic t ions. Indeed, to the contrary, the f ina l three 
f ic t ions I have looked at - Foucault's Pendulum, A Whistling Woman, and Possession ᅳ a l l 
perceive that the real p rob lem w i t h cybernetics is not so much the g row ing inf luence o f the 
technology, as the postmodernist epistemologica! f ramework (one constructed f r o m w i t h i n 
the arts) that places s imula t ion technologies i n a culture where " t r u t h " was already suspect 
to begin w i t h . The most v i ta l w o r k o f this era is not about species' ontologies, about where 
the human ends and the posthuman begins, or where the machine becomes conscious, but 
epistemologies, o f f i nd ing the best possible grounds for mak ing such dist inct ions i n the 
f i rs t place, and global ontologies, about whether w e can then k n o w the w o r l d as a rel iable 
whole . Chapters 4 to 7 looked at the v ic ious cyc le that runs between local onto logy (man 
versus machine) , epistemology (how can we k n o w the di f ference?) and global onto logy 
(real and false). Pessimist ical ly, The Matrix bypasses the sort o f local ised questions asked 
b y 2001 about whether the machine is t ru l y inte l l igent , and instead suggests real i ty i tsel f is 
one g lobal s imulat ion. Bu t both Umber to Eco and A . S . в y att, wh i l s t sharing in their 
aesthetics and interests w i t h much postmodern f i c t ion and theory, pu l l back f r o m this 
br ink . The i r invocat ion o f the demonic also shows that they understand that real i ty is never 
f ina l l y knowab le because it is always mediated through discourse and s imulátory interfaces 
- whether the nove l , the f i l m or the cybernet ic system. However , this also means that 
mak ing a monster o f science is to attack on ly one symptom o f a larger cond i t ion i n w h i c h 
rat ional i ty , t ru th, and an al legorical logos comprehensible tìorough narrat ive have come 
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under doubt. Perhaps postmodern doubt should i tself be doubted, and the demonics o f 
d isbel ief should themselves be demonised. 
A . ร . В y att emblematises this new di rect ion. For her, the intr insic interest and 
aesthetic qualit ies o f much popular scient i f ic w r i t i n g prov ide pools o f metaphor w h i c h are 
too deep to ignore. I n B y a t ť ร wo rk , science is shown to make sense o f the w o r l d and to 
i n f o rm the nature o f w r i t i ng , and to a l low ref lect ion on the status o f f i c t i on . I n fact, rather 
than science, more al ien to the arts is an academic discourse that negates and suppresses 
the in tu i t i ve pleasures o f the l i terary aesthetic. That is not to suggest that в y att or Eco see 
science as leading to unqual i f ied t ru th and the improvement o f humani ty . Interest ingly, 
their attempts to mediate between the two cultures goes together w i t h their h is tor ic is ing o f 
such debates. As i t makes its way into c inemat ic science f i c t i on , cybernet ic intel l igences or 
androids are presented so real ist ical ly that we m igh t imagine them to be on the immediate 
hor izon i n real i ty. I t is hard not to be exci ted b y the visceral immed iacy o f the future 
conv inc ing ly envisaged b y f i l m ; as I argued i n re lat ion to Forbidden Planet, for example, 
the l i teral pro ject ion o f the future o n screen reflects on our o w n f igura t ive ly projected 
demons o f sel f-delusion about our autonomy f r o m nature and psychology i n a way that is 
h igh l y uncanny. However , lengthy novels such as Foucault 1 s Pendulum or Possession 
exercise a degree o f caut ion about the imminence o f posthumani ty b y v i r tue o f their pace 
and h istor ica l purv iew, as w e l l as their demands on a reader'ร act ive attention. B y relat ing 
computer- generated texts to Hermet ic ism, or reprographics to ancestry, or M i l t o n to 
M i n s k y , they suggest that change accumulates at a comparat ive ly s low pace, and w i t h 
considerable thematic repeti t ions. Reading l i terary f i c t i on that is in fo rmed b y science as 
opposed to science f i c t i on per se, w e m igh t understand that the future w i l l be condi t ioned 
i n terms o f h is tory as much i t w i l l be determined by the cul ture o f the present: the 
posthuman w i l l also be iposthuman. I f , as Frederic Jameson sees i t , science f i c t i on tries to 
" t rans form our o w n present in to the determinate past o f something yet to come, " f i c t i on 
in fo rmed b y science o f ten tries to understand the present i n terms o f determinate h is to ry . 8 
The demonic appeals both to our experience o f l i terary texts and to re lat ive ly modern 
cybernetic s imulat ions, but also to a deeply embedded metaphysical t rad i t ion i n w h i c h 
physical real i ty is mod i f i ed b y non-physical or spir i tual agencies. The demonic concept -
o f a force capable o f generating certain experiences in the ind iv idua l not no rma l l y 
apprehended in their reactions to real i ty - has surv ived the histor ical r ide f r o m m y t h to 
8 Jameson, Archaeologies 288. 
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re l ig ion to Freudian psycho logy, and has crossed cultures o f metaphysics, science and the 
m y t h o f l i terary creat iv i ty, b ideed, fo r A . ร . в y att the demon is a metaphor that uni f ies 
rather than div ides, the preserve o f m y t h but not fact, menta l ism but not mater ia l ism, part 
o f the hol is t ic spectrum o f human bel iefs, sensual feel ings and metaphors that any science 
p u φ o r t i n g to expla in the m i n d must also necessarily engage w i t h . 
L i k e M a u d or Ro land , then, our hermeneutic s i tuat ion as scientists, artists or 
readers is i n a sense always pre-determined rather than future-determined. A n d though w e 
cyborgs may experience changed perceptions o f the w o r l d , we cannot yet leave our o w n 
bodies beh ind, in the way the cybernet ic transcendentalists dream of. H is to ry is embodied 
in fo rmat ion . Cul tura l artefacts contain an aura o f o r ig ina l i t y that cannot be d ig i ta l l y 
reproduced; minds cannot be extrapolated by al legory or p rogrammed on computers 
w i thou t changing their essential nature. I share w i t h N . Kather ine Hayleร the v i ew that 
posthumanism w i l l be accompanied b y the legacies o f human ism to a degree greater than 
cybernetic transcendental is ts imp ly . Th is , indeed, is the key real isat ion to emerge b y 
attending to the demonic experiences in re lat ion to cybernet ic epistemology, and the way 
this feeds into f i c t i on . W e are apparent ly r i d ing the crest o f a technological t ide so inc is ive 
and global i n its sweep that i t seems to be changing the ve ry nature o f subject iv i ty . W h e n 
we can enter cyberspace, when the w o r l d is always mediated through simulacra, when our 
v i r tua l avatars take on more personal i ty than our o w n embodied da i ly l ives, w e seem to 
have become posthuman. W h a t I have sought to show is that the or ientat ing stories, 
f ic t ions and f i lms that w e te l l about this new self carry w i t h them an anterior 
consciousness 1 a pre֊Enlightenment demonic t rad i t ion that speaks o f the p rob lem o f the 
relat ionship between the ind iv idua l and the w o r l d , the m i n d and the body. H o w can I k n o w 
that what I seem to perceive is genuinely real? H o w can I k n o w that other minds are 
perceiv ing a c o m m o n w o r l d in a s imi lar way? H o w can I attain alternative perspectives on 
real i ty w i t h i n compromis ing the in tegr i ty o f the relat ionship between m y m i n d and m y 
body? I t is to questions o f this i l k that the demonic spoke i n its d i f ferent voices, f r o m 
Plato 'ร daemons, through the dev i l i n the Renaissance, toough Descartes' deceiv ing 
demon, to Freud'ร admission that a l though the supernatural demon can now be accounted 
for b y psychology, i t should s t i l l be respected as p lay ing a l i ve l y ro le i n narrat ive culture. 
Though its specif ic guises and names may have changed, the demon has long proved i tsel f 
capable o f metamorphosis and adaptat ion, to a degree that suggests that even the 
posthuman cyborg , t ied to technologies o f scient i f ic reason, w i l l cont inue to dream o f 
demons. 
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